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Abstract 
 
This dissertation asks how Dubai’s dream and position as a ‘global city’ impacts 
on and is impacted by the experiences of a migrant-majority population; and, 
simultaneously, how the operation of highly exclusionary citizenship regimes and 
everyday ideologies work to justify and rationalize social hierarchies. It explores the 
making of Dubai’s global, developmental trajectory through a multiplicity of dreams and 
temporalities as they shape urban landscapes and social hierarchies in the city. 
Methodologically, it operates through an understanding of the simultaneity of social 
scales, which allows, in part, for an examination of how the ‘everyday’ offers insight as a 
counterpoint to the spectacle of globality. Theoretically I argue that understanding the 
construction of particular subjectivities created through relational identity formation and 
processes of ‘Othering’ based on privilege and exclusion allows for a more complex 
understanding of the social, political, economic and imaginary realms through which we 
might challenge social hierarchies and the subsequent violence(s) they engender as 
somehow natural, inevitable, increasingly acceptable, and at times, necessary in the 
making of neoliberal globality. It is argued that migration is an integral and foundational 
aspect of Dubai’s development and global allure, illustrated by mapping the diverse 
routes that comprise geographies of migration to the city, while simultaneously 
‘unmapping’ the historical genealogies that accompany migrants on their journeys to the 
city. Together, these examinations allow us to trace histories of race, nationality, class 
and gender, operating at different scales, and in different forms and temporalities, to 
rationalize, normalize, and even, legitimize violent landscapes and hierarchies.  
 
Keywords: Dubai, global city, migration, citizenship, nationality, neoliberalism, 
race,  nationality, hierarchies of entitlement, othering, privilege, lived 
experiences,  ‘everyday’ narratives, and ideologies of ordering, genealogy, 
geography, imaginaries of the global.  
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Introduction  
Dubai’s Dream and Dubai Dreams 
Money connects us all. Everyone wants a decent life. A normal life. For some 
people those dreams become real, and for others they remain just that.  
A distant dream. (Rebecca, Egyptian) 
 
No labourers ever say they want to buy property here. That is a dream of expats. 
So this is just a shortcut to their dream [Back home]. (Mario, Egyptian)  
 
Dubai is a cow that we are all trying to milk. When the milk runs out, we will all 
move on. (Adonis, Canadian/Jordanian) 
 
In considering the Dubai dream, this study reflects on how the dream of living 
and working in Dubai is understood in a diversity of ways. Referenced to the idea of the 
‘American dream’, interviewees considered what a Dubai dream is, how it is created and 
methods of differentiation between sectors of the resident population. The most 
significant outcome of these reflections is the understanding that there is no single 
hegemonic dream that motivates all, but rather the overarching promise of Dubai 
articulated through diverse sets of dreams dependent on where one stands in the world.  
 
The American dream is still here… but in Dubai you are not dreaming of Dubai 
for your whole life. (Peter, Egyptian) 
 
It might be the same dream, but it is just different where you finally settle. You 
are here to build, to reach your dream in your home country. (Sara, Canadian).  
 
The American dream is somewhere people go and leave their country for the land 
of opportunity…  making money, raising children. Maybe you are a taxi driver, 
but your kid will be a doctor. In Dubai, you come for three years, leave and take 
your money, and move on to the next place… they come here to make money and 
leave. So the Dubai dream is just that. (Natasha, Emirati)  
 
Some of the most popular dreams of Dubai are promoted to the West, and the 
global North more generally, through tourism, popular media and the national 
government. These popular images often present Dubai through orientalist and 
infantilized representations, but always promote the city as decadent and desirable, a 
popular portrayal that is commonly referred to as ‘Brand Dubai’. As interviewees 
discussed, this dominant Dubai dream is an exclusive one, which can include living in a 
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penthouse, driving a luxury car, ordering 10,000 AED (United Arab Emirates Dirham) 
bottles at a club, having a young wife, having a maid and driver, access to luxurious 
yachts, hotels, restaurants, tax free salaries, gaining experience and career building for 
young professionals, golfing, ‘ladies that lunch’, year-long sunshine and beautiful 
beaches. Very simply, the dominant Dubai dream is based on a highly exclusive, 
excessive and capitalistic idea of ‘living the life’. Though this dream is made possible by 
the nightmarish living conditions and experiences of ‘Third World’ or poor, working 
class migrants, Dubai’s allure remains strong at both extremes of a historically 
embedded, globally infused, locally instituted social hierarchy. Through a critical, 
relational analysis, it will be shown that the creation and maintenance of ‘undesirables’, 
referred to here as ‘Others’, generates preferred subjects who are then able to live the 
dream that is the global city of Dubai. Importantly, it is necessary to recognize the ways 
that dreams of Dubai extend beyond the privileged world of ‘Western’ expats, Emirati 
citizens, or elites from the ‘second’ and ‘third’ worlds, to also shape the ambition of 
migrants from the Global South.  
 When an American or British guy thinks of coming here, he thinks to buy a 
 Porsche, a yacht…and live on the Marina…coming from a Third world country, it 
 is different, [they think] of stability and money to feed my kids and a good 
 education… it is a totally different dream from this side and that side. No one 
 common dream for all.  (Karen, Canadian) 
  
Different dreams for different classes. (Mohamed, Canadian)  
  
I think people dream because they have seen Dubai, their dreams are inspired 
from here. And because they can’t have this lifestyle back home, they imagine 
Dubai is a vacation where you can make money tax-free, have a nanny and driver 
lifestyle. (Reda, Emirati)  
 
As interviewees explained, many migrants come for a short stay, make money and 
leave to retire somewhere else. However, many come thinking it will be short stint and 
end up staying a decade or longer. Other interviewees described those who come for most 
of their adult lives and are forced to return ‘home’ on retirement, or those who come 
repeatedly over the course of several decades on short contracts, while others come and 
never leave, living on the fringes of society in their illegality. The motivations can differ. 
For many low wage migrants it can be about making money to send back home to 
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support a family, putting food on the table, paying school fees or building a home, 
dreams, however, that are always constructed through reference to ‘back home’. Some 
discussed the stories of women who migrate to escape violence from abusive 
relationships or to gain independence from difficult familial situations ‘back home’. For 
many Westerners who were interviewed, Dubai is seen as a place to make money and live 
a luxurious life for a short time. For those expat professionals coming from the Global 
South, their dreams of Dubai are often seen as one stop on their journey towards another 
permanent place to settle with family.  
It is important to consider for which populations dreams are constructed in 
relation to spaces in Dubai, and for which ‘Others’ are dreams relegated to spaces ‘back 
home’. These ideas shape how desirable subjects are constructed through the exclusion of 
‘Others’ and are a significant example of how differentiated are the ideas of belonging 
and entitlement. These ideas of who dreams from and to where are significant in shaping 
the material realities of the lives of different subjects in the spaces that constitute Dubai. 
Thus, the consideration of how different geographies of migration come to meet in the 
global city of Dubai needs to be understood through a genealogical approach, including 
‘unmapping’ the historical, structural factors and forces that shape global hierarchies of 
race, gender, class and nationality over time and space, as they in turn shape the routes of 
migration and the ideologies which accompany people on their journeys. Through this 
conceptualization, the ‘dream’ becomes one major example/force of consideration in 
understanding the construction of different subjectivities, and the creation of particular 
categories of humanity where matters of life and death are conceptualized and made to 
govern over who matters and who does not, for whom certain conditions are allowable 
and for whom they would never be tolerated. In short, these processes create binaries of 
deserving and undeserving, human and alien, thereby also legitimizing violence and 
exclusion through the maintenance of rigid social hierarchies that shape everyday life.   
My dream is to get out of Dubai and move to the West, to raise my kids with less 
discrimination. (Rebecca, Egyptian)  
  
You cannot have equality here. That is bullshit. (Mohamed, Canadian)  
 
It depends on how you live in your own country. You want more than what you 
already have. (Anna, Canadian/Egyptian) 
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Dubai keeps getting better, and Egypt, the alternative, is going down hill.  
(Zain, Egyptian)  
 
Many of the interviews from professionals coming from the Global South are 
shaped by their insecurities in going ‘back home’ after living a life of relative privilege in 
Dubai. In addition, as alternatives diminish back home with ongoing instabilities, the idea 
of going home is challenged by the promise of the Dubai dream. A significant factor that 
became clear through the interviews was the idea of where you are from, as a highly 
influential factor in the individual understanding of Dubai and his or her dreams. For 
many low paid workers from the Global South, Dubai is imagined as ‘Sonapur’ (Hindi 
word for ‘the City of Gold’) but this dream is extremely complex and diverse, as one taxi 
driver remarked, “They promise you green fields, but when you come here all you get is 
desert” (Mohamed, Pakistan). Surmounting debts, and/or endless greed lock different 
types of migrants into situations of precariousness, albeit to different degrees. Consider 
American expat Carlos,  
… You never leave. You always want to say, yeah two years and I’ll leave and 
then you say another year, and then just one more year … and then you start 
making money, and think you need to buy a house, but then you start dreaming 
bigger, as in a bigger house with a bigger pool, so that’s another two years. It is a 
leech. You know when a leech sucks your blood, and it keeps on sucking and 
sucking and sucking, this is what Dubai does to you, and then you get used to it, 
so you eventually stay for the rest of your life. It sucks you dry. Just like my 
father. (Carlos, American) 
 
Various definitions of a dream can be considered in the conceptualization of 
Dubai’s allure. Psychoanalytically, dreams have been considered as part of unconscious 
desires (Freud, 1913/1900); neuroscientifically, dreams are considered a response to 
changes in brain activity (Hobson and McCarley 1977); while in popular culture, dreams 
are understood as imaginative experiences of waking life that feel like a dream, a state of 
mind that represents a release from reality, a vision resembling a dream life state, 
something notable for its beauty, excellence or enjoyable quality, a strongly desired goal 
or purpose, something tied to the fulfillment of a wish (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Pushing 
past the dominant brand Dubai image of the dream, we see a multiplicity and diversity of 
Dubai dreams that are shaped by the interplay of race, class, gender, nationality and 
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employment. These Dubai dreams are a series of wishes, hopes, ambitions, goals and 
possibilities differentiated and based on where one stands/is ranked in the world, and 
entirely shaped by how one enters into the city.  
This dissertation asks how the aspirations and position of the Dubai dream as a 
‘global city’ impacts on and is impacted by the experiences of a migrant-majority 
population and, simultaneously, how the operation of highly exclusionary citizenship 
regimes and everyday ideologies work to justify and rationalize social hierarchies. To do 
this we begin by, first, examining how these haunting interdependences amidst diverse 
dreams are historically embedded in a global genealogy that is expressed through the 
broader international political economy and contemporary migratory patterns, and, 
second and simultaneously, how narratives, different subjectivities and hierarchies are 
created, understood, legitimized, utilized or challenged in the ‘everyday’ context of the 
‘global city’.  
 
Context  
Located at the crossroads of Asia, Europe and Africa, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) has rapidly become recognized as an important global economic center beginning 
in the late 20th century and continuing into the 21st century. Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the 
two leading city-states of the UAE, are often described as the epitome of global 
cosmopolitanism, uncritically described as combining ‘traditions of the East’ with 
‘comforts of the West’. In a nation built entirely on temporary migrant labour with a 
migrant-majority population, the UAE is a dynamic and complex web of social relations.  
Dubai has arguably experienced one of the fastest processes of urbanization in the 
contemporary period. These shifts have largely occurred during the period of 
‘globalization’ from WWII onwards, accelerating in the 1980s and continuing into today. 
While the historic role of the Gulf and the UAE in particular has shaped its entrance into 
the contemporary global political economy, so too have regional developments within the 
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) made up of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, 
Kuwait and Bahrain. However, simultaneously, the current, ambitious leader of Dubai 
has prioritized a vision of Dubai that is intimately propelled by notions of the global 
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which have set Dubai apart within the UAE, within the Gulf region, and arguably, within 
the world.  
Dubai is often presented as an exemplary model for rapid urbanization and 
development, with emerging city centers around the world with global ambition looking 
to the remarkable economic and infrastructural growth that characterizes contemporary 
Dubai1. In particular, Dubai represents a neoliberal paradise, with the ‘Dubai model’ 
representing “an apolitical, consumer-mad, citizenship-free society” (Escobar, 2006), “an 
oasis of free enterprise without income taxes, trade unions, or opposition parties (since 
there are no elections)” (Davis, 2006, 61), a place where “immigrants … totally renounce 
their political rights on the altar of economic improvement” (Escobar, 2006). Thus, the 
neoliberal capitalist logic that is embedded in Dubai’s development, combined with 
historical political and economic conditions that allow for the accumulation of surplus 
petrodollars and seemingly endless supplies of poor migrant workers, and unique 
conditions of local development have all impacted the developmental ‘global’ trajectory 
of Dubai.  
The result is a hyper-globalised city-state where non-citizens make up over 80% 
of the population and where European and Asian influences pepper a 
sophisticated cultural scene. A little vulgar? Maybe - it’s been slated as ‘Vegas-
meets-Disney-in-the-desert’ by its critics. Yet it is impossible not to admire the 
vision behind the crafting of the emirates. In economic and evolutionary terms, 
Dubai’s transformation has been nothing short of dramatic - a rapid trajectory of 
change unrivalled by any other city on the planet. (Woods 2009) 
 
Popular representations such as this, that describe Dubai as a ‘global city’, are 
rich in tourist materials2 often representing Dubai as a cosmopolitan city of the world. 
Dubai is also represented as bringing together ‘East and West’ and, as I argue, ideas of 
tradition and modernity that follow this binary. To investors, developers, corporations 
and tourists, the city is marketed as ‘multicultural’ and ‘modern’ (Time Out Guides Ltd, 
2007). This international acclaim cannot be overrepresented, if only for the sheer number 
of an estimated 12 million visitors in 2010 (Woods, 2009, 7). At the same time that the 
UAE continues to be recognized in popular sources for its remarkable development and 
																																																								
1 Abaza 2011, Elsheshtawy 2004, 2010, 2011, Fox and Mourtada-Shah 2006, Hvidt 2009, Kanna 2010, 
2011, 2013, Krane 2009, Mouawad 2014, Reyes-Ruiz 2010, Velegrinis and Katodrytis 2015 
2 McAuley, 2008; Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007; Walsh, 2008; Woods, 2009 
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achievements, those who build and maintain the global city face a rigid ethnic division of 
labour that impacts entitlements and protections by the state. International organizations 
such as Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) have documented growing cases of exploitation and violence 
against both construction workers and female domestic workers.3 
This study was motivated by the gross inequalities and lack of effective policies 
in protecting vulnerable workers in the UAE. However, it very rapidly became apparent 
that any study of these geographies and urban landscapes would require a historical 
analysis of the larger processes that have shaped the international division of labour as it 
intersects with contemporary forces of neoliberal globalization in the emerging global 
city of Dubai. Additionally, the overt acceptance and normalization of these hierarchies 
in everyday life demanded insights from residents of all ranges and backgrounds in the 
city, in order to develop an understanding of how processes of normalization and 
legitimization were created and perpetuated to uphold hierarchies that shape entitlements 
for different groups of residents, the vast majority of whom lack access to formal 
citizenship. Although rapid industrial capitalist development in the UAE is relatively 
recent, taking shape in the 1970s, a historical genealogy accompanies the spatial 
composition of the UAE at many different levels. Additionally, amidst considerable 
diversity in lived experience, there are remarkable similarities in the conceptualization of 
the UAE by, for example, expat professionals, tourists or national citizens, whether it 
refers to the notion of Dubai as caught in-between two worlds; ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’, ‘East’ and ‘West’, ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds, or the citizenship-based 
entitlements which create an ethnic occupational hierarchy that is easily narrated by any 
visitor to the UAE.  
Understanding Dubai’s globality through these historically situated concepts is 
one of many reasons why a genealogical analysis is a key component in understanding 
the reproduction and re-creation of seemingly older tools and knowledge(s) of colonial 
and imperial conquest. Whereas the metropolitan cities of the West are tied to legacies of 
colonialism, global cities in the non-Western context also participate in, and benefit from, 
ongoing hierarchies through the international division of labour. In particular, as this 
																																																								
3 HRW 2004, 2006, 2012, 2015, 2014, ITUC 2014, AI 2005, ILO 2004 
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analysis argues, if mapping migrant geographies is an integral aspect of understanding 
Dubai’s contemporary development, and if we understand contemporary forms of 
globalization as leading to the creation and maintenance of global cities such as those in 
the UAE, then it is necessary to explore the historical legacies and genealogies that 
accompany geographies of migration for labour, and that shape the UAE’s relationship to 
colonialism, and global capitalist development more broadly. In addition, the emphasis 
here on ‘everyday’ lived realities and socio-spatial hierarchies is linked significantly to 
the historical lineages that accompany migrants on their journeys. Through this, we are 
able to see how ideologies of race, class, gender, nationality and labour intersect in the 
local (global) context of the city to create and sustain inequalities. This is significant as 
the underlying racial logics embedded within many of the policies and practices that both 
target labour migrants, and privilege expat professionals are connected to broader 
colonial legacies and histories. Understanding how the geographies and genealogies of 
Dubai’s development are thus linked to a specific set of methodological commitments 
conceptualized broadly as ‘unmapping’ will be elaborated in Chapter Two.  
 
Research Questions  
The major research questions guiding this study include:  How does global city 
status impact the experiences of diverse groups of residents in Dubai? And in turn, how 
does a migrant majority population impact global city status? How do social hierarchies 
create and maintain hierarchies of entitlement? And how does this complicate traditional 
understandings of citizenship? How can we account for contemporary forms and 
experiences of labour migration to the UAE by simultaneously mapping geographies of 
migration, and unmapping historical genealogies, such as the international division of 
labour, under contemporary forces of globalization? How do colonial continuities shape 
geographies of migration to the global city? What legacies are embedded in the making 
of rigid social hierarchies in Dubai? How is space related to neoliberalism, and 
neoliberalism related to the making of different subjectivities? How do histories and 
modes of citizenship operate to generate social hierarchies and subjectivities? 
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Theoretical Considerations  
Several key methodological and theoretical considerations shape these analyses, 
which are presented here broadly but explained further in Chapter One. Firstly, the 
analysis operates through an understanding of the simultaneity of social scales, which 
allows for an examination of how the ‘everyday’ offers insight as a counterpoint to the 
spectacle of globality. This in turn works to unmap the historically imbued narratives of 
race, nationality, class and gender, as they operate on different scales, and in different 
forms and times, to rationalize, normalize and even legitimize socio-spatial hierarchies. 
Together understanding the construction of particular subjectivities made through 
relational identity formation and ‘Othering’, privilege and exclusion allows for a more 
complex understanding of the social, political, economic and imaginary realms. Through 
these understandings we might challenge ‘violence’ as somehow natural, inevitable, 
increasingly acceptable and, at times, necessary in the making of neoliberal globality. 
Additionally, the broadest objective of this project is to understand how the position of 
Dubai as a ‘global city’ impacts the lives of a migrant-majority population.  
 
Methods 
In order to address these questions, I examine/map migratory patterns and 
developmental histories which have led to the growth of contemporary global Dubai, and 
simultaneously ‘unmap’ how interdependencies between contexts are generated. This is 
carried out through a genealogical analysis of the historical legacies and colonial 
continuities that manifest within the unequal international division of labour, broader 
political economy and migratory patterns as well as the subsequent social hierarchies that 
shape entitlements and ontologies, in the ‘everyday’ context of the ‘global city’ of Dubai. 
In part this pushes us to rethink temporalities such as the present by radically 
reconceptualizing them through a genealogical mapping of the past as it is embedded in 
the current and implicated in possible futures. In particular, examinations of what makes 
the system possible, and also how it is maintained and reproduced, rationalized and lived 
are explored through extensive fieldwork and interviews, as well as reviews from key 
scholars and popular media representations. These data sets are in turn analyzed in 
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relation to the lifestyles and insights of three identified broad categories of the 
population, Emirati citizens, Expat professionals, and Low waged Migrant Workers.  
The different levels of analysis here include first, historicizing the conditions that 
give rise to migration among sending states and the demand for migrants in receiving 
cities in the UAE, through a genealogical analysis of the legacies of colonialism, 
development and the impact of neoliberal globalization on the international division of 
labour. At the national level, through the examination of the UAE, and particularly, 
Dubai, I ask what this case study allows us to understand about neoliberal economic 
globalization and the role of migrant labour? Also, what does this case study allow us to 
understand about citizenship and immigration/migration policy within global cities? 
Overall, I ask what are the relationships between the global cities under contemporary 
forms of neoliberal globalization and the international division of labour?  
 
Organization 
               Dreamscapes. The dissertation is presented and organized as a dreamscape, a 
concept I am using to bring together ideas of landscapes, spatiality and the imaginative 
realms of dreaming that are developed and activated in shaping migrant and 
developmental trajectories of Dubai’s globality. Migration is understood here as a central 
aspect of Dubai’s development and the ‘dreams’ that shape and accompany migrant 
geographies, which are central to the landscapes and everyday lives that inspire, create 
and uphold Dubai’s global dreams. Thus, dreamscapes are also significant in the 
conceptualization and implementation of the hegemonic Dubai dream tied to global city 
status, and influence how dreams of globality shape the physical landscapes, as well as 
how dreams circulate to catapult the city into global consciousness. Therefore, the 
dissertation begins with ‘the dream’, as dominant and hegemonic, and ‘dreams’ as 
multiple and heterogeneous, together allowing us a unique entry into a world of colliding, 
colluding and coalescing visions and versions of the ‘global’ as they are made in and 
beyond the city.  
The conceptualization of Dubai through ‘dreams’ emerged as a major theme 
through fieldwork interviews and participant observation, during which many different 
people described the city and their experiences. In addition, the physical landscapes of 
Dubai are infused with dream-like qualities and are marketed as global icons representing 
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realms beyond our everyday reality. Thus, Dubai’s landscapes are built and represented 
as beyond our waking consciousness, they represent what most see as ‘dreamlike’, as 
beyond our reality, without boundaries. The seeming impossibility of dreams is thus 
made real in Dubai, which can therefore be seen as a ‘dream’ world in which many 
diverse sets of visions interact. However, as we will see through our analysis, the 
genealogies that accompany migrant geographies, as well as the genealogies embedded in 
Dubai’s development, are important forces in shaping whose dreams are made reality. In 
fact, deeper examinations of the social hierarchies that operate as ‘normal’ everyday 
relationships in the city awaken a far more nightmarish version of the global, Dubai 
dream.   
At the simplest level, any visitor to Dubai can attest to the dream-world qualities 
that the city exudes, bursting with grandeur, the lights blind and heights strain. The city 
continually boasts some of the most unique, groundbreaking and obscene developments 
as part of its allure, catapulting it into global significance. However, at the same time, 
these innovative and unique developments house a city of extreme inequality, hidden 
behind ideas of ‘diversity’ that is justified through everyday rationales. Much of this is 
based on references to existing global hierarchies that are said to determine worth, and 
subsequently, wages. Thus, these geographies of the city’s landscapes, as well as the 
geographies of migration that bring migrants to the city, are continually related to 
genealogies beyond the immediate materiality of the city.  
Dreams therefore connect these diverse actors, landscapes and levels in which a 
diverse range of subjects engage in the making of their own dreams via Dubai. However, 
we will see that where one stands in the world impacts how one’s dreams are realized, 
and it is thus significant to note that not all dreams are intended to be made or lived 
within Dubai, although they are linked to the city in important ways. For example, the 
value of workers is based on highly racialized and gendered ideas of work and worth that 
are historically implicated. In addition, some workers are more welcome than others, with 
Western passport holders paid salaries to sustain Dubai’s global cosmopolitan lifestyle, 
while Others are paid salaries affording their better life, ‘back home’. These differences 
are not just about labour sector but represent entirely different scales. Thus, we could 
argue that some are paid first world salaries, while others are paid third world wages, 
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despite both living and working in the same city. For the majority of low waged migrants, 
Dubai is therefore seen as a tool to reach their dreams ‘back home’, which is not solely a 
matter of personal choice but is systemically enforced through policies and practices that 
exclude these poor workers from living the dominant Dubai dream. As this research will 
show, this can range from things such as policies tied to income based requirements 
which exclude this category of workers from bringing their families, or short term, 
temporary work contracts that deny these workers any chance of settling in Dubai, to the 
physical segregation of workers in labour camps accommodations. Thus, while in theory 
all migrants are ‘temporary’, as citizenship is a highly exclusive status not open to 
foreigners in general, this study shows that some are more welcome or able to live their 
Dubai dreams while in the city, while ‘Others’ are forced to imagine their dreams ‘back 
home’ via their access to Dubai through migration. These considerations raise a number 
of interesting questions such as the substance of different dreams that bring people from 
around the world to Dubai. What images, ideas and possibilities exist for different people, 
and what are the criteria influencing who dreams of Dubai, how and of what? At the 
same time, this study raises questions about how Dubai’s development trajectory has 
been imagined and built and the ways in which ideas of the ‘global’ and global city status 
shape its direction and influence lived experiences for different groups.  
 In regards to globality, the hegemonic dream of Dubai as well as the multiplicity 
and diversity of Dubai dreams are explored as they operate through allure and desire, 
implicating historical genealogies, which undergird contemporary geographies of 
migration. The chapters follow the building of this dream through the development of a 
dream cycle. They therefore begin by examining the imaginative realm as the ‘making’ 
of, laying the foundation and preparing for dreaming. This moves to a state of living the 
dream, the stage where dreaming actually takes place in the cycle, characterized by 
diversity and exposing the exclusions and complicity that are masked by the glamour of 
globality. In turn, we are awakened by the nightmarish realities that shape and legitimize 
social hierarchies based on constructions of degrees and modes of humanity.  
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Chapters and Connections 
 Dreams are explored here in a diversity of ways, including some sociological and 
scientific explanations, which are examined in more detail in the next chapter. To 
understand how the idea of dreaming is used to develop the chapter, we begin by 
examining how dreams are linked to sleep. This is conceptualized as a cycle, culminating 
in Rapid Eye Movement (REM), the space where the most vivid dreaming occurs. While 
dreams can arguably occur in any of the stages of sleep, the most memorable dreams 
happen in the last stage (Simons, 2009). The different stages of Dubai’s development are 
organized here in relation to changes in brain activity and to the stages of the dream 
cycle. As Breus (2015) notes, dreaming can be understood as a form of consciousness 
that unites past, present and future by processing information from the past and present as 
part of preparations for the future. With regard to globality, the hegemonic dream of 
Dubai and multiplicity and the diversity of Dubai dreams are explored as they operate 
through allure and desire, implicating historical genealogies (representing the ‘past’) that 
undergird contemporary geographies of migration (lived in the ‘present’), and shape the 
possibilities of Dubai’s globality (linked to ideas of the ‘future’).  
The dissertation begins with Chapter One on Methodology, which highlights 
several strands of the research plan and objectives, as well as insights from reflections on 
the processes of conducting fieldwork as they impacted the insights that were collected. 
In addition, this section also operationalizes some key concepts that guide the analysis 
that follows, including genealogy, ontology, subjectivity and violence. In this section, I 
turn to explain/map the dreamscape as it relates to dreams of Dubai, and Dubai’s dreams 
and development as a global city.  
In Stage One, the body is preparing to drift off, thus one may experience periods 
of ‘dreaminess’ which are likened to ‘daydreaming’, except we are beginning to fall 
asleep (Walcutt, n.d.). Some have characterized this initial phase as a transition period 
between being awake and asleep, understood as a restful place where you may experience 
hallucinations (Walcutt, n.d.). Physically, the body experiences muscle relaxation and a 
slowed heart rate as it prepares to enter deep sleep (Simons, 2009).  Here, Chapter Two 
“Imagining the Dream” is linked to representing this first stage of sleeping as part of the 
preparation necessary to dream deeply. This chapter explores Dubai in the global 
	 14	
imaginary as a ‘global city’, thereby examining the imaginative realm as represented in a 
diversity of sources and spaces. Some of these perspectives include UAE leadership, 
popular tourist publications, novels, interviewees and scholars. Through these initial 
examinations we find the idea of the ‘global’ city emerges as a prominent theme that is 
linked to different dreams. We also see how Dubai’s globally induced, aspirational, 
developmental trajectory, as linked to a multiplicity of dreams and different spatial and 
temporal dimensions that collide and collude, shapes urban landscapes and social 
hierarchies (spatiality) in the city. From these popular representations of the global, I turn 
to a thorough scholarly review of global cities, which explores key features and criteria of 
global city status, as well as theoretical insights into postcolonial and critical scholarly 
works. Together, these diverse data sets help us to lay the foundation for a critical 
engagement with colonial continuities that are embedded in the geographical and 
genealogical aspects of Dubai’s global dreams. This section explores the notion of the 
‘global’ not just as an imagined idea or aspiration, but also as a spatial location. It 
reviews major scholarly contributions to the field and develops a critical postcolonial 
theoretical framework to analyze the complex historical genealogies that influence 
contemporary global city dreams.  
The second and third stages of sleep are best understood as preparation for 
dreaming during REM sleep. In these stages of the sleep cycle the body’s temperature 
drops and heart rate slows (Simons, 2009). It is the stage in which the immune system 
repairs the day’s damage, thus conceptualized as a stage necessary for sustainability. 
Here, Chapters Three and Four follow along as part of the preparation for dreaming, 
entitled “Making of the Dream”, Parts I and II. The major goal of these chapters is to ask 
how the aspirations/position of Dubai as a ‘global city’ impacts and is impacted by the 
lives of a migrant-majority population and, simultaneously, how the operation of highly 
exclusionary citizenship regimes and everyday ideologies works to justify and rationalize 
unequal social hierarchies. Part I of Chapter Three begins by examining the current status 
of Dubai and explores past and present economic and political developments that together 
lay the historical and theoretical background necessary in understanding contemporary 
processes. It paints a contemporary picture of Dubai, exploring insights related to its 
population, political structure, and development over time, examining pre colonial, 
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colonial and post war developments as they are linked to its contemporary role in the 
neoliberal global capitalist order. Overall, through this genealogical analysis we are able 
to contextualize the contemporary manifestations of Dubai’s globality - linked to its 
ability to optimize its limited resources and geographic position as it moves towards 
attaining its desire for global city status as a node connecting ‘East’ and ‘West’ - which is 
contingent upon the maintenance of a neoliberal, global order that maintains and 
perpetuates gross inequalities. Overall, Chapter Three examines the developmental 
trajectory of Dubai and the UAE more broadly within the regional and international 
arenas, providing the scholarly review and historical context necessary to understand the 
development of the city. 
The fourth stage of sleep is characterized as a deep sleep, although not the 
deepest, a phase in which, for instance, sleepwalking may occur (Walcutt, n.d.). Thus we 
are still in preparation for dreaming but are deeper into the cycle and thus able to 
experience more dream like qualities in our sleep cycle. Here Chapter Four, or Part II of 
“Making of the Dream” continues to build the background insights into Dubai’s 
development but examines more specific processes that are significant for Dubai’s 
cotemporary development. It builds the analysis of how geographies of migration are 
central to the creation and maintenance of the global city of Dubai by examining how 
histories and processes of migration are integral to the development of the city’s physical 
infrastructure, daily operations and maintenance, as well as in creating its global allure 
for migrants of all socio-economic statuses. Thus, Dubai is examined in more material 
dimensions such as through the international division of labour and histories of demand 
for labour and development. In addition, this chapter examines state policies on 
citizenship, migration, and labour, against the backdrop of migrant experiences                                                                                                                                                                        
as interviewees articulate why and how they migrated, and how they relate to Emirati 
citizens. Through these processes of development, we can see how different articulations 
of the Dubai dream shape desires for migration from North and South, as well as how the 
conditions tied to processes of neoliberalism impact the making of these geographies. 
Thus we are able to understand how the processes of migration and labour are central to 
the formation of Dubai as a global city, and this means examining geographies of 
migration in relation to their genealogies. Together, Chapters Three and Four provide the 
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background to prepare us for the next chapter in which the Dubai dream is lived and 
realized, wielding highly unequal and violent practices necessary to sustain the global 
dream.  
 Stage five is the final phase of sleep in which the most vivid dreaming occurs. It 
is a phase characterized by REM (rapid eye movement), an increased respiration rate and 
brain activity. It is also known as ‘paradoxical sleep’ because while the brain and other 
body systems are more active, the muscles become more relaxed, even paralyzed 
(Walcutt, n.d.). Thus, interestingly when the most vivid dreaming occurs we are 
simultaneously paralyzed or immobilized. Here we enter Chapter Five, “Living the 
Dream” and examine the lived realities and spatial logics of migration and labour in 
Dubai as they manifest into rigid social hierarchies. This begins with a focus on how 
practices of citizenship in relation to precarious, third world migration can be seen as a 
contemporary metropolitan counterpart of imperialism. It explores how dominant images 
of Dubai’s globality compare to the lived realities articulated by interviewees. Each of the 
three major categories of residents (low waged migrant workers, expat professionals and 
Emirati citizens) reflect on issues related to the Dubai dream, lifestyles, the role of 
citizenship and nationality, and their relationships to other sectors. From these insights 
we are able to see how the Dubai dream operates as a lived experience for various 
residents in Dubai in order to highlight both the structural and ideological forces that 
impact the creation of social hierarchies. Through these insights we see the historical and 
ideological genealogies of race, class, gender, and nationality as they shape the 
engagement of various subjects with the spatial geography of the place. The relations 
embedded in the space both shape and are shaped by forces such as the broader political 
economy, as well as national discourses, policies and practices, while historical 
genealogies, which undergird the geographies of migration, implicate broader histories of 
the colonialism and the international division of labour in the making of various 
subjectivities. Overall, in this chapter we see how the ‘everyday’ operates as a 
counterpoint to the spectacle of globality. Theoretically I argue that various subjectivities 
are constructed through relational identity formation and processes of ‘Othering’ based 
on privilege and exclusion. These considerations allow for a more complex understanding 
of the social, political, economic and imaginary realms through which we might 
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challenge social hierarchies and the subsequent violence(s) they engender as somehow 
natural, inevitable, increasingly acceptable and, at times, necessary in the making of 
neoliberal globality. Thus, when we dream Dubai dreams we imagine ourselves as ‘free’ 
when in reality we are paralyzed.  
 Chapter Six represents the “Awakening”, through theorizations and reflections on 
how the Dubai dreams and dreams of Dubai might be reconceptualised through the 
uncomfortable experiences of a nightmare. This in part explores the insecurities of the 
nation through the making of the ‘Other’, in which the façade of the global dream is 
made and the consequences are felt. Thus, we link the global geographies, which meet in 
the global city through a methodological unmapping of the genealogies that are 
embedded in these contemporary journeys and landscapes. Together, these examinations 
allow us to trace histories of race, nationality, class and gender, as they operate on 
different scales, and in different forms and times, to rationalize, normalize and, even, 
legitimize violent landscapes and hierarchies. Overall, this chapter awakens from the 
Dubai dream of the global city to the nightmares of seemingly informal social 
hierarchies, which are linked to ideologies of ordering that have normalized hierarchies 
of entitlement based on the dehumanization of others. This is seen in the ways in which 
these inequalities are often formally regulated but become common sense and 
perpetuated at the ‘everyday’ level. It explores in more detail the role of citizenship in 
influencing these hierarchies and social organization more generally, and also examines 
how the absence of citizenship for the majority of migrants impacts their experiences of 
the Dubai dream. Furthermore, we will see that when national identity is seen as under 
threat and national insecurity becomes a dominant socio-political concern, the social 
consequences are felt differentially based on social locations within the urban hierarchy. 
Thus, we will explore the role of exaltation and othering as it impacts subject making. In 
addition, we solidify the argument for a genealogical analysis that exposes both the 
historical lineages that accompany migrants on journeys of migration and the forces that 
have shaped Dubai’s global city based developmental trajectory. This is linked to notions 
of belonging, entitlement, and valuations of humanity that are linked to both formal 
processes and policies at the state level to control and regulate social relations, as well as 
to the broader everyday narratives and experiences of belonging that are employed to 
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justify, excuse, rationalize, and even legitimatize the exclusion and exploitation of the 
majority of poor, low waged workers. Thus, hierarchies of entitlement are made possible 
through the dehumanization of others by creating narratives of disposability and 
normalizing violence through relational identity formation. It seems in the end that the 
dreams of some become, or are based on, the nightmares of others, which in turn make 
possible the global city dreams of Dubai.  
 
Dreams, Webs and Threads 
Dubai was a dream I once had. Alluring. Its promises haunting. I knew better but I 
wanted to dwell and dream for a while, however dangerous. 
 (YYZ to DXB Diary)  
 
 Turning back to how the city is imagined, the collusion of various dreams of 
Dubai, which coalesce to create one space, is an important thread connecting the different 
levels of analysis throughout the dissertation. The dream world operates at various spatial 
levels and temporal realms within which the dominant images promoted by the state are 
always contested and contrasted by the dreams of those bodies who move through spaces 
in the city, imbuing them with life and often death. Thus, the different spatial levels are 
significant in understanding how the Dubai dream, both imagined and real, creates lived 
spaces. In another way, the Dubai dream or Dubai dreams also become a challenge to 
linear time as different dreams play with different times by imagining the city as future, 
as past, while lived in the current.  
 When considering the question of ‘What is the Dubai Dream?’ interviewees 
referenced the dominant notion of the ‘American Dream’, popularized by generations of 
immigrants in the postcolonial period who embarked on the life changing journey to the 
‘West’ where they were told of unlimited wealth and possibility, opportunity and 
equality. This dream however is much more nightmarish in reality as, lurking behind the 
white picket fences, are histories of slavery and racism, coupled with all types of 
exploitation and imperialist wars that were necessary to make possible the dreams of 
some. In a similar vein, the dominant images of Dubai also work to mask a reality, the 
majority migrant labour force that makes possible the glittery façade, who are hidden and 
devalued in the social imaginary, as well as physically segregated into labour camps and 
ghettoized areas of the city, often on the outskirts away from ‘Brand Dubai’. These 
	 19	
workers are thus necessary tools in the making of binaries between self and other that 
work to hierarchically order the population.  
 The field research presented here is an important challenge to the dominant 
images of Brand Dubai as the Dubai dream model. This complexity is examined through 
a plurality and diversity of voices from a wide range of perspectives and positions. 
Throughout the dissertation we can consider how histories impact the creation of dreams, 
whether and how dreams matter, and the important ways that Dubai dreams specifically 
challenge the hegemonic appeal of the American dream with important insights into the 
continuities and ruptures of the current neoliberal period of globalization. Taken together 
this impacts how we think of citizenship, migration, labour, race, class, gender and 
nationality and how emerging global cities in the non-western context are connected to 
the broader global city landscape. While power and privilege play a significant role in 
whose dreams come closer to reality, the most powerful aspect of dreams is that they 
need never be realized to be real. This is significant both theoretically and 
methodologically as dreams allow us an avenue into examining the present through 
different temporalities thereby endowing us with new tools in conceptualizing different 
intersections and layers of the living pasts that shape our dreams for the future and haunt 
our waking lives in the present.  
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Chapter One: Methodology  
 
 “There are no new ideas. There are only new ways of making them felt” (Lorde, 
1984, 39). In considering methodology, it is important to understand how power operates 
to create knowledge. Thus, imagination, affect and lived experience are all important in 
the production of knowledge(s) about the Dubai dream(s). These epistemological 
underpinnings are connected to the broader methodology of this project through the 
collection and dissemination of data, but also on reflections of everyday realities, 
experience and encounters. Recognizing the power of embodied knowledge allows us to 
challenge the traditional Cartesian mind-body dualism in which only the mind matters, 
and the body becomes a mere object. However, knowledge in the form of diverse human 
experiences can be articulated in a variety of forms and, thus, the data that forms this 
project is cognizant of the multiple forms of knowledge and their diverse articulations.  
 In addition, by expanding the notion of ‘knowledge’ to include embodied 
experience we can consider levels of inquiry such as the everyday, the local, or social 
spaces in conjunction with the verbal articulations of interviewees. Thus, we can ask how 
everyday actions and forms of being are implicated within broader structures of power 
and how they carry within them a rich genealogy.  We can ask how myths and dreams 
operate in realms of the imagined with material impacts, how ideas of the ‘global’ are 
implicated within narratives of innocence allowing subjects to safely and comfortably 
distance themselves from the immediate inequalities and violence(s) of their ‘everyday’ 
lives, or how everyday actions and rationales both conceal and reveal, and ultimately 
create possibilities for social change. The contradictions and negotiations between these 
levels of experience, forms of knowledge and historical legacies are part of the 
methodology of this project. 
 The remainder of this chapter examines the methodological considerations that 
shaped the research plan from the stage of the proposal to reflections and insights from 
the processes of undertaking fieldwork in the UAE.  This includes a discussion of the 
steps leading up to the research plan, drafting the proposal and experience of the ethics 
review procedures. It explores both the experiences of doing fieldwork and how the 
research plan shaped and was shaped by being on the ground, and reflections on the 
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changes and issues encountered as a researcher and subject implicated in the space.  In 
addition, a detailed examination is provided on the fieldwork plans in Dubai including 
considerations such as the motivations for this research, major aims, strategies and the 
techniques employed. This chapter is organized into three major areas: 1) Research 
Design; 2) Fieldwork Reflections, and; 3) Key Theoretical Concepts and Methodological 
Tools.  
 Section One focuses on the Research Objectives, including the aims and process 
of going to Dubai and rationales for the decision to conduct interviews as the source of 
the bulk of research data.  In addition, previous fieldwork experience in Dubai is explored 
and reflections given on its impact on the current research. Section One then discusses 
the major research questions, the initial plan, exploring the ethics review process, the 
initial design, scope, and subsequent changes, as well the process of selecting informants, 
and locating sites for observations. Overall, in this section, the initial plans, ideas and 
assumptions and major obstacles, limitations and changes are discussed in relation to the 
original research plan.  
 Section Two focuses on Reflections on Fieldwork, and begins with experiences 
that relate to methods. These include some defining experiences that shaped my research 
in Dubai, and me as a researcher in the field, both as a visitor to the city and as an 
academic. These roles intertwined in interesting ways with often profound mental and 
physical consequences in terms of methodological considerations that shaped the 
collection and analysis of data.  These insights not only are significant in the analysis 
provided here, they offer as well broader insights into the experience of research 
fieldwork, with interesting considerations for methods more generally.  
 Section Three examines key theoretical concepts and methodological tools that 
are important in providing a set of navigational tools to map the analyses, but also in 
operationalizing and contextualizing key concepts that inform the study.  
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Section One: Research Design  
 Major research objectives. The broadest objective of this project is to 
understand how the position of Dubai as a ‘global city’ impacts the lives of a migrant-
majority population. To do this, I intend to map the geography of migratory patterns and 
simultaneously ‘unmap’ or uncover a genealogical analysis of historical legacies that 
manifest within the unequal international division of labour. This objective was informed 
by wide previous research experience on the issues of workers’ rights and exploitation in 
the region more generally, and with previous research experience in the UAE in 2005 as I 
undertook fieldwork for my Masters (MA) thesis project. That earlier project examined 
the experiences and treatment of domestic workers and construction workers in the UAE, 
based heavily on the narratives of expat professionals who had employed or sought to 
employ domestic workers in their homes. My master’s thesis examined how this sector of 
expats related to Emirati citizens, and the vast low waged migrant working class and 
documented their experiences, outlooks and issues within these relationships.  In addition 
to fieldwork research, an extensive review of secondary sources was carried out, 
including scholarly works on migration and labour in the region4 and reports from 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International 
(AI) (2005), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and Human Rights Watch 
(2006, 2009). The strength of these publications lies in their extensive documentation of 
issues and experiences of domestic and construction workers as a key aspect in 
establishing a basis for understanding the problems they face, and also in the 
identification of policies and programs that support the systems that make possible these 
types of exploitation. However, the limitations of these works are in the very limited 
historical and political contexts that accompany the migratory geographies that make 
possible this temporary workforce. There are significant gaps, in the existing research 
tied to a lack of analysis of the ways in which contemporary forms of neoliberal 
globalization and policies and programs related to migration and citizenship are related to 
historical forces of power that significantly generate, shape and maintain international 
																																																								
4 (Arnold & shah, 1984; Haddad, 1999; Halliday, 1984; Longva, 1997; Sabban, 2005; Shah, Al-Qudsi, & 
Shah, 1991; Silvey, 2004; Suad, 1996; Vora, 2008; Zahlan, 1978), 
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flows of capital. This implicates both the global North and South in the creation of new 
‘global cities’ such as Dubai.  
 While the major research objectives of the current project may have been built out 
of my previous research experience, the initial phases continued to focus primarily on the 
experiences of the majority population of low waged migrant workers from the Third 
world. However, as the project evolved, the broader spatiality in which subjectivities of 
all three categories were constructed and experienced became increasingly significant in 
understanding the relationships and interconnectedness between these dynamic 
relationships. While ‘hierarchies of entitlement’ in terms of rights, protections and access 
to resources were clearly identified as a major structural force in the social landscape of 
Dubai, it was only within this matrix of relationships and through the relational creation 
of these different categories that these hierarchies could be adequately analyzed. 
Additionally, while many of these practices are enforced and legitimized by the state 
apparatus, there was also a sense of normalcy in the daily operations of the city, which 
was upheld by a diverse range of actors, not limited to the state or to workers themselves. 
Thus, after MA fieldwork new questions emerged to be used in examining these 
dynamics, such as what are the global economic and political forces that make possible 
the movement of workers from North and South towards the city? Additionally, how are 
the interactions between different categories of workers influential in upholding systems 
of exploitation in the city? What are the historical forces or legacies that are embedded in 
the migrations of different populations and how do these ideologies impact the 
construction of different subjects? How and why are western subjects continually 
privileged at the expense of racialized third world migrants for instance, and where are 
Emirati citizens located in this matrix?   
 These questions informed the broad research objectives noted above that consider 
the larger history that gives rise to, and continues to maintain, the international division 
of labour, and also, to understand the particular social, political, economic and cultural 
dynamics of the global city thesis in the UAE, thus examining both what makes the 
system possible, and how it is maintained. The fieldwork is based on an exploration of 
three broad major population categories within the UAE, (1) Emirati citizens referred to 
as ‘Emiratis’ or ‘nationals’, ‘(2) migrant professionals referred to as ‘expat professionals’ 
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or ‘expats’ and (3) migrant workers referred to as ‘low waged labourers’, employed 
primarily in the construction, domestic and service sectors. While both categories of 
migrants are temporary and non-citizens of the UAE, there is a very significant and 
obvious differentiation between those privileged professionals from both North and 
South, and the majority of poor, working class populations primarily from the Global 
South. Within these three extremely broad categories there exists considerable diversity 
but on a general structural level many of the experiences discussed by interviewees fall 
within these three popular understandings of social stratification. As will be shown, 
within each group there are important markers and elements of differentiation that 
determine the relationships between sectors, and influence the spatial composition of 
Dubai. Thus, the project critically examines the underlying historical influences that 
shape understandings of racial and gendered subject formation.  
 
 Research and fieldwork plans. The current research study passed through a 
relatively stress-free ethics review process, despite the political climate of the Arab 
Spring in the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2010. This was in 
contrast to a full ethics board review required at McMaster University for the MA process 
in 2005. The review was dominated by a general lack of knowledge on the context and 
the stereotypes and assumptions about the ‘Middle East’ more generally. Preparedness 
from previous experience allowed me to avoid any issues or questions with the review 
process at York University.  
 This project has a qualitative, multi pronged research plan that includes fieldwork 
in the form of semi structured interviews and participant observation, as well as 
substantial scholarly reviews and ethnographic reflection. The initial design for fieldwork 
was a complex methodological project based on selecting three major sites/locations, 
each specifically relevant to one of the three groups, with interaction and observation 
between the groups. The sites were anticipated to function as spaces in which different 
levels of power were in action, allowing for an examination of social relations within 
corporate workspaces, observing relations to illuminate the function of citizenship, race, 
gender, class and other markers of identity utilized to differentiate groups and shape the 
organizational hierarchies that impact relationships and entitlements among different 
	 25	
sectors. However, the feasibility of this project was questioned early on because of the 
lengthy approval processes and exposure and involvement of corporate and public 
officials. Securing permission from corporate entities that do not want internal practices 
exposed was very difficult, beside which there was an increasingly intense level of 
restrictions over politically charged research and conversation on ‘controversial’ topics in 
the country at the time of my fieldwork. This fieldwork coincided with the Arab Spring, 
with its continual media discussion of the growing insecurities amongst Gulf monarchs. 
In the UAE in particular, the ruling elites were being reported by major international 
news sources such as The Economist, BBC, and Times Magazine (Shah, 2011, Yom 
2012) as enticing their citizenry with material benefits from the state in exchange for 
political silence, while those who choose to speak out against the state were being 
arrested, jailed, and when possible deported. Importantly, these forms of surveillance and 
expulsions were ongoing experiences, especially for migrant workers who attempted to 
change jobs, organize unions, protest or demand their rights or better entitlements. The 
combination of the corporate and political climate would have limited my access to 
potential interviewees, and as such I amended the research design once in the field to 
allow for a richer, more insightful and open dialogue with participants. Thus, I chose to 
work outside of formal channels and instead conducted a smaller number of in-depth 
interviews with people from the three major social categories under examination.  
 The final design was organized into three major areas: 1) participant observation 
and ethnographic reflections; 2) formal and informal interviews; and 3) an extensive 
scholarly review.  This design allowed for the integration of interviews and observation 
based on qualitative fieldwork through formal, semi-structured and informal interviews, 
as well as participant observations in my navigation of the city, organizations and cultural 
events, and personal reflections that documented the experiences of conducting 
fieldwork/research. Additionally, extensive scholarly reviews were undertaken on global 
cities literature, as well as work on Gulf studies, and I participated in two major Gulf 
studies conferences in 2012 held in the United Kingdom (UK).  
 
 First, in terms of participant observation I explored the multiplicity of social 
interactions between different subjects through navigating diverse sites in the city, and 
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reflections about my experiences as a researcher and visitor navigating the city. Some of 
the spaces included locally organized community events with artists, local galleries, 
social clubs, private corporate functions, malls, public institutions, university campuses, 
taxi, buses and the Metro, hotels, malls, and various other social meeting spaces. This 
was done consciously in an attempt to engage a diverse range of informants and 
document a variety of different groups and backgrounds. These observations were 
documented with extensive written notes, which were then supplemented with 
ethnographic reflections on the places and people, as well as structures and access to 
various spaces in the UAE. In addition, I collected and examined an extensive range of 
artifacts, including for example, popular news media, which circulated stories and 
information related to the themes of migrant workers, expats and Emiratis. The outcome 
of all of this data collection was approximately a hundred pages of field notes and 
reflections, which were written up during the three months of intensive fieldwork. These 
insights are referenced throughout the dissertation as ‘Fieldwork Notes 2011’. In 
addition, since much of this work is about experiential insights, it was important to keep 
note of the ways in which my subjectivity both as a researcher and visitor were 
implicated in the work. I documented these experiences in a more personal account and 
have shared this throughout the dissertation as an integral methodological feature of 
undertaking fieldwork that illustrates the ‘becoming’ and undoing of self as researcher 
and subject, referenced here as ‘YYZ (Toronto Pearson International Airport) to DXB 
(Dubai International Airport) Diary 2011’.  
 
 The second major data set came from formal and informal interviews that were 
carried out from April to August 2011, and which compose the primary insights of the 
study. These interviews were based on a multi-pronged, multi-sited research design, 
which includes 20 formal interviewees with expats, 11 formal and informal interviews 
with Emirati citizens, and 17 informal interviews with low waged migrant workers. The 
formal interviews were based on semi-structured questions, which were organized into 
two areas: demographic questions such as country of origin, employment history and 
current employment, living situation, how long have they been in the UAE. The second 
part of the questions was based on open-ended questions that allowed subjects to narrate 
	 27	
their own journey to the UAE and to highlight some key experiences and interactions 
with various other categories. These interviews were open-ended in the sense that they 
would be guided by questions such as: how and why they chose to come to the UAE, 
their views on working conditions and labour policies in the UAE, their relationships to 
other sectors and categories of society. In addition, interviewees were located primarily 
through an organic process whereby existing contacts and professors working in the UAE 
were able to provide contacts to others to identify. They were contacted with different 
emails that contained the broad parameters of the study and major research questions 
(Appendix A).  
 While conducting interviews was a key method in allowing participants from 
different sectors to reflect on their experiences, it is significant to note that the majority of 
formal, recorded interviews were conducted with expats and Emirati citizens, while all 
low waged migrant workers were engaged through informal interviews that were 
immediately documented and analyzed on the day of the interview. The differences here 
are tied to the difficulties for low waged workers to meet outside of work, and the 
tremendous insecurities they face with their precarious status, making formal interviews 
dangerous for their livelihoods.  
 Once formal interviews were arranged with Emiratis and expats, a location was 
agreed upon, primarily in public settings such as coffee shops, while low waged migrants 
were engaged at their places of employment or nearby on their ‘breaks’ outside of the 
surveillance of their employers. Formal interviews began with an introduction of the 
research questions, background information on my objectives and key terms (Appendix 
B). Each participant was informed of their right to terminate the interview whenever they 
might choose, with no consequence or harm. I garnered verbal consent after answering 
any questions they might have about the study, risks and dangers of participation, and 
how to gain access to the work after completion.  
 The interview questions were designed to explore how subjects understood the 
city of Dubai itself, within a broader global context. In particular, the questions asked 
subjects to reflect on how Dubai is understood globally and if and in what ways Dubai 
can or is understood as a ‘global city’. This concept was not defined but was left open 
ended to allow subjects to articulate how global status was defined and understood 
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through their experience. To encourage participants to reflect on their experiences with 
these issues it was important to tailor interview questions to suit their broad experiences. 
Interviews with ‘local’ Emirati citizens asked them to reflect on three areas: personal 
experiences/history, focused analysis and a general perspective area. In the first section, 
they were asked to describe their family history and origins with regard to being born 
citizens or becoming citizens, how citizenship and nationality operated, experiences of 
growing up in Dubai for an Emirati, insights into the society and culture of Dubai, how 
they related to labourers and expat professionals within Dubai, to describe some of the 
issues facing each group, what factors impacted the life and experiences of different 
groups and how the local population related generally to the migrant majority population 
and the impacts of this demographic composition of the UAE on Emiratis (Appendix C).  
For the expat sector, the same three general areas of questions were tailored to 
reflect on the migration experience, as well as the imagining of Dubai before they came, 
and how this changed, was confirmed or challenged on arrival (Appendix D). In addition, 
participants were asked to consider the major push factors that motivated migration, and 
the pull factors that encouraged them towards Dubai. Comparisons were sought between 
home countries and Dubai. In the focused analysis, they were asked to consider dominant 
narratives or ideas about Dubai and how their experiences would either challenge or 
confirm these ideas. Additionally, they were asked to discuss Dubai as a global city, and 
the factors that contribute to this status, as well as how Dubai had changed since they 
came, and the issues they faced in the city itself. They were also asked to discuss the 
societal structure and cultural elements of the city, focusing on the two major city-states 
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The ‘relationship to other sectors’ was most significant here as 
they were able to reflect on being in the middle of the hierarchy between locals and 
labourers in the workforce. Additionally, this group was also asked to consider the idea of 
‘belonging’ in Dubai, as well as how or whether nationality or citizenship status impacted 
their lives while in the city. Finally, in the general perspectives, they were asked to 
discuss the ‘personality of Dubai’ and how the idea of the ‘American dream’ had been 
taken up in Dubai with reference to the ‘Dubai Dream’? And whether there was such 
thing as a Dubai Dream, or Dubai Dreams?  
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While this category represents the most extensive set of interview data, it is 
significant to note that in the analysis that is presented here, the insights from each 
category are analyzed in relation to both extensive scholarly data and reports from 
notable international organizations. Thus, I attempt to balance the analysis against too 
heavy an influence from just one set of interviewees by recognizing the diversity within 
categories of residents; and by analyzing each group in relation to the factors that shape 
its experience, both as they discussed, and through data on the histories of migration, the 
international political economy and urban development, and insights into forms of power 
such as race, class, gender, and nationality. Furthermore, the questions and analysis put 
these different categories into conversation with each other and pushed us to recognize 
that identities and hierarchies are created in relation to each other and the 
interdependencies and intricacies cannot therefore be separated.  
 Informal interviews were conducted with the majority of low waged migrant 
workers, who face the harshest conditions and have the fewest entitlements. As 
anticipated from my research design, access to conduct long interviews in a formal 
process with these workers would not have been possible or desirable, as many work 
extremely long days, moved from ‘home’ to work on transportation provided by 
employers, or have limited opportunity/mobility to move or meet outside of their work, 
whether on a construction site, in an employee housing unit or, in the case of domestic 
workers, within a home. The majority of these interviews, in particular those with taxi 
drivers and workers on public transportation, domestic workers, service sector workers in 
malls and restaurants, workers in government run offices and lavatories and workers on 
construction sites were conducted informally through whatever access was possible and 
through informally through whatever access was possible and through informal 
conversations in a mix of English, Hindi, and Arabic. All of these included a set of 
standard basic questions to begin conversations including how long have you been 
working in Dubai? What motivated you to come here? How is Dubai imagined? How do 
you describe your work and life while in Dubai?  In addition, other personal and 
background information was obtained through conversations, directed in large part by 
what was significant to each participant. This method allowed subjects great openness to 
articulate what they saw as important to share, and how they might understand their own 
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experience. These interviews were some of the most insightful experiences as subjects 
directed conversations based on their own personal experiences and their interests, issues 
or opinions.  
 In methodological terms, these sets of interview data are remarkably complex.  
Each of these three categories of subjects was integral to a deep and nuanced 
understanding of socio-economic-spatial relations within the global city. Taken together, 
they offer us insights into a variety of diverse subjects as they negotiate their own 
identities and social locations. They connect individuals from the local, to the national, 
regional and global, and allow us to pursue different scales of analysis from the personal 
and everyday accounts, to their implications within the social as it is shaped and shapes 
national policy and global constructions and imagining of Dubai as a ‘global city’. From 
these data sets we can see that Dubai very simply is a space of multiple worlds that are 
conflicting and adapting, ordinary, peaceful and conflating, while simultaneously 
conflicting, colliding and erupting.  As we will continue to see, the space of the ordinary 
and mundane ‘everyday’ is a significant and radical methodological shift that allows us to 
glean the global and national from the local within a matrix of experiences.  
 The third area of data is based on an extensive review of scholarly work in a range 
of areas. The first area can be broadly understood as works on the political science, 
economics and history of ‘globalization’, spanning themes of political economy, 
‘development’, migration, citizenship and labour studies. Another area is related 
specifically to the ‘global city’, where I have compiled an extensive review of literature 
in three broad areas: some ‘key’ (dominant) global city scholars, critiques of the global 
city thesis, and global city analysis of new Asian and Gulf cities, with Dubai as a specific 
focus. The third major area is a review of works in a range of scholarly disciplines and 
popular mediums on the context of the Gulf region, with a specific focus on the United 
Arab Emirates and Dubai. 
 In addition to these literature reviews I attended two important scholarly 
conferences on Gulf Studies in 2012 - the Gulf Studies Conference hosted by the Center 
for Gulf Studies at Exeter University; and the Gulf Research Meeting organized by the 
Gulf Research Center held at the University of Cambridge.  
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 Important here to note is that as fieldwork unfolded and the analysis of collected 
data began, the theme of the ‘global city’ became an increasingly central/focal point in 
understanding the relationships between individuals and their motivations for migration, 
as well as in understanding the relationships between sectors and the global location of 
Dubai - geographically, economically, politically and ideologically. Therefore, it became 
an important anchoring point in understanding the many layers and levels that constitute 
the space of Dubai. As a result, the attempt to compartmentalize the levels of analysis for 
the proposal, as a way to address the major levels of influences involved in constructing 
the research process, was challenged by the simultaneity of social relations, which 
became the major force in narrating lived experience of workers across sectors. This 
simultaneity was also tied to the anchoring of the ‘global city’ as the analytic tool in 
developing an analysis of how subjects relate to the city and create the city, and are 
created as subjects of the city. Furthermore, the lived experiences of different subjects, 
conceptualized in part as ‘dreams’ of and within the city, are in turn related to 
experiences and understandings of the globality of Dubai.   
 In addition, the analysis of this data is presented throughout the dissertation 
through the integration of diverse narratives that are used as the theoretical threads that 
connect the various subjects and insights, written with the intention of piecing together 
parts of living histories that would allow us to understand the epistemological 
underpinnings of different subjectivities. In addition, it attempts to add complexity to 
debates surrounding exploitation and violence by presenting the insights of various 
subjects whose narratives neither necessarily reject nor accept popular discourse on the 
subject of workers’ rights, but instead highlight complex negotiations including 
considerations often overlooked in traditional labour studies, or international political 
economy. The focus on these tensions also highlights the need to question top down, 
Eurocentric attempts to exceptionalize the context, often based on racist notions of Arab 
and Muslim ‘otherness’ in the contemporary period, and also to question international 
human rights based or developmental attempts to expose exploitation without historical 
considerations. Taken together we will see the relational nature of power and privilege, 
which implicates a larger genealogy based on colonial and imperial projects, as they 
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become embedded in contemporary neoliberalism and globalization, allowing for masked 
complicity through the glamour of contemporary globality.  
 
Section Two: Fieldwork Reflections 
 As noted previously, the data for the dissertation brings together different forms 
of research, including formal and informal interviews, a rich body of insights as a 
researcher in the form of a diary, a collection of cultural materials including print, film 
and participation in various artistic spaces, in social spaces such as malls, restaurants and 
in public transport, in exhibitions, airports and work places, homes and social gatherings. 
Some of the first narrations of my experiences within the first few weeks of arriving in 
Dubai were documented and contrasted with experiences and insights that evolved 
throughout the course of fieldwork. Here I will highlight two major areas of insight: first, 
some experiences that impact the researcher in the field, both as a visitor to the city and 
also as an academic. Together these roles intertwine in interesting ways with often 
profound consequences revealed in both mental and physical ways that can be seen as 
part of the methodological considerations that shape the collection and analysis of data. 
In the second area of insight, we can consider some theoretical notes on broader findings 
and analyses that emerge from the experiences of research and from an analysis of 
interviews which together become significant insights for the project but also for the 
process of conducting research more generally.  
 In reflecting on my position, I considered my role as a researcher, my status as a 
Western passport holding, non-white, yet somewhat racially ‘ambiguous’ woman, 
entering as a relatively privileged ‘professional’ expat, all of which shaped my level of 
access and entitlement in the city. However, simultaneously my status as a researcher 
made me vulnerable to surveillance and induced, at times, a sense of fear in political 
participation. The reflections implicate both social and cultural experiences of navigating 
different spaces and also raise questions regarding methodology and the ways in which 
many Eurocentric/western-centric assumptions often erase other knowledges, the barriers 
in communication and access to certain people and places, and the general feelings of 
belonging, otherness, privilege and lack there of. 
	 33	
 The following themes begin with those considerations related to fieldwork and 
research, which inform the project, followed by considerations of the theorization of 
these different narratives and experiences. These themes do not summarize the findings 
of this dissertation but rather offer windows into the experience and influencing factors 
on fieldwork both in terms of methodological and theoretical considerations.  
 Passports and privilege.   
 “What passport?” asked an Emirati airport official dressed in a crisp white 
 dishdasha, as he texted on his phone. “Over there”, pointing to an enormous line, 
 comprising primarily South Asian and Filipino passengers. I turn with a look of 
 confusion as groups of white passengers are directed to the empty lanes adjacent 
 to us (Fieldwork Notes 2011).  
 
 The organization of nationalities begins upon arrival into DXB as you are shuffled 
into different lines based on passports. GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) citizens enter 
into their own private expedited section; and all EU, United States and other privileged 
nations citizens enter in another area, right next to the area where all ‘Others’ are sent. At 
the time of this fieldwork, Canadians had lost their special status due to conflict between 
the Canada and the UAE states, one consequence being the mandatory visa requirements 
and loss of military related arrangements5. There is an immediate sense of privilege 
present in the arrangement of nationalities, and the racial and class based elements are 
extremely apparent, as the majority of ‘Others’ are labourers and other less privileged 
working class migrants primarily from the ‘third world’. Very easily, the broader global 
economic system is made apparent in major world airports such as DXB.  
 Noticing the confusion on my face, the official says, “Canadians have to wait.”  
 “Leh astana” (why are we waiting?), my partner asks 
 “Your government” he replies without looking up from his iPhone screen.  
 “Eh el moshkila? Khalas ma’thebena” he jokes (Why? You don’t like us 
 anymore?) 
 He looks up and smiles with a warm and polite smirk, then turns to join a group of 
 fellow  Emirati workers huddled together chatting and laughing on the side. 
 Despite this setback, there is a sense that you do not belong in this line by  virtue 
 of your citizenship status, there is a privileged sense of entitlement that engulfs 
 you as you wait next to masses of labourers. You feel the difference. You feel the 
 insecurity of some, and the entitlements of others (Fieldwork Notes 2011).  
																																																								
5 These visa policies were adjusted in 2013, when the government of the UAE announced that Canadians 
would no longer require special visas to travel, once again elevating the status of Canadian nationals to that 
of other privileged categories. While these changes did not effect my experience, it is significant to note the 
changes and how this impacts the status of Canadian citizens as a privileged group once again.   
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 As an interesting note, my partner’s visa was garnered through work contacts in 
the UAE, who did not physically bring the visa to the airport that evening. However, with 
a little bit of conversation, UAE officials allowed him to enter the country by leaving his 
passport with them on the condition that he would return the next day to present his 
documents and retrieve his passport. The shock of the informality with which such an 
agreement was made continued to shake me for the rest of the night. Coming from the 
West in a climate of intense regulation of particular identities such as Arabs and Muslims 
in general, there is a growing sense of uneasiness and trepidation with regards to travel 
and securitization.  
 What are the odds that someone named Mohamed, born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 
 would  be allowed to enter without a proper visa? In the West he would have been 
 held in a detention center as a criminal attempting to deceive the government with 
 false documents. I felt a sense of relief in the moment and on early reflection. 
 What a nice change I thought, a young Muslim man not being the extreme target 
 of border regulation. It felt radical in the moment. Later on I would realize that 
 this is how they dupe you. (Fieldwork Notes, 2011) 
 
 On reflection of this experience, it was clear that there was an immediate 
difference in the obvious ways that ‘Muslimness’ is understood and experienced, 
markedly different than in the West, because you do not face the same obvious, 
immediate, and rampant Islamaphobia. However, as you realize, this acceptance is 
contingent on other markers of identity such as class, race, and nationality. Thus, within 
the broad category of the ‘Umma’ (global Muslim community), where you are from 
continues to over-determine the degree of privileges or belonging you experience. For 
instance, as a Muslim you may feel a sense of community, as an Arab a sense of 
confidence in communication, but as an Egyptian or Palestinian this is lessened as your 
nationality is seen as a marker of class, as an Indian, racialized representations permeate 
your experiences, but as a wealthy Indian you may feel a relative sense of privilege in 
some ways as you are able to buy/consume your way into ‘belonging’ and then 
simultaneously you may then be dehumanized again through discrimination in finding a 
home or deskilling at the workplace. The intersections and complexities are infinite but 
the deception looms ever present, and extreme measures of surveillance silently ensure 
compliance.    
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 Upon arrival, setting up a temporary life in the city was generally an easy 
experience, although communication was often a difficult element to overcome in daily 
interactions. The dominant language of communication was English though this was 
infused with a range of other languages, as one subject remarked, “Everyone here speaks 
a broken version of English, Arabic, Hindi, Urdu and Tagalog”. The search for an 
apartment, car and phone number was seamless. Much of the city is set up for these types 
of transitory stays, daily, weekly, and monthly rentals are common, though highly 
contingent on what passport you hold.  
 
 Altruism as activism.  “Dubai is great, it’s easy to feel like a good person” (Sean, 
American). Referring to the altruistic feelings generated by living in a city dominated by 
exploitative and unequal relationships between sectors of the population, one interviewee 
exclaimed that Dubai allows one to become a selfless person by virtue of simple, 
everyday politeness. The basic nature of this altruism is considered in the context of 
intense hierarchical relations that often create master-servant dynamics that are ongoing 
topics of uneasiness for some, affirmation for others and intense conversation for many in 
the city. As Davis argues in his discussion of social hierarchies in Dubai, “Dubai is expert 
at catering to colonial nostalgia” (Davis, 2006). 
 In many ways it is found that subjects come to know themselves, in terms of 
privilege and identity in relation to others. This relationality is most obviously articulated 
in the case of altruistic feeling emerging through interactions between expats and low 
waged migrant workers. One immediately enters into a state of privilege and entitlement 
in relation to Others, which in turn allows one the power to ‘smile’ or speak to those 
serving with a polite demeanor and tone that is then internalized as an altruistic gesture, 
reaffirming the innocence of expat subjects who conveniently remove themselves from 
any responsibility.   
The idea of ‘responsibility’ is linked to the state and local Emirati citizens who 
are the only sectors of the population with formal access to citizenship, and thus to 
belonging and state sponsored entitlements. Many expats feel in a state of perpetual 
temporariness because of this lack of belonging and exclusion from formal political 
participation and with it the lack of ability, or need, to speak, work or advocate for social 
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and policy changes. This in turn, as I argue, generates a sense of innocence on the part of 
expats who feel no responsibility for perpetuating social hierarchies. While it is true that 
they have no avenue to political participation, as we will see, their role in upholding 
hierarchies of entitlement and their benefiting from the low waged labour of migrant 
workers continue to uphold their privileged status in ways that are far from passive. Thus, 
complacency can be seen as a form of complicity, which must be considered in 
understanding how power and privilege are made into everyday realities. From this 
position, as many interviewees alluded, simple ‘politeness’ can become contextualized 
into a form of ‘activism’ that allows the privileged an entry into absolution. Many 
subjects remarked in subtle, and not so subtle, ways that their response to the inequality 
of relationships between workers and themselves was rectified because of their personal 
better ‘treatment’ of individual people. Better treatment is expressed as “She is like a part 
of our family”; “We love our worker”; “She gets a day off every week”; “She can’t go 
out after work, in case something happens to her”; or “She gets a place to live, food to eat 
and a ticket to visit back home.” These statements are seen to justify the confiscation of 
passports, substandard living quarters, unlimited working hours, differential standards of 
pay, and countless other ‘exceptions’ which are said to protect workers, benefit them, or 
be ‘enough’ or ‘acceptable’ for them. ‘Enough’ and ‘acceptable’ are of course based on 
where the workers are from and the commonly held misconceptions about ‘back home’. 
As we will examine later, policies and programs also work to structure these relationships 
in a way that enforces unequal relationships, such as the linking of sponsorship for 
workers to employer visas through the Kafala sponsorship system that makes employers 
‘responsible’ and fearful of reprisal from any wrongdoings or harm to ‘their’ workers.  
The forms, outcomes and factors influencing these relationships will be discussed at 
length, but of critical importance here is the way that privilege allows for a sense of 
accomplishment when, for example, expats attempt to perform their kindness through the 
mere changing of tone or gesture towards ‘Others’. This in turn generates a feeling of 
altruism, often seen as a source of ‘activism’, in which these behaviours are seen as 
radically different from the socially acceptable behaviours of treating the working classes 
in derogatory and degrading ways. However, critical reflection on these insights can 
argue that altruism and egotism are here conflated allowing privileged parts of the 
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population to see themselves as benevolent and beyond systemic forms of inequality and 
encouraging a popular form of privileged absolution that continues to support and benefit 
from a system of rigid social inequality.  
 
 On paranoia, safety and other myths of Dubai. While many of my fears never 
materialized in the particular ways that they were imagined, they often impacted my 
outlooks on research, who I would engage with, who I would avoid, and they most 
definitely impacted how I spoke with people I had just met, what information I would 
share, and what topics I would discuss. As such, these fears became very real. As Smith 
(2010) argues, “one cannot understand why Dubai’s landscape has emerged as it has and 
does the work that it does without recognizing the transformative impacts of multiple 
trajectories and varieties of fear” (Smith, 2010, 264).  Through his examination of 
landscapes, he argues that fear can become a major locus of operation, highlighting 
several types of fear such as anxieties about Arab Gulf prosperity understood through 
orientalist representations of the Arab ‘Other’, fears of oil running out, fears of migrant 
dependency or fears of ‘bachelors’. Thus, fear, in its multiplicity and diversity, flows 
through the landscapes of Dubai (Smith, 2010, 279). Furthermore, in thinking through 
how fear impacted the fieldwork process we can, as Smith argues, “trace our fears back 
through the landscape and see how they work in order to enliven the object we study” 
(Smith, 2010, 280).  
 One major example of how Dubai presents itself through a myth of security and 
safety is as “the safest city in the world” (Zain, Egyptian). There are constant references 
to the ‘safety’ of the city by expats. However, the part of the city in which one stands 
definitely shapes experiences and notions of security and safety. I never considered 
conducting fieldwork in the UAE a dangerous endeavour, but the context was shifting 
with the Arab Spring revolutions underway and political tensions high. I was continually 
disciplined in many ways to not fall for the false sense of freedom and security that the 
city blanketed you with. In my first meeting, a Professor at Zayed University cautioned 
me about ‘sensitive’ topics, particularly for a researcher without a local institutional 
affiliation. He warned me to proceed with caution. “There is a tremendous false sense of 
security”, he warned. “There is always surveillance, although most often invisible, it does 
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not mean that it is not happening”. He continued, “Trust me. You do not want to go to jail 
here.” He also made reference to a colleague who had recently been jailed for a book he 
wrote (Fieldwork Notes, 2011).  
 In another meeting with a female professor from the American University in 
Sharjah, a conversation about academic life led to her criticisms related to a lack of 
security, tenure and academic freedom. She explained, “You can’t say whatever you 
want… you are very restricted” (Fieldwork Notes, 2011). She explained that her most 
recent project proposal with another Professor was rejected (since research needs 
institutional approval) because of the sensitive context related to the Arab Spring. 
Jumping between themes, she abruptly turned to me and said, “Did you know that Black 
Water has a contingent here?” (Fieldwork Notes, 2011).  As it turned out later, it was in 
fact true that the UAE government had recently hired 800 private forces to supplement 
the UAE military (Sengupta, 2011). The interweaving of academic and political 
freedoms, and increasing securitization and militarization were significant themes in the 
perpetuation of regimes of fear.  
 Another Canadian expat working in Dubai highlighted the general fear or 
trepidation of expats, particularly white, often British, who are afraid of and frustrated by 
rules that they believe can get them into trouble because of their lack of knowledge. “You 
can get in trouble a lot by mistake,” (Sean, Canadian) remarked.  
 My friend who had been in Dubai for a year was driving in a rental car from 
 Dubai to Abu Dhabi when he was in a pretty severe car accident. He was fine 
 physically, but the car was a write off, and normally, insurance for the rental car 
 would cover the loss, but in this case, the police found a bottle of alcohol in the 
 trunk and this is illegal in the UAE.  As a result, his insurance policy with the 
 rental company was invalidated and he was forced to repay the fine, and cost of 
 the vehicle on his own. (Sean, Canadian) 
 
 So in this case his friend spent the next year working to repay the rental company 
for the car because of a ‘simple’ mistake of not knowing the rules. “He was so afraid. He 
couldn’t even go home,” he continued.  
 During fieldwork, I often wrote about the many stories and experiences/feelings 
of paranoia, which were intensified after my interactions with numerous professors 
working in the UAE. I wrote many times in my reflections that I did not know if this 
sense of insecurity was real, in that it never materialized in my time there through arrest 
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or deportation but, nevertheless, the idea that one is not protected by any political rights 
left me with a sense of fear that impacted how I proceeded with my interviews, who I 
contacted, and what I discussed with people I did not know and thus did not trust. I found 
myself often checking over my shoulder, questioning whether I was being followed, 
ripping up outlines or questionnaires and reviewing and deleting data from my hard drive 
as fast as possible. At times I found myself redefining my research as an exploratory 
work examining the globality of the city, and how people understood their experiences 
and relationship to each other, making sure to exclude any more critical questions. 
Whether or not these fears were ‘real’ become increasingly less relevant as I watered 
down my preambles and refused to carry with me research papers or information I 
collected. Consider the following example from my experience conducting fieldwork 
where I believed that I was being followed by two police officers,  
I pulled up to the villa, sweating and short of breath, as if I had been running in 
the fifty-degree heat. I ran to the door, unlocked it and tried to rip off my shoes as 
I tripped towards the room. I closed the door and locked it. Damn it, I thought. 
There are no curtains. I grabbed a few cushions from the couch and put them up o 
block the last bit of light and sat silently in the dark, listening and waiting for a 
knock. Some time passed, and the officers I imagined never materialized. I slowly 
turned on the lamp, noticing my shaky hands. Opened my bag and pulled out the 
papers. “Great!” I thought to myself,  “Are you an idiot?” Research questionnaires 
and consent scripts piled casually into my purse. I sat for an hour quietly and 
methodically tearing them into thousands of tiny pieces. (YYZ to DXB Diary, 
2011)  
 
 This particular entry was written at the culmination of two months of paranoid 
conversations with different professors and interviewees. On this particular evening, I 
had stopped by Spinney’s, a British supermarket chain, against the advice of my friend 
who told me that only ‘snobby British people’ shop there for overpriced goods. I went 
anyways to explore this space, and he was right, white Brits everywhere I looked 
shopping in their mini dresses and flip flops, with their posh steps and civilized 
demeanors, gathering prepackaged, ready to heat dinners. Then I noticed two police 
officers enter the store after me.  
I made eye contact with one officer and looked away quickly. I quickly got a 
paranoid anxiety wondering, what if they are following me? I made my quick 
purchase and darted out of the store, in my rental car and back on the road. I tried 
to talk myself out of my paranoia. I am not doing anything wrong? Am I? I plan 
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what I am going to say before I get caught. I have to note that I am generally 
already a pretty paranoid person, growing up with a single mother fleeing an 
abusive relationship, living in a sexist, misogynist society where stories of rape 
and assault against women are a daily occurrence, especially for women of colour 
who know that our bodies are seen as more exploitable and  disposable, often 
leaves us pretty fearful of the potential of violence. On my drive home, I noticed 
the two officers in an unmarked car behind me. I was terribly afraid. When I 
turned onto my street, I spotted another cop car that was unmarked, and this 
seemed to confirm to me that something was happening. I felt stupid, but also 
afraid. After I  finished tearing up my proposal and questionnaires, I put them into 
a plastic bag, which I tied tight and shoved to the bottom of a large garbage pail. I 
then uploaded my data to my email and deleted any traces of it from my 
computer. (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011) 
 
 That night, I slept in fear of who might come knocking. Although, no one actually 
came, this was another case where whether or not the threat was real, the possibilities 
existed enough to create a real sense of fear. It felt real. And it was possible. Whatever it 
was, it worked. The intended outcome of surveillance was achieved. It disciplined my 
behaviour by making me constantly question my security, and most definitely changed 
how I spoke about my project from then on.  
 Insecure and Inadequate.  
 My rental car is really slow. It’s new…just really, really slow. Or so it feels. It’s 
 probably just relative. This must be the millionth time I am driving on Sheikh 
 Zayed road, trying to  change lanes, when I get cut off by some massive SUV… 
 Mercedes, BMW, Porsche, Range Rovers, and who even knows what else. You 
 name it. I have been cut off by it.  Every time it happens, I find myself just 
 barely escaping being run off the road and every time I find myself lamenting, “I 
 am a human being too!” Though I am careful to heed the warning of a friend, 
 “Don’t ever give anyone the finger on the road. You never  know who it is. It 
 could be a local…  and then you’re screwed”. So I always swallow it and 
 continue on down the road feeling less important, less valuable, less capable, 
 less human than them… albeit still with the privilege of driving a car… just not 
 equal and not good enough. (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011) 
 
 There were many moments while living in the city when I found myself re-
evaluating my self worth. I found myself questioning the basis on which to demand 
respect. To consider the basic fact of my humanity? Nationality?  Education? With a lack 
of political and civic rights for the majority of the population, one feels a sense of 
insecurity in understanding their sense of self worth as a ‘non’/member of a place to 
which you are continually reminded that you do not ‘belong’. Many interviewees and 
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scholars I interviewed mentioned that belonging in Dubai is contingent upon 
consumption, and this was reinforced by many experiences I shared during fieldwork.  
 You can never be pretty enough, skinny enough, rich enough… but no one cares 
 if you  are smart. Or at least it feels like no one cares about anything. So, things 
 are superficial, what else is new? So is the rest of the world, except, there is 
 something different in how that pressure feels here, because there is no other basis 
 from which to claim your legitimacy or access. Not through rights, or obligations, 
 or universality. You can’t yell back demanding to be treated with equal respect as 
 other people who are dressed well on the basis of some kind of relative 
 universality of our humanity, because that is not in fact recognized in any legal or 
 political way as a right or truth. (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011) 
 
 The seeming neoliberal dream being lived in Dubai pushes us to question how 
power operates to discipline different subjects, as Davis argues, “Dubai, indeed, has 
achieved what American reactionaries only dream of - an oasis of free enterprise without 
income taxes, trade unions or opposition parties (there are no elections)” (Davis, 2006, 
61). What is the basis on which one knows oneself in relation to other people and to the 
place? How does it feel to be in a place where there are always more possibilities of 
wealth, all the time, all day? Is it possible as one informant asked, “to not get caught up 
in the life?” to not strive for the ‘Dubai dream’. However different this may be for 
different people, the overarching reach remains the same. As a researcher I felt insecurity 
for particular reasons; as a visitor and as a women I felt it again, and again, continually 
reminding you that you are inadequate, and as a result you become insecure in more ways 
than one.  
 
 Epistemology, Subjectivity, Inculcation and Consumption. Inculcation is 
understood generally as a process of influencing oneself into particular ways of being or 
knowing through continuous or repetitive mention or action, influenced by environmental 
conditioning. Ontology is understood as the philosophy of understanding the nature of 
being, becoming, reality and categories of being and their relations (Stanley and Wise, 
1993, 190), whereas ‘epistemology’ is a framework for understanding the “constitution 
and generation of knowledge about the social world; that is, it concerns how to 
understand the nature of ‘reality’” (Stanley and Wise, 189).  Although there are important 
distinctions between the two, as the theory of knowing and the theory of being, it is 
important to note that it is not possible to separate the two entirely. Thus, throughout the 
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analysis, mention of ontological constructions refers to the making of particular 
subjectivities, in effect influencing notions of their being through particular 
epistemological frameworks, and ‘knowledge’ based on ideological constructions of race, 
gender and class for example. Subjectivity is understood as “historically and socially 
contingent, shaped in and through social relations, as contradictory and fragmentary, 
inherently unstable and in constant flux” (Thobani, 2007, 8). Many contemporary 
theories draw upon Foucault’s theorizations regarding modern subjectivity as shaped by 
knowledge and power within discursive formations. Thus, as Thobani explains, Foucault 
discussed the constitution of the human being in the modernist guise of the individuated 
‘subject’ through disciplinary power called bio-power (Thobani, 8). Foucault argued that 
disciplinary forms of knowledge produced about/by this subject organize the particular 
“field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse 
comportments may be realized” and that power shapes the “parameters for 
subjection/subjectification” (Thobani, 8). Thus, subjectivity cannot be understood 
without situating it in the context of discursive power. In modernity, technologies of 
government changed from the “prohibition of participation acts to life-controlling and 
subject-shaping management of action” (Thobani, 8). This knowledge/power nexus 
produces the subject as an effect of power. From here, Thobani then goes on to argue that 
nationality has been used as technology of exaltation with important and significant 
consequences.  
 In the example here, we can consider patterns of consumption and how they 
impact/influence ways of being based on access to, and consumption of, various goods 
and services. In turn we can consider how these ideological and routinized behaviours 
and ways of being influence the making of different subjectivities, supported by the 
epistemological considerations that explain and justify the hierarchical impacts.  
 Life in the city can be disciplined by many different elements, such as policy, 
citizenship status, employment, or nationality, but an overarching form of inculcation 
occurs through consumption. Scholars have examined consumption as a form of 
conspicuous belonging (Kanna, 2010; Vora, 2008). Those who have the power to 
consume more than others become more worthy of entitlement and wield a greater sense 
of belonging than those who lack the ability to consume in the same manner. The 
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glittering malls, cafes, five star resorts and restaurants, shiny new high-rises, or expensive 
cars all elude exclusivity and privilege, which is tied intimately to consumption patterns.  
But it is by this same logic that individuals are also disciplined by what they do not have 
as there are always going to be others who have more. This constant reference to what 
one does not have also works to shape subjectivity. 
 Through these mechanisms of social organization and discipline it seems people 
become alienated from themselves and each other. People feel a sense of loss to 
determine their lives and to define their relationships to others. As one subject mentioned, 
"Living here for too long does something to you. You change from being a social being 
to one who sees others only as tools, as instruments to meet your needs...", "Why? 
Because you can and because they have no choice" (Fieldwork Notes, 2011).  
 At the same time however, this ‘life’ is understood through a Western secular 
liberal humanism that informs us of the ‘good’ life governed by private ownership, 
accumulation of wealth and the individual liberties that go along with it, all governed by 
a dominant global capitalist logic. At many moments, subjects challenged this 
epistemology and instead highlighted alternate worldviews that created a different 
ontology, governed by radically different ideas of self. We can consider here how the self 
is understood through a non-secular teleology predicated upon an understanding of one’s 
place in a world that is not regulated by Western secular time. Though not homogenous 
in its organizing principle, there was a sense of relationality that appeared to be radically 
different. Questions and explanations related to this were ever present.  In a western 
capitalist worldview, freedom is understood in part as the liberties afforded to those under 
a system that allows for the accumulation of material wealth, a sense of ‘freedom to’, 
though in many encounters there was also a sense of ‘freedom from’ those pressures. 
Freedom to accumulate wealth is the individual liberty most respected under capitalist 
liberal democracies and the state must create the conditions for this dream as its 
foundational promise. However, in many of my encounters with low waged workers, I 
began to ask questions related to how ‘freedom’ was conceptualized,  
  Freedom to accumulate… freedom to indulge… freedom to explore the individual 
 in all  of its  desires… sex… money… freedom to… but what does freedom 
 from these things mean? Freedom from the excessive indulgences and 
 distractions of materiality and allure and promise of consumption and capital as 
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 the means of happiness… What about a freedom understood through a logic of 
 discipline and introspective reflexivity predicated upon humility and freedom 
 from the excesses of capitalism. (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011) 
 
 One interviewee presented an important example of an alternative worldview. 
Asked how Sheikhs and leaders alike can justify their wealth and support systems of 
exploitation and inequality, she remarked, “I just thank God that I have not been 
burdened with the responsibility of that money because God will make you account for 
every cent you spent and the responsibility and weight of that burden is more than we 
will know” (Dee, Canadian). She continued, “Those who are last in this life, will come 
first”. This challenges the constant drive to push for understandings predicated on the 
lack of material life as the lowest, most absolutely detrimental state one might be in, and 
which can only be rectified through a redistribution of wealth. So what is the goal, one 
subject asked, “So that we can all equally buy and consume things?” Another subject 
reminds himself that perhaps the reason the wealth he seeks has not found him, is 
“Maybe God is protecting me because he knows that I am not ready for the responsibility. 
Who knows what would happen if tomorrow I have a million dollars. I know myself right 
now. What if I get caught up in the ‘life’, cheat on my wife, start drinking and waste all 
the money. Everything is written. Everything is Naseeb. My share is my destiny” (Imad, 
Egyptian).  
 As a researcher this theme of how different notions of the self are informed 
through either consumption or alternative worldviews challenged me to deconstruct the 
desire I have to continually only, or primarily, think in terms of structure and systems. 
Many of these encounters with subjects pushed me to consider how a radically different 
starting place might impact on an understanding of the space. How can we think outside 
of these dominant logics? How/or can we imagine possibilities beyond them?  
 There were many key moments from subjects who narrated this alternative way of 
understanding their life in the city. One Bangladeshi boat driver named Yassin, on an 
afternoon on Bur Dubai creek told me, when asked about how he liked his life here, 
“Dubai offers me clean food, mosques to pray…” (Yassin, Bangladesh). Others, such as a 
Filipino nail technician discussed how migration to Dubai for work allowed her the 
ability to leave her husband back home and build a life for her children who are cared for 
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by her mother. With divorce not legal in the Philippines, millions of women unable to 
start a new life without ties to men who are no longer their partners see migration 
becomes a strategy to break away. There is an infinite number of possibilities often 
missed when we approach a particular subject with a singular lense and while we might 
say this can help in understanding the why or how of its occurrence, it need not colonize 
the way it is felt or lived.  
 I feel an intense frustration and tension with how severely I have been disciplined 
 to think through the predominant mode of understanding of structures and 
 systems. It limits what I can see and what I can hear, thankfully it hasn’t 
 colonized how I feel. What would it mean to start from a radically different 
 starting place? I am still caught thinking through the same logics I am trying 
 to deconstruct. How can one think outside or beyond these logics?  Part of these 
 limits is the place where they are being written and the ways that they have to be 
 organized and  translated into word, many encounters are far more  affective and 
 embodied.  How do we hold onto these feelings and view them as  legitimate 
 sources of knowledge, as Audre Lorde says, “our feelings are our most 
 genuine paths to knowledge” … but what if they can't be translated into 
 paragraphs? Can I hand in teardrops, smiles, anxiety and love for my 
 dissertation? (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011) 
 
 This was a question I wondered about at many moments during the fieldwork 
journey. If how we come to know others and ourselves matters, and how we articulate 
our position and subjectivity matters, how do we reconcile instances of those who do not 
articulate their ‘unfreedom’ in the same way?  Or perhaps as Zizek (2002) notes, the 
modes we know as ‘freedom’ seem/feel as such only because “We feel free because we 
lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom”? (Zizek, 2002, 16). We might not 
agree on what it means to be free, but we can agree on what it means to be unfree. Or can 
we? Furthermore, should we?  
 
Section Three: Key Theoretical Concepts and Methodological Tools.  
 This section begins by exploring the Power of Dreams in shaping migrant and 
urban developmental trajectories and explains how dreams emerged as a major theme and 
organizational tool. It then turns to an exploration of the Levels of Analysis, which also 
incorporates a discussion of key theoretical considerations, and operationalizes and 
contextualizes theoretical concepts that shape this analysis. This latter section is 
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organized and explained through three major levels of analysis that help to locate where, 
in the multilayered and multidimensional analysis of global city making in Dubai, they 
find their prominence.  
The first major methodological consideration is linked to an understanding of the 
‘simultaneity of social scales’, which operates to constitute the space(s) of Dubai itself 
and must be considered in its relational and simultaneous nature. ‘Social scales’ refer 
both to different levels of analysis, such as those presented here as ‘global’, ‘national’, 
and ‘local’, as well as their presence/absence across time and space. In the case of the 
latter, contemporary processes, movements and landscapes, most prominently 
emphasized here as ‘geographies’, are simultaneously conceptualized through 
genealogies, thus emphasizing the historical legacies and continuities, which are 
embedded in social structures and processes. In the structure that follows, the 
interactions, intersections and inter-dependencies between different scales of analysis are 
emphasized in the levels of analysis as global, national, and local. Methodologically, this 
commitment requires us to weave together the histories and narratives that follow through 
their intersections and relationality, and ultimately emphasizes the complexity in ‘lived’, 
social structures and processes. This is in part motivated by tendencies to privilege the 
‘global’, macro and most often, economic, as the primary force in the making of social 
processes. Importantly then, within these various scales, we find important theoretical 
considerations that emerge to shape the analysis, and in particular, the theoretical 
considerations of ‘geographies and genealogies’, linked to the methodological tool of 
‘unmapping’ in supporting the simultaneity of social scales, particularly those related to 
time and space, which emphasize the connections between past, present and future in the 
making of various landscapes, geographies and dreams.  
 
Power of dreams. The power of dreaming cannot be understated in relation to 
contemporary global city making. In the case of Dubai, dreams were a significant point of 
reference for the city’s development and for interviewees when discussing their 
motivations for migration. Organizing the dissertation through a sleep cycle led to 
interesting connections to dreaming, as well as to the way in which dreams are 
conceptualized more broadly in relation to Dubai. The dissertation is thus conceptualized 
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as a dreamscape in which the story of Dubai’s development builds alongside a sleep cycle 
in its quest towards dreaming, only to be awakened by the nightmarish global realities 
that undergird its developmental trajectory, which is embedded within a historically 
situated, uneven global economic system.  
 The creative process of thinking of dreams came from considering how dreams 
are popularly conceptualized. In this sense, dreams are often linked to ideas of ‘freedom’, 
conceptualized as an escape from reality, whereby the subconscious mind is able to 
unleash its boundless imagination in the safety of the dream state (Freud 1913/1900, Jung 
1963). In other ways, dreams are not just about sleep, but are understood as linked to 
conscious life, allowing us to imagine our worlds or selves beyond our existing realities. 
They are often considered aspirational or motivational and as part of imagining more, 
better or different worlds. In Freud’s analysis, dreams were “those poems we tell 
ourselves at night in order to experience our unconscious wishes as real” (Simons, 2009). 
For Freud, dreams were very simply understood as an unconscious wish (Freud, 
1913/1900) and although this idea has continued to be reproduced in popular culture, 
scholars have developed more nuanced reasons why dreaming occurs and its functions 
for our waking life. As Simons (2009) explains, “dreams allow us to be what we cannot 
be, and to say what we do not say, in our more repressed daily lives” (Simons, 2009). 
Thus, dreams here are conceptualized as providing a way to cope or deal with the 
limitations we experience in our waking lives by allowing us to imagine ourselves 
beyond its bounds. In addition, as we see here, dreams are also, whether built in our sleep 
or not, inspired or induced (made possible) by and in relation to Dubai itself. Thus, ideas 
of Dubai’s globality and landscapes are themselves tools in shaping how migrants 
imagine their futures. As one Filipina migrant worker explained, Dubai is a place that 
inspires dreams. Louisa wanted to bring her teenage son from the Philippines to Dubai so 
that he could dream of something beyond his everyday reality, and beyond the past, the 
‘third’ and impossible spaces of Otherness, and towards and into the ‘future’ and 
seemingly endless possibilities offered by the global city. Dubai’s landscapes inspire 
ideas and notions of possibility, of other worlds that may have been previously unknown. 
People dream to come, people come to dream, people are linked by their dreams of and 
from Dubai. Despite the many interesting ways that dreams can be conceptualized, the 
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power of dreams in general cannot be denied. As many have argued, dreams have no 
boundaries and this makes them significant worlds of influence, allowing us to imagine 
things beyond our current realities, and inducing desires towards future attainment. Thus, 
the dissertation considers dreams in multiple ways and for different subjects, examining 
how dreams link different migrants and how dreams are built into the city’s landscapes. 
Thus, the focus of dreams related to Dubai all connect to ‘global city’ status, which gives 
direction and shapes the city’s developmental trajectory and inspires migrant 
geographies.   
To consider the significance of dreams in both physiological and imaginative 
understandings, we might ask a basic, yet profound, question as to why we dream. Breus 
(2015) notes that there is no one reason but rather a number of theories that span many 
disciplines such as psychiatry, psychology and neurobiology. Here, I emphasize the idea 
that dreaming is linked to memory processes, and can be seen as an extension of waking 
consciousness such that we may reflect on experiences of waking life as constituting a 
space where we can work through difficult, complicated or unsettling thoughts, emotions 
or experiences. A brief overview of some major ideas related to dreaming can help 
explain the origins of popular representations of dreams and how contemporary science 
has added, challenged or enhanced these early understandings.  
Hobson (2009) notes that dreaming has been a source of fascination, mystifying 
humankind for ages. Early understandings of dreams were often tied to the content of 
dreams, often understood as ‘messages’ undeliverable in any other way (Hobson, 2002). 
Whether from religious thinking as messages from God, or artistic tools acting as 
vehicles for artistic expression (Hobson 2002, 2009, Bulkeley 2008, Patton 2004). Patton 
(2004) argues that ancient cultures understood dreams in profoundly different and more 
significant ways for living. They have been considered as spaces for healing and for 
understanding the future (Patton, 2004). She explains that the ancients saw dreams as 
“enigmatic parable”, highly valued, and often see as potentially divinely sent “fraught 
with meaning about the future, and having the potential to heal or offer solutions to life’s 
biggest problems” (Leddy, 2013). Thus, dreams were understood as spaces of healing and 
had the potential to impact waking life. From these early conceptualizations, explanations 
for dream content formed the basis of most, early theoretical insights on dreaming. For 
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the most part, psychoanalysis dominated this thinking (which occurred well before the 
discovery of REM linked to modern brain science), explaining dreams as part of 
repressed desires (Freud), and complex reasoning in relation to mythic narratives (Jung). 
This thinking is seen in opposition to contemporary brain science which largely 
challenges the idea that dreaming is “meaningful, privileged, and interpretable 
psychologically”, and rather argues that dreams are the “simple reflection of the sleep-
related changes in brain state” (Hobson, 2002, 1-2).  
 For Freud (1913/1900) “the interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a 
knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind” (Freud, 1913, 608).  In his 
understanding, all dreams were the fulfilment of unconscious wishes or desires that were 
repressed in society due to societal norms and expectations (Freud, 1913/1900). For Jung 
(1962, 1974) rather than hiding our unconscious desires, dreams revealed more than they 
concealed and were an expression of our imagination in which mythic narratives helped 
to integrate conscious and unconscious lives through processes of individuation.  
 Building from here, modern researchers such as Hall (1966) explored the 
cognitive dimensions of dreaming, well before the discovery of REM sleep. Hall 
dismissed Freudian notions of dreams as covering up desires, arguing instead that dreams 
“are the concrete embodiments of the dreamer’s thoughts; these images give visual 
expression to that which is invisible, namely, conceptions.” (Hall, 1966, 95). As a 
behavioural scientist, he argued that dreams help structure our waking lives, and thus the 
content of dreams had coherent meaning.  These ideas were largely challenged by 
scholars such as Hobson and McCarley (1977) who argued that understanding dreams is 
best accomplished by focusing on the formal features rather than content, and thus, 
Hobson considered the perceptual (how we perceive), cognitive (how we think), and 
emotional (how we feel) qualities of dreaming, regardless of content (Hobson, 2002, 1).  
Hobson largely challenged the focus on psychological dimensions of dreaming 
(which he did not altogether deny), by arguing that privileging this obscures what can be 
seen as a simple reflection of sleep related changes in brain states (Hobson, 2002). 
Hobson argued that studying the content of dreams does not necessarily explain what 
caused the dreams. The bizarre content of dreams, which Freud argued was a 
psychological defense against an unacceptable unconscious wish, Hobson argued, is a 
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function of “selective activation of brain circuits, underlying emotion and related precepts 
in REM sleep” (Hobson, 2002, 6). This also then meant there was an inactivation of other 
areas such as circuits and chemicals related to memory, logical reasoning, and self 
awareness (Hobson, 2002). Some interesting insights into the cognitive features of 
dreaming include “loss of awareness of self (self-reflective awareness); loss of 
orientational stability; loss of directed thought; reduction in logical reasoning; and, last 
but not least, poor memory both within and after the dream”: (Hobson, 2002, 5).  
Since the discovery of REM sleep, researchers such as Winson (1990) have 
explored the neuroscientific aspects of REM sleep and memory processes together. For 
Winson, dreaming was very meaningful and significant and related to memory processes, 
a process through which we form survival strategies and evaluate current experience in 
relation to these strategies (Winson, 1990). Thus, dreaming here is a reflection of an 
individual’s strategy of survival, where the “subjects of dreams are broad ranging and 
complex, incorporating self-image, fears, insecurities, strengths, grandiose ideas, sexual 
orientation, desire, jealousy and love” (Winson, 64). Winson argues that the 
characteristics of the unconscious and associated processes of brain functioning however 
are very different from what Freud thought. Rather than being solely about untamed 
passions and destructive wishes, he argues that the unconscious is a “cohesive continually 
active mental structure that takes note of life’s experiences and reacts according to its 
own scheme of interpretation” (Winson, 1990, 67). Thus, rather than disguised 
consequences of repression, their unusual character is a result of the “complex 
associations that are culled from memory (Winson, 1990, 67).  
With the discovery of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, the neural underpinnings 
of dreams have generated new understandings of dreams (Hobson 2009). Understanding 
dreams in scientific terms begins by examining sleep architecture, which refers to the 
“basic structural organization of normal sleep” (Colten and Altevogt, 2006, 1). The 
‘cycle’ is broken into two general considerations: Rapid Eye Movement (REM) and Non-
REM sleep, which is further broken down into four stages which each have their own 
variations in brain wave patterns, eye movements and muscle tone. Scientifically defined, 
sleep refers to a “reversible behavioural state of perceptual disengagement from and 
unresponsiveness to the environment” (Carskadon and Dement 2011, 16). Furthermore, 
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NREM sleep is defined as “relatively inactive yet actively regulating brain in a moveable 
body” (Carskadon and Dement 2011, 17), while in contrast, REM sleep is defined by 
“EEG activation, muscle atonia, and episodic bursts of rapid eye movement” (Carskadon 
and Dement 2011, 18). Interestingly, during REM sleep, the state in which the most vivid 
dreams are experienced, the inhibition of spinal motor neurons by brainstem mechanisms 
that limit motor abilities is also simultaneously experienced, and thus REM sleep is also 
defined as “an activated brain in a paralyzed body” (Carskadon and Dement 2011, 19).  
While in REM sleep “motor neurons are inhibited, preventing the body from moving 
freely” (Winson, 1990, 59), “eyes move rapidly in unison under closed lids, breathing 
becomes irregular and heart rate increases” (Winson, 1990, 59).  
Stage one plays a transitional role in sleep stage cycling, turning into stage two as 
a deepening of sleep, which in turn becomes stages three and four, characterized as slow 
wave sleep (SWS), all building up towards REM sleep. Both REM and NREM alternate 
throughout the night in a cyclic fashion, in which periods of REM sleep get longer across 
the night, and stages three and four may disappear all together as stage two sleep expands 
to occupy the NREM portion of the cycle (Carskadon and Dement 2011, 27). In an 
interesting parallel here, we can see the way that the background and historical 
genealogies (preparation) that shape the global imaginary of Dubai’s developmental 
aspirations (dreams) are obscured or disregarded in mainstream, privileged experiences 
of the Dubai dream.  
 
In his most recent work, Hobson (2009) has revised this earlier hypothesis, to 
acknowledge the deep psychological core of dreams, albeit with a focus on brain stem 
activation. He argues that “REM sleep may constitute a proto-conscious state, providing a 
virtual reality model of the world that is of functional use to the development and 
maintenance of waking consciousness” (803). As he explains, waking consciousness is 
defined by awareness of the external world, our bodies and our selves and the awareness 
of our awareness, however, “When dreaming we are also consciously aware; we have 
perception and emotion, which are organized in a scenario-like structure, but we 
erroneously consider ourselves to be awake despite abundant cognitive evidence that this 
cannot be true” (Hobson, 2009, 803).  Thus, when we dream, we wrongly think that it is 
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real (lived), as they are abstractions from fully lived conscious reality. When we consider 
the hegemonic Dubai dream we see that it is both lived and imagined simultaneously, but 
that it faces the problem that all dreamers and dreams face, which is the “failure to 
recognize its own true condition, its incoherence (or bizarreness), its severe limitation of 
thought” (803). Thus, dreams of Dubai and Dubai Dreams conceal and potentially ‘hide’ 
aspects of their reality. However, as Hobson highlights, dreams also can reveal and have 
implications for full consciousness. He explains that some argue that the connection 
between sleep and psychology is tied not only to the mere deprivation of sleep, but the 
denial of dreaming (occurring in REM sleep). Specifically, he argues that this is the most 
detrimental force in triggering cognitive deterioration (Hobson, 2009, 803). Dreams, are 
therefore understood as a necessary counterpoint to our conscious state, whereby as 
Hobson argues, the “integrity of waking consciousness depends on the integrity of dream 
consciousness” (Hobson, 2009, 803). Thus, “what we may need to navigate our waking 
world is an infinite set of charts from which we may draw the one best suited to an 
equally infinite set of real-life possibilities” (803). Hobson asks, if REM sleep precedes 
dreaming, what happens before dreaming appears? He argues that the brain is preparing 
itself for consciousness, “a lifelong process, an innate virtual reality generator, the 
properties of which are defined for us in our dreams” (Hobson, 2009, 803). Thus, dreams 
are both a necessary component for our conscious state and are implicated in our lived 
realities, and are simultaneously, inherently limited in their inability to recognize their 
state for what it is. Both Dubai’s dominant, state sponsored dream, and Dubai dreams, 
rely on the production and function of dreams to make possible our lived experience. 
However, these dreams can also be awakened to a reality with serious limitations that we 
cannot know from a dreaming state. Thus, dreams are as much preparations for waking 
consciousness as a reaction to it. “We are as much getting ready to behave as we are 
getting over the effects of our behaviour” (Hobson, 2009, 803).  
Interestingly, just like sleep, dreams are also vulnerable to disruption from mental 
and physical health related problems. It is argued that depression and anxiety are more 
commonly accompanied by nightmares, and that the presence of nightmares may be an 
indication of the severity of depression (Breus, 2015). Thus we might see dreams in both 
their aspirational and nightmarish forms as in fact linked. When we awaken from Dubai’s 
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dreams what we often find is that the promises of Dubai’s dreams are not as they seem 
for many.  They are not reflected, in the statement that Sheikh Mohamed makes, that 
“…Dubai is a city where you do not feel estranged or marginalized and where nobody 
lives on the fringes feeling dismal, because this is a feeling alien to Dubai” (Al Maktoum, 
2012, 151). Dubai dreams are in fact much more violent and nightmarish than the vision 
of this Dubai dream implies. The fringes are in fact outside but within at once, embedded 
into the cityscape and expressed through spatial relations which can only be understood 
through a tracing of Dubai’s geographies and the genealogies that make possible its 
‘globality’. 
In addition, as we can see in popular culture, for individuals dreams have been 
tied to values and conditions of possibility, as escapes, as aspirational, as powerful 
motivations, as goals, and as ambitions, but they may be simultaneously, or additionally, 
tied to ideas of delusion and incommensurability, not bounded by the limitations of 
waking life. Either way, they are often the ‘freest’ we might be to imagine worlds beyond 
our own mundane reality. They are also seen as productive in that they induce a sense of 
aspiration, but can also be stressful, disturbing, frightening, recurring, haunting. As the 
chapters unfold here we will develop a deep, nuanced background and historically 
grounded genealogy of migration and the dependencies and relationships that shape the 
everyday realities of a diverse group of residents. Dreaming therefore is significant as it 
is the most “universal, enduring aspect of being human” (Breus, 2015), and thus we 
might ask about the influence of dreaming in our waking lives, and whether there is any 
way that dreams might help us live better. There are views that support the idea that 
dreaming is a creative portal and new studies argue that dreams may assist in daytime 
functioning, whereby “… dreams may be fertile territory for influencing and enhancing 
our waking frame of mind” (Breus, 2015). Therefore, dreams are not only abstractions 
but have real, lived consequences in our daily lives (Hobson, 2010). Overall, “dreams 
provide us with insight about what’s preoccupying us, troubling us, engaging our 
thoughts and emotions. Often healing, often mysterious, always fascinating, dreams can 
both shape us and show us who we are” (Breus, 2015). As in the case of Dubai, the 
dreamscapes that are built into the contemporary landscapes of the city are tied to a 
multiplicity of globally linked and historically situated processes, which include a 
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multitude of different dreams that together make possible the dominant Dubai dream of 
global city status. Additionally, these dreamscapes also show us how unequal the global 
landscape is, as it generates rigid everyday social hierarchies that highlight the ways that 
the dreams of some are built on the nightmarish realities of Others.  
 
Levels of analysis. We can begin by examining the interactions between 
international/global, regional, national and local/‘everyday’ discourses and practices, 
which allow us to understand historical processes that have shaped notions of the ‘global’ 
inside and outside of the ‘city’ itself. As de Sousa Santos (2008) highlights, debates over 
definitions of globalization, for example, are a part of a “vast social field in which 
hegemonic or dominant social groups, states, interests and ideologies collide with 
counter-hegemonic or subordinate social groups, states, interests and ideologies on a 
world scale” (393). Thus, as he explains, even while the hegemonic camp, referred to as 
‘top-down’ or ‘globalization from above’ is fraught with tensions, “over and above them 
there is a basic consensus among its most influential members” (393). These dominant 
members can be identified as G8 leaders and nations, international financial institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). This ‘consensus’ is what de Sousa Santos explains as 
conferring globalization’s dominant characteristics, and is linked to a genealogy of 
concepts such as ‘modernization’ and ‘development’. Furthermore, the dominance of 
neoliberalism, often referred to as the ‘Washington consensus’, encompassing 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation (Beaudet, 2011, 108) is most commonly 
associated with contemporary globalization. These ideas are largely attributed to the 
economists at the University of Chicago known as the ‘Chicago Boys’, such as Milton 
Friedman, as well as the entrenchment of neoliberal thinking into international 
institutions (de Sousa Santos, 2008; Harvey, 2006; Stiglitz, 2003). The tension is such 
that,  
 On the one hand, if, for some, globalization is still considered a great triumph of 
 rationality, innovation and liberty, capable of producing infinite progress and 
 unlimited abundance, for others, it is increasingly an anathema, as it brings 
 misery, loss of food sovereignty, social exclusion for ever vaster populations of 
 the world, and ecological destruction. (de Sousa Santos, 2008, 395) 
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 Thus, de Sousa Santos importantly challenges the linear, homogenizing, 
irreversible process of ‘hegemonic globalization’, instead pushing for a conceptualization 
of ‘globalizations’ in their plurality and diversity. Additionally, he challenges the 
domination of the global over the local, arguing that we “live in as much a world of 
globalizations as we live in a world of localizations” (393), and furthermore that “there 
are no global conditions for which we cannot find local roots” (396). It is the same 
process, he argues, that creates the global as dominant in unequal exchanges, which 
simultaneously produces the local as the dominated, and therefore “hierarchically 
inferior” (396). Thus, rather than assume that the ‘global’ operates above and outside of 
the everyday experiences of urban life, I work to develop a methodology that attempts to 
uncover genealogical histories embedded in geographies of urban development through a 
recognition of the simultaneity of scales. Additionally, recognizing the power and impact 
of ‘localized globalism’, allows us to challenge top down, purely macro-economic 
thinking, and broaden our view to examine the interrelated nature of diverse global 
processes at different scales. Thus, the global political and economic relations which 
shape the role of Dubai globally are simultaneously examined through the everyday lived 
experiences of various groups living in Dubai, Emirati nationals/citizens, Expat 
professional migrants, and migrant workers employed in the service, construction and 
domestic sectors. 
 In another example of the global scale we can see how the location of the UAE 
regionally, and Dubai internationally, can be understood as straddling a space between 
‘East’ and ‘West’, ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds. It is significant to note that this dissertation 
understands the historic relations between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world nations through the 
‘international division of labour’, and the intersection of these hierarchies within the 
unique ‘national’ context of the global city of Dubai as integral to shaping the global, 
structural conditions giving rise to patterns of migration, labour, citizenship policy. The 
usage of terms such as ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world is done consciously to highlight the 
continued structural dominance of the international division of labour in relation to 
international labour migration, as well as the global history/knowledge that the forces of 
colonialism and development have created about the ‘third world’ and its peoples.  As 
Escobar (1992) highlights,  
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… development can be described as an apparatus that links forms of knowledge 
about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, 
resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies. In other words, 
development is what constructs the contemporary Third World, silently, without 
our noticing it. By means of this discourse, individuals, governments and 
communities are seen as "underdeveloped" (or placed under conditions in which 
they tend to see themselves as such), and are treated accordingly. (Escobar, 1992, 
23) 
 
The socio-spatial mapping of the Third World has been made through powerful 
forms of Western intervention and domination both through colonialism and 
contemporary processes of ‘development’, generating important ideas about its places 
and people.  These legacies also highlight the difficulties of (ideologically) locating the 
UAE, which is represented as both ‘first’ and ‘third’ world, depending on what aspects 
are being considered. For example, in many popular discussions, criticisms over the lack 
of ‘democracy’ are tied to orientalist notions of ‘backwardness’ and ‘underdevelopment’, 
while praise for neoliberal economic practices are lauded as signs of Dubai’s successful 
and ‘modern’ business environment. Thus, in either case, the scale of measurement and 
comparisons reinforce historically embedded conceptualizations of ‘modernity’, 
‘development’ and ‘Otherness’, which generates important forms of knowledge about 
Dubai’s contemporary globality. In turn, what we will see in the analysis that follows is 
that ‘global city’ status in Dubai highlights the precariousness of being located ‘in-
between’ worlds. While concepts such as Global North and South better highlight the 
growing transnational capitalist class, which challenges traditional First-Third world 
relations, the structural features of colonialism and development in the broader Global 
South continue to perpetuate stigma and discrimination for migrants based on their 
country of origin. Furthermore, the concept of the ‘New international division labour’, as 
criticized by globalization theorists, has challenged notions of comparative advantage in 
economic development by highlighting the hierarchies and legacies of colonialism that 
have continued to maintain divisions in the international system.  
 In addition, some of the impacts and pressures associated with globalization can 
be seen through attempts to reclaim footing through localization and nationalization of 
various aspects of social and cultural life, which have direct consequences for all non-
citizens. These considerations highlight the impact of spatial, temporal and material 
	 57	
processes on shaping globally induced urban life and are particularly important in a 
context that is heavily tied to ‘world city aspirations’ and ‘spectacular urbanization’ 
(Mohammad & Sidaway, 2012, 607). Thus, as Mohamed and Sidaway (2012) argue, Gulf 
cities are significant to our understanding of urban studies today, and while much of the 
attention has been to “applaud their rapid development, impressive architecture, artificial 
islands, skyscrapers, cultural centers, free trade zones and shopping malls, they must also 
be seen as social spaces that demand scrutiny” (607). In particular, this scrutiny is linked 
to the acute dependency on migrant labour at all levels of development, and rigid social 
hierarchies that shape the socio-spatial urban structure. For Mohamed and Sidaway 
(2012), “excavating life in Abu Dhabi, is not about the ‘front stage’ of Gulf spectacle, but 
rather the mundane, back stage, inhabited by those whose labour makes possible the 
spectacle and the lifestyles of the elite” (610). Thus, linking the global processes to the 
everyday lived realities of residents helps us to explicate the strategies and practices of 
normalization, legitimization and rationalization that make permissible the rigid social 
hierarchies that dominate social life in the Gulf and, in this case, Dubai specifically.  
 Theoretically what we find in the analysis that follows is that the ‘global’ 
represents and is generated in relation to historical genealogies that shape contemporary 
processes, patterns and landscapes. Here, genealogy is understood as a methodological 
tool and theoretical argument for emphasizing the historical lineages of contemporary 
processes, best conceptualized as the ‘unmapping’ of various historical continuities. 
Thus, for example, tracing the various routes of migration from across the globe to the 
city is best explained by simultaneously ‘unmapping’ these geographies to uncover the 
genealogies that undergird migratory patterns, influencing the processes, motivations, 
limitations, and ideologies that accompany journeys to the global city of Dubai.  
 ‘Unmapping’ as introduced here can be an important methodological 
consideration for citizenship and migration studies since it historicizes forces of ‘push’ 
and ‘pull’, extending the analysis beyond the purely economic and political to 
considerations that are linked to lived experiences such as space, dreams and desire, and 
temporality. This method helps us to theorize the formation of ‘hierarchies of 
entitlement’, which are generated to control and discipline the uniquely majority-migrant 
population. Thus, social hierarchies that dominate everyday life need to be historicized 
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through an understanding of the genealogies of race, gender, and class that generate the 
epistemological underpinnings of racialized categorizations based on nationality. 
Together, these understandings ultimately inform the ontological constructions of 
humanity based on racial constructions of otherness, expressed through categories of 
citizenship and influenced by notions of neoliberal globality in the contemporary period. 
We will see in the analysis that follows, how, for example, the ‘everyday’ logics of 
normalization impact social inequality, and the ways in which they are in fact linked to 
historical forms and forces of racialization that position certain entire categories of the 
populations as disposable.  
The concept of genealogy can be traced to a range of different scholarly works. 
Here we can consider two major usages of the concept as a methodological tool, 
beginning with the work of Foucault. McLaren (2002) explores Foucauldian thinking on 
the concept of genealogy as a dynamic rather than static approach, oriented towards 
practices as well as discourses, and that introduces a dimension of power. Genealogies 
are understood as local and specific histories, but unlike traditional histories, genealogies 
are based on discontinuity rather than continuities, thus, they challenge the notion of 
progress and do not seek to define a point of origin (McLaren, 2002). This method allows 
us to ask how current practices, institutions and categories came to be the way they are, 
as well as how power operates as a relationship rather than a thing.  
 The genealogical method as discussed by Foucault develops his notion of power 
in relation to subjectivity and explores the ways in which “power operates on individuals 
through social norms, practices and institutions” (McLaren, 2002, 5). For Foucault, 
genealogy was not about finding origins, nor was it about substantiating linear 
development. Instead, he argued for plurality, stating that, 
Genealogy retrieves an indispensable restraint: it must record the singularity of 
events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most 
unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history - in sentiments, 
love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to 
trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where 
they engaged in different roles. (Foucault, 2010, 76)  
 
 Thus, genealogy is about understanding the present more fully in order to 
transform it, which is done through historical inquiry, through the examination of 
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“techniques of production, techniques of signification or communication, and techniques 
of domination” (McLaren, 2002, 3). Thus, through the specific ‘unmapping’ of histories 
that accompany migratory patterns we are able to examine the specific contexts and 
histories that intersect through relationships of power such as those embedded in 
processes of colonialism and imperialism and that help to explain how current practices 
and categories came to be. Following McLaren’s analysis, we trace here a ‘history of the 
present’ not to understand the past, but to understand the present. As McLaren explains, 
“A history of the present allows one to see how the present came to be the way it is; it 
exposes the contingency of historical forces that created the present” (2002, 31).  
 More generally, genealogy has been invoked by feminist writers to highlight the 
(dis)/continuities and (re)/formulations of present, lived experiences. Thus, “the burden 
of persistent colonialisms” (Alexander and Mohanty, 1997, xiii), mixed with national and 
cultural genealogies as they intersect with current statuses, such as immigrant, or 
foreigner, challenge the possibilities of redressing the present. As Alexander and 
Mohanty (1997) argue, geopolitical shifts and forms of globalization in the contemporary 
period necessitate active, deliberate focus on questions of genealogies, legacies and 
futures in comparative feminist praxis (Alexander and Mohanty, xvi). In this body of 
work, the authors map the paths by which feminist communities, organizations and 
movements reflect upon moments in their own collective histories and struggles as they 
remember them. They explain that the use of words such as genealogies or legacies “is 
not meant to suggest a frozen or embodied inheritance of domination and resistance, but 
an interested, conscious thinking and rethinking of history and historicity” (xvi). 
Genealogies rely on a comparative, relational, and historically based methodology to 
explore the dialectic relationship between old and new, which provides the “theoretical 
and politics cues in understanding contemporary relations and hierarchies” (xxi).   
 In particular, through this genealogical tracing we consider in detail the role of 
colonial legacies in “continuities and fractures between historical and newly emergent 
forms of colonization” (Alexander and Mohanty, xxii). The concept of colonial legacies, 
which is explored throughout this analysis, is similarly meant to evoke an, “imagery of an 
inheritance and to map continuities and discontinuities between contemporary and 
inherited practices within state and capital formations” (xxi), and in the making of 
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various subjectivities and the ideological forces in the making of nationality through race, 
class and gendered notions of ‘Otherness’. Postcolonial life and genealogy are 
importantly linked because of the pervasive nature of the violence colonized people 
endured. Thus, as Mama (1997) states “to excavate the past, a genealogy of the 
conditions which foster this violence is necessary” (47). Thus, to understand the 
conditions that make possible various contemporary forms of violence or migration, for 
example, we must examine how the ‘histories of the present’ occurred and endured 
during the epoch of imperialism to understand how to better counter their development 
today.  
 Imperialism therefore is an important lens for studying dynamics, which have led 
 to present conditions, not to simplify or impose homogeneity on the diversities 
 within either region but to lay out a foundation which may direct our investigation 
 of the specificities of particular contexts. (Mama, 1997, 48)  
 
 Overall, ‘unmapping’ towards a genealogical analysis allows us to examine the 
material, discursive and emotive aspects of migratory patterns that undergrid the making 
of the ‘global city’, which cuts across time and space, ultimately deepening our 
understanding of how the exaltation of some is created through a relational mechanism of 
differentiation that shapes entitlements and notions of belonging of others, all of whose 
histories have been largely ignored in understandings of the ‘present’, everyday realities 
and relationships.  
 Contemporary scholarship supports these theoretical interventions into rethinking 
temporalities. For example, Agathangelou and Killian (2016) present a complex and 
nuanced examination of how time and temporality may be negotiated in understandings 
of the present, arguing that “rather than understanding time as a backdrop before which 
the present passes into a shadowy history, postcolonial projects seek to unhinge time 
from its presumed neutrality; at their most creative, they maintain an unwavering 
commitment to thinking about temporality in relation to an indeterminate future” (2). In 
this work, the reimagining of time and temporality allows for deeper understanding of the 
complexities of lived experience and, as they argue, opens us up to an understanding of 
different processes and structures as they undergo change in a variety of “overlapping 
social spaces, power dynamics and discourses and with the use of multiple devices and 
institutions of governance to secure a certain international order” (4). These attempts to 
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maintain the tension of multiple scales, temporalities and forms of lived human 
experience allow us a more complex ability to see how the “production of knowledge 
(science) and politics interact in co-producing the normative, epistemic, ontological, 
practical and technological aspects of life in modern societies” (4-5). The goal then, as is 
found within this work, is to search not to understand the “essence of a thing, but to probe 
the formation of phenomena to see how social imaginaries point to new existence and to 
ask what activates them” (5). Thus, as the use of a genealogical method here showcases, 
maintaining these tensions and attempting to think through processes of simultaneity and 
layers of human experience as they challenge ideas of linear time allow us to examine the 
ways in which the ‘present’ geographies which shape the making of global dreams 
continuously haunt our current realities and also influence our ‘indeterminate futures’.    
 
 The second major level of analysis we will explore the ‘national’ scale through a 
discussion of economic, political, social and cultural policies and realities that shape 
national discourses and dependencies on migrant labour, as well as intersections with and 
through these webs of relations between subjects. Thus, I consider how the scale of the 
national impacts workers by examining how place is reconsidered as space and how 
social relations of power impact on the ways in which physical places are experienced. 
From here we turn to consider the concept of ‘hierarchies of entitlement’, referring to 
both informal and formal mechanisms that operate in the city to create seemingly 
informal hierarchies which shape the rights, entitlements and treatment of workers, 
ultimately dictating who is worthy of what in the city. Additionally, in considering the 
making of different subjectivities, we see how identity formation is relationally 
constituted between different sectors of the population and, in particular, we consider 
how the identities of national Emirati citizens are constructed in relation to others, and in 
turn how the state and nationhood are considered under threat, thereby justifying and 
rationalizing state initiatives to minimize the impact of ‘foreigners’ on local, ‘indigenous’ 
culture. ‘Culture’ is often represented here as unchanging, static and homogenous, thus 
state sponsored ideas of ‘Emirati’ culture are often being fixed to an idea of a shared past, 
language and religion, and outsiders are constructed as a threat to this identity. However, 
as we will see the ‘culture(s)’ of the global city is/are very much shaped by forms and 
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forces of power that have historical genealogies. In considering how processes of 
exaltation generate Emirati identity as citizen-subjects in relation to ‘Others’ we see how 
Thobani (2007) presents an important analysis of these processes in which ‘exaltation’ is 
used not only to explain particular characteristics of untouchability, but also to explain 
the ways that exaltation impacts the regulation and disciplinary mechanisms that control 
all ‘others’, specifically those who come to stand outside the nation, seen in terms of 
belonging. In addition, she highlights that exalted characteristics provide an axis for 
grounding, unstable identities and offer a national structure to humanity. What we find, 
similar to the case study of Canada highlighted by Thobani, is that conceptualization of 
the nation as ‘vulnerable’ contributes to the distancing of citizens (and privileged expat 
professionals) from migrant-Others. To promote national unity, she highlights the 
importance of such practices as rituals and rites, which sustain citizenship of nationals in 
their daily encounters with each other, and with outsiders. Formally, these include: 
recitations of national anthems, raising of flags, the public pledges and oaths of 
allegiance to the sovereign, the celebrations of national holidays, parades, play and 
fireworks. While in addition, she argues, they include national violence such as lynching 
of Black men in US, swastikas on synagogues, “Paki-bashing,” the raping of women in 
war, burning of crosses, and pulling off Muslim women’s headscarves (79). She argues 
that it is in attending both the rights and rites of citizenship that an understanding of the 
full meaning and power of the institution in the lives of social subjects can be grasped. 
Overall then what we see is the ways in which the “…racialization of persons-on-the-
move is central to their ontologization as aliens by exalted citizens, who claim inalienable 
rights for themselves while helping to destroy those of Others” (72).  
 Some of the guiding questions for this (national) scale of analysis include: what is 
unique about the context of the UAE? What is similar to or a reproduction of other 
contexts? In what ways are social hierarchies, visible in the UAE, based on race, gender, 
class, labour sector employment, national origin and citizenship statuses? What are the 
relationships between social hierarchies within the UAE, the international division of 
labour and the contemporary location of the global city of Dubai? What techniques and 
justifications are employed at various scales, global, international, national, municipal, 
local and lived to maintain structure? How does the state conceptualize itself in the face 
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of a migrant majority workforce? And, furthermore, how does this impact the experiences 
and treatment of workers from various sectors? In addition, I ask how notions of 
modernity and tradition, East and West, and First and Third world impact national 
mythologies as well as national identities.  
 
 Considering the level of the ‘local’ is primarily based on documenting and 
analyzing the narratives and experience of people working and living in the UAE.  The 
analytic focus begins on those workers located in highly precarious and temporary 
sectors, but also involves examining relationships of power between different subject 
positions. Amidst the local we can consider the ‘everyday’ outlooks, practices and ideas 
that impact, and are impacted by, the ‘global’ that shapes and is shaped by Dubai as a 
city. It is important because it challenges the idea of ‘exception’ in that, instead of 
viewing, for example, an instance of violence such as a suicide or murder as something 
individual, shocking, or irregular, we would instead start to see a much more complex 
view of these situations which extend violence not at the instance of physical violence, 
but as a structural, systemic form of institutionalized behaviour and actions, which shapes 
and curtails possibilities for groups of people as they navigate their daily lives. This is 
difficult, primarily because we often view these situations through legal frameworks 
which individualize and target particular actions but are incapable of redressing collective 
or social forms of violence and exclusion, which themselves are forms of ‘everyday 
violence’.   
 Violence here is understood in multiple dimensions including, physical, 
psychological, social, economic, political, psychic, structural and spatial. It is useful to 
consider the discussions of Fanon (1968) in relation to violence in the colonial context to 
fully grasp the genealogies of contemporary violence(s). As Fanon discusses, these types 
of violences have their roots in economic and racial projects but extend into the daily 
regimes of policing and the creation of abject bodies.  
 The Manichaenian structure and the compartmentalization of society are seen in 
multiple manifestations of violence imposed upon the colonized. For Fanon, these 
spheres of violence intersect with each other, but are also internalized and experienced by 
the colonized against each other. He argues that without a permanent break, the process 
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of decolonization only works to reinforce unequal relationships. Fanon highlights both 
the material realm of violent domination and the psycho-affective realm that has 
consequences for mobilization in the aftermath of national independence. The retributive 
violence that Fanon insists on is a necessary means of resistance that can only be 
understood in relation to the violence perpetrated by the colonizer and its regime.  
 In regards to psychological violence, Fanon discusses the dehumanization of the 
‘native’, through which the settler gains his humanity and meaning is given to his 
existence. This relationship is perpetuated both materially (through the exploitation of 
raw materials and property) and discursively (knowledge about the self, in relation to the 
Other). In terms of structural violence Fanon points to the ways in which state sponsored 
violence is legitimized, as opposed to violence as a form of resistance (Fanon, 1963). 
Further Fanon notes the contradictory appeals made by the settler to the native to use 
principles of reason and progress in negotiating processes of decolonization but asks how 
such notions enable the colonized to divest from a deeply entrenched and inherently 
violent colonial structure? Another structural feature is linked to the economic 
superstructure which is underpinned by distinct racial categorizations that will 
perpetually define the colonized as underdeveloped. In terms of geographical or spatial 
violence Fanon discusses the differences in living conditions between the native sector 
and the colonist sector, in which the native sector is, 
...a disreputable place inhabited by disreputable people. You are born anywhere, 
anyhow. You die anywhere, from anything. It’s a world with no space, people are 
piled one on top of the other, the shacks squeezed tightly together. (Fanon, 1963, 
4) 
 In contrast, the settler’s world is one of reciprocal exclusivity, “is built to last, all 
stone and steel. It’s a sector of lights and paved roads, where the trash cans constantly 
overflow with strange and wonderful garbage, undreamed-of leftovers” (Fanon, 1963, 4). 
This notion of reciprocal exclusivity is linked to the incapacity of the native ever to 
experience the livelihood of the settler, and vice versa, and has further psychological 
effects on the native.  
The look that the native turns on the settler’s town is a look of lust, a look of 
envy; it expresses his dreams of possession – all manner of possession: to sit at 
the settler’s table, to sleep in the settler’s bed, with his wife if possible. The 
colonized man is an envious man. (Fanon, 2004, 39) 
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Finally, in considering yet another form of violence, Fanon considers the temporal 
in which the native is constituted through the violence of archaic primitive barbarity. The 
colonizer, being representative of advancement, is the edifying force that keeps time 
moving towards modernity. The colonized escapes violence by entering different 
temporal realms, in which dreaming is one way to escape temporarily. As he states, 
 
…the dreams of the colonial subject are muscular dreams, dreams of actions,  
dreams of aggressive vitality. I dream I am jumping, swimming, running, and 
climbing…during colonization the colonized subject frees himself night after 
night between nine in the evening and six in the morning. (Fanon, 2004, 15)  
 
However, as Fanon argues these escapes are fatalistic and work to justify the 
colonial condition. Of course Fanon’s discussion of violence in the colonial period is 
marked by extreme physical force and a kind of banality that is specific to the context. 
However, in considering the genealogies of violence that undergird contemporary 
processes, we can consider such insidious ways as those encapsulated in the ‘everyday’. 
This means that examining the ways in which daily violence is sanctioned, first by the 
state and then by the larger social body and normalized into commonsensical everyday 
practice, is important. Thus, the violence of expulsion from the ‘proper’ social body 
relegates particular bodies to the peripheries of the social, geographical and ideological 
landscapes in the city through the generation of hierarchies that shape notions of 
precariousness and privilege. In part, as the ‘everyday’ illuminates, the power of ideology 
is found in people’s abilities to reproduce it through their everyday practices and actions. 
This is part of the significance of my fieldwork in its careful attention to individual 
narrations of larger processes and the ability of individuals to locate themselves in a 
larger matrix of social, economic, political, cultural and environmental relationships.  
 The genealogical method therefore allows us to unmap the relations of production 
over time, which structure the relationships between the countries, states, and (non)-
citizen subjects through the power of ideological and cultural narratives that work to 
normalize and create consensus through everyday production and practices. Significantly 
then, the seeming mundane nature of the ‘everyday’ is where an important tension exists 
and which is a counterpoint to the ‘global’, a place to anchor the reality of globality in the 
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everyday lives of the subjects and spaces that live the reality both shaped by and shaping 
the ‘global city’ of Dubai.  
 Taken together, these methodological and theoretical considerations help to 
navigate the complex and diverse narratives, histories and processes that shape the socio-
spatial landscapes of Dubai’s globality. Furthermore, in considering how the dreams of 
some are sustained through dehumanization and the legitimization of violence towards 
Others, we will examine the realities of precariousness and ‘temporariness’ for all 
migrants, as well as processes of dehumanization and systemic violence that shape the 
lives of the majority population of low waged migrants, and the relative degrees of 
privilege and exaltation of national Emirati citizens and expat professionals.  
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Chapter Two: Imagining the Dream 
 
Dubai in the Global Imaginary 
Geographically located in the Arabian Peninsula, the United Arab Emirates is a 
country bordering Oman to the Southeast, Saudi Arabia to the Southwest and shares sea 
borders with Qatar and Iran. Dubai is one of seven Emirates, including the capital Abu 
Dhabi, as well as Sharjah, Ajman, Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah and Umm al-Quwain. The 
spatial location of Dubai in a broader global landscape is an important area to narrow in 
on, as it is implicated in many transnational networks and flows. Dubai’s global location 
necessarily impacts all levels of its political, economic and social development, and has 
significant impacts on the formation of national-citizen and migrant subjectivities.  
This chapter is conceptualized through the first stage of the sleep cycle (NREM) 
reflecting the body’s initial processes of entering into a sleep state. Similarly, this chapter 
aims to set a foundation for the experience of dreaming by exploring the ways in which 
historical processes have shaped notions of the ‘global’ inside and outside of the ‘city’ 
itself. The significance of these conscious experiences of imagining ‘dream’ worlds is 
supported by more recent scholarship on sleep, in which scholars have argued that 
dreaming is linked to psychological and emotional states which impact the ways that 
dreaming occurs and influencing their content. Rather than repressed feelings that are 
generated from disturbing and harmful desires and impulses (Freud 1913/1900), dreams 
have been linked, in contemporary research, to various mental and physiological 
functions (Hoss, 2003). As Hoss (2010) argues in his review of numerous scholars in the 
field, the “dream is not meaningless random neural firings” (2003, 8).  Instead, dreams 
are significant for memory processing (Zhang 2005, Hartmann 2011), emotional 
processing (Stewart and Koulack 1993, Griffin 1997, Stickgold 2009) and problem 
solving (Ullman 1959, Stickhold 2009, Foulkes 1982, Hartmann 1995, Barrett 1996). 
Dreams can therefore be seen as a reflection of, or having implications for our waking 
lives, and thus, we can relate these conceptualizations to the broader project of Dubai’s 
global city making trajectory as imagined by migrants and as represented in popular 
media around the globe. 
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These conceptualizations help us maintain a methodology that challenges a linear 
historical method, conceptualizations of the global dreams of Dubai are part of the 
various overlapping, intersecting, interacting, and multiply constitutive discourses and 
practices that shape the city. As it will be shown, the Dubai dream as imagined by various 
subjects and mediums, inside and outside of the city, is understood in relation to the 
making of a ‘global city’.  From these general insights, the foundations for examining 
global city making are set in order to understand how ideas of ‘globality’ link dreams to, 
of and in, the city. Thus, the ideological elements combine with the material to shape the 
development of the city at many levels, implicating diverse set of ‘dreams’ and imaginary 
elements. We begin to see how Dubai’s globally induced, aspirational developmental 
trajectory is shaped by, and shapes, various diverse dreams, and we thereby set the 
foundation for how the notion of the ‘dreamscape’ is developed as a set of interactive 
narratives, imaginative stories and dreams, and experiential insights that are located in or 
connected to the broader political economy and its historical trajectories of development.  
 
 Dubai dreams are examined in relation to the making of the ‘global city’ in both 
the global imaginary (seen particularly through migrant dreams as well as popular media 
and tourism) as well as embedded within the developmental trajectory and ambitions of 
the city. Through a review of popular tourist materials, insights from interviewees and a 
review of key concepts and scholars on ‘global cities’, we set a foundation to examine 
how these ideas are embedded in the ‘making’ and ‘maintaining’ of the city and are 
integral to shaping the global geography of the city. Section I begins by exploring Dubai 
Dreams as they are tied to experiential dimensions of life in the ‘city’, as well as 
insightful discussions about the ‘personality’ of the ‘city’ by interviewees and selected 
tourism publications that attempt to market the city to tourists internationally. Section II 
builds from here to examine global city literatures, by reviewing key scholars of the field, 
focused on the growth and emergence of global cities in a broader historical landscapes. 
Here selective highlights from key scholarly contributions, which can be related to the 
case of Dubai, are considered.  Section III explores critiques of mainstream global city 
literature and presents complex and nuanced epistemological considerations that will help 
to develop a more critical, postcolonial , racial analytic through which we can examine in 
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the subsequent chapter the making of the city in more concrete and material terms. This 
chapter lays the foundation for developing a theoretical framework that will allow us to 
evaluate global city status in Dubai by those living and working there through a critical 
engagement with scholarly work that complicates dominant approaches to global cities, 
which often mask and often oversimplify or ignore important historical and contemporary 
features of non-western cities.  
 Through these diverse data sets, we see how the construction of the Dubai dream 
through its global location, as caught ‘in-between’ ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds operates as a 
central tool in shaping what things are possible in the policy and hierarchical ordering of 
populations and also how ideas of ‘East’ and ‘West’ help us think about the globalizing 
of race in the contemporary context.  
 
Section One: Popular representations of the global.  
 Dubai has been described as a ‘global village’, as a ‘meeting place for the world’, 
and as the ideal model for a cosmopolitan metropolis. The global location of Dubai can 
be understood in a multiplicity of ways, which all work to show how the global operates 
or is expressed through the national, and often societal level. Using a global critical race 
analytic allows us to understand the growth of global cities in the non-western context 
through an examination of the temporal and spatial relations of its ‘globality’, 
‘globalizing’, ‘globalness’, or ‘worlding’. The global, temporal and developmental 
aspirations whether globalized or globalizing, all shape imaginaries of global cities.  To 
understand the complexities of what constitutes a ‘global city’ it is necessary to delve into 
the multiple imaginaries, which together constitute the ‘Dreamscapes’ of Dubai. With 
this in mind, the data that comes together to form this chapter comes from several 
sources, including popular culture through mediums such as newspapers, magazines, 
government tourisms websites, and popular tourist materials such as travel guides 
(McAuley, 2008; Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007; Walsh, 2008; Woods, 2009) and fictional 
novels (Bennett, 2010; Tatchell, 2009). In addition, the insights from interviewees on 
popular representations of Dubai as a global city are weaved together to tell the 
mainstream story of the phase of imagining the ‘global’ dream that is Dubai.  
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 Global city status is often reproduced through popular media, tourism, state policy 
and discourse, recruiters, and migrants themselves. Some of the considerations include 
criteria such as the city’s relationship to global capitalism, migration patterns, 
developmental projects with global aspiration such as the landscapes, global icons and 
infrastructure, and are also shaped by the social relations. Often times the city is 
evaluated in terms of its ‘stage of development’ in the schema of modern global cities as 
articulated by scholars. While the global city aspirations or status of Dubai is tied to its 
global location, this does not mean that Dubai operates fully at the supranational, but 
rather that the global location of the emirate is impacted by, and impacts, the location of 
it in the global. However, it must be noted that the multiple imaginaries of Dubai’s 
globality can be different depending on the audience and who is speaking. However, 
there are still dominant images that are promoted and circulated about Dubai as a global 
city to the world that can be seen through the identification of a few major themes.  
 One major example is related to the global location of Dubai as imagined in 
popular culture and through different experiences of subjects. This location will be 
explored in relation to a historical process of world system making in regards to the 
‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds, which will be seen for example, through an examination of 
tourist materials, which make constant reference of Dubai as a global city between ‘East’ 
and ‘West. Additionally, these representations are often characterized through the 
implicit racist and colonial notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ as applied to particular 
orientalized ideas of Arabs, and Muslims more generally. As Said explains in Orientalism 
(1979), Western knowledge about the Eastern world often depicted the ‘orient’ as 
backwards, irrational, weak, in relation to itself, the occident, the rational, strong and 
modern. In addition, as Said explains, much of this need to create difference between 
‘East’ and ‘West’ allowed the West to know itself, and was tied to traits thought to be 
inherent to Oriental peoples. He explains, Orientalism is,  
 … a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, 
 sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a 
 basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, 
 Orient and Occident), but also of a whole series of ‘interests’ which, by such 
 means, as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, 
 landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, 
 rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to 
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 control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or 
 alternative and novel) world. (Said, 1979, 12) 
 
 Thus, Said emphasizes that geography is expressed through spatial 
conceptualizations tied to power that create ideas of development and progress. As he 
states, “The boundary notion of East and West, the varying degrees of projected 
inferiority and strength, the range of work done, the kinds of characteristic features 
ascribed to the Orient: all these testify to a willed imaginative and geographic division 
made between East and West, and lived through during many centuries” (Said, 1979, 
201). Thus these ideological forces are significant as they have important consequences 
for how the context is presented by the West, and how violence and exploitation are 
conceptualized and then refuted, rationalized or excused both inside and outside of the 
city. It impacts who can do what and why, as Said explains, in the popular mind, Arabs 
are thought of as,  
 … camel-riding, terroristic, hook-nosed, venal lechers whose undeserved wealth 
 is an affront to real civilization. Always there lurks the assumption that although 
 the Western consumer belongs to a numerical minority, he is entitled either to 
 own or to expend (or both) the majority of the world’s resources. Why? Because 
 he, unlike the Oriental, is a true human being. (Said, 1979, 108) 
 
 Similar to these conceptualizations of the Arab figure are examples of how Dubai 
and the Arab Gulf generally is represented as ‘in-between’ worlds. As Smith (2010) 
highlights, “…the Arab Gulf is not home to ‘colourful Others’ who make ‘authentic’ 
tourist handicrafts/textiles or aromatic cuisine or offbeat animation” (269). Instead, Gulf 
Arabs are known as a leisurely privileged class clad in traditional white dishdashas. Thus, 
  They do not fit comfortably into categories: they are ‘non-western’ to be sure (in 
 fact, their status as Muslim and all the discursive baggage it carries may over-
 determine all else that is known about them), but they are not notably poor. They 
 live in one of the sparsest environments on Earth, yet consume resources, at per 
 capita levels that exceed those of the UAE. Even other Arabs- especially in cities 
 like Cairo and Beirut, with their long histories of cosmopolitanism and elite 
 cultural production- resent the newfound wealth of people they would have 
 considered backwards only forty years ago. (Smith, 2010, 269)  
 
 Thus, “Gulf Arabs are both simultaneously foreign and Other, but materially 
comfortable in ways all too familiar” (Smith, 2010, 270). This unique position between 
‘East’ and ‘West’ has interesting implications in how globality is understood and 
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represented. These ideas will be furthered through examinations of how Dubai’s global 
position through these representations is linked to attempts to reclaim footing through 
localization and nationalization which impact significant aspects of social and cultural 
life, shaping the hierarchical ordering of the population and subsequent processes of 
exaltation and dehumanization. Together we can see how these examples highlight the 
role of considering the spatial, temporal and material processes which together shape the 
parameters for imagining the globally induced urban life that constitutes the cityscape of 
Dubai.  
 
 General descriptions on Dubai and globality. As noted above, insights from 
interviews provide a significant bulk of the data under examination in this dissertation. In 
particular, residents of the city have important insights into the ‘globality’ of the city. 
Interviewees were asked to reflect on the ‘personality of the city’ and whether or not, or 
how, Dubai can be considered a global city based on open ended questions and self-
directed criteria. In addition, interviewees reflected on what gives a city ‘global’ status? 
And whether or not Dubai fits these considerations. In addition, to examine whether or 
not ‘global city’ describes Dubai best, the ideas of who the city is built for, and various 
aspects of development, infrastructure, environmental issues and working life are also 
examined. In thinking this through further, informants who migrated to Dubai were asked 
to reflect on ‘how they imagined Dubai before they came’ and how these ideas were 
either challenged or reinforced upon residency, while citizens were asked to reflect on 
how they believe Dubai is represented internationally and how these ideas of globality 
shape the changes taking place in the city over time.  
 In addition, tourist publications on the city that are targeted towards Western 
visitors have interesting representations, which can interestingly be considered alongside  
outward strategies of self-promotion and branding of Dubai from the state, as a ‘global 
city’. Together, these three major data sets are then examined and upheld or contested by 
various people living and working there. Taken together, we can see how the imagined 
ideological aspects of the city measure up the lived experiences or practical daily realities 
of various groups. From here we turn to examine literatures on ‘global cities’ as a way to 
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examine the criteria on which this status is gained, as well how scholars may help shed 
light or miss particular aspects of Dubai’s global city status.  
 
 Firstly, the official story on the Government of Dubai’s website tells us that it is,  
An emirate of more than 200 nationalities and cultures, living and learning from 
each other and creating natural vibrancy and globalization, Dubai is also 
strategically located between the great continents of Europe, Asia and Africa and 
attracts approximately 5 million investors and tourists on an annual basis. (“Dubai 
Free Zones Council”, 2016)  
 
 As an historical trading village, the city as a hub immersed in trade routes 
becomes seen as naturally progressing with the force of economic globalization, between 
worlds, its ontology is embedded in a developmentalist trajectory tied to the capitalist 
growth of the West. Although being written to place itself in the center of the world, it 
leaves unexamined the historical forces that made possible the growth of global 
capitalism in the current period and its role in relation to American hegemony, or its role 
and relationship to European colonialism. The global city of Dubai, generally assumes a 
model of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism that is devoid of this historical context, 
and presents us with the glamour and hegemonic ideas of 21st century neoliberal 
economic globalization.  
 According to Sheikh Mohamed, current leader of Dubai states in his book My 
Vision: Challenges in the Race for Excellence (2012),  
 To date, our achievements have helped us catch up with the rest of the world 
 in its  drive to globalize. This process began slowly during the last two decades 
 of the  twentieth century, before accelerating exponentially in the new 
 millennium, and can now be seen as a prelude to what is set to become the 
 most important economic race that the world has ever witnessed. The prize 
 is one of epic  proportions and failure is not an option. (Al Maktoum, 2012, 12)  
 
 Developmentalism understood as the linear movement, growth and development 
of countries from ‘traditional to modern’ shapes much of Dubai’s economic ambition. 
This shift from underdeveloped to developed, marks an important element of 
representations on Dubai, which are made with reference to the unparalleled scale and 
pace of its infrastructural and economic development. Thus as Hvidt (2009) states, “Fifty 
years ago, Dubai was an insignificant, poverty-ridden settlement of 30,000. To- day it is a 
city–state of 1.4 million people expanding its global outreach and undertaking a range of 
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high-profile investments and acquisitions” (Hvidt, 2009, 397). This idea of the rapid, 
development and growth of the city from ‘nothing’ to something ‘amazing’ is popular in 
many academic and media sources. Furthermore, as Hvidt highlights of Sampler and 
Eigner’s (2003) analysis of Dubai’s developmental success, conscious state policies by a 
‘late-late’ (states who joined development process after WWII) state was done in order to 
“catch up with the developed world” (Hvidt, 397). Thus the move from tradition to 
modernity, developing to developed is a significant aspect of many discussions of Dubai's 
change over time. The histories which make possible this linear trajectory of 
development are not often seen as important aspects in how the story is told, although 
when we look at the legacies embedded within the emergence of Dubai as a global city, 
we begin to see layers and historical genealogies that have shaped the possibilities of 
Dubai’s drive and dreams.  
 To the business world, Dubai describes itself as the ideal neoliberal location, with 
many reasons to invest, some of which include being,  
 
 One of the safest cities in the world with a very low crime-rate, Dubai has a fair 
 judicial system, a liberal economy, no income tax or corporate tax, no trade 
 barriers, quotas or foreign exchange controls, 100% repatriation of capital and 
 profits and strong investor incentives from the government of Dubai. (“Dubai 
 Freezones,” 2016.)  
 
  Represented as the perfect neoliberal model for contemporary global capitalism 
and the place of opportunity.  
 With rampant development comes great opportunity- a fast that’s not lost on the 
 tens of thousands of new residents who arrive in the city every month to seek their 
 slice of the Dubai money pie. From South Asian construction workers to teachers 
 from New Zealand and financial high-flyers from Europe and the US, the city is 
 the new frontier for fortune hunters. (McAuley, 2008, 9)   
 
 Dubai is imagined as the epitome of contemporary neoliberal economic dream, 
embedded in its foundation,  
 The place was born of a western belief system, a belief system that took hold in 
 the seventies and was championed by Reagan, Thatcher, and Wall Street. It was 
 the belief in the free market, or if not free, as unfettered as it could be.  It got its 
 moral imprimatur from the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union. 
 Since the Communists had so clearly got it wrong, the free marketers must have 
 got it right. Dubai was and is a crystallization of that belief. It is the freest of free 
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 markets. No taxes, no welfare, few scruples and the chance to create simple 
 colossal wealth. So in they flocked, the banks and corporations, to a new world 
 hub, and the hub blossomed. But the same qualities that made Dubai blossom, 
 have also made it shady. The same qualities that have attracted the giant 
 corporations have attracted the racketeers. The parasites and exploiters, the traders 
 in misery, the organized crime syndicates fell in love with Dubai for all the same 
 reasons and saw all the same possibilities. (Bennett, 2010, 239) 
 
 In his personally narrated semi-fictional/farcical journey of Dubai, author Joe 
Bennett (2010) describes the neoliberal dream championed by Dubai’s leadership and 
promoted to global corporate elites as the place of unfettered capitalism. Combining this 
notion of business with that of lifestyle, many representations of Dubai note its opulence 
and luxury for global elite consumption. As discussed by interviewees many imagined 
Dubai as a playground for the global elite, which is seen in the self promotion and 
investment in marketing of luxury to any and all who want to indulge, consider a surreal, 
almost alien vision of opulence (Bennett, 2010). This grandeur can never be overstated 
but its representation as ‘alien’ signals an exceptional case in which capitalism’s excess 
have been left to take on an other wordly dimension, one unmatached by any other place 
on earth. This alien quality can be extended as part of a broader process of 
exceptionalism that attempts to imagine Dubai as uniquely excessive, rather than as a 
space in an international linkage between global cities. 
 Many popular representations, particularly British, targeted to global elites, 
promote the ‘bespoke’ lifestyle, and representations such as the following are all too 
common, “Greater luxury simply can not be had… It enshrines a notion, of impossibly 
rich people…” (Bennett, 2010, 114). A critical point for many Emirati’s who were 
interviewed was that the popular representations of Dubai disregard the many complex 
layers of Emirati culture that extend beyond the glitz and glamour of Dubai’s ultra elite.  
 However, these representations of Dubai are endlessly described by informants, 
whether it be the incredible wealth and infrastructure of the city, epitomized by the 
‘license plates’ and power and wealth signified by single digit plates, climaxed in the 
2008 story of the 25 year old, Emirati from Abu Dhabi who paid 52.2 million dirhams 
(more than 14 million USD), for the number 1 license plate (Abdul Kader, 2008). In these 
stories, the ideal subject of Dubai is clearly the cosmopolitan, neoliberal elite subject and 
not the majority of poor, Third World migrant workers who build and maintain the city.  
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Dubai is often told in relation to the world largest theme park, biggest mall, tallest 
building, largest international airport and the biggest artificial island. As Davis highlights, 
Dubai confidently predicts that its enchanted forest of 600 skyscrapers and malls will 
attract 15 million overseas visitors a year by 2010, three times as many as New York 
City” (Davis, 2006, 49). The biggest, tallest, largest, busiest, first and only, all help to 
situate one of its iconic landmarks as part of what Davis calls the ‘Imagineered 
Urbanism’ of Sheik Mo (Davis, 2006, 50). As one developer discussed in the Financial 
Times, “If there was no Burj Dubai, no Palm, no World would anyone be speaking of 
Dubai today?”  You shouldn’t look at projects as crazy stand-alones. It’s part of building 
the brand” (Davis, 2006, 53).   
 
 In a city fond of sound bites and self-promotion (the seven-star hotel, the 
 manmade islands, the world’s tallest tower), Dubai’s most startling feature, its 
 infancy, it often overlooked. Compared to most major cities, Dubai is in its 
 formative years; but it’s growing up fast. (Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007, 6)  
 
 Another area of consideration is tied to comparisons of Dubai to other global 
cities. This is a theme that resonated heavily with the interviewees who often used 
comparisons to Western cities, or cities in the Global South to understand Dubai. In 
thinking of the defining features of globality outside of the specificities of state-city 
boundaries, other participants discuss the recognition of Dubai globally in a comparative 
style. Whereby for example, the marketability of Dubai points to its recognition as a 
global city, amongst others. Egyptian-Canadian resident Mohamed states “People always 
say, Dubai, New York, and then Paris, and then London. You know, whether or not it has 
similar qualities [is debatable], but the fact that it does raise that comparison is enough to 
put it on the list”.  
 Recognition from outside Dubai also tends to increase the feeling of its global city 
status, whereby for example, Egyptian-America Carlos, who grew up in AD, UAE, 
explains,  
In the States, the first year I moved there, people thought you would get 
transported on camels, people actually asked me so you ride camels and they 
didn’t think we were that civilized in Abu Dhabi, but then I tell them I’m from 
Dubai, and they are like wow! How is it there? Like in the same conversation, 
they wouldn’t know Abu Dhabi, which is the capital, but then Dubai comes 
up…everybody knows. (Carlos, American)  
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 Another key theme is related to the pace, economic growth and opportunity, 
which are used to evaluate the development of Dubai on this linear trajectory. This linear 
developmental model is used to both admire its remarkably fast paced infrastructure and 
economic development, but also to orientalize it. 
 …Time is passing, the clock is ticking, the world is racing, and no one will wait 
 for us. We cannot ask our competitors to wait; we must rather develop and 
 enhance our performance and ourselves. We can not stop now…It reminds us that 
 if we were gazelles and stopping running, lions would devour us; and if we were 
 lions and stopped running, we would starve to death…do we have any other 
 alternative? (Al Maktoum, 2012, 68) 
 
 The capitalist race is embedded in the infrastructure of the place, this urgency and 
fear of being left behind can be seen in the race against time to build the city. But time 
takes on other meanings as well, whereby the history of the place is used as a marker of 
its achievement, but also its banality and infantilized inability to embrace markers of 
civility that the West so perfectly espouses.  
 A little vulgar? Maybe- it’s been slated as ‘Vegas-meets-Disney-in-the-desert’ 
 by its critics. Yet it is impossible not to admire the  vision behind the crafting of 
 the emirates. In economic and evolutionary terms,  Dubai’s transformation has 
 been nothing short of dramatic- a rapid trajectory of change unrivalled by any 
 other city on the planet. (Woods, 2009, 6)  
 
 These representations paint Dubai as a caricature-type city based on Western 
models, which in its infancy is excused for its brashness, while simultaneously valuing its 
rapid growth. This creates the vulgarity of Dubai through reference of “Vegas meets 
Disney in the Disney”, the city as a place of splendor and excessive capitalism and also a 
caricature or a young city attempting to mimic the West, in the orientalized context of the 
‘East’. This is captured in statements such as “…welcome to Dubai. It may be young, 
brash and at times vulgar, but that’s half the fun. Prepare to be amazed” (Time Out 
Guides Ltd, 2007, 7), or “With its gleaming skyscrapers, love of modernity and apparent 
lack of anything over ten years old, you’d be forgiven for thinking that Dubai is a mere 
child of a city, albeit one undergoing an incredible growth spurt” (Time Out Guides Ltd, 
2007, 12). What is clear is that Western representations of Dubai invoke ideas of 
modernity with a teleology and developmental schema that makes a mockery of its global 
city attempts, and also creates rationales for its misgivings such as a lack liberal 
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democracy and ongoing human rights abuse by excusing its dark side by attributing it to 
infancy, in which children do not yet have all the tools to understand what they doing, 
that they haven’t get caught up, that they are not themselves capable of getting there and 
thus need ‘us’, or that they are in fact incapable of reaching the same level of Western 
modernity because of their inherent Eastern qualities.  
 Many representations of the city make reference to it being a ‘fake’ city, lacking 
substance, culture and history. As Canadian teacher Sean states, “I just feel like it is just 
so different from a normal city”. Expanded by British producer Hattie, “I think that there 
are no real spaces, like gathering spots. It is all a bit too refined”. Many expats critiqued 
the ‘lifestyle’ of Dubai as being about a ‘bubble’, out of touch with reality. In considering 
how subjects discussed Dubai as a global city. Canadian resident Mario discusses Dubai 
as a global city “by all means” and discusses criticisms of the city’s youth as deterring its 
ability to be compared to cities like London and New York. His comments highlight the 
consideration that culture is also tied into globality, in which many argue that Dubai is in 
fact a bubble or fake city. “It is not really a fake city, it is just a new city. Like you can’t 
come here expecting to walk through the city and see cathedrals or mosques that have 
been there for centuries, it is just not how the city was built, 40 years ago”. When asked 
what gives it this status he states,  
 It has one of the busiest airports in the world, it has anything you need really, a lot 
 of companies move their headquarters here whether they are American, British or 
 French, they all have their headquarters here, all operations run here. Again, the 
 difference is that there is no history to it. I think that is the main difference, other 
 than that, it is a global [in its operations]. (Mario, Canadian) 
 
 The idea of a global hub was exemplified in its bid for the 2020 World Expo, 
which it won in November 2013 with the theme of,  
Connecting Minds, Creating the Future”, in which it was described by Dubai’s 
ruler, Sheikh Mohamed in the following terms: “In today’s highly interconnected 
world, a renewed vision of progress and development based on shared purpose 
and commitment is key. While a single human mind, an individual country, or a 
specific community is both unique and remarkable, it is by working 
collaboratively that we truly advance. (“Our Bid”, 2012). 
 
 Beginning with the location of Dubai globally in relation to business, British 
expat Hattie explains that “Dubai acts as a kind of central hub for the region. So culture is 
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exhibited and traded here from other parts of the world” (Hattie, British). Using the 
language of trade to describe cultural encounters with a diverse range of nationalities, 
estimated to be made up by over 200 nationalities from around the globe provides one 
important starting point for thinking of diversity and multiculturalism as a marker of 
globality. Building on this, Canadian expat Sean describes the relationship between 
migration and finance through a comparison between older global cities explaining that 
what defined New York and London as global, is the immigration and settlement of 
people from around the globe, while what defines Hong Kong is its role as an internal 
financial center. Supporting the focus on nationality and diversity, Egyptian- Canadian 
Mohamed states “the thing that makes a city global is a nice diverse population. Different 
cultures coming together and recognition and it has both”. Building here through a more 
specific example, Egyptian resident Zain gives the example of a university setting, 
particular American University of Dubai (AUD), where he explains “you had 10% locals, 
around 30% Arabs which included Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, around 20% of 
Americans, Canadians and a little bit of British, and then Iranians as the biggest majority 
in the university” (Zain, Egyptian). He explains further, “the way that I see it is that you 
get to see people from all over the world in one little, very tiny location, so I mentioned 
this before, you get to know a lot about different backgrounds, different religions, you get 
to learn how to communicate” (Zain, Egyptian).  
 In building on the role of diverse nationalities in the city space, Emirati national 
Reda explains that while the city has adapted to providing “something to cater to all 
nationalities”, this may not be a complete global city. Insinuating that ‘globality’ may 
mean a move from specificity in particular cultures, to a more cosmopolitan notion of 
globality beyond the confines of particularity. Supporting this idea, American expat 
Carlos states that while you may interact with a diverse group of people, befriending 
some and learning to communicate effectively, in the end “every community sticks 
together” (Carlos, American).  
 Examining population tourist data, primarily from the West allows us insight into 
the dominant images of Dubai that are perpetuated by the state. This can be contrasted 
with the images and ideas promoted to labour sending countries. How this popular media, 
and state branding operates to project a world image of Dubai is significant as we 
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contrast it with what interviewees have said, and how lived realities and the underside of 
Dubai pose threats, challenges and are often integral to the creation and maintenance of 
this global image.  
 The incredible influx of expats from all over the world has created not so much a 
 melting pot as a salad bowl. This is still a city divided by class and creed, and a 
 person’s experiences of Dubai today will depend very much on where they come 
 from and what they do. (Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007, 22)   
 
 But the multicultural façade of community, collaboration and progress is quickly 
challenged by critiques of hierarchical orderings of the population. Although many 
publications from the West have orientalist representations of how and why this is unique 
to Dubai, for example, “In any case, visitors should be aware that, based on where they 
are from and what they look like, there will be some expectations of what kind of person 
they are, what kind of work they will do, and, consequently, some measures of their 
status in society” (Walsh, 2008, 46). That this is somehow unique to Dubai. Emirati 
citizen Natasha states,  
 It has all these things that you might not find elsewhere and lots to do… but 
 in reality when you dig deeper it is not very global, in terms of, it is growing 
 fast in terms of infrastructure, but because it has been way too fast, it has not 
 really had the opportunity to catch up in terms of… social and civil liberties, 
 or the social environment and so, I think in those terms it is not a global city 
 because there is lots of things that I frankly see as underdeveloped. (Natasha,       
            Emirati).  
 
 However, as much as multiculturalism defines its global allure, ideas about 
Emirati culture are often thought of in a static and singular way, and is often considered 
as an area of contention in the city, where some residents feel that while financially 
speaking, Dubai has become internationally recognized, its fast paced economic 
development has limited the development of a ‘rich’ historical culture, and as some 
describe, despite its fast growing physical infrastructure and economy it may still be 
underdeveloped in other areas. Building on this, Natasha is also cognizant of the fact that 
this may or may not be seen as criteria for evaluating its global city status, when she 
states “If we were talking about freedom of speech and things like this, these are issues of 
whether or not it is what a global city is” (Natasha, Emirati)  
  
	 81	
At first glance, Dubai seems like a city that’s easy to pigeonhole. From the 
 outside the world’s fastest growing metropolis, famous for its shopping malls, 
 year round sunshine and ambitious construction projects, appear as though it is 
 losing a very public battle of style versus substance. Dig a little deeper, however, 
 and you’ll discover that Dubai is a complex mix of ancient traditions and 21st 
 century multiculturalism and innovation. (McAuley, 2008, 7) 
 
 Subjects commenting on whether or in what ways Dubai can be understood as a 
global city highlight a plethora of diverse elements of the city’s globality, such as its 
geographical location and travel networks, its developmental agenda, infrastructure, and 
political system and civil liberties, and culture. For almost all of my interviewees, the 
idea of globality was tied to multiculturalism, and the supposed idea of ‘Eastern’ and 
‘Western’ cultural and developmental aspects. For example, the idea of ‘Eastern’ 
tradition and culture was highlighted, while this was consistently referenced to the idea 
its ‘Western’- style developments and infrastructure. Thus, Dubai acts as a space that is 
simultaneously, a meeting place for both ‘East’ and ‘West’, as well as a space 
‘inbetween’ these two imagined spaces. These ideas have significant implications for the 
ways that the city is imagined as a global, and understood in the global landscapes with 
important consequences on the lived realities and spatial organization. In addition, the 
terms carry with them important historical genealogies that shape how the space is 
imagined and lived.  
 
 In considering the conceptualization of Dubai as linked to East and West, we can 
see how Dubai is presented as a hub, link, meeting place, as a node between several 
continents, including Asia, Europe and Africa. As a ‘center’ point in these connections, 
many describe Dubai as straddling both ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ spheres of culture and 
influence. As Egyptian resident Svetlana states, “The Emirates is somewhere in the 
middle between the West and the East. It has a good balance of you still being an Arab or 
an Eastern and still having some qualities of a Western country” (Svetlana, Egyptian). As 
a young person who grew up in the UAE, but has no formal entitlements to citizenship or 
permanent residence, she describes the multiple identities which characterize the many 
long term residents of the UAE whose families migrating from the ‘third world’ to Dubai, 
before either migrating again to the West, or sending their children for education abroad. 
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She states here “so you either move to Canada or the States, or anywhere in the West and 
you have the extreme Western country where you feel different, or back to Egypt or any 
Eastern country and you still feel like you are different. That is the problem with here as 
well. You have this double life” (Svetlana, Egyptian).  
 In the 1970s, what is now a sprawling orgy of malls and hotels was little  more 
 than sandy outpost, and even by the mid-1990s Dubai boasted few  landmarks and 
 even fewer tourists. But with the confidence that comes with youth, Dubai has 
 burned itself on to the world’s consciousness. Through a mixture of ambition, 
 audacity and a swathe of mega-projects, the city has transformed itself into one of 
 the most dynamic centres on the planet: a cultural and economic hub linking East 
 and West (Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007, 6).  
 
 The linkages between East and West are tied to ideas of economics and migration. 
Whether made explicit or not, the idea that Western economic development in an Eastern, 
or non-white place, is made global through the networks of economic and migratory 
flows that characterize it. Thus, since migration is an integral component to the 
contemporary development of Dubai, a foundational aspect of its growth and 
development, the importance of recognizing the histories through which these 
movements and subsequent ideas are made is significant in shaping not only discourses 
about Dubai’s globality, but also has important consequences for the lived realities of 
residents in the city. Important examples of the ways that these ideas have spatial 
consequences will be explored further on, here I will highlight the role of discourse in 
constructing the imagined global position of Dubai, and the following chapter will delve 
into the more material processes and conditions which are shaped by these ideas, and 
have important consequences for the hierarchical ordering of the population.  
 Traveling or living in the UAE can be a challenge. It is likely to involve 
 moving beyond your cultural comfort zone but, having made the effort to  bridge 
 the divide, you will find people whose embrace of modernity is exhilarating and 
 whose effort to combine the ancient and the modern is fascinating example of 
 globalization. (Walsh, 2008, 9)  
 
Dubai manages what many other Arab cities fail to achieve: a healthy 
balance between Western influence and Eastern tradition… (Woods, 2009, 
197).  
  
           Not only is Dubai seen as a space that brings together East and West, but 
importantly, it may also be seen as a space being caught ‘in-between’ different worlds. 
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The global is imagined and constituted with reference to the binary of East and West with 
important implications. Dubai is seen in many instances as having Western qualities, 
which are generally tied to the high standard of living enjoyed by citizens and expat 
professionals, as well as the infrastructure and capitalist economic development practices, 
but then relegated to Other through the invoking of the East in reference to non-
democratic political practices, migration and labour policies, religion and gender, and 
thus is tainted by its ‘Eastern-ness’, when necessary, ‘almost there but not quite’. As 
scholar, Springborg (2008) discusses in terms of concerns posed by Gulf citizens that 
their culture (understood as that which is being supported by the state as a static and 
singular version) was being eroded or dismissed, he highlights coexistence of mutually 
exclusive stereotypes of Gulf culture, 
 
One view if that the Gulf is a backward region in which inadequate education, 
easy wealth, male dominance and persistence of tribalism have militated against 
cultural dynamism, so traditional cultural norms and practices persist. A 
contrasting view is that the region is super modern, with the rapid pace of 
globalization having thoroughly undermined traditional culture, replacing it with a 
cosmopolitan, international one in which women are leading the way. 
(Springborg, 2008, 10) 
 
              Together these representations of Eastern and Western influences complicate the 
idea of culture and identity in the Gulf. After further analysis from diverse sources, the 
questions to consider here are then are related to how and whether Dubai is seen as 
inherently incapable of attaining global city status, if incapable of shedding itself of its 
Eastern qualities. The struggle articulated here as about the struggle between a,  
 
 …balance of tradition and modernity., and the UAE today is a country of 
 contrasts, embracing luxurious hotels and shopping centers while it black abayas 
 and shayla clad women are mostly kept securely out of sight. (Walsh, 2008, 8)  
 
 Dubai can be understood through these representations then, as bringing the 
‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds into conflict, which is attributed to its non-western-ness, but 
also to particular modes of orientalist understandings of being Arab, Islamic or generally 
non-white. What is it about the place that is incapable of fully becoming modern? How 
does this inherent desire for modernity (whiteness) impact and shape policies and 
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processes in the city’s development and operation? But the in-between is also about 
retaining ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’, as significant state projects aim to ‘preserve’ an idea of 
authentic culture that is unique to the country and its Arab inhabitants. The drive to 
‘protect’ national culture has been framed primarily by the growing influences of oil 
wealth, rapid ‘modernization’ and diverse global cultural flows (Khalaf, 2005). There are 
many examples highlighted by scholars (Davidson, 2008; Lawson & al-Naboodah, 2008; 
Rahman, 2008) in which external influences related to the nature of the UAE’s diverse 
migrant population are seen as threatening local culture. In this view, culture is not 
conceptualized in its plurality and heterogeneity, but is trying to be fixed as a static set of 
traditions and beliefs, supported by the state. The response by the UAE’s ruling families 
to ‘protect’ their version of the dominant ‘culture’ was to sponsor numerous clubs and 
agencies to promote local cultural preservation and dissemination. Thus, some of the 
projects include the Emirates Heritage Club in Abu Dhabi, The Folk Arts Society in 
Dubai, the Heritage Directorate in Sharjah, the Documentation and Studies center in Ras 
Al Khaimah, the Fujairah Cultural Organization who held lectures, seminars, festivals 
and celebrations to promote pre-oil era culture (Lawson & al-Naboodah, 2008). Another 
major center is the 1999 opening of the Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum center 
for Cultural Understanding, (SMCCU) which shares ‘Emirati’ culture with expatriates, 
also offering classes in Arabic and lectures on Islam (Lawson & al-Naboodah, 2008, 16). 
Additionally, in 2005, the government set up the agency called the Abu Dhabi Authority 
for Culture and Heritage (ADACH) which managed different aspects of culture, such as 
education, media, literature, arts, development of museums, conservation and 
development of cultural tourism (Lawson & al-Naboodah, 2008, 27). In addition, 
scholars note two key areas in which cultural preservation has been emphasized, one is in 
education (Haque, 2007), and the other is in national dress codes (Khalaf, 2005).  
 In the case of the former, the concern over education is tied to concerns over 
culture and value systems as well. Younger generations are seen as being impacted 
negatively, and government agencies are necessary to “preserve and promote the national 
culture that is a blend of the Arab and Islamic traditions” (Haque, 2007, 14). Haque asks 
important questions in this area tied to how Emirati youth think their culture is being 
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influenced. To what extent do the young Emiratis value their language, ethnic 
background, religious beliefs, national pride, education on national history, traditional 
clothing, sports, ways of traditional healing, etc.? Do they know their indigenous culture 
and can they distinguish between their own and the modern western culture? Do they see 
any direct conflict with the modern western culture, and if they do, how do they go about 
resolving it? What suggestions do they have as individuals going through the process of 
identity development and change on preserving and/or promoting local culture among 
themselves? (Haque, 2007, 14).  In the area of national dress, Khalaf explores how 
national anxieties about threats to their national cultural identity have led to increased 
pressure to preserve national dress as well as protecting other aspects of Emirati society 
and culture such as newly invented cultural traditions, social customs and heritage sports, 
like camel racing, traditional boat racing and falconry. In addition, Khalaf highlights how 
these broad national heritage-oriented discourses are also reinforced by religious Islamic 
discourse. Thus, “Emirati contemporary discourse on national dress is a fusion of 
multiple ideologies and value systems that include social traditions, heritage, Islamic 
values as well as national political symbols” (Khalaf, 2005, 261). Overall national dress 
is an important “boundary marker for maintaining their distinct national identity” 
(Khalaf, 2005, 265), this is often done vis-à-vis others in order to maintain their privilege 
as national citizens.   
 Overall, these attempts can be seen in certain ways as a response to the hegemony 
of Western capitalism and the liberalization of ‘cultural’ ideas and practices, but 
interestingly, the policies which stem from these insecurities are enacted upon the largest 
numerical force of migrants in the region, those low waged labourers and Others who are 
seen as more threatening to the place than Western professional expats. A recent post in 
the Wall Street Journal’s Expat blog (December, 2014), Dewolf discusses the ways that 
some are considered ‘expat’ while others are not, linking those who are to their roots in a 
Western country (Dewolf, 2014). Dewolf continues that Filipino domestic helpers for 
example, not matter how long they have lived in HK are just guests or migrants. He 
continues that, “A more current interpretation of the term “expat” has more to do with 
privilege. Expats are free to roam between countries and cultures, privileges not afforded 
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to those considered immigrants or migrant workers” (Dewolf, 2014). In another article 
published in March 2015, Koutonin of The Guardian writes “Why are white people 
expats when the rest of us are immigrants?”. Koutonin states,   
 Africans are immigrants. Arabs are immigrants. Asians are  immigrants. However, 
 Europeans are expats because they can’t be at the same level as other 
 ethnicities. They are superior. Immigrants is a term set aside for ‘inferior races’. 
 (Koutonin, 2015)   
 The assumptions behind these logics is that ‘white’ people who migrate for work 
do so by choice, while Others do so out of necessity, reinforcing a hierarchy in which 
expat is a designation reserved for privileged Westerners. Overt forms of racism abound 
in the city, with almost all interviewees acknowledging explicit forms of discrimination 
in hiring policies, housing structures, labour policies and contracts, the organization of 
city spaces, and the law. Taken together, we will see how, even when not as blatantly 
obvious, the creation of more insidious forms of ordinary, everyday violence, 
experienced as safety, peace and multicultural harmony, and the orientalist framing of 
Dubai by the West, as well historical genealogical linkages from earlier colonial periods 
that have shaped the world into hierarchies of migration, together importantly shape its 
global ambition and imbue the city with a desire for ‘whiteness’ through the globalizing 
of race. Through an examination of popular representations through tourist materials and 
publications, we see the ways that these ideological representations in popular culture are 
supported by subjects living in the city.  
 Whether from tourist materials, informants, or the ruling elite in the UAE, the 
message is clear: the space that constitutes Dubai is caught in-between two worlds; 
‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ and ‘East’ and ‘West’. These quotes and the corresponding 
images have explicit spatial qualities. From the quotes provided here from tourist 
materials (McAuley, 2008; Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007; Walsh, 2008; Woods, 2009) it is 
clear that several themes emerge as markers of Dubai involving both physical 
infrastructure and symbolic representations.  Dubai becomes spatially located ‘in-
between’ the binaries of ‘East’ and ‘West’, ‘Tradition’ and ‘Modernity’ and ‘First’ and 
‘Third’ World. What becomes clear from these examples is that Dubai must be assisted 
into modernity. The question then becomes, through what practices and processes is 
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Dubai at once ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’? What are the formal strategies that regulate this 
ambiguity? and how is this a function of the genealogy of migration as tied to colonial 
relations?  
 For many scholars on the Gulf, the UAE, and Dubai in particular, the forces of 
modernity such as ‘globalization’ are met or combined with a relentless traditionalism. 
For some,  “… the Gulf Arabs synchronized a traditional ideology, with its own ethos of 
‘knowledge’, with a modern lifestyle to create a multilayered cosmology” (Fox, 
Mourtada-Sabbah, & Mutawa, 2006, 9). In fact, as they explain, leadership in the Gulf 
constantly works to show “how tolerant Islam is as a religion so that globalization and 
development may continue to be bereft of indigenous reactions” (Fox et al., 2006, 9). 
Thus for these scholars, “globalization in the Gulf meshes with traditionalism…” (Fox et 
al., 2006, 9). The constant references to ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ shapes the global 
location of Dubai in significant ways with important implications.  
 Following Goldberg (1993) we can see that “Just as spatial distinctions like 
‘West’ and ‘East’ are racialized in their conception and application, so racial categories 
have been variously spatialized more or less since their inception into continental divides, 
national localities, and geographic regions” (Goldberg, 1993, 185). Thus understanding 
Dubai as ‘in-between’ is itself a project of imperialism and a continuity of colonialism 
through the collision of various subjects in spaces constituted through racial hierarchies. 
The in-between-ness of Dubai is tied to spatial relations based on racial, colonial 
ideological constructs which position it as simultaneously caught in the ‘pre-modern’ 
barbarity of culture and tradition, as well as holding spaces of ‘white’-Western capitalist-
modernity. This discussion helps us to introduce “the formative relations between the 
conditions for the subjective experience of knowing one’s (racial) place in the 
contemporary city, on one hand, and the social structures and discursive formations of 
(racial) space on the other” (Goldberg, 1993, 205).  
 We can ask here how and in what ways the position of Dubai, UAE as a ‘global 
city’, between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds under contemporary forms of neoliberal 
globalization, impacts socio-spatial relations in the city? In addition, one may ask, with 
all the talk of Dubai as a global city, what are the criteria or requirements for attaining 
this international status? Can we see this status as impacting the lives of millions of 
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labourers from the ‘Third world’, and as state attempts to expunge national identity from 
the traces of ‘other’ following them into modernity? Do white bodies perform the 
function of perpetuating colonial racial hierarchies, which value the ‘West’ over the rest? 
Further, how and why are state fears related to national identity as under threat 
conceptualized as caught in between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’? In addition, how do the 
influences of capitalist consumerism on indigenous culture become manifested into 
policies targeting those residents who are in fact the most marginalized from the social 
body? In many scholarly works on the region, there is no discussion on these questions. 
There is often no discussion of race, and how it is tied to nationality. How does one 
explain the migrants from ‘East’ and ‘West’ flocking to Dubai in search of the good life? 
How do migrants from various groups articulate their dreams, motivations, experiences 
and reflections on issues of migration, global city status, social relations and societal 
structures, culture and cultural practices and spaces?   
 The global location of Dubai linking East and West, and in-between First and 
Third Worlds, i.e. Tradition and Modernity, is a manifestation of global level ideologies 
that position the world in a historical, genealogical networks of racial thinking. In other 
words, the locations of East and West are not just about physical geography, they may be 
thought of in terms of the racialization of space and the construction of worlds of 
modernity. Thus, these representational systems have their origins in the colonial project, 
the development of global capitalism and broader European modernity. They are key in 
understanding how these legacies are embedded in the post WWII making of 
development and underdevelopment, and, as we will see throughout the analysis, in the 
making, ordering and evaluating of globality and global city status.   
 Importantly then, we can move beyond the nation to think about global 
landscapes of race which position the third world vis-à-vis the first world in a hierarchy 
of human ontology that shapes global possibilities. Within this, understanding the 
international division of labour historically helps us to map these ‘geographies of 
migration’ and un-map the genealogy that makes them possible and is embedded within 
them. In addition, the linear developmental model of modernization thinkers and 
economics alike, creates an understanding of time that shapes what is possible of the 
global city of Dubai, its position internationally, and shapes desirable subjects and subject 
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formation more generally. We will see this unfold through the latter chapters of the 
dissertation in which the making of citizenship is (de)/constructed through exclusions and 
differentiations between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, of which ‘them’ is based on a historical 
racialization of the world population, and places and spaces in it.  
 Through this analysis we see the development of Dubai’s dreams, both in terms of 
the imagined and ideological forces, as well as the material, political and economic 
forces, which are all at play in shaping Dubai’s developmental trajectory. The following 
sections of this chapter turn to examine scholarly insights into the making of the ‘global 
city’ including the criteria and impact(s) of this status.  
 
Section Two: Evaluating the Global City in Scholarly Works 
 Building on the imagined and ideological apparatus of Dubai’s globality, this 
review examines a range of mainstream scholarly works on the global city before turning 
to some important critiques and contributions of scholars engaged with critical race and 
postcolonial studies in the field. Broadly, this scholarly review helps us to situate the 
notion of the ‘global’ in two major areas, global city literature that I will take up here, 
and globalization studies that will help explicate the contextual analysis of Dubai’s 
development in the following chapter.  
The notion of the ‘global’ is examined not only as an imagined idea or aspiration, 
but also as a spatial location that has been taken up by scholars in reference to material 
and ideological criterion. Examined as an analytic unit by most scholars, the ‘global’ is 
often understood as a place based analysis of networks and processes that imbue certain 
spaces with global city status with sets of bounded criteria. Through this analysis we will 
see how the ‘global city’ becomes a dominant or hegemonic ideal that shapes and 
promotes urban aspirations around the globe. Furthermore, the study of urban social 
geographies requires a methodological commitment to multiplicity, relationality and 
simultaneity of social, economic, political, and cultural processes, as  the urbanscape is a 
complex social and physical/geographical space comprised of layers, intersections and 
conflicting relationships that often take shape through the interplay with categories based 
on race, ethnicity, employment, status, and gender, which in turn generate hierarchical 
social arrangements.  
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 On a more focused analysis of Dubai, we can keep in mind that whether accepted 
in mainstream scholarly criterion as having achieved this designation or not, the fact 
remains that notions of what the ‘global city’ represents shapes the developmental 
trajectories of spaces such as Dubai in ways that have profound implications for the 
processes of urbanization and experiences of a diverse range of actors.  
 
 Key features. The criterion by which to evaluate world or global status is vast. 
Most early analysis (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Beaverstock, Smith, & Taylor, 1999, 2000; 
Cohen, 1981; Friedmann, 1986; Friedmann & Wolff, 1982; Sassen, 2001; Sassen & 
Appiah, 1998) tended to focus on the number of headquarters of big corporations, or the 
existence of world financial centers, which often led scholars to already established 
capitalist industrialized cities in Europe and North America. Building on this, scholars 
began to expand their criterion and started to identify the existence and capacity to 
service the global economy through a focus on Advanced Producer Services (APS) 
(Brenner 1998; Castells & Castells, 1996; Sassen, 2001)  which were seen through 
services such as banking and finance, accounting, legal services, or marketing and the 
availability of advanced communications technologies. This opened up the analysis to be 
less about place, and more about capabilities, which lent itself to the examination of cities 
within networks, and furthermore, emerging centers. Building on these criterion scholars 
(Derudder & Witlox, 2005; Kunzmann, 1998; Rimmer, 1998) have also examined levels 
of airport traffic and the links to airline networks as mapping important global 
geographical locations. Others have examined international labour markets and urban 
labour markets (Samers, 2002), levels of professional migration of highly skilled workers 
(J. Beaverstock & Smith, 1996),  tourism and lifestyles or real estate (Haila, 2006). 
Amidst all of these considerations, scholars (King, 2006; D. A. Smith & Timberlake, 
2001; M. P. Smith, 2001/2006; Taylor, 1997) have also identified global hierarchies 
amongst these networks of cities, whereby a tiered system of cities becomes more visible. 
Thus the tier system of global cities tended, and still does tend to reinforce Western, 
Anglo-centric views of globality, which tend to focus exclusively on cities of the 
capitalist, industrialized North such as New York, London, and Paris. However, more 
recent studies (Marcuse & van Kempen, 2000; Massey, 2007; Olds & Yeung, 2004; J. 
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Robinson, 2002; R. G. Smith, 2003; Yeoh, 1999) have challenged this by examining 
alternative criteria and focusing on ‘emerging’ global cities or those integrated into global 
networks in different ways which allows us to expand our view to include cities in the 
periphery as tied to migration networks, producers of raw materials and manufactured 
goods, or those new emerging markets within Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle 
East. These studies (Malecki & Ewers, 2007; Rimmer, 1998; Shin & Timberlake, 2000) 
of global cities include discussions of Singapore, Hong Kong or Dubai, and growing 
symbols of globality shape their positions in the global imaginary. However, what we 
find generally is that the coveted status of ‘global city’ is not given to cities that have 
historically been integral to the development of capitalist industrialization in Europe for 
example, such as the colonies, which are perpetually designated to the peripheries of 
Europe’s globality.   
 
 David Simon (1995/2006) identifies the defining features of the global city as 
including the existence of complex financial services that provide support to global 
clientele, international networks of capital and information and communication flows, 
and a high quality of life conducive to attracting and retaining skilled international 
migrants, as well as the physical and aesthetic aspects of the environment but also 
perceived economic and political stability cosmopolitanism and cultural life (Simon, 
2006, 206). These ideas summarize some of the dominant forces of global city formation, 
as they are understood to impact a few key cities, primarily in the Global North.  
 Friedmann’s work in the 1980s on what he called the ‘World City Hypothesis”, 
expanded further with Wolff (1982), identifies the world city as serving as a point of 
departure. Arguing that the existence of ‘global cities’ is not new, but rather the function 
of the world economic order through networks, which are “increasingly oblivious to 
national boundaries” (Friedmann, 1986, 69). The emphasis for Friedmann is on the 
economic power located in command and control functions of particular cities. In this 
view, the number of corporate headquarters for example is seen as a key feature of power 
in the new international division of labour. The ‘global’ city of the contemporary period 
is seen as a product of changes in technological capability, which in turn shapes the ways 
the economics and politics function. For Castells (2006) the defining feature of the 
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contemporary global city is understood in relation to the ‘informational city’, which 
articulates the functions of the global economy in a network of decision-making and 
informational processes. This new spatial logic is seen as characteristic of the 
informational city and is determined by the preeminence of space of flows over the space 
of places (Castells, 2006, 135 ). The space of flows is defined by a “system of exchanges 
of information, capital and power that structures basic processes of societies, economies 
and states between different localities, regardless of localization” (Castells, 2006, 136). 
We can see through these perspectives, the dominance of shifts and changes in 
characteristics related to economic globalization as the determining force through which 
global city networks are made and given significance.  
 Saskia Sassen, whose work has largely popularized the concept of the ‘global 
city’, has examined the relationships between London, New York and Tokyo as 
emblematic of the global city network. Methodologically her work challenges traditional 
notions of scale by highlighting the “the dynamics and processes that get territorialized at 
these diverse scales [which] can in principle be regional, national or global” (Sassen, 
2001, xix). Her focus on the dispersal of activities through these geographic networks 
lends itself to the analysis of global cities in terms of their ‘functions’ and ‘capabilities’. 
However, as Sassen argues, amidst all of this de- and re-territorialization it is important to 
maintain a historical perspective that recognizes the relationships of power and capitalist 
development that have significant impacts in shaping the economic and political 
landscapes of networks of ‘global cities’, shaping priorities and desires of ‘globality’. 
Similarly, Friedmann and Wolff (1982/2006) argue for the recognition of a dynamic 
historical perspective, one in which the role of different cities is never fixed, but changes 
in terms of function, relationships and spatial dominance. However, while they recognize 
the historical roots of the idea of a world economy for example, they emphasize that the 
present situation is unique.  
 Scholarly insights originating in the 1970s and 80s, such as those of Friedmann 
and Wolffe (1986) tended to focus on shifts in the global economy, in which the ‘global’ 
over the international was being shifted through cities as nodes in a global network over 
national economies.  In Friedmann and Wolff’s analysis, the post WWII era of post 
Fordist industrial structures that shifted towards a system in which capitalist institutions 
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become increasingly internationalized and freed from national constraints organizing 
global production and markets for their own interests was significant (Friedmann & 
Wolff, 1982/2006).  This can be seen as the financialization and internationalization of 
world economy, which was seen as uniquely, engendering new modes and functions of 
global capitalism.   
 Not only were headquarters of major transnational corporations (TNCs) important 
markers of globality, but also as scholars such as Sassen argue, it is its capacity to 
produce financial services that makes them significant. Thus APS and the overall ability 
to support sectors such as law, accountancy, consulting and other essential features of 
increasingly global business operations are all characteristic of the necessary functions of 
a global city (Sassen, 2001). The push towards the centralizations of command and 
control capacities within agglomeration economies of major urban centers highlight how 
the  “the more dispersed a firm’s operations across different countries, the more complex 
and strategic its central functions- that is, the work of managing, coordinating, servicing 
and financing a firm’s network of operations” (Sassen, 2001, xx). These shifts are tied to 
the growth of technological advances that allows corporations to coordinate production 
and investment regardless of location, which has meant changes in capital mobility and 
new information technology. Additionally, while capitalist production may always have 
been global in scope, the growth of the producer and financial services ‘complex’ 
represents a shift in that the role of the global city to provide a host of essential services 
that enable capitalism to carry out production and investment on a global scale (Sassen, 
2001). Thus, whereby in the past central functions were carried out at the headquarters, 
today much of this is outsourced and many more firms are buying more of such inputs 
than producing them in house (Sassen, 2001). Thus through these functions for example, 
the global city becomes emblematic of both the local, placed based and of the global, 
transnational. Overall it can be said that since the 1980s, major changes in the new 
international division of labour (NIDL) have been generated to free TNCs from national 
constraints while they establish a global network of production and distribution (Hamnett, 
1994).  
 In building on the importance of these shifts, Sassen (2002) also argues that while 
we are witnessing greater transnational flows and networks, the significance of these 
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functions is made through greater focus on how cities are integrated, not only as being 
hosts to an array of businesses and fostering the lifestyles conducive to this, but as being 
places of concentration of these functions.  Thus, in her examination of the geography of 
globalization she sees a simultaneous dispersal of capabilities and mobilities, as well as 
the concentration of resources necessary for the managing and servicing of that dispersal 
(Sassen, 2002) 
  In considering in more detail the greater concentration rather than massive 
dispersal, Sassen highlights that while communication technologies may have the ability 
to facilitate dispersal, they also tend to strengthen the importance of central coordination 
and control, in for example, the need for state of the art resources and top professionals 
(Sassen, 2002). Thus, “economic globalization and telecommunications have contributed 
to producing a spatiality for the urban which pivots on cross border networks and 
territorial locations with massive concentrations of resources” (Sassen, 2002, 30). 
Additionally, she highlights the role of cross border mergers and alliances, as well as the 
denationalized agendas that they carry. This emphasizes the loosening of national 
attachments and identities for global firms, as well as the increased forces of 
neoliberalism through deregulation and privatization that have weakened the need for 
national financial centers.  
 Thus, according to Sassen, cities are important and strategic sites for examining 
global processes and major politico-economic processes. Additionally, she argues that 
they allow us to reclaim the concrete localized processes through which globalization 
exists. While much of what is popularly understood of Sassen’s work is tied to 
discussions related to global economic processes, she in fact is careful to emphasize the 
need to account for the city, communities and workers from a different scale. Thus, 
reclaiming place and production processes allows us to see how “global processes are 
structured by local constraints, including composition of the workforce, work cultures 
and prevailing political cultures and processes” (Sassen, 1996, 631). Instead of traditional 
conceptions of globalization in which the global, national or local are seen as a mutually 
exclusive, she pushes for a re-scaling of globalization emphasizing the ways that the 
“dynamics and processes that get territorialized at these diverse scales can in principle be 
regional, national or global” (Saskia Sassen, 2001, xix).   
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 While scholars such as Sassen are seen as reemphasizing the significance of cities 
in the traditional capitalist core such as London, New York and Tokyo, others challenge 
representations of these allegedly ‘new type of cities’ referred to as ‘global’. While, for 
example, Lughod (1999/2006) notes that the ‘new age’ is one in which the global city is 
characterized by the internationalization of the market through changes in commerce due 
to revolutions in technologies, decentralizations of production and simultaneously 
concentration of control in the core region, in turn creating demands for FIRE services 
(Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate), she also notes the histories in which these cities are 
embedded. For example, she argues that in the case of New York City (NYC) the ‘seeds 
from which the present ‘global city’ grew were firmly planted in Manhattan during the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century” (Abu-Lughod, 1999/2006, 43). The major 
metropolitan agglomerations that service today as ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities were built 
over time as she argues. With a focus on US cities, she argues that even within the US, it 
is difficult to compare cities without a more specific historical and geographic contextual 
analysis from which they developed. Lughod highlights the role of cities at the heart of 
the world system, which she invokes through historical references to imperial capitals. 
However, as she notes the scale and reach of these networks was still very limited, 
though they did lay the foundation for processes of urbanization around the globe. She 
argues that “History does not end with globalization” (Abu-Lughod, 1999/2006, 47) and 
the present power of certain cities is tied to changing geographies of power, which in turn 
are tied to larger systems. For Ancien (2011) in Sassen’s analysis it is important to 
understand that “the emergence of these global cities is situated in time and is 
conditioned by a particular geohistorical marterial context: that of the financialization of 
the world economy, made possible through the development of information technologies 
in particular” (Ancien, 2011, 2475). This is typified by the early global city thesis  
(Friedmann, 1986) conceived in relation to traditional economic centers in cities in 
Western Europe (London, Paris, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Zurich), North America (NY, 
Chicago, LA and Toronto), and East Asia (Tokyo, HK, Singapore).  
 For Sassen, while we have seen cross border networks in the past, what is 
different is the “intensity, complexity and global span of these networks, the extent to 
which significant portions of the economies are now dematerialized and digitalized and 
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hence the extent to which they can travel at great speeds through some of these networks” 
(Sassen, 2001/2006, 95), which in turn leads to a number of cities that are part of cross-
border networks operating at vast geographic scales. This ‘new’ urban spatiality links 
cities across the globe, and contrasts with capitals of empires in the past, in which today’s 
global cities existing only in relation to each other, albeit within a global hierarchy of 
power.  
 In reviewing these earlier analyses, the focus on ‘traditional’ centers of economic 
power has been linked to the creation of ‘ideal’ model of ‘globality’ or ‘global city’ 
status. These epistemological assumptions are embedded in many analyses and have been 
criticized as generating certain biases in what signifies importance in the making of 
global networks of power and exchange. While the argument has been made that the 
focus on ‘Western’ cities is linked to structural tendencies in the making of world 
capitalism, it is also important to consider the assumptions embedded within the making 
of ‘case studies’ as exemplary models of what represents ‘global city status’. The 
implications of these seemingly rational cases, is the creation of a hierarchy through 
which ‘global-ness’ is measured, thus generating models to be emulated and 
developments to be desired without the necessary historical genealogy to help explain 
their rise. Scholars such as Robinson (2009) have critiqued these exclusive cities as 
eclipsing important urban growth and development in places ‘off the map’ such as those 
in the ‘developing world’ that account for over 95% of urban population growth for 
example (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 25). Robinson argues, that these theories often work to 
create a ‘normative’ model, which is “defined only by a handful of cities” (W. I. 
Robinson, 2009, 26).  These critiques are taken up in more detail later on in this section.  
 
 In considering the politics of the global city in more detail, we can consider the 
“process through which cities try to achieve the status of the global city” (Haila, 
1997/2006, 282). Of major significance here are the ways in which the global ‘image’ of 
a city plays a significant role in shaping, for example, investments and real estate. 
Additionally, image promotion and the media are important mediums linked to the 
symbolic power and politics that shape the city. In a more focused discussion on real 
estate, Anne Haila (1997) highlights the way that real estate is seen as a sign of success in 
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the world economy which is, “at once measured by, and visibly expressed through, the 
skyline of office towers and similar landmarks of economic success such as airports, 
ports, festival districts” (Haila, 1997/2006, 283). Thus, “Real estate capital has found an 
unexploited area of consumption, where it increases not only its own profits but also 
consumption through development of places of consumption” (Haila, 1997/2006, 283). 
Haila argues, as per David Harvey (1989), that ‘entrepreneurialism’, which is distinct 
from managerialism, dominates urban governance. In this way, entrepreneurs are 
privileged at the expense of inhabitants, and as Haila argues, in specific, the real estate 
developers and investors are prioritized (Haila, 1997/2006, 283). Another novelty she 
highlights are the ways in which other cities are seen not as models for new ideas nor as 
lessons to learn from but as legitimation for certain measures. Overall, in thinking about 
the ‘global’ in relation to city formation, while many scholars emphasize networks as 
open, connected and dependent, she argues that the question we should be asking is what 
is the nature of this dependency? Thus, by examining the real estate or development in 
particular sites, you can see the global networks which make them possible. For example, 
the Petronas Tower in Kuala Lumpur is linked to construction companies including 
Japanese, South Korean and Australian firms and migrant labourers who are mainly 
Indonesian, Bangladeshi and Filipino. These important geographies highlight the global 
linkages and dependencies between real estate development, and also the shifting spaces 
of globality in which for example, the tallest buildings are now outside of the West 
(Haila, 2006, 287). Overall real estate is seen as a key example that exemplifies many of 
the politics of a global city, through which physical signs are written in the urban 
landscape (Haila, 2006, 286). Thus, buildings are not just frameworks for activities, or 
objects of investment but also “symbols of trophies, exclusivity and the image of fame, 
name and prestige” (Haila, 2006, 286). What we find as we link these priorities in global 
city development and the mythologies which surround them, is that the goal is to 
segregate and exclude in order to build luxury, exclusivity and fame.  
 
 Another major area of consideration here is linked to hierarchies between and 
within cities which are central aspects to understanding how cities are created in regards 
to networks, as well as how their mode of integration into networks is expressed within 
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urban spaces. Globality itself finds expression and meaning through networks, and these 
linkages are hierarchical and interconnected as ‘world city nodes’. These city nodes are 
also understood as command points of the global economy, the “new pillars of a late 
capitalism characterized by new conditions of rapidly increasing globalization, 
financialization and deregulation of the world economy” (Ancien, 2011, 2473).  These 
forces of contemporary globalization and the transnational operations and linkages in 
global networks of capital and information whereby  “these new, vibrant economic 
regions are spatially defined by networks of cities that may be more closely linked to 
cities in other countries than with other cities in their own countries” (Shin & 
Timberlake, 2000, 2260). Thus the linkages between cities often transcend their national 
borders and facilitate international connections beyond the nation state.    
 As urban studies was expanded in the 1970s to emphasize the need for cities not 
to be studied in isolation, growing emphasis on the international system and the 
subsequent creation of hierarchies amongst cities was exposed, through the groupings of 
first, second and third tier (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 11). Similarly, the ‘world cities 
hypothesis’ pushed this further and understood globalization in relation to the 
international division of labour emphasizing core, semi-peripheral and peripheral cities. 
Following world system theorist Immanuel Wallerstein, Friedmann and Wolff (1982) 
explained that the core refers to those already industrialized, often post-industrialized 
regions, which are home to the majority of corporate headquarters. Semi-periphery refers 
to those who play a significant role in mediating relations between core and periphery, 
many of whom are rapidly industrializing but are still dependent on core region capital 
and technological knowledge, and finally, the world periphery refers to what is left of the 
market economy, such as those who are  “poor, technologically backwards and politically 
weak” (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 311). These categories have arguably been 
substantially challenged in the contemporary period, as the growing divisions between 
core and peripherialized aspects of national economies have allowed some formerly semi 
or world periphery places to operate important functions for TNCs and other global 
transactions. Nonetheless, these hierarchies continue to dominant and influence how 
global city status is evaluated in many ways, with significant implications.  
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 For Cohen (1981/2006) the ‘urban hierarchy’ is tied to the ‘new international 
division of labour’ (NIDL) and its relationship to Multinational Corporations, whereby 
changing locational patterns of MNCs that are shifting away from national webs of 
articulation move towards global networks. Thus, for Cohen this can be seen to be 
reflected in efforts to map the ‘new global urban order’, which was entrenching rather 
than loosening existing global power relations and North-South inequalities. 
Additionally, even within the core globalizing cities of the US, class based social 
polarization was intensifying as the process of globalization unfolded (Cohen, 1981/2006, 
51). Cohen emphasizes the location and role of transnational corporations in relation to 
the NIDL and the urban hierarchy. He examined the increasing centralization of 
corporate linked functions within a few key US cities, as well as the increasing 
internationalization of operations. Even with the recognition of this hierarchy, its 
acknowledgement didn’t challenge the naming of ‘global cities’, which as Cohen argues 
could only be named if they have a wide range of international business institutions such 
as banking and strategic corporate services (Cohen, 1981/2006, 51).  
 Friedmann and Wolff (1982/2006) have argued that the global system gives rise 
to an urban hierarchy, at the apex of which there are ‘world cities’ that are interconnected 
through decision making and finance. This hierarchy is important in understanding the 
comparisons and evaluation of emerging global cities, as cities are linked through these 
networks and are shaped by their role and function in the global economy. However, as 
these cities are not equal in their functions, global city theorists have devised complex 
articulations of hierarchies amongst cities, ranking them based on differential criteria. 
Thus, it is not the population size that determines their character but rather the specific 
and fundamental ways in which these urban regions are becoming integrated with the 
global economic system. Their modes of integration being a key consideration, he also 
determines much of this world city status to the number of MNC headquarters that 
operate there. This then, for example, leads to the global urban hierarchy, which is a 
“reflection of the unequal distribution of economic power across the globe” (Shin & 
Timberlake, 2000, 2259).  
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 In addition to the international or global hierarchies within which global cities 
exist, their mode of integration into these networks also shapes their internal dynamics, of 
which social polarization has been a key area of scholarly concern.  
 They become the major points for the accumulation of capital and ‘all that  money 
 can buy’. They are luxurious, splendid cities whose very splendor  obscures the 
 functional relation: rich and poor define each other (Friedmann & Wolff, 
 1982/2006, 61).  
 
 For Sassen, processes of economic change have led to polarization in 
occupational structures, such as there “has been an expansion at the top and bottom ends 
of the occupational/income distribution at the expense of the middle” (Hamnett, 1994, 
401).  Much of this decline in the middle class is due to the changing nature of the 
economy in these cities, for example, the decline of industrial manufacturing and growth 
of advanced producer and financial services have contributed to these changing 
socioeconomic distribution patterns. Thus interestingly, the growth of APS for example is 
met with a growing proliferation of low skilled, low paid service jobs.  
 The connection is further explained by Friedmann and Wolff (1982/2006) who 
argue that these urbanizing processes such as the economic, social, and spatial elements 
that define life in the cities are reflections, to a large extent, of their mode of integration 
into the world system. Thus, the form and extent of a city’s integration into the world 
economy and the functions assigned to this city in a new spatial division of labour is key 
to understanding various structural changes. Central to this analysis is control over urban 
life, which is shaped by competing interests and demands, the priorities of which will 
shape experiences in the city. Thus, as Brenner and Keil (2006) describe the inequalities 
of the NIDL within their boundaries created simultaneous spaces of hope and gloom, 
“sites in which ‘citadel’ and ‘ghetto’ existed in uneasy proximity” ( 57).  
 In particular, these global control functions of world cities shape the structure and 
dynamics of production and employment sectors, which is turn impacts growth in 
finance, transport and communication, as well as business services such as advertising, 
accounting, insurance, and legal services. In addition, Friedmann also recognized here the 
highly dichotomized nature of the labour force split between high level professionals and 
an army of low skilled workers (Friedmann, 1986; Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006). This 
theme related to labour, has been characterized as reflecting the nature of global cities as 
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‘dual cities’ in terms of how global functions draw high skilled professionals and well 
paid skilled labour but also rely on unskilled, poor paid immigrant workforce to service 
global companies (J. Robinson, 2002, 546). For Sassen, this is the result of the 
downgrading of traditional manufacturing sectors and emergence of advanced producer 
and financial services. Rather than view the dominance of finance and professional 
services as growing at the expense of lower paid service sector workers, Sassen notes 
new economic regime relies on an army of low waged workers. Importantly then, this 
focus on cities and communities allows us to see a specific geography that encompasses 
the global scale as well as microgeographies.  
 
 In considering processes of labour and migration more closely, many scholars, 
such as Sassen argue (1988), that the transnationalization of production has created new 
conditions for the international mobility of labour (transnational migration of labour), 
while traditional economic theories assumed “the international mobility of commodities 
(that is, world trade) but the immobility of capital and of labour” (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 
8). The ‘new international division of labour’ theory emerging in the 1970s and 1980s 
was characterized by increased FDI in developing countries, shift in manufacturing from 
North to South, spread of EPZs and increase decentralization of production (W. I. 
Robinson, 2009, 8). These shifts were dependent on a cheap labour force, which was 
importantly analyzed later through the ‘feminization of poverty’ and the gendered nature 
and impacts of an increasingly young, precarious, female labour force.  In Sassen’s work, 
international migration was seen as a part of the processes of globalization, which also 
included flows of capital, goods, services and information (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 8). The 
linkages between industrialized and ‘developing’ countries highlight both the impacts of 
the global economy on restructuring the labour market of ‘sending’ countries, but also 
highlights the new conditions in developed countries which are tied to the expanding 
demand for low waged labour to be filled by immigrants. This analysis extends into the 
formation of global cities in which the economic conditions that allow these centers to 
service and manage the world economy create similar demands for new immigrant 
labour. Thus, as Sassen states “the same set of basic processes that has promoted 
emigration from several rapidly industrializing countries has also promoted immigration 
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into several booming global cities” (Sassen, 1988, 22). For Sassen, labour migration in 
the current period is intimately related to the historical development of world capitalism, 
in which growing pools of migrant labour in formerly colonized countries is key. As she 
argues, both global cities and export processing zones attract immigrant labour, and the 
“the growing concentration of immigrant labour in service jobs in developed countries 
can be viewed as the correlate of the export of jobs to the Third World” (Sassen, 1988, 
53).  
 For Malecki and Ewers (2007) the importance of understanding the demand for 
the unskilled labour, which is available in peripheral regions, is tied to the growing 
consumption and demand for low skilled services by professional workers in ‘global 
cities’. The authors note that most analyses of global cities focus little on labour and more 
on APS and TNCs, which tends to construct global cities as linear and deterministic. In 
this schema global cities must have attained an APS base, and have been deindustrialized 
or postindustrialized in order to achieve the pinnacle of labour markets in the global 
capitalist economy. However as Malecki and Ewers highlight, in the case of the Middle 
East, many economies are bifurcated comprised of preindustrial resource extraction and 
postindustrial service activities.  
 In addition, Malecki and Ewers discuss the role of capital investment as key to 
attaining global city status, as those cities that do not, are often left out of traditional 
analyses. Furthermore, they agree with the dichotomized nature of the labour force 
whereby the division of primary and secondary, and formal and informal reign true, they 
state that “in segmented labour markets, employers match jobs with certain segments of 
the workforce based largely on socially constructed attributes of skill, race, sex or 
ethnicity” (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 469). Thus what we see is labour processes in global 
cities which necessitates both high skill and high wage, and low skill, low wage labour, 
“to provide specialized knowledge based services on the one hand, and organizational 
flexibility and lower labour costs on the other” (Malecki & Ewers, 2007, 469). These 
changes in the global economic structure and division of labour lead to things like the 
‘race to the bottom’, and thus, the global industrial restructuring and the rise of global or 
world command points, is met with a decline in industrial bases in many cities, while 
accompanied by rise in APS leading to unequal social and employment structures made 
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up of a transnational business class of professionals, and army of low skilled workers that 
“cater to privileged classes for whose sake the world city primarily exists” (Malecki & 
Ewers, 2007, 470).  
 In addition, they highlight the linkages between contexts, whereby the “Spatial 
manifestation of the global job market is seen in the urban continuum from global cities 
in core economies to towns and villages in peripheral economies” (Malecki & Ewers, 
2007, 471). They note that in between world cities and peripheral cities are numerous 
other places that exhibit varying degrees of world city-ness.  
 In thinking about migration and labour supply, the authors note that the earlier 
world city hypothesis was largely focused on documenting APS and TNCs in order to 
also explain out migration and pull factors in developed countries. They argue that the 
demand driven theory of migration, leading to polarization, is not adequate, and that 
while demand can be initial reason for migration, cumulative causation gives momentum 
for successive migration decisions (Malecki & Ewers, 2007). Thus, labour demand is one 
of many reasons for migration to global cities, and there are additional push factors to 
consider. For example, changes in economic structure, demand driven processes, and 
income disparities, low wages and additional push factors in sending countries are all a 
part of the supply side processes. Thus, while some original theories emphasized 
destination countries in the developed world rather than the countries that supply most of 
the labour, the authors argue that not enough research focused on labour supply countries 
and how social organization operates within circuits of labour in global economy. Thus, 
from here they highlight a three circuit framework including, contract procurement, 
recruitment within sending countries, gaining access to employment and the reasons for 
why people take them. They also emphasize the role of the state in facilitating these 
movements by exploring examples such as that of Manila, where the government has 
created programs and projects to encourage migration as a development strategy since the 
1970s.  
  
 In analyzing the impacts of these shifts, we can consider that while the city has 
typically been analyzed vertically, as Brenner and Keil (2006) argue, cities can also be 
understood horizontally in terms of the everyday lived experiences expressed in “diverse 
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social, cultural and political space”, in which different relations of power are “produced, 
contested and reworked” (Brenner & Keil, 2006, 4). Dissecting the diverse elements that 
together constitute the urban experience often exposes a collision of opposed social 
dynamics. In addition, it is important to recognize that these everyday experiences are not 
outside of the ‘global’. For example, in the case of Dubai, we can see how these scales 
operate simultaneously exposing the links and embedded nature of Dubai’s globality in a 
range of networks that shape both the lived everyday experiences of inhabitants, and also, 
the representations of the city in the broader global city landscape.  
 In considering the horizontal view of the city, the issues of social and spatial 
polarization become glaring. Friedmann and Wolff (1982/2006) for instance, argue that 
spatial polarization can be found at many scales, globally, between economies, 
regionally, and in metropolitan areas. Spatial polarization is thus caused by class 
polarizations found in three major facets: income gaps between elites and low skilled 
workers, large scale immigration from rural areas or abroad, and structural trends in the 
changing structure of the labour market and the types of jobs required (Friedmann, 1986). 
Thus spatial polarization is directly linked to labour and in particular, the types of jobs 
available. Building and expanding on this, Friedmann and Wolff offer a more detailed 
analysis of the changes associated with social restructuring in world cities by examining 
the lifestyles of transnational elites which dominant and shape employment structures. 
These cosmopolitan elites define affluence in the urban landscape and are predominantly 
males between 30 and 50 years of age (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 63). They are 
contrasted with the underclass of the city,  
 They crowd along the edges of the primary economy- the ‘formal’ sector- or 
 settle in its interstices, barely tolerated, yet providing personal services to  the 
 ruling class, doing the dirty work of the city. The ruling class enjoys 
 permanent employment, steady income, complete legality; they do not have 
 to justify their existence. For all practical purposes, they are the city. The 
 underclass lives at its sufferance (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 63) 
 
 Briefly noted in their analysis is the reality that the underclass is made up of a 
different ethnicity, and thus difference is measured through race and language, which 
gives many cities a  ‘third world’ feel (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 63). They give 
the examples of Puerto Ricans and Haitians in NY, Mexicans in LA and San Francisco, 
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‘barefoot Indians’ in Mexico City, ‘nodestinos’ in Sao Paulo, Jamaicans in London, 
Algerians in Paris, Turks in Frankfurt, Malays in Singapore, and I would add here, South 
Asians in Dubai. The authors highlight racism, segregation, and violence as part of the 
inherent contradictions of the city. Social polarization is expressed physically in the 
geography of the world city, and is spatially organized with the citadel and ghetto. 
Characterized as the following “with its towers of steel and glass and its fanciful 
shopping malls, the Citadel is the city’s most vulnerable symbol” (Friedmann & Wolff, 
1982/2006, 64). In addition, there are private spaces, secluded spaces, overcrowded 
ghettos further divided by race and ethnic criteria, poor public service provision, and in 
many places residents of the ghettos are not allowed outside their zones only during 
working hours as  “their appearance in the Citadel after dark creates a small panic… at 
night, ghetto residents belong to the ghettos. There, isolated like a virus, they can only 
harm themselves” (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 64).  
 For Friedmann, the social costs generated by world cities often exceed the fiscal 
capacity of the state, and the costs of social reproduction such as housing, education, 
health, transport and welfare. In this sense, the clash between needs is seen as 
transnational elites emphasize their demands at the cost of the city’s poor. As he notes, 
state budgets reflect the general balance of political power, and the overall result “is a 
steady state of fiscal and social crises in which the burden of capitalist accumulation is 
systematically shifted to the politically weakest, most disorganized sectors of the 
population. Their capacity for pressing their rightful claims against the corporations and 
the state is further contained by the ubiquitous forces of police repression” (Friedmann, 
1986, 79). Friedmann and Wolff (1982/2006) argue that there are ‘life spaces’ and 
‘economic spaces’. In the economic space the logic of capital, individualized and profit 
motivate dominant, and in the life space, which people occupy, is space in which their 
dreams are made, people’s lives unfold (65). However a more critical spatial analysis 
(Sassen 1991, Lefebvre 1996, Soja 2006, Harvey 2001) recognizes the mutually 
constitutive nature of ‘citadel’ and ‘ghetto’ for example, challenging the reductionist 
duality of the ideas of ‘economic spaces’ and ‘life spaces’ and instead pushes for a 
dialectic understanding of the relationality and mutually constitutive nature of these 
forces.  
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 In considering the lifestyles that characterize the global city, we can consider 
those valorization dynamics which are tied to high process and top of line restaurants, 
hotels, upscale shops, all of which cater to a new high income urban elite. However, this 
high income gentrification process needs and in fact, depends, on a vast supply of low 
wage workers (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 16). It is important for Robinson’s examination to 
highlight the duality of the glamorous and the impoverished.  Since “the globalization of 
labour flows is part of the same process as the development of global finance and the 
global circulation of capital, so the worlds of difference represented in the global city 
spring from the same global processes” (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 16). The glamour exists 
because of those who do the ‘dirty work’. In global cities you see a concentration of new 
gendered and racialized transnational labour pools facing the casualization and 
informalization of work. Thus the “social geography of the global city is one of a spatial 
and class apartheid” (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 17).  
 In the social organization of cities, we can see how, as Hamnett (1995) argues, 
that these shifts have ramifications all over the cityscape for example, in the demand for 
housing, whereby gentrification takes place in parts of the inner city and the 
concentration of the “less skilled, in less desirable parts of the housing market” (Hamnett, 
1994, 402). It is also interesting to consider the concept of the ‘peripherialization of the 
core’ in which immigration and low wage labour supply is said to be shaping the socio-
economic dynamics of the global city in important ways through intensifying social 
polarizations and violence (Hamnett, 1994). Thus, what socio-economic dynamics were 
typically relegated to the ‘periphery’, are finding their way into the ‘core’ through 
immigration and the demand for low waged labour to support the professional and elite 
classes of the global city.  
 
 Critiques of global cities scholarship. While many of the traditional approaches 
to global cities research has focused on cities of the global North, and primarily those 
identified in the core, such as New York, London, and Tokyo, it can be argued that there 
is an implicit bias in these early approaches in which most theoretical work on global 
urban development is centered on the experiences of the West. While this is seen as a 
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necessary analysis as these cities often formed the core of expansion for global 
capitalism, more recent scholarship has shifted from criteria based on banks, stock 
markets, communication networks, transportation networks, etc. towards a relational 
approach that is more interested in the linkages and relationships between cities. While 
some maintain that global cities remain distinct in terms of their functions for 
management and coordination of global economic processes, others have argued that 
cities located outside of the core have been restructured in significant ways due to 
processes of globalization. These ‘geographies of capitalism’ have traditionally focused 
on Western Europe, North America and East Asia, which can be contested if we 
acknowledge the ways in which global capitalism was born out of colonial expansion in 
cities of the ‘global South’. Some scholars such as Shatin (1998) explore processes of 
globalization beyond these limitations and argue that we should view LDCs not as “an 
unfortunate footnote to the phenomenon of globalization and economic restructuring” 
(Shatkin, 1998, 378) but rather as integral to the processes of capital accumulation. One 
of the ways in which discussions of the global South have been integrated into analyses 
of global urban cities research has been through the conceptualization of ‘globalizing’ 
cities. Interestingly this conception is meant to highlight the ways in which processes of 
globalization are transforming these spaces, however, as I argue throughout this analysis, 
rather than being peripheral to the world economy, these spaces are integral to its 
production. The notion of cities ‘off the map’ and ‘globalizing’ seems to imply the 
developmental logic of ‘catching up’, when in fact these cities are often what makes the 
status of global cities in the North possible. Some of the features that connect these cities 
‘off the map’ include the experience and legacy of colonialism, the era of ‘development’, 
and the impacts of neoliberal restructuring through Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs) and connections to international organizations such as the World Bank (WB), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United 
Nations (UN).  
 
 Evaluating the ‘global’ aspects of cities has been based on diverse sets of criteria. 
As highlighted through mainstream scholarly works, the primary criterion for 
understanding globality is tied to economic globalization. However, critical interventions 
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in urban studies have helped add nuance and complexity to the ways in which ideas of the 
‘global’ are said to operate at the macro level and are seen as the primary and dominant 
mode of influence in shaping cities in the global landscape. To critique the hegemonic 
notions of the ‘global’ scholars consider linkages and levels of analysis that push us to 
think beyond the economic center top down models of economic development. Thus, as 
Mohamed and Sidaway (2012) argue, this shift requires us moving “beyond commodity 
and merchant networks into variegated subaltern historical geographies of globalization 
that do not take the West as the only (or indeed principle) point of reference” (621).  
 For example, as Smith (2001/2006) argues the Global City thesis depends largely 
on a set of assumptions about the role of global economic restructuring, which is said to 
precede and determine urban spatial and sociocultural restructuring. This is done through 
“transforming localities by disconnecting them from their ties to nation-states, national 
legal systems, local political cultures and every-day place making practices (M. P. Smith, 
2001/2006, 379). The implications of which are that the economic-centric models of 
understanding that are based on a grand economic narrative of globalization which is 
supported by those interested in the advancement of particularly western-oriented, 
modernization perspectives, these include transnational corporate and financial elites, 
heads of international agencies, state managers who embrace the IMF, WB and WTO (M. 
P. Smith, 2001/2006, 379). Smith argues that we need to question the ‘objective’ findings 
of these theorists who may be guilty of legitimizing this project by viewing these 
‘realities of global cities’ as part and parcel “of an unstoppable process of economic 
globalization”, therefore “unintentionally, their epistemology thus becomes the ontology 
of global cities” (M. P. Smith, 2001/2006, 380).  
 This intervention pushes us to denaturalize the assumptions propagated by this 
most recent historical version of free market ideology based on neoliberalism. This 
means recognizing that ‘global space’ is not the natural or unchanging reserve of global 
capital, but instead “is a discursive arena and very much a contested terrain” (Smith 
2001/2006, 380). Thus is it necessary to challenge the dominance of a purely economic 
interpretation of globalization and of the ‘global’ by recognizing the complex sets of 
processes, which implicate various actors, interests and institutions. Through this 
recognition, it becomes possible to hear the voices and concerns that do not fit into 
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dominant frameworks.  This also opens up possibilities of understanding and imagining 
‘global cities’ and other urban settings in more complex, nuanced, and localized ways. 
 Many globalization theorists have criticized the dominance of the ‘global scale’ 
and pushed for a reimagining of the global through the local for example, or for the ways 
in which different scales operate simultaneously through each other rather than in 
exclusivity. In this way, many scholars (Hannerz, 1980; Lefebvre, 1968; Sandercock, 
2003)  have shifted to examining the ‘lived experiences’ of cities, whereby some argue 
that “global cities are about the everyday lived experience of a globalized world” (W. I. 
Robinson, 2009, 26). Through these internal dynamics, social contestation and everyday 
politics of urban life we see that research on global cities is a political project that is not 
neutral, but rather is embedded “within ongoing struggles to shape and reshape the 
everyday geographies of social, economic and political relations within cities” (Brenner 
& Keil, 2006, 356).  
 
 In considering the context of analyses on global cities, Ancien (2011) asks 
whether most scholars on ‘global cities’ are focused more on the urban aspects of the 
city, or on globalization. While she does not deny the importance of analyzing 
globalization, she does advocate a multidimensional analysis in which we overcome the 
limitations of traditional global city’s thesis by emphasizing the geohistorical context as 
integral to understanding how cities are produced and reproduced, as well as where they 
are embedded in different scales such as the regional, national, and I would add, the local.  
Ancien argues for a multi-scaler, historical, geographical materialism which allows you 
to see “an interpretative framework which incorporates a powerful ability to set parts 
within the context of wholes whilst allowing at the same time for how the parts also 
construct the wholes” (Ancien, 2011, 2474).  
 For scholars such as Ancien, it is not enough to simply claim that global cities 
operate in a network linking them to other centers of ‘command and control’. This 
hierarchy of globality implicates important historical forces that are rarely considered as 
integral to shaping the forms that urban centers take in a global landscape. In fact, many 
critics (Ancien, 2011; King, 1991, 2006; Massey, 2007; J. Robinson, 2002; Shatkin, 
1998; Simon, 1995/2006) argue that truly ‘global’ analyses should implicate a range of 
	 110	
factors, histories and forces, cities and spaces that make possible globalization. These 
critical scholars expand the idea of ‘push’ factors by exploring how linkages and 
networks go beyond economic decisions in the Global north, and thus consider additional 
networks, which sustain the formation of global cities. This can be found for example, in 
Massey (2007) who argues in her conception of ‘geographies of responsibility’, that we 
need to consider the links between London and the places of origin of many workers who 
are key to London’s economy, but are a loss to the development of their home countries. 
Although the connection between sending and receiving states is an important 
relationship to highlight, we can also question the idea of ‘loss’ and complicate it with an 
analysis of remittances and the state promotion of migration as a part of formal national 
development policies. Ancien advocates a less structured, more fluid approach located 
from the bottom up that allows us to understand “the multiple processes that constitute a 
global city” ( 2011, 2476). The starting point for most analyses of the ‘global’ has been 
focused on the impacts from the ‘top down’ in order to understand how global economic 
and political processes trickle downwards. However, if we start from the ground, from 
the lived experiences of city dwellers, and move up and outwards, from the past historical 
genealogies that are embedded in the contemporary moment that are also shaping futures, 
we can open up our analysis to a more complex understanding of how and why both 
material and ideological forces shape geographical developments, as well as human 
experiences.  
 The ideological, symbolic and imaginative dimensions of globality are also 
significant here. In trying to add complexity to the pull factors of the global city, Jennifer 
Robinson (2002) emphasizes the aspirational pull of the ‘global city’ in terms of shaping 
not only the common considerations of migrant dreams, but also how these ideas are 
linked to the political priorities of ‘development’. This developmental trajectory that I 
discussed earlier and will continue to examine further in the following chapter, is linked 
to the desires and dreams of being ‘global’, which as Robinson highlights, can orient 
policy makers to prioritize seeking global status, or reduce the problems of improving 
city life to the promotion of development (545). From a ‘developmentalist perspective’ 
many of these cities in poor countries are seen as lacking in city-ness, and thus become 
objects of Western intervention. These ‘ordinary cities’ as she calls them, should be 
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understood as “…diverse, creative, modern and distinctive, with the possibility to 
imagine their own futures and distinctive forms of city-ness” (J. Robinson, 2002, 546). 
The implications are that,  
 …neither the costly imperative to go global, nor developmentalist  interventions 
 which build towards a certain vision of city-ness, and which focus attention 
 of the failures of cities, are very rich resources for city planners and 
 managers who turn to scholars for analytical insight and assessment of 
 experiences elsewhere. (J. Robinson, 2002, 546) 
 
 When scholars continually reinscribe such assumptions, they leave little room to 
imagine different futures for these cities ‘off the map’. Thus, Robinson calls for urban 
studies to ‘decolonize’ its imagination about city-ness, and the possibilities and limits of 
what cities can become “if it is to sustain its relevance to the key urban challenges of the 
twenty-first century” (J. Robinson, 2002, 546). Robinson argues that instead of pursuing 
postcolonial critique, urban studies “replicated this division by accepting the categories of 
world/global city as analytically robust and popularizing them in intellectual and policy 
circles” (548).  
  
 Building on this, we can examine how the criterion for evaluating global city 
status has significant implications for how hierarchies of global city status are built. One 
major form of this is the creation of ‘case studies’ that are used to exemplify these 
processes, creating ‘ideal types’ from which all others can be measured and evaluated. 
Simon warns scholars to think twice about the assumptions of these constructs as well 
being cognizant of the desire to ascribe universal ‘truths’ based on Euro/American and 
ethnocentric experience, paradigms and research (Simon, 1995/2006, 209). Critical 
scholars emphasize the ways that these typifications often reinscribe sets of assumptions 
and uncritically reinforce Westernized notions of ‘development’ and ‘globality’ that lack 
historical consideration. For example, case studies of New York, Los Angeles or London 
are applied as the case to which all cities can be measured in their globality. This in turn 
ends up creating and upholding particular standards and ways of being that are then 
enacted by various globalizing cities as the exemplary and primary mode of inclusion. 
Additionally, since a sole focus on the “global functions and connections, economic and 
financial, means that more cities, especially in the global South are left out of the analysis 
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and off the global map of urban studies” (Ancien, 2011, 2476), it is necessary to expand 
our analysis and to look beyond traditional centers of economic power and towards those 
historically embedded, newly emerging or differently engaged spaces.  
 For example, in Simon’s analysis of the political economy of world city 
formation, he examines the ways that these cities are related to international production, 
circulation and distribution through globalized networks. His interest in postcolonial 
urban development examines these capitals and other major cities in terms of their “mode 
of incorporation into the world economy” (Simon, 1995/2006, 204). In understanding 
much of Africa’s perpherialization, Simon highlights their role as producers for raw 
materials, which met the needs of European industrial capitalism and imperial ambitions, 
giving them a necessary resource base to exploit and shaped their development as ‘global 
centers’ which continues to have important ramifications today in how globality is 
understood and experienced. Thus, he argues that globalization is a fundamental aspect of 
world cities, and that various parts of the Third world are embedded and incorporated 
through differentiating criteria which is often tied to exploitation and unequal exchange 
(Simon, 1995/2006, 208). With this analysis however, he is cognizant to avoid the idea 
that Sub Saharan Africa for example, is particularly destined to remain peripheral and 
instead asks what meaning the ‘world city’ has for different inhabitants, and in particular, 
the most marginalized. This can also be considered through a methodological 
commitment to shifting our vantage point to engage with the everyday experiences and 
dreams of various migrant groups and their interactions and relationships to the city’s 
globalizing developmental efforts.  
 Ancien (2011) provides an interesting argument for the ‘political deficit’ that can 
be found in global city literatures, whereby there is a “very limited understanding of the 
processes and conditions that underlie, enable and constrain the production and 
reproduction of global cities” ( 2477). However, the growing focus on networks of cities, 
exemplified through concepts such as “globalizing cities” (Marcuse & van Kempen, 
2000), or ‘Cities in globalization’ (Taylor, 2004), helps to highlight the processes of 
becoming, rather than solely on the materiality of places.  
 In addition, Ancien pushes scholars to consider more fundamentally the uneven 
geographical patterns of development. Here, a more complex understanding of 
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accumulation in relation to the particular histories and geographies of specific global 
cities are required. Thus, they are “characterized by particular spatialities of power and 
their legacies beyond and within the city” (Ancien, 2011, 2479). Following David Harvey 
(1984) she powerfully articulates the need to explain the “ensembles of relations, 
conditions and constraints over time and how they are both produced through particular 
spatial configurations and in turn produce certain geographies of capitalist development” 
(Ancien, 2011, 2479). The emphasis on multi levels of analysis, located through multiple 
spatialities (geographies), and most importantly over time and through an understanding 
of ‘historical geographies’ is key. This is heavily related to the argument for a 
methodology examining geographies and genealogies of globalization and migration. For 
example, as she states, Britain’s imperial history and its legacy are also “critical to 
understand the social reproduction of labour in the global city” (Ancien, 2011, 2480).  
 While much of Ancien’s work provides important insights into the history of 
capitalist development and related patterns of uneven geographical development, her 
analysis is again centered on the economic sphere without a critically engagement with 
regimes of power related to race, gender, or nationality as they impact and shape the 
experiences of diverse migrants in global cities.  
 
 Another significant aspect of this discussion that is often missed is the role of 
discursive and ideological power. In this sense, the state is an important actor not only in 
the material production and reproduction of the global city by also for discursive 
production. This can seen for example through state rationales that are utilized to support 
capital and the capitalist class, but also the ways in which the state understands its 
relationship to labour and migration. The state holds power to “provide the dominant 
social imaginary… in which policy issues are framed, political subjectivities mobilized 
and judged to be legitimate, rational” (Ancien, 2011, 2484). In fact, while global cities 
continue to be analyzed for their role in the global economy, increasing backlash has 
been documented in terms of conservative, racist and xenophobic notions of citizenship, 
belonging and national identity, which are also important in shaping the experiences of 
migrants, and in particular, the most precarious workers. I would also add here that the 
ideological apparatus of the state is significant for also defining and reproducing its 
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identity in the international system and within the global urban hierarchy.  For example, 
the self-promotions of many emerging global city centers, such as Dubai can be 
highlighted here and the powerful role that ideology plays in constructing subjects. Thus, 
pushing the idea of the geohistorical context further, we can consider how in many 
instances, global cities are defined as an objective reality operating outside the social 
construction of meaning (M. P. Smith, 2001/2006, 378), which must be problematized.  
 Recognizing the geohistorical context also means understanding the linkages over 
time that are seen in analyses of globalization to link processes of economic and political 
imperialism to older forms of colonialism and development which are embedded in 
contemporary processes of global integration. In addition, the particular ways that 
assumptions based on linear, Eurocentric teleological assumptions create historical 
referents seems to erase their origins, making them appear neutral and devoid of 
historical context and meaning. This is linked to critiques by scholars such as Anthony 
King (1991), who argue that much global cities research has been dominated by a form of 
cultural imperialism grounding in western cultural forms and intellectual paradigms. In 
emphasizing the importance of these interventions I would highlight the need to 
challenge Eurocentric categories and narratives, which dominate a normative framework 
of urban studies on global cities. Anthony King explores how the emergence of 
knowledge regimes about the international, were in fact established through European 
hegemony in both the metropole and colonies, bringing the world under the Anglophone 
Euro-American cultural sphere. King argues that colonial legacies are embedded in the 
spatial structure of many postcolonial cities and argues that these legacies impact 
contemporary structures of power. In his discussion of analyses of globalization, King 
highlights the ways in which much of this work has attempted to correct earlier 
Eurocentric and ahistorical analyses by examining the viewpoint of those outside of the 
West, tracing earlier Islamic phases of globalizatiosn before European hegemony and 
tracing “1950s postcolonial globalization” (King, 1991/2006, 320).  
 In examining the impacts of imperialism and colonialism in relation to the 
historical forces of global urbanization, King argues that what we see as ‘global cities’ 
today are just the contemporary round of such formation in a long history of transnational 
influences of urban development. In his analysis of the formation of British cities he 
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argues that while colonial expansions influence on industrialization and capital formation 
is acknowledged, the urban and environmental implications of this are not, thus he states 
that “just as the emerging industrial system of Britain assumed its place in a developing 
international division of labour that is both social and spatial, so also the urban and 
environmental forms that result from this single, international system and global system 
of settlement and build environment” (King, 1991/2006, 197). Thus, all cities have 
historical forces of urban development that are linked to international production and 
consumption that shapes the international division of labour. Understanding the role of 
different cities also helps to explain the ways in which they are built. This can be seen for 
example in the ways in which colonial urban systems linked the interior of countries to 
ports, which in turn were linked to each other and then to the metropole (King, 
1991/2006, 199). Just as cities have historical factors for their development, 
contemporary physical and spatial infrastructures in networks of global cities is also tied 
to restructuring of the social, cultural and political order, “through the creation of centers 
supporting new modes of consumption and transformation through ‘modernization’ and 
commodification, of social, cultural and political consciousness” (King, 1991/2006, 199). 
Importantly then, as King explores, the colonial system was not just about the economy, 
but also political, ideological, social and cultural system, all of which, “need to be 
recognized if we wish to understand the way in which strands of yesterday’s colonialism 
are woven into, and influence the fabric of today’s world-economy and politico-cultural 
system” (King, 1991/2006, 201). We need to see the urban development of cities as part 
of the larger world system (Wallerstein 1974) whereby built environments are both a 
product and resources for understanding global processes. 
 King is also interesting in the ways in which cities are either grouped as ‘world 
cities’ or not, especially in regards to the current criteria being used to evaluate them such 
as the focus on APS.  For King, recognizing the historical imperial and colonial origins 
and legacies of many world or global cities today is not just about getting the facts right, 
it is instead important “to draw attention to the ‘world city paradigm’ and its framing 
within a narrowly restrictive framework or urban political economy. And also to 
highlight the ahistorical and analytically feeble nature of the category of ‘global city’” 
(King, 2006, 321) 
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 The postcolonial cultural, and economic linkages of world cities are also 
important for understanding world cities in the West. A major example of this can be 
seen through migration patterns to world cities, whereby historical, cultural and political 
power relations shape patterns of migration.  For example, the relationships between 
cities in Europe and North America to migrant sending nations in the ‘Third world’, 
postcolonial societies, are shaped by their colonial histories which in turn shape their 
current relationships to power (King, 2006, 332). To analyze the historic and symbolic 
aspects of these power relations, King examines some key signs through architecture and 
buildings, for example. This is an interesting aspect of global city status whereby cities 
become invested in a contest and grouping with other cities, with whose ideas of 
modernity they share.  This can be seen for instance through the building of Burj Khalifa, 
Taipei 101 or Jakarta Tower as spectacular architectural feats confirming the modern 
developments and globality of these cities.  Interestingly, this type of ‘spectacular’ 
development has become emblematic of a postcolonial condition whereby for instance, a 
British architect remarked that if Malaysia’s Petronas Tower were built in the West it 
“would confirm the status of Britain as Third World country” (King, 2006, 323). Thus, 
this conceptualization of newly emerging global cities as suffering from ‘second city 
syndrome’ highlights the role of the modern ‘high rise’ as “prototypical sign of the global 
city” in the postcolonial period of many non-western global cities (King, 2006, 323).  
 Examining globalization through this critical lens importantly questions whether 
the social and spatial polarization, which is often highlighted as a key characteristic to the 
contemporary ‘world’ or ‘global city’, “is simply a continuation of the social, spatial, and 
racial divisions occupied by colonized and colonizer in the earlier layout of the city” 
(King, 2006, 324). King asks some significant questions, which ask us to critically 
examine what places are labeled as ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities “not only from a world 
outside the West, such as Asia, but also from a time, such as the future, that is beyond the 
present” (King, 2006, 324).  
 Building on this, Robinson (2002) provides a postcolonial critique of dominant 
urban studies approaches to global city theory arguing that mainstream approaches 
continue to implicitly be grounded in Euro-American, or Western bias in their 
normalization of the key features of what a ‘global city’ represents. She calls for us to 
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break free of the “categorizing imperative” that reinscribes many Western dominated 
forms of knowledge. The focus of her analysis is the ways in which those cities of the 
global South, those ‘off the map’, are seen as lacking the qualifying characteristics of 
‘global city’ status and development. She argues for the need for contextual and historical 
analysis that challenges the epistemological shortcomings of the entire global city theory 
apparatus, which is premised upon on static, decontextualized categories and typologies. 
For her, the relevance of a city in the global urban hierarchy should not only be based on 
the location of transnational corporate activities but a range of global-local linkages. She 
argues that the un-reflexive use of categories such as ‘global, ‘world’, and ‘third world 
city’ limit our thinking and instead replace diversity with the unstated experiences of a 
few, small group, of mostly Western cities. In this way, cities that exist outside of the 
West are assessed in terms of this pre-given standard of ‘world city ness’ or ‘urban 
economic dynamism’ (J. Robinson, 2002, 532).  
 In addition, Robinson (2002) points out that while many scholars claim to 
emphasize connections and not characteristics/attributes, they tend to analyze in relation 
to a priori analytical hierarchies. Thus, scholars often reinscribe global hierarchies 
through their epistemologies, which normalize categories of globality through the 
creation of benchmarks which are then used to measure all Others without historical 
analyses that reveal the deeply embedded nature of these cities ‘off the map’ as actual 
integral to the making and maintaining of cities at the ‘top’.  
 In considering how this reorientation may help reveal globality in other ways, 
Robinson highlights the role of ‘development’ through understandings of the role of the 
IMF and WB, SAPs and their impacts. These alternative global connections which 
suggest that while global links may be changing, “It is quite another to suggest that poor 
cities and countries are irrelevant to the global economy” (J. Robinson, 2002, 538). In 
fact, as we see through our analysis, they are integral. In another example, we see that 
when we change the criteria for ‘globality’ we may in fact find those same cities 
currently ‘off the map’ at the center of our map. As Robinson highlights for example, 
mineral extraction which is crucial to the global economy is done in some of the world’ 
poorest countries, and if we change our view we will instead see that these places, rather 
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than being irrelevant or peripheral to the global economy, are in fact “central to 
sustaining it…” (J. Robinson, 2002, 538).  
 Linking knowledge production to policy, Robinson highlights how the drive to 
become global is based on calculated attempts that have had devastating impacts in terms 
of service provision and redistribution. An example is the creation of Export Processing 
Zones (EPZs), which are aimed at attracting global economic activities, often touted as a 
pathway to success. In the name of this, cities and national governments, and citizens 
primarily, pay a high price to become attractive, like lowering labour standards and 
environmental laws. 
 The categorization of a small group of cities as ‘global’ on the basis of 
concentration of management and coordination denies where success and power come 
from (J. Robinson, 2002). In fact if we consider the hierarchy that is created through 
these categorizations, argues Robinson, we find a familiar hierarchy that city managers 
around the world aspire to become like (J. Robinson, 2002, 547). Interestingly, this 
literature emerges alongside the growth of postcolonial literature, which critiques 
categorizations of the world, which are created in relation to differences based on 
deviations from a Western norm. Similarly, global city categorizations tend to reproduce 
a particular standard to which all cities should aspire. This is turn has serious implications 
related to the idea of being ‘global’ and the trajectory of development that is embedded in 
a Euro-American worldview that perpetuates the myth of globality as neutral and outside 
of the ‘Third world’, generating standards and norms from which all others are judged 
and displaced off the map. “Global cities have become the aspiration of many cities 
around the world; sprawling and poor mega cites, the dangerous abyss into which they 
might fall should they lack the redeeming (civilizing) qualities of city-ness found 
elsewhere” (J. Robinson, 2002, 548). From Robinson’s critique, the imperative to 
decolonize the field of urban studies calls us to expand the scope for theoretical 
imaginings and emphasizes that as with cities themselves, power relations and their 
geographies cannot be avoided.  
 Here we can consider the ways in which images of Burj Khalifa (the world’s 
tallest tower) are used to showcase their globality:  
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 The iconic tower symbolized his pride as an Arab. It would cement his legacy as  
 one of the great Muslim builders. The Sheikh’s project would become the most 
 significant Arab monument since the Alhambra, built in Spain during Muslim rule 
 in the fourteenth century. He would call it the Tower of the Arabs- Burj Al 
 Arab…The Burj’s purpose was to put Dubai on the map. (Krane, 2009, 113) 
 
 The symbolic power of the Burj Al Arab is significant as it was envisioned by 
Sheikh Mohamed as a global symbol of the coming of age of Dubai. Overall we can 
consider the different ways in which the city is imagined as global, and how this in turn 
impacts the urban experience from different viewpoints and then in turn shapes and is 
shaped by the city.  
 For Grant and Nijman (2002), in their analysis of LDCs in relation to the 
corporate geography of globalization, they highlight the ways in which Western bias fails 
to consider cities positioning beneath the upper tiers of the global city hierarchy. They 
highlight the different models of urban development from colonial and postcolonial 
conditions. In particular, they highlight the spatial transformations which are important to 
the time period of the 1980s economic liberalization (Grant & Nijman, 2002, 320). They 
argue that global firms are transforming the sociospatial fabric of cities in the developing 
world, and that ironically, globalization studies embedded with a Western bias is not 
really as ‘global’ as it should be (Grant & Nijman, 2002, 320). They explore the changing 
urban geographies of cities in LDCs in the context of economic globalization. They argue 
that the internal spatial structure can be understood in relation to its evolving role in the 
wider global political economy. With these important historical forces, the claims to 
universal validity of world city literature needs to be seriously reconsidered. They argue 
that just as colonial landscapes exhibited “high levels of segregation of foreign and native 
commercial and residential activities, the economic geographies of both cities also 
displayed high levels of functional specialization and concentration” (Grant & Nijman, 
2002, 326).  
 
 This tension between genealogies and contemporary processes relates to the 
analysis of macro and micro level processes as well. The tension is integral to reveal the 
rich nuances, which make up human geographies and urbanization. For example, 
becoming enthralled in the micro level relationships that sustain the everyday, allows us 
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insight into those rich complexities that reveal processes of negotiation in relationships 
between subjects.  However, there is a point where scale assumes particular aspects of 
this specificity that can negate or erase structural, systemic forms of violence that are 
themselves inherent to the overall system. This can for example be seen in the everyday 
negotiations, which subjects undertake to rationalize their privilege for instance. Thus, 
while the micro level analysis illuminates certain things, it can also be used to relativize 
the systemic and structural, or historical exclusions that are reproduced in the everyday 
through the negation of its structural or institutionalized forms of violence. This can be 
seen for example through he individualized justifications that are used to rationalize the 
choice to hire particular nationalities to perform specific types of labour. Or the ways in 
which it is often heard that many believe maids to be treated badly, however this is never 
seen as a structural feature of the system, but rather is isolated as a problem of individual 
employers who chose to treat their maids this way. This is interesting because it 
highlights the ways in which violence becomes the exception, rather than the norm. This 
narrative in turn serves to absolve responsibility for the many, by denying the systemic or 
institutional factors that facilitate the systemic exclusion and violence against workers.  
 In considering rethinking ideal or model global cities, we can turn to an 
examination of labour in more detail to understand how the formation of working 
conditions within low income communities is tied to the massive expansion of informal 
labour conditions and downgrading of working conditions related to macroeconomic and 
spatial shifts in the urban labour market. For Buechler (2006) a methodological 
commitment to interviewing workers as a means to understand everyday experiences of 
engagement reflects a ‘globalization on the ground’ perspective. Her basic argument 
reiterates the idea that low income communities are an integral part of globalizing cities, 
and not only the financial districts that are normally the focus of the global economy.  
Rather than focusing on a narrow conception of the ‘global city’, Buechler focuses on 
broader dimensions of globalization to explore the spread of neoliberal ideologies, the 
growth and power of TNCs, growing unemployment and its impacts on labour conditions 
in the Third world. In particular, she highlights global trends such as growing 
international competition that has increased downward pressures on prices which in turn 
justifies low cost and outsourcing. Importantly, she pushes an understanding of the 
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different functions of various within a broader single economy, whereby for example, 
street vending, homework, or work in MNC banks, should all be viewed not as belonging 
to different economic spheres, but rather as components of a single global economic 
system. This is significant as it reinforces the mutual interdependence of these seemingly 
distant socio-economic systems. In addition, the international aspect of this analysis 
highlights the multiple outcomes and functions of the spread of neoliberal economic 
globalization which has consequences in both ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ states, in both the 
global city and its alleged ‘periphery’, which both operate together and rely on each other 
for their existence.  
 Interestingly the majority of urban studies research reviewed here assumes the 
rights of citizens to, however minimally, claim entitlements from the state.  In many 
discussions, one key tension can be found between city subjects (citizens of the state) to 
make claims and challenge the policies and practices of the state, and the global 
positioning of the city. However, these ideas need to be considered in relation to 
neoliberal trends in citizenship and immigration policy as they relate to labour and 
migration. Here the idea of migrant labour as temporary, disposable and peripheral is 
continually overlooked with limited consideration of different immigration regimes and 
how this impacts the political participation of low waged migrant workers.  
 
 In broadening the scope of global cities beyond the traditional focus on cities in 
the industrialized West, is a rich and interesting body of research on globalizing Asian 
cities. Anne Haila (2000) discusses the traditional focus of Western scholars on ‘villages’ 
in Asia, and aim to bridge the gap between Asian studies focuses on villages and Anglo-
American studies on cities. Interestingly, Haila notes “the more I have understood the 
land-lease system in Singapore and Hong Kong, the more I have understood the new 
policy of new home town Helsinki to sell its landed properties…” (Haila, 2000, 2142). 
Thus, she highlights that there are trends being spearheaded by emerging global cities 
that make other contexts intelligible. This pushes us to examine the underlying logic and 
motivating force behind these global trends, despite, as she argues, our limited 
vocabulary to speak of them.  
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 Shin and Timberlake (2000) explore the growing world cities of Asia presenting 
an overview of export-oriented industrialized pacific Asian countries such as Japan, 
NICs, ASEAN and China. Focused on mapping the ‘structural’ relationships among 
cities, they highlight that these new economic regions are “spatially defined by networks 
of cities that may be more closely linked to cities in other countries than with other cities 
in their own countries” (Shin & Timberlake, 2000, 2260). In comparison to what they 
identify as the top Western global cities of New York, London, Paris, Amsterdam and 
Los Angeles, they also highlight Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taipei, Seoul, Osaka, 
Manila, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. It is said that this ‘new Pacific rim division of 
labour’ spearheaded by Tokyo as the head of the world financial command center, has 
become a ‘capitalist archipelago’ characterized by large reserves of low cost and highly 
industrious labouring masses (Shin & Timberlake, 2000, 2259).  
 Furthermore, Olds and Yeung (2004) echo the criticism of world city theory as 
being limited by case studies in the US, UK and Japan. They argue for the need to expand 
global cities research to challenge the origins of the world cities theory based in an 
Anglo-American worldview. They add complexity to the categorization of global cities 
by differentiating three major ‘types’. Hyper global cities referring to ‘classic’ global 
cities such as NY, London and Tokyo; emerging global cities in which national or local 
social forces and institutions are attempting to position themselves strategically in global 
economic system; and global city states such as those contexts of Singapore and HK 
which have unique institutional and socio-spatial arrangements (Olds & Yeung, 2004).  
They argue that the globalization of urbanization is happening along differential, 
contextually specific pathways. By this they mean to emphasize the differential paths 
through which cities globalize or are globalized.  
 Recognizing the historically and geographically specific ways through which 
‘other’ global cities are formed allows us to understand how they are transformed and 
extended. If we follow this call, we are able to connect cityscapes to the historic and 
contextual considerations, which make them possible and to how globalized networks, 
images and ideologies shape their ‘globality’ within the global urban hierarchy.  
 Firstly, ‘hyper global cities’, for Olds and Yeung, have been historically 
integrated into a hierarchy of regional, national and global economies. These cities are 
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not only linked to their immediate global city region, but also engaged in competition 
with other city regions in the country. They argue that the level of competitiveness is 
shaped by the city’s role and function within the global city network, which transcends its 
specific context. Furthermore, in the context of those striving to become global cities, 
characterized as ‘emerging’, they highlight the ways in which significant resources and 
inputs from home countries and multilateral institutions are utilized to reach these 
particular developmental agendas. While these cities, such as Malaysia and Shanghai, do 
not facilitate outwards flows of surplus capital, they deploy substantial resources in the 
goal of transforming these cities into ‘global’ cities. The significance of this category can 
be contextualized within the current globalizing era, marked by postcolonial  
development in many ‘developing’ countries that are “engaging in discursive practices 
and mobilizing disproportionate material resources to construct representations of 
entrepreneurial global cities” (Olds & Yeung, 2004, 507).  
 In the case of the final category of Asian ‘global city states’ such as HK and 
Singapore we see unique historical and geographical realities because of the ways that the 
state “is contained with fully urbanized and spatially constrained territorial unit” (Olds & 
Yeung, 2004, 507). Thus, they are unique in their geography, as they do not have an 
immediate hinterland within the same national territorial boundaries. They are also 
heavily shaped by policies related to the strong financial role played by the state.  They 
argue that these city-states are unique from hyper global cities in some fundamental 
ways. For example, these city-states have the ability to legitimize strategic resources to 
meet national objectives in ways unseen by other contexts, for example, in the lack of 
tension between national and urban politics. As Olds and Yeung argue there are no ‘intra-
national regions or cities competing for material resources. Thus, the focus is on the 
strengths or weaknesses of policies rather than intra-national units who are more or less 
deserving of attention or resources (Olds & Yeung, 2004).  
 Interesting for our broader discussion is the ways in which both examples are 
products of colonialism and postcolonial political dynamics. Their colonial histories 
helped to shape their connections to global economy and built “an openness to constant 
change and outward oriented and relatively cosmopolitan sensibility”, as well as laying 
foundations for the “legal, linguistic and technology foundations for integration in to the 
	 124	
contemporary global economy” (Olds & Yeung, 2004, 510). In the case of these global 
city-states, we see a challenge to discussions in globalizations studies of the end of the 
nation state and instead witness key examples of the mere reshaping of this role. They 
highlight an interesting consideration of the ways in which some global city states, as 
well as having a role as command control nodes, are governed by a developmental 
agenda that may put the “global logic of capital above the local/national interests of 
citizens” (Olds & Yeung, 2004, 511). In this sense, state developmentalism may 
significantly impact the prioritization of a particular agenda. As a case study of Singapore 
highlights, there are a multitude of ways in which state directed institutions, policies, 
programs and projects have emerged to promote particular outward investment processes 
based on historical underdevelopment .  
 Another significant consideration for our broader analysis here is the form of 
immigration policies, which are tightly managed to facilitate particular labour market 
restructuring to meet the city’s needs. The level of control over the social and political 
life of citizens is also marked. Overall in this case you see the ways in which the “nation 
state becomes the city and the city becomes the (nation) state” (Olds & Yeung, 2004, 
513).  
 In considering what differentiates Asian global cities from others, Hill and Kim 
(2000) discuss the role of the ‘developmental’ state in East Asian cities, highlighting the 
differences this implies from paradigmatic case studies such as NY or London. They 
argue that these differences undermine the applicability of global city theory beyond 
market focused, Anglo American world. As examples, they highlight Tokyo and Seoul 
which diverge from this ‘global standard’ due to the “lack of extensive urban socio-
spatial polarization, the embeddedness of local financial institutions and the national 
industrial fabric, the persistence of manufacturing industries in the city, continued role of 
activist national governmental policies and national political elites in guiding urban 
development” (Child Hill & Kim, 2000, 170).  Hill and Kim (2000) challenge the claims 
of global cities theorists such as Freidmann and Sassen who believe in a single global 
system that is superimposed on nation-states which are losing importance as a result, and 
instead argue for view of contemporary capitalism that sees that “the world’s major cities 
are strongly influenced by the national development model and regional context in which 
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each city embedded” and therefore not a singular overarching global regime (2188). 
These fundamental differences between contexts mean that understanding Tokyo and 
Seoul for example, necessitates a different understanding of the world system from the 
globalist version.  
 Gavin Shatkin (1998) builds this analysis in the case of ‘fourth world’ cities in the 
global economy, many of which he locates in ‘globalizing Southeast Asian city-regions’. 
Building his analysis against the tendency of global city theorists (Castells, 1993/2006) to 
argue that SSA, Asia and Latin America have been “structurally irrelevant to world 
economy” (Shatkin, 1998, 378). However, as Shatkin argues, these cities are shaped by 
global economic processes, even without significant foreign direct investment (FDI).  
 The econocentric focus on FDI as a marker of a city’s relationship to the global 
economy was heavily influenced by the 1980s rapid industrialization and growth in many 
newly industrializing countries (NICs), China and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) countries. However, the exclusion from this industry-led growth, and 
promoting the category of ‘fourth world’ is problematic to Shatkin as it ignores the ways 
in which many LDCs interact with the global economy. This can be seen through raw 
material exports, tourism and underground economies for example. Furthermore, as 
Shatkin argues, we need to consider the historical legacies that each country carries into 
the era of globalization, including “colonial heritage and geopolitical situations”  
(Shatkin, 1998, 382). Overall he argues that while LDCs may not be the main targets of 
FDI, they remain impacted by and impact processes of globalization. Connected to these 
insights we see how a related assumption tied to the alleged uniformity of globalization, 
leading to greater homogenization, is challenged by reality of unequal integration and 
differential incorporation in the network of global cities.  
 
Significance for Dubai. This review of scholarly work on urban studies, both 
mainstream and critical, with a focus on global city formation, highlights several major 
contributions that help to create the theoretical underpinnings for the next few chapters. 
From these considerations, we can ask the following questions: what are the implications 
of conceptualizing Dubai as a ‘global’ city? How is global city formation impacted by 
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and shaping lived experiences of the ‘everyday’? How are the global city aspirations of 
Dubai tied to its global location?   
 In particular, we can see how the ‘global’ is examined in many different aspects 
of city formation, not as a geographical location but as a set of processes shaped by 
multiple scales and temporal realms. As we have seen urban geographers, anthropologists 
and sociologists have always been interested in processes of urbanization, primarily 
focused on the West. These studies have generally emphasized studies of larger socio-
economic and political changes resulting in emerging urban cultures and forms of social 
organization. In the contemporary period, the growing focus on processes related to 
‘globalization’ has again centered the city as a focal point for social analysis and debate. 
In particular, scholars locate the emergence of or renewed importance of global cities as 
important nodal points for understanding shifts in the global economy, with particular 
emphasis on financial capital and service based economies in the First world. In addition, 
scholars of migration and labour studies have scrutinized the underlying processes of 
labour and migration, which make possible the formal developments of cities into global 
‘command’ centers of the economy with a growing political presence internationally. 
Most scholars agree that any discussion of the growing power and influence of global 
cities, must be understood through the dialectic between poverty and affluence, as 
growing social polarization and inequalities between groups is a central reality for most 
cities of this power. In addition, scholars have emphasized the role of ‘global cities’ in 
supporting a highly mobile transnational capitalist subject. Thus criteria such as air traffic 
and tourism have become important markers in the capabilities of global cities to allure 
global elites. Thus, the diverse processes that have been generally related to a particular 
period of global interaction accelerating in the 1980s has continued to influence how 
economics, politics and social relations are examined in the contemporary period. Of 
course, critical works on globalization push us further in thinking about the historical 
genealogies that shape contemporary processes, thus European colonialism and US 
hegemony in the post WWII period have shifted the world in important ways. Taken 
together, these insights help us to understand both, what aspects of the contemporary 
period are new or unique to this time, and those, which have earlier roots. Through our 
analysis of the case of Dubai we will see both the acceleration of certain economic 
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processes that coincide with the UAE’s growth and development as a state, as well as 
those historical legacies which are embedded not only in the international relationships 
that have shaped the UAE’s growth, but as those which can be found in contemporary 
processes of migration and labour which in turn shape notions of belonging, race, class 
and the role of nationality and labour regimes in the national context.  
  In the next chapter I turn from Dubai Dreams, and the Imagined Globality of 
cities more generally, to a more focused analysis on the ‘Making of the Global City’ of 
Dubai with an emphasis on how processes of globalization have shaped the role of Dubai 
within the global political economy, and its national development strategies. Within this, 
I will argue that integral to the formation of Dubai’s policy is the orientation towards the 
global, shaping its ambition and forms of development, and the formative networks of 
labour migration that made and continue to make its global city ambitions possible. Thus, 
through a more focused analysis we will see the ideological forces of imagining Dubai as 
a ‘global city’ which have come to materialize in formal development strategies and 
programs.  
 Part of the difficulty in undertaking this analysis, is that the Gulf often confounds  
traditional methods of understanding in International Development, Globalization studies, 
and Urban studies. The division of the world into two prominent political and economic 
spheres of ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds has shaped thinking about ‘globalization’, with 
particular focuses on ‘development’ and colonialism implicating the Global North and 
South, while analytically erasing the Gulf.  Interestingly, as Dubai is also positioned 
between ‘east’ and ‘west’ by many, we see that the ideological limitations created by this 
historical divide impacts how and where we can understand Dubai. Interestingly what I 
have found is that the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular are skipped 
almost entirely in these areas of scholarly study and relegated to area studies or IR. It is 
not that knowledge of the Middle East is not produced, in fact, much has been written and 
continues to be written about the region, but it does not analytically figure into simple 
dichotomies of First and Third. Interestingly, this opens up space for discussion of its 
global location. This present absence extends into other realms of scholarly work once 
again. In particular the centering of the ‘global’ as Western, either European or North 
America is embedded in global cities literature, with serious analytic, and political 
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implications. As Mohamed and Sidaway (2002) highlight, “it is perhaps time to liberate 
Arabia’s… history from the area studies paradigm and the postwar concept of the Middle 
East” (622), and as Hanieh (2011) argues, to understand the Gulf as a major mode of 
world capitalism (2).  
 Overall, I underscore the importance of the global city and the aspirations and 
promises it induces, as transnational spaces that showcase the historically embedded 
interdependences and processes that work to uphold neoliberal globalization, and the    
wide array of localized, every day practices that work to sustain global processes at the 
ground level.  The focus on the global is significant in this case study because the global 
location of Dubai necessarily impacts all levels of its development and the formation of 
national and subject identities. It also informs its location amidst the international 
division of labour, as well as global ideologies of race, not limited to national boundaries 
but instead sets of globally related ideas, which find meaning in the ways they are 
expressed in local conditions, but are not bound by them.  
 Thus the following chapter turns to a more focused discussion on processes of 
globalization, which shapes the role of Dubai and the UAE within the global political 
economy. In addition, it explores a more contextual discussion of the historical forces of 
development in Dubai, including broader features of colonialism, capitalism and 
neoliberal globalization as they shape the city. Building from this chapter’s focus on the 
ideological apparatus of global city status and desire, the chapter considers examples and 
insights about the material infrastructure, development and economy, as they are linked 
to processes of migration and labour that together make Dubai possible. Thus, I examine 
the processes of making the dream of Dubai a reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 129	
Chapter Three: Making of the Dream I  
 
 Contemporary processes of neoliberal globalization have arguably further 
entrenched global inequalities and relationships between the Global North and South, 
most prominently seen through growing highly precarious networks of migration and 
labour. In addition, ideas of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’ have been recast through 
desires for global city status in non-western spaces around the globe with important and 
unique implications. The previous chapter established a scholarly foundation for the role 
of global cities as nodes of capitalist accumulation in the contemporary, postcolonial 
period, and the role of these processes in creating a hierarchical global system connected 
largely through cities, paving the way for Dubai’s emergence. In this chapter, following 
Hanieh (2011), I locate the role of the Gulf as central to the development of global 
capitalism after WWII, rather than secondary or peripheral. 
In this chapter, tracing the genealogy of Dubai’s historical development helps to 
situate the contemporary form of the city’s globality, and allows us to implicate the 
continuities of colonialism, for example, in the making of capitalism and neoliberal 
globalization as they shape the city. Additionally, if as it is argued, dreams are 
expressions of human emotions that are integral to memory processing, then 
understanding the background and broader economic and political situation in more detail 
also substantiates the arguments in Chapter Four that link migratory regimes as a central 
tool in the making and maintenance of Dubai’s dream at all levels.  
Overall, Chapters Three and Four represent a joint section entitled ‘Making of the 
Dream’. They are organized as such in order to examine the developmental trajectory of 
Dubai and the UAE more broadly within the regional and international context, providing 
the historical, scholarly review necessary to understand the ‘making’ of the city over 
time. In terms of our movement towards dreaming, we consider the deepening of sleep 
from stage one’s transitional phase between being awake and asleep, and build towards 
Stage Two NREM sleep. Here the body continues preparation for dreaming in REM sleep 
by arguably doing the ‘work’ of making dreaming possible. Here, the body’s temperature 
and heart rate slow in order to repair damage from the day (Simons, 2009).  
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Current Dubai 
 It is so different. It is almost like someone built this place out of Lego blocks and 
 expected it to follow the same sort of life as a real place (Sara, Canadian)  
 
 They are skipping that step but they are still getting to the same goal somehow. 
 The way I see it is that this place grew up so much from nothing to this, regardless 
 if its copying other cities or wanting to be the best, or being really focused on 
 infrastructure, it has grown so much to a point where I see that they have done so 
 much for the country, putting it on the map. Fine, they are fake maybe, maybe 
 they are imitating some other cities, or building the same looking things, but the 
 skyline of Dubai looks like the skyline or New York…so they did it. From 
 nothing. From Zero. It’s like someone who had no education owning one of the 
 biggest companies in the world. (Zain, Canadian)  
 
 Dubai is precisely the sort of decent, modernizing model we should be trying to 
 nurture in the Arab-Muslim world…Dubaians are building a future based on 
 butter not guns, private property not caprice, services more than oil, and globally 
 competitive companies, not terror networks. Dubai is about nurturing Arab 
 dignity through success not suicide. As a result, its people want to embrace the 
 future, not blow it up. (T. L. Friedman, n.d.)   
 
 Yasser Elsheshtawy (2010) in his important study of the urban politics of Dubai, 
asks not just whether or not there is such thing as a Dubai model, but also, whether it is 
desirable or sustainable. Scholars (Elsheshtawy, 2010; Mohammad & Sidaway, 2012) 
highlight that Dubai is often touted as the exemplary model for global city development 
in the contemporary period, especially for many postcolonial  states or other states in the 
non-Western world. As they highlight, Gulf cities, such as Dubai, represent a distinctive 
model of urban modernity and encompass unique sociospatial dynamics. They are 
different from classical colonial cities, from other ‘Arab cities’ and from postcolonial 
cities in Africa, Asia or elsewhere (Mohammad & Sidaway, 2012, 608).   Before the 
2008 financial crisis, and even after, Dubai had often been cited as a success story in 
hyper-development and urbanization. In addition, scholars note that the ‘model’ is 
popular because of its exportability (Elsheshtawy, 2010). Interestingly, as discussed and 
promoted by international media, the tourism industry, and residents within the city, 
Dubai is rarely discussed in relation to its historic role as a mercantile city, or the 
successful diversification strategies that have made it into an important intermediary in 
trade, finance and travel, and instead the focus is largely on the Dubai brand. These 
	 131	
representations have been globally popularized by the media and exported from Dubai’s 
administration itself. Furthermore, as Mohamed and Sidaway (2012) argue, Gulf studies 
today offer important insights for urban studies in their promotion of “spaces of 
accumulation, consumption and display” (608). These cities are now seen as amongst 
those spaces, such as megacities in Africa, the Americas and East Asia that have 
“increasingly defined the experience and meaning of urban modernity” (621). As they 
further highlight, the rulers of Dubai often describe the Emirates as the center of the 
world geographically, weighted towards Asia. With this in mind, the authors argue that 
the traditional centering of the West which posited the rest of the world as peripheral to 
Western led capitalist urban development needs to be rethought (621).  
 Representations of Dubai are vast and various markers used by institutions around 
the globe have attempted to rank and quantify its developments. The range is broad but 
includes many of the following elements; exact numbers are difficult to find, but a survey 
of different sources highlights that in 2012, Dubai’s tourism was approximately 9.9 
million. In 2009 Dubai International Airport (DXB) received 46 million international 
transit passengers, making it the fourth busiest airport in the world. In 2014, the 
government says it became the number one airport for international passengers, according 
to the Airports Council International, handling more than 70 million passengers in 2014, 
up 6.1 percent from 2013. Passenger numbers are projected to reach 79 million in 2015 
and 103.5 million by 2020 (“Dubai Airports: Factsheet,” 2015). In 2009, Dubai ranked 
highest in the Middle East, and 11th in the world for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 
the same year, Dubai’s investment in the global market was estimated to be around $120 
billion dollars through government and semi-government owned companies such as 
Dubai International Capital, Emaar, Jumeirah Group, Dubai Ports World and Limitless 
(Kazim, 2010, 87). Remittances from Dubai are estimated to be between 15-20 billion 
dollars transferred by non-locals in the UAE, broken down by percentage as: 10 percent 
to Europe, 25 percent to Arab world, 40 percent to Asia, and 25 percent to rest of the 
world (Kazim, 2010, 87). Between 2000-2009 Dubai’s annual economic growth was 18 
percent, and from 2006-2008 property prices increased 80 percent (Pieterse, 2010, 16). At 
the same time, Dubai ranked as the world’s seventh most expensive office market, more 
expensive than Paris (Pieterse, 2010, 16). It is also home to the ‘eighth wonder of the 
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world’ the man-made Palm Jumeriah island (Pieterse, 2010, 16), and the self-proclaimed, 
world’s only seven star hotel the ‘Burj Al Arab’. Contemporary Dubai is represented by 
many superlatives, tallest, biggest, best, highest, the largest tower, largest mall, largest 
man made island, biggest underground car park, biggest indoor ski slope…” (Pieterse, 
2010, 16). These spectacular forms of development comprise the dominant imagery being 
projected into the world, continuously showcasing its desire for global city status, with a 
focus on luxurious high rises and endless consumption. These representations were a 
dominant theme in many interviews during the fieldwork, with interviewees discussing 
the attempts of Brand Dubai to project particular images to the world that both revealed 
and concealed certain realities. Subjects used a range of descriptions to describe the city 
including: fake, materialistic, flashy, superficial, brash, and snobbish. As Canadian expat 
Sarah said, “Dubai is very indulgent, very greedy, selfish, soul-less, materialistic, flashy, 
extravagant, fancy, transient, non-committal” (Sara, Canadian). In contrast, Emirati 
national Natasha discussed Dubai as “Very dynamic, very young, very warm and kind of 
open. I think generally, for everyone it is a very warm, inviting place… but definitely 
superficial” (Natasha, Emirati). Building on these insights, Egyptian national, Laura, 
described Dubai as “Confused, very dependent, ignorant, and unstable”, adding further, 
“…but I love Dubai”. In addition, Dubai has often been described in the interviews in 
reference to its youth, its ambitious drive, and its need for attention, as Emirati national, 
Reda discussed,  
 Dubai is an attention seeker screaming ‘Look at me! Look at me!’ I have always 
 kind of said Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Sharjah are siblings.  Abu Dhabi is the older 
 city, where you kind of listen to what it says, Dubai is the middle child, the total 
 attention seeker, and Sharjah is the humble, cultural one, the educated one, who is 
 going to carry on doing things and thinks ‘I don’t care what other people think 
 about me’.  So Dubai’s personality is always the attention seeker. Like that is to 
 me, the perfect description of Dubai. (Reda, Emirati) 
 
 Adding to these ideas of seeking attention, Karen, an Egyptian expat describes 
Dubai as,  
 Trying too hard to fit in the map, like ‘I’m right here! Look at me! There is my 
 tallest tower, its right there, come to me!” It’s really trying too hard. Like 
 seriously, come on? The Guinness world records of everything right now are in 
 Dubai. Come on, its not a coincidence, they are just trying so hard. (Karen, 
 Egyptian) 
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 It seems apt that Dubai can be seen as “trying to obsessively build itself into 
significance” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 103). Accurately referenced to the reality that up until 
2008, approximately 25 percent of the world’s cranes were in operating in Dubai alone 
(Elsheshtawy, 2010, 122). It has been described as “A new kind of global city” (Pieterse, 
2010, 17), described by some as the ‘Bangkok of the Middle East’, ‘The Las Vegas of the 
Middle East’, or ‘The Paris of the Middle East’. Some scholars and commentators argue 
that the ‘Dubai moment’ is about showcasing the global integration of Dubai in the 
broader region, and that it is tied to a sort of Arab Renaissance, a return to the rich 
histories of the region, with Dubai as the center of a new world, connecting ‘East’ and 
‘West’. Some scholars such as Khalaf (2006) have even sought to model a ‘Gulf city 
type’ based on the articulation of an oil economy and globalization, characterized with 
additional features such as a sharply segmented labour market that is expressed socio-
spatially in the urban structure (Mohammad & Sidaway, 2012, 609). Dubai visionary, 
Sheikh Mohamed, ruler of Dubai since 2006, highlights the success of the Dubai model 
for development in the region as tied to a particular vision,  
 …Our mission is for Dubai to become an international, pioneering hub of 
 excellence and creativity, and we are already striving to make it the world’s 
 premier trade, tourism and services destination in the twenty-first century… 
 Dubai will never settle for anything less than first place. (Al Maktoum, 2012, 8)  
 
 The race for ‘first place’ is a dominant theme throughout Sheikh Mohamed’s 
2012 English edition of his book entitled “My Vision”, where he sets out the ideological 
and practical visions he has for Dubai’s global model for success. He highlights a 
‘survival of the fittest’ model of racing towards development and ‘modernity’. Sheikh 
Mohamed’s tone of relentless ambition can clearly be seen as embodied within the 
physical infrastructure and spatiality of the city in terms of the pace, the style, and the 
goals of propelling Dubai into the global arena as a leader in the world, providing a hub 
of finance, trade and travel, connecting the world through its world-class  
 At the time, however, many criticisms of the ‘Dubai model’ have been tied to the 
feasibility of this model in terms of sustainability, both environmentally and 
economically. In addition, it has been criticized for focusing exclusively on a brand based 
on attracting wealthy elites and tourists from around the world, focusing on luxury high 
rises and development, through a developmental model that blurs the lines between 
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public/private whereby most developments are controlled by the state and a few wealthy 
merchant families. Subjects in my fieldwork often discussed the urbanscapes of the city 
as uninhabitable for many and criticized the city’s infrastructure for not fostering 
effective urbanisms. Canadian expat teacher, Sean, exemplified these concerns in the 
following comments,  
 See that patch of grass over there that they just put in by my school? Oh! It’s so 
 green, it’s so nice. It takes a barrel of oil a day to desalinate the water to keep it 
 green, but that takes a  barrel of carbon out of the ground? It is ridiculous. ‘Oh so 
 its bad  for the environment to have grass in the desert?’. Yes! Only desert plants 
 should be in the desert. I am glad I have been teaching you biology for 2 years 
 and you seem to have not listened to me. (Sean, Canadian) 
 
 In addition to the environmental unsustainability, many expat subjects commented 
on the lack of connections between places, often lamenting the troubles they had in 
navigating the city without cars, which still proved difficult even with the main artery of 
Sheikh Zayed Road connecting and disconnecting so many places simultaneously. In the 
case of migrant labourers and those employed in lower waged service industries, the 
issues of travel, distance and accessibility were amplified by the locations of worker 
camps on the outskirts of the city, or those who were bussed into Dubai from 
neighbouring Emirates, who were virtually disconnected from the central locations of the 
city. The experiences were vastly different, but all amount to important issues with the 
development and infrastructure of the city. Dubai has been described not as a city in the 
conventional sense but as a “set of cities connected by a network of highways, where 
there is hardly any pedestrian circulation and everything is geared towards consumption” 
(Elsheshtawy, 2010, 206). Of course this dominant imagery of Dubai is self-perpetuated 
and also based on many sensationalist accounts of a city seen to be without culture, 
history or belonging for most residents.  
 When subjects were asked to describe Dubai, many of them fixated on the idea of 
‘luxury’ and ‘consumption’, American expat Katie described Dubai as the following,  
  Its just hotels, restaurants, crazy cars, some of the most expensive things are 
 here. There is a book that I was just reading at Borders the other day. It’s the 
 top 100 most expensive things in the world, and 30 of the things were here in 
 Dubai. Its like seriously, all over the world and it has to be here. The most 
 expensive yacht, the most expensive car, the most expensive license plate.  Like 
 come on! Some dude paid 20 million dollars for a license plate. Do you know 
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 about the license plates here? Like the most expensive license plate just has the 
 number 1, like whatever, and some dude paid 20 million dollars for it, and that’s 
 not even the car, that’s just the metal plate. And that is the  type of thing you hear 
 about. And then there is the negative stuff say, like  people say, like before I 
 came, someone I worked with last year, they said  they are doing awful things to 
 slaves there. I don’t know… kind of a mix of stories… kind of funny…like there 
 are indoor ski place… (Katie, American) 
 
Fixated on Dubai as it is being experienced and sold to her, American teacher 
Katie shuffles between the luxurious side of Dubai, and then makes references to the 
majority migrant labour force which she refers to as ‘slaves’. Throughout the interview, 
her demeanor showcased her fear of reprisal for talking critically about the politics of the 
country, where she often began to open up, critically, and then would self-sensor and shut 
down quickly. In particular, her fears, as she explained, were linked to the broader 
context of the Arab Spring and the strong fear of ‘speaking out’ against the government. 
It seemed there was a dark cloud hanging over the city at the time. However, her weaving 
of the absurdity of certain levels of Emirati wealth, coupled with her privileged 
experiences and social elevation in accessing luxury she had never experienced before, in 
relation to ‘slavery’ and seemingly ‘absurd’ developments such as indoor skiing, all 
played a role in her descriptions of Dubai. The contradictions of her analysis are 
important examples of many insights by interviewees, not only because they highlight the 
complex relationships at play, but also because in her analysis, her privileges are never 
examined or questioned and are continually ‘relativized’ in relation to Emirati status. 
Building on questioning the ‘reality’ of the Dubai lifestyle for privileged groups of expats 
and citizens, Egyptian passport holder, Laura, born in the UAE, explains her shock in 
moving to Egypt for the first time during university. She highlights that in reflection she 
was extremely “naïve, because I thought that everyone was nice, and everything is 
perfect and everything is clean. I thought Dubai was the real world, you know what I 
mean?” (Laura, Egyptian). Reflecting on the ‘perfection’ Dubai offers, her reality check 
came in visiting her ‘home’ country, only to realize the bubble she had been living in. 
She focused on highlighting that Dubai’s perfection is in fact not the ‘real’ world when 
met with the ‘reality’ of Egypt’s political, economic and social ‘disorder’ which she 
viewed as the ‘chaos’ of real life, not found in her experiences of the UAE. 
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 Further criticisms of Dubai can be found in numerous international newspapers 
and media outlets. Many include highly orientalized descriptions of the region, and most 
of these criticisms center on the ideas summarized in the following quotation from 
journalist Escobar Pepe,  
 
 Welcome to the ultimate sociopolitical model for the 21st century: a Blade 
 Runner-esque melting pot of neoliberalism and ‘subterranean’ economy, Sunni 
 Arab Islam and low taxes, souks and artificial islands, a giant warehouse and a 
 tourist paradise, life in the fast lane and post-modern slavery. The model spells 
 out an apolitical, consumer-mad, citizenship-free society. (Escobar, 2006) 
 
 These criticisms build on the experiences articulated by many interviewees who 
found adapting to life in Dubai a difficult experience because of its corporate, often 
sanitized, and highly divided nature. These ideas are exemplified in the experiences of 
British expat Lo, reflecting on the difficulties of ‘fitting in’ to a model found to be 
‘foreign’: 
 Constantly contradictions the whole time. I think that is Dubai’s biggest challenge 
 now, and it is what will make it a place where people actually stay and not see it 
 as a place of transition, where people will stay and invest more of there time. I 
 think its because you need all of those sides, that’s what makes a city so rich, is its 
 diversity and I think at the moment, they are too much of a contradiction, there 
 needs to be that middle ground where you blend the two together. At the moment, 
 it is not a blend, everything is segregated, and it started to mix but its not fully  
 blended. (Lo, British) 
 
            Lo’s experience in Dubai’s art world has given her experience in discussions and 
tensions between supporting ‘local’ Emirati arts and culture and the divides within Dubai, 
which are often taken up by privileged migrants more explicitly. This model under 
criticism is related primarily to the status and experiences of the majority of the migrant 
population in contrast to the privileged, ‘exalted’ status of local Emirati citizens. In 
particular, the majority of migrants hail from the Global South, and form the seemingly 
‘endless’ supply of cheap labour necessary for Dubai’s development.  
 Discussion of the social hierarchies of Dubai are described by Davis (2006) with 
the Al Maktoum family at the top, then the native 15 percent of the population (many of 
them originally Arabic speakers from Southern Iran) which he describes as “a leisure 
class whose uniform of privilege is seen through the traditional dress of the white 
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dishdasha” (Davis, 2006, 64). Davis argues that obedience to the dynasty by citizens is 
rewarded by income transfers, free education, subsidized homes and government jobs. 
Below them are the British expats, along with other European, Lebanese, Iranian and 
Indian managers and professionals, “who take full advantage of their air-conditioned 
affluence and two months of overseas leave every summer” (64).  He argues this is led by 
the biggest cheerleaders for Al-Maktoum’s paradise, David Beckham and Rod Stewart, 
as “Dubai is expert at catering to colonial nostalgia” (65).  At the bottom of this social 
pyramid are the majority of migrants such as South Asian contract labourers, legally 
bound to a single employer and subject to what he calls, “totalitarian social controls” 
(65).  As Davis states,  
 Dubai’s luxury lifestyles are attended by vast numbers of Filipina, Sri Lankan 
 and Indian maids, while the building boom (which employs fully one-quarter of 
 the workforce) is carried on the shoulders of an army of poorly paid 
 Pakistanis and Indians, the largest contingent from Kerala, working twelve 
 hour shifts, six and half days a week, in the asphalt melting desert heat.(65)  
 
 In the absence of adequate labour laws and regulation, little or no environmental 
regulations and a lack of NGOs, labour unions or democratic political rights, many cases 
of abuse, exploitation and violence have been documented in local and international 
media and NGOs. Thus, while the image of Dubai is discussed as based on luxury, the 
‘dream of Dubai’ also has a nightmarish ‘dark’ side. Pakistani taxi driver Imran, 
describes the experience of the majority of low-skilled labourers in Dubai as, “They 
promise you green fields, but when you come, all you find is desert” (Imran, Pakistan). In 
his reflection on the dreams of Dubai, he contrasts the ideas that were sold to him back 
home by family, friends, and recruiters with the reality he found once he arrived. The 
failed dream included the inability to save and to surmount debts from recruiters, visas, 
and the cost of living in unsanitary and inhumane shared accommodations with strict 
controls and regulations over movement, and an overt lack of personal freedom. This can 
be illustrated best in the pervasive practice of passport confiscation by employers, 
withheld or delayed wages, and the looming fear of deportation or imprisonment for any 
union type organization or protest amongst workers.  
 The ethnic, racial, class, and gender based ‘hierarchy of entitlements’ that has 
been narrated in many variations to reflect the dominance of national citizens over all 
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expatriates, who are then subdivided by race, class, nationality and gender to create a 
division of labour, is easily reiterated by any visitor to the Emirates. As Pieterse 
highlights, a Pakistani saying sums it up well, “The Emirates in the UAE stands for 
English-managed, Indian-Run, Arabs Taking Enormous Salaries” (Pieterse, 2010, 17).  
The hierarchies in relation to ‘entitlements’, by which populations are divided by 
nationality and class into categories that are given differential criteria for entry, residence, 
employment, and legal protections, are created and maintained n two main ways. First by 
formal policies and practices like the ‘Kafala’ sponsorship system that binds worker visas 
to specific employers, and by the important seemingly informal, everyday mechanisms of 
identity formation centered on ideologies of power such as race, class, gender, 
nationality, employment that create subtle and not so subtle forms of social acceptance 
and normalization of violence, justified through important racialized histories and ideas. 
This is a significant area to examine in the coming chapters, as the formal and informal 
everyday realities between groups become untangled through the examination of the 
genealogies that accompany diverse migrant geographies to the city.  
 This ‘other’ side of Dubai described by interviewees is in fact being carefully kept 
away from the dominant global image. As I argue, even though many formal strategies 
exist to segregate and exclude this poor majority of the population, the obvious and well 
known inequalities are rationalized through narratives that normalize, excuse and even 
sanction this structure, and these can all be found in the daily operations and encounters 
between sectors of the population. Davis has described Dubai as “Milton Friedman’s 
beach club”, adding that “Dubai has achieved what American reactionaries can only 
dream of – an oasis of free enterprise without income taxes, trade unions, or opposition 
parties (since there are no elections)” (Davis, 2006, 61). Similar sentiments are reiterated 
by journalist Pepe Escobar (2006) when he states,  
The result is immigration without citizenship - a model that fascinates assorted 
American neo-cons and neo-liberal right-wingers, with the added bonus that 
unlike Mexicans and Central Americans in the US, immigrants to Dubai totally 
renounce their political rights on the altar of economic improvement. Neo-liberals 
refer to Dubai as proof that Islam is not incompatible with globalization. 
(Escobar,  2006)  
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 It is clear that the making of this new ‘Middle East’, as it is referred to by many, 
is modeled by neoliberal agenda makers but needs to be contextualized through a longer 
genealogy of regimes of trade and commerce since 500 AD.  
 A significant point of criticism of Dubai’s ‘development model’ surfaced during 
the 2008 global economic downturn. The ‘recession’ exposed important limitations in the 
supposed ‘model’, but also reaffirmed Dubai’s position globally. While the impacts are 
highly debated amongst commentators, scholars and interviewees, certain important 
ideological and practical outcomes can be seen as generally agreed upon, such as the idea 
of ‘debt’, the ‘exodus of migrants’, and the need for ‘transparency and accountability’.  
 
Recession? 
 Once the manic burst of building has stopped and the whirlwind has 
 slowed, the secrets of Dubai are slowly seeping out. This is a city built from 
 nothing in just a few wild decades on credit and ecocide, suppression and 
 slavery. Dubai is a living metaphor for the neo-liberal globalized world that may  
be crashing – at last – into history. (Hari, 2009) 
 
 In 2009, Johann Hari published an article in the newspaper, The Independent, 
telling the story of Dubai’s burst bubble. Through the experience of Karen Andrews, a 
Canadian expat who had been living in Dubai with her husband, Hari reports her 
‘awakening’. “We were drunk on Dubai.” Soaking in all the privileges and luxury Dubai 
could offer, Karen and her husband fell deep into debt, culminating in his eventual 
imprisonment for not paying his debts – with no possibility of declaring bankruptcy, debt 
default is criminalized and punishable by imprisonment. She is ‘found’ by Hari, in a 
luxury hotel parking lot, living in her Range Rover. Hari states, “This is not where her 
she thought her Dubai dream would end.” In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis that 
reverberated around the globe, ‘maxed-out expats’ found themselves without jobs, homes 
or savings, having to flee Dubai, abandoning their luxury cars in airport car parks with 
notes apologizing. In the sensationalist reports (Bond, 2012; Hari, 2009; Lewis, 2009; 
Triggs, 2009) that flooded Dubai’s way, reporters condemned the Dubai model for the 
expat dreams it had promised and then destroyed. The response was highly problematic, 
in that these expats, having reaped the benefits of Dubai’s boom - champagne to their 
hearts desire, driven around by chauffeurs, nannies to care for their children, maids to 
cook meals clean homes, often far beyond the means they had available ‘back home’ - 
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began demonizing the place. Dubai had duped them; they had been lied to; the once 
revered, now ‘backwards’ and heartless figure of the Gulf Monarch had failed to live up 
to their ‘civilized’ standards. In effect, when things were good, Dubai was a ‘civilized’ 
Arab city that offered their whiteness the privileges they believed they deserved; when 
things were difficult, the system was ‘backwards’, ‘archaic’, and ‘uncivilized’. The idea 
that they too had participated and benefited from said system rarely came into question. 
As, Karen states in reflection of her time in Dubai,  
The thing you have to understand about Dubai is – nothing is what it seems. 
Nothing. This isn't a city, it's a con-job. They lure you in telling you it’s one thing 
– a modern kind of place – but beneath the surface it's a medieval dictatorship. 
(Hari, 2009) 
 
 The racist and orientalist descriptions of the ‘backwards’ Middle Eastern city go 
to highlight the unstable, contingent status of Dubai’s modernity, one tied to its ‘Western’ 
sensibilities. But as we can see from these insights, expats like Karen, are quick to return 
to a comfortable place, distancing themselves from the non-white Other when times get 
tough.  
 The recession of 2008 brought about important criticisms of the Dubai model, 
leaving many wondering whether the ‘bubble’ had burst. The dark side of Dubai was 
being exposed by newspapers and books, such as Davidson’s “The Vulnerability of 
Success” (2008) or Ali’s “Dubai: Gilded Cage” (2010), exposing money laundering, 
prostitution, arms trade, exploitation and violence against workers.  
 The subjects in my study articulated various aspects of these discussions in their 
own experiences, but as their presence indicated, they did not return ‘home’ like many 
others, they rode it out and waited and hoped for the best.  
 Abu Dhabi is the oil rich emirate, and Dubai is not. Dubai is 120 billion dollars 
 in the hole in debt. They went on all these massive real estate projects that they 
 couldn’t afford, and they basically owe all the banks money, and just because they 
 are a country, they don’t have to pay... They are trying to [repay], but you know 
 the point is that they defaulted on their debt. They tried to reschedule their debt, 
 which is what any bankrupt company does. I just, you know… I think its just poor 
 form that the royal families feels the need to live on their extremely extravagant 
 level when they owe people money essentially and are refusing to pay. That 
 doesn’t bode well with me… it doesn’t sit well with me. (Mohamed, Canadian)  
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 As Mohamed continues to explain, the structure of the UAE is such that locals 
receive intense material benefits and privileges, which, he argues creates a particular 
attitude and culture of ‘laziness’ that is spawned by money.    
 
 I think its BS, because that attitude is spawned by the money they have gotten 
 from the oil, and let’s face it, the tap is going to run dry at some point, and you are 
 going to be left with a giant problem because you know, it’s just not sustainable. 
 People are going to leave and I think what will be left is just a giant shell of a city 
 which is what it is now, to me, with all these massive real estate projects that are 
 not complete, you know, show me some immigration numbers and that’s the 
 reason that the government has zero transparency. (Mohamed, Canadian) 
 
 Mohamed’s experience in the financial sector in the heat of the ‘crisis’ exposes 
many important criticisms and problems that were discussed, such as the vulnerability of 
its success, the lack of transparency with regards to finance, a lack of government 
accountability, ‘unfair’ laws regarding debt and bankruptcy, and different/double 
standards for different sectors of the population. Many have described Dubai as one of 
the worst hit cities in the world, highlighting the many halted construction projects, 
layoffs of thousands of workers, debt collection crisis in financial institutions, and the 
exodus of migrants returning home. The crisis was heavily felt in many respects. Real 
estate was hard hit. Prices, at their peak in 2008, began dropping below the purchase 
price in less than a year, with buildings left vacant, construction stopped and were leaving 
in large numbers. It had been reported that between the end of 2007 and the first half of 
2010, available office space in the city grew by 140 per cent – more than double – to 48 
million square feet (Spencer 2010). In the lead up to the global financial crisis, Dubai’s 
office vacancy rate was less than 5%, which sparked a rise in commercial developments. 
The vacancy rate increased to 22% in 2009, increasing as more offices were completed 
(Jones, 2014), with some estimates putting vacancy at 50 percent (Spencer, 2010). 
However, the major focus was on the fact that Dubai was caught in billions of dollars 
worth of debt, exemplified through Dubai World, the emirates flagship holding company 
and owner of Nakheel, the largest of Dubai’s construction market, which defaulted and 
sought restructuring of its $22bn debt. Thus, the asset bubble was said to have finally 
burst. The Government of Abu Dhabi and The Central Bank of the UAE, came in with a 
bailout, providing $10 billion dollars to state run Dubai World. “The bailout 
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announcement calmed the nerves reassuring investors, financial and trade creditors, 
employees, and common people that the government will always act to uphold the market 
principles and globally acceptable business practices” (Hasan, 2010).  
 
All of the subjects in this study, who had lived in Dubai prior to 2008, discussed 
the impacts of the crisis whose extent and effects were felt differently. Emirati national 
Natasha saw the recession as a reality check for many people. Rather than as the ‘end of 
Dubai’, she saw it is part of a larger economic cycle that happens over and over again. 
She compared the impacts to Canada or the US, where unemployment is a constant long-
term challenge, but in the Emirates you witnessed it visually as people just suddenly had 
to leave.   
 Suddenly you had people who were overleveraged, huge amount of debts, 
 because everybody is living this lavish Dubai life that they  suddenly couldn’t 
 afford and you know, suddenly they didn’t have a job and  didn’t have a visa, 
 and there were no jobs anywhere because no one was hiring in the middle of 
 the crisis. So unlike maybe the US or Canada where they have to lay low for a 
 while, these people were like seriously screwed. Either they go to jail or they 
 run away. (Natasha, Emirati) 
 
 For many scholars such as Pieterse (2010), Dubai’s default in 2009 can be seen as 
a shock, but not as a surprise. He argues that Dubai’s real estate sector had long been 
seen as a ‘bubble waiting to be burst’. However, in his analysis of the crisis, he highlights 
that the breakdown of Dubai World’s debt was mainly tied to iconic projects, and not to 
the ports and free zone world, which, he argues, were on more sound footing and are the 
backbone of the economy, not oil or tourism as many believe (Pieterse, 2010, 25). To 
challenge the fatalist portrayals of Dubai’s default, and the financial crisis, he uses 
context to shed light on the fact that while the “Disneyland Dubai” may have crashed, the 
core business model remains sounds, in the sense that Dubai still remains a central hub in 
the region with ports and airports unmatched in the Gulf. As Sheikh Mohamed has said, 
“People think we’re just building Dubai. But no, were accommodating 1.5bn people in 
the central world, here between east and west” (Pieterse, 25). What is important then, is 
to follow a longer historical perspective to understand the role of the GCC, the UAE, and 
Dubai in a broader historical period, as well as in the larger political economy and 
examine its role as a global city in the globalized, neoliberal world economy.  
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 Despite discussions of the degree of impact in the financial and economic sectors, 
what the crisis most definitely did was shed light on the lack of transparency, weak 
institutions and legal systems, and the need for better legal rights for expats. In particular, 
and related to this, many argued that the hardest hit group was the majority of low waged 
migrant workers who suddenly found themselves without jobs, being sent home without 
being paid and carrying huge debts. In Hanieh’s (2011) analysis of how the financial 
crisis impacted the relationship to migrant labour, he highlights how the Gulf was able to 
spatially displace the crisis by impacting migratory flows in which large state and private 
companies stopped hiring workers and repatriated thousands through the cancellation and 
postponement of hundreds of projects (Hanieh, 2011, 177). In 2009, the Indian consulate 
reported that UAE construction firms had removed 20,000 workers through block 
booking entire planes (Hanieh, 2011, 178). Hanieh argues that because of the dependence 
of many South Asian countries on GCC labour markets and their lack of citizenship 
rights, it was “possible for the Gulf States to transfer the worst impacts of the crisis onto 
migrant labour and – by extension - the surrounding region, with little regard for its social 
consequences” (Hanieh, 2011, 178). Thus the spatial fix embedded at the core of Gulf 
capitalism permitted the spatial displacement of the crisis (Hanieh, 2011, 178). In 2010, 
figures from main labour exporting states confirmed these decreases. For example, 
Bangladesh saw a 45 percent decrease in annual overseas employment in GCC between 
2008 and 2009, and India with a 25 percent decrease in workers to the Gulf (Hanieh, 
178). Even professionals from North America, Europe and Australia saw a 10 percent 
decrease (Hanieh, 179). Remittances also fell significantly, and working conditions 
deteriorated leaving workers stranded and increasingly vulnerable to severe forms of 
exploitation and suicide. For example, in Kuwait in 2010 it was found that migrant 
workers were committing suicide at a rate of one every two days (Hanieh, 179). In the 
UAE specifically, local and international newspapers published stories of migrant 
labourers committing mass (families) or individual suicides due to high debt or 
unemployment. The National, a UAE newspaper, reported that, 
 More than 700 Indian expatriates have killed themselves in the past six years, a 
 suicide rate of more than two a week. In the first eight months of this year, 59 
 committed suicide - and even that figure pales into insignificance compared with 
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 2008, at the height of the financial crisis, when 176 Indian expatriates took their 
 own lives. (The National, 2013)  
 
 Deepening financial crisis, lack of security and safety nets, continuous 
exploitation and hopelessness turned, and continue to turn, the ‘Dubai’ dreams of some 
into nightmares with tragic endings for ‘Others’. These cases of suicide highlight the 
extent of hopelessness that many find in a system, which is made possible through their 
labour, but labels and treats them as disposable.  
 These tensions highlight the significant differences between the reality for many 
and the dreams of Dubai that are projected into the world as the dominant images. This 
representation of ‘Brand Dubai’ or ‘Dubai Inc.’ follows the same popular tale we have 
examined thus far, and is reinforced through displays such as the one discussed by 
Emirati ‘Reda’ on the launch of the Palm Island in November 2008,  
 I will never forget the day the Palm Island opened and it was like a big party. I 
 was in London at the time… but that evening Palm Island was happening, big 
 fireworks and celebrities that came. And a few weeks before, that’s when things 
 were crumbling around the world, the economic crisis had happened everywhere, 
 and Dubai was still going ahead with this multi-million dollar fireworks show. 
 And its like, ‘How obnoxious’ and I was in London… the news I was getting was, 
 ‘we are in Dubai now, and what crisis is this? Things are great in Dubai’. And I 
 was like, ‘This is terrible’ and I am in the tube and people are reading the 
 newspaper, and it’s like, ‘what crisis? Dubai is throwing this big party’, and I am 
 like ‘This is so uncomfortable’. And then they threw the big party and then the 
 following day things are falling a part. Like people lost their jobs and things 
 started crumbling here, its like, was it necessary? It was awful. On fireworks for 
 god’s sake, you know? It’s just awful. This is just so upsetting and infuriating.  
           (Reda, Emirati)  
 
 These tensions highlight the importance of considering different scales of 
analysis, where understanding the broader historical development of Dubai’s political 
economy can help shed light on the development of the city, while the global context 
helps to situate Dubai’s development in a broader context that sheds light on 
developments that are transforming the globe, and in particular for this study, between 
migrant ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ nations. From here, the everyday urbanisms that are 
discussed offer another rich and complex dimension for understanding these tensions. 
Thus, not only do we examine the physical developments, policies and practices here, but 
also the ideological apparatus that shapes how social hierarchies are upheld and lived. 
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The importance of these genealogies will continue to be seen through the examples that 
follow. 
 
Past and Present: Economic and Political Development in Dubai 
 In the late 1990s, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman) had a total population of 27.7 million, of whom 
10.6 million were temporary migrant workers – including 7.4 million women - and their 
families (Shah, 2004, 183).  By, 2006 the GCC population was 37 million, or 
approximately 12 percent of the total Arab population of the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, but the economy accounted for more than 55 percent of the Arab 
world’s $1.25 trillion economy (Elsheshtawy, 2009, 24). Per capita income for nationals 
of the UAE was $38000, higher than many advanced industrialized countries 
(Elsheshtawy, 2009, 29).  
 In 2013, the UN reported that the UAE had a total population of approximately 
9.2 million, of whom 11.5 percent were nationals, while 88.5 percent were non-nationals. 
In other words, the UAE is home to some 7.8 million migrants (Malit and Youha, 2013). 
Dubai Statistics Center reports the population of Dubai to be around 2.2 million (Dubai 
Statistics Center, 2014). Dubai is also home to the highest number foreign born residents 
of any city, at 82%, followed by Miami, at 51%, making it demographically unique. 
Estimates put the Emirati population around 10% of the population, yet some argue that 
this number is closer to 4 or 5% (Elsheshtawy, 2009, 213). While expatriates make up 
approximately 80% of the total population, they make up 95% of the workforce 
(Khondker, 205). In addition, 75.77 % of Dubai’s population is men, and 24.23 % are 
women (DSC, 2014). The top countries of origin of foreign-born residents in the UAE are 
estimated to be India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt and the Philippines.  
 While each of the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (established in 
1981) confronted significant development changes at different decades, nonetheless, as 
these countries approached the end of the twentieth century scholars argued that they 
shared many similarities in the development of their socio-economic and political 
structures, so much so that some scholars (Khalaf 2006, Davidson 2008, Heard-Bey 
1982, Zahlan 1970, Kanna 2010) argue that they together constitute a societal type 
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particular to this oil-rich region (Khalaf & Alkobasi, 272). In addition to the social 
composition, drastic ‘modernization’ and economic growth is believed to have led to the 
achievement of all material aspects of life on an unprecedented scale, while “socio-
cultural and political organization remain relatively traditional and conservative” (Khalaf 
& Alkobasi, 1999, 272). Scholars argue that these relatively small societies within the oil-
rich Gulf stand distinctively in political, social and economic terms and are thus 
characterized as a unique societal paradigm different from “developed capitalist industrial 
societies or those of the developing Third World” (Khalaf & Alkobasi, 1999, 272). Prior 
to the accelerated process of modernization and industrialization, the Gulf was relatively 
homogenous with village and rural settlements. However, they have become leading 
commercial capitals that are linked to the cosmopolitan cities of our day (Khalaf & 
Alkobasi, 1999, 272). 
 
 In terms of the political structure, the UAE is a federation of the seven former 
Trucial states: Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and 
Fujairah and Dubai. It is based on a presidential monarchy, which has a President and 
Prime Minister, as well as the Supreme Council made up of the Amir’s (Princes) of the 
seven states. The two most powerful states are Abu Dhabi, followed by Dubai. One of the 
most powerful figures in the history of the UAE was former President Sheikh Zayed bin 
Sultan Al Nahyan, Ruler of Abu Dhabi who was succeeded by his son, Sheikh Khalifa 
bin Zayed Al Nahyan in 2004. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan is understood as the 
single most important man in UAE history. The history of Abu Dhabi from 1905 onwards 
was confronted with frequently changing leaders resulting from murders by family 
members, in contrast to Dubai, which had peaceful transitions. The Bani Yas, a tribal 
group, have traditionally been the main rivals of the Qawasim, who lost power because of 
treaties with Britain after 1820. After this time, a succession of leaders took place by 
means of takeover and murder/assassination (Zahlan, 1998, 108).  However, Sheikh 
Shakbut bin Sultan (1928-1966) finally retained power after the instability, and did much 
to strengthen the power of Abu Dhabi through successful negotiations with coastal towns 
and villages (Zahlan, 109). In 1958 oil was first discovered in Abu Dhabi, however the 
leader of the time feared the disintegration of the social fabric and thus restricted the 
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spread of wealth, until he was forced out of power by family pressure and British 
influence (Zahlan, 101). He was replaced in 1971 by Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan, easily the 
most revered and cherished leader in the UAE until his death in 2004. As Zahlan 
highlights, at the same time that the extent of oil reserves in Abu Dhabi became known, 
the British government announced that it would withdraw from the Gulf by late 1971. 
Sheikh Zayed settled historic disputes with Dubai’s leaders and worked to bring together 
a federation of seven states (Zahlan, 110-111).  
 The present ruling family of Dubai is the Al Maktoum, rulers since 1912 through 
successions of son, grandson, and great grandsons of Sheikh Maktoum bin Hashar who 
ruled from 1894-1905. Under Sheikh Maktoum bin Hashar “a bustling and flourishing 
trading community was thus established well before the oil era began” (Zahlan, 2002, 
112). Sheikh Said bin Maktoum (1912-1958) was succeeded by his son, Sheikh Rashid 
bin Said Al Maktoum, who was succeeded by Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoum (1959-1990). 
Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoum, was characterized as a strong businessman who 
administered Dubai like a large corporation (Zahlan 2002, 114). He was however, 
reluctant to give up the individuality of Dubai to join a federation but realized there was 
no way that Dubai would survive on its own, once British protection was removed 
(Zahlan, 1998, 113). Sheikh Rashid was elected Vice President but it was soon clear that 
he and Sheikh Zayed had different opinions of power sharing, with Sheik Zayed opting 
for centralized and strong integrated administration, and Sheik Rashid wanting more local 
autonomy. Although there was gradual federalism and integration, Dubai still retained 
much of its independence.  
Sheikh Rashid died in July 1990 and his oldest son Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid 
Al Maktoum succeeded him and named, not his son but, his brother Sheikh Mohamed bin 
Rashid Al Maktoum successor. In 2006 after the death of Sheikh Maktoum, the brother 
Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum came to power. Thus, the ruler of Abu Dhabi 
Sheikh Khalifa is the President of the UAE, the head of state and the ruler of Dubai 
Sheikh Mohamed is the Prime Minister of the UAE, the head of government.  
 The political structure as outlined by the government of the UAE is a legal system 
based on civil law systems and Sharia law, and has both civil courts and Sharia courts. In 
terms of administration, the UAE is a federation of seven emirates with their own 
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monarchical ruler, each emirate retains considerable power including control over 
mineral rights such as oil and revenues. The constitution separates power into executive, 
legislative and judicial branches, which are divided into federal and emirate jurisdictions 
(UAE Interact, 2015).  
 The federal system comprises the Supreme Council, the Council of Ministers 
(Cabinet), a parliamentary body of 40 elected members called the Federal National 
Council (FNC) and the Federal Supreme Court. Also, the Supreme Council elects a 
president and vice president from leads of the seven Emirates to serve for a renewable 
five-year term (UAE Interact, 2015). The Council of Ministers, the ‘executive authority 
for the federation’ is headed by the PM, chosen by the President. Many commentators 
remarked that although it is unofficial, the Presidency is de facto hereditary to the leader  
of Abu Dhabi and the Premiership is hereditary to the tribal clan of Dubai. Generally this 
is linked to the financial power of each emirate, whereby the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, the 
UAE’s main oil producer, is President, and the Vice President and Prime Minister 
coming from the UAE’s dominant commercial center in Dubai.  
 The al-Majlis al-Watani al-Ittihadi is the UAE’s legislative body made up of 40 
members, half of whom are appointed by the rulers of their respective emirates, and the 
other half, holding no real political power and seen rather as advisors are elected by an 
electoral college whose members are appointed by their emirate (UAE Interact, 2015).  
 Theoretical considerations. The history of the Gulf States provides an important 
connection into contemporary processes and relationships under globalization.  The 
relationships with European colonial powers, as well as more contemporary relationships 
with the US, have been a major force in shaping the relationships in the region and in 
positioning individual states in a global network. However, while most historical 
accounts of the UAE have described Dubai as emerging out of nothing, Dubai has a 
“distinguished history” whereby it was able to “optimize its limited resources and its 
geographical position” (Elsheshtawy, 60). In addition, globalization is arguably not new 
to the region, as it retains a history of long distance trade and commerce. This challenges 
the largely Eurocentric view of the ‘Trucial Coast’ as one that was disconnected from 
European modernity until the 1970s when rapid modernization emerged in relation to oil 
exploration. These representations often miss important linkages not only to colonial 
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powers but also to precolonial forms of trade and networks of commerce that existed 
between Asia and the Middle East and which helped to shape certain contemporary 
processes in the region such as the expansion of migratory and commercial networks.  
 In addition, arguing that the rapid and dramatic developments that characterize the 
Gulf are based on historical linkages between the Gulf and the world economy, Hanieh 
(2011) highlights that at its peak the GCC’s nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 
over 1 trillion, just under two percent of the world’s total, and that in 2008, the GCC 
registered a per capita GDP three times the world average (Hanieh, 2011, 2). Hanieh 
argues that the GCC as a major mode of contemporary world capitalism, in which 
processes of class formation are related to an internationalization of social relations tied 
to the development of what he refers to as Khaleeji (Gulf) Capital, used to describe 
“those capitalists whose accumulation is most thoroughly and consistently grounded in 
the internationalization of capital across the GCC space” (Hanieh, 2011, 2). To review 
these historical influences, we will turn to an examination of different periods in which 
the ‘global’ has been made and remade in class and state formation in the UAE. 
 Precolonial and colonial period. Roger Ballard (2010) explores the emergence 
of Dubai as a global trading hub through a historical examination of its shifting role in 
relation to external forces. In considering the precolonial histories of the region, Ballard 
argues that while city states acting as trading hubs is not new to the Indian Ocean region, 
Dubai is unique in that it is a product he identifies as part of the current phase of 
globalization. Historically, trading hubs emerged as somewhat autonomous city-states, 
there to facilitate trade and thus became poly-ethnic in character and were largely driven 
by trade rather than military conquest (Ballard, 2010, 42). He challenges the largely 
Eurocentric assumption that the post-Columbian period is one which saw unprecedented 
globalization, rather he argues that while European colonialism eventually “proved to be 
a major turning point in global affairs”, these ‘achievements’ were in no way “transcribed 
onto a tabula rasa” (Ballard, 2010, 42). Challenging the pervasive Eurocentric account of 
the precolonial world as being ‘untouched’, ‘uncivilized’, ‘backwards’ and thus justifying 
European imperialism and the need for white, Christian salvation, he argues that in fact, 
“generally speaking the Europeans came relatively late into the field of oceanic voyaging, 
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compared to their Asiatic counterparts” (Ballard, 2010, 42). He examines complex 
systems of long distance mercantile exchange for cotton, silks, textiles that linked China, 
India and the Gulf. He argues that, “By the end of the fifteenth century, levels of 
prosperity in the oriental part of the Asiatic land mass were far superior to those enjoyed 
by the inhabitants of its far western fringes” (Ballard, 2010, 42), whereby, at the time, 
Muslim, Chinese and other networks were far more ‘spectacular’.  
 In addition, Ballard highlights the role of ‘free money’ from the silver mines of 
Mexico and the Andes, in making up for the inferior European technology, which had 
little to offer in exchange in Asia. This conquest provided the financial foundations of the 
next Eurocentric phase of globalization, which he identifies as taking almost three 
centuries to complete. When Europe’s ability to circumnavigate the globe became 
possible, they lacked a basis on which to participate in the markets of Asia because, very 
simply, they had nothing to sell. Thus, piracy emerged as their alternative option, and 
through the extraction of silver from the mines of the ‘New World’ through the use of 
slave labour from Africa they were able to develop a new basis for growth. Ballard 
summarizes this by highlighting that “Production was low, scale of silver was enormous, 
and demand for silver in India and China was great. They had finally found a way to buy 
into the thriving marketplaces of South and East Asia” (Ballard, 2010 48). As Europeans 
became bigger players in the expanding global economy, new trading hubs gradually 
began to emerge in locations that suited their priorities, such as Hormuz, Manula, Goa, 
and Macau, which Ballard identifies as early Iberian favourites, followed by Bombay, 
Madras, Calcutta, Singapore, and Hong Kong, which came to the fore as the British East 
India Company built its own favoured hubs (Ballard, 2010, 49).  
 In this historical account, he identifies that Europe’s limited influence in Asia was 
due to its restricted number of hubs, but as centuries passed, the profits extracted from 
their colonies in the Americas grew steadily larger, particularly because of the “ever more 
extensive use of slave labour” (Ballard, 2010, 49). As Europeans began to borrow and 
merchandise Asiatic manufacturing technologies, and to invest heavily in military 
training, the picture began to change. In the 17th century they began to extend activities 
well beyond confines of narrow hubs, and with military growth began to overturn Asiatic 
empires. “During the first decade of the 20th century (five centuries after the first phase of 
	 151	
Asiatic globalization reached its apogee), the second (Euro-American) phase of 
globalization achieved an even more dramatic position of virtually unchallenged global 
hegemony” (Ballard, 49).  
 Within this broad historical account of European colonial roots, Ballard situates 
contemporary Dubai as developing at a time in which many regions of the world that 
were subjected to two centuries of Euro-American imperialism had begun to “turn the 
tables on former hegemons” (Ballard, 39). He argues further that Dubai has emerged as 
one of the world’s most significant trading hubs by playing the role of brokerage. In this 
vein, three interrelated activities in Dubai are examined: the circulation of value through 
huge volumes of hard currency tied mainly to remittances, the circulation of goods 
largely driven by the import/export activities of dhows (an Arab sailing craft) in the 
Dubai Creek, and by the long distance container port and, finally, in the circulation of 
people through airports, as showcased through Emirates airline. He argues that all of 
these activities are linked to a global scale, in a unique plural character where two thirds 
of the population is migrants, most of whom have ties to the Indian subcontinent (Ballard, 
39).  
 Building on the idea that Dubai’s development is closely connected to shifts in the 
broader global political landscape, Zahlan (1989) discusses two major themes that 
characterize the experiences of the Gulf: first, the history and influences of the past, 
which influenced the rush to modernization; second, the role of international forces and 
interests on the people and society. As Zahlan states, “the Gulf states were molded and 
shaped according to considerations which rarely had anything to do with local criteria” 
(Zahlan, 5). In a similar vein Kazim examines the social and historical construction of 
Dubai as a globalized city through its role as an ‘intermediary’ in the postcolonial global 
system.  His argument is that the transformations of Dubai are linked to changes within 
the global system, whereby “Today, Dubai links the Arabian Gulf, the rest of the Middle 
East, and the former Soviet republics with Asia, Africa and Europe, as well as the 
Americas, through movements of multinational corporations (MNCs), labourers, 
financial transactions, goods and bond investors, real estate investors, homeowners, etc.” 
(Kazim, 2010, 74). Kazim argues that Dubai’s contemporary role as an important 
intermediary emerged in relation to the departure of traditional colonial powers and the 
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formation of new states. He situates Dubai within three ‘global’ periods, firstly the global 
system that lasted until 600 AD, the global system between 600-1500 AD, associated 
with the rise and decline of Muslim empires, and the transition period of 1500-1800, and 
the global colonial 1800-1971 and postcolonial 1971- present period. Scholarly works on 
Dubai’s historic development are best organized into the colonial and postcolonial 
periods as the city emerges alongside broader global shifts.  
 Kazim (2010) argues that British control of the Gulf led to the destruction of 
existing commercial systems and reconstruction of cities to serve the colonial interests 
(Kazim, 75). Kazim notes the role of the British in the destruction of the Al-Qawasim, 
and the signing of treaties in 1820, naming the region as the Trucial Emirates. The Al-
Qawasim were an Arab mercantile grouping coexisting with a tribal confederation called 
the Bani Yas who lived in the area, establishing commercial bases and ports. Zahlan 
argues that the British had a direct interest in the region, as a major route to India and 
outlines the role of the British as seeking to consolidate their hegemony to ensure no 
competition from outside interests. The British saw the existing Qawasin tribe, with 
influence over the areas that are now the Emirates and having a sizable maritime fleet, as 
a threat to their territorial ambitions. As a response to the Qassimi trying to charge the 
British for navigational rights in the Gulf, Britain attacked Ras Al Khaimah in 1805 and 
ultimately defeated the Qassimi in 1819, establishing British colonial rule. Thus as Kazim 
argues, the mercantile cities had been destroyed by the time of the British treaties, and 
most of the commercial ports and fleets were destroyed in the war again the Al-Qawasim 
(Kazim, 75). British rule then lasted until 1971.  
 Dubai’s growth can be attributed to a dispute within the Abu Dhabi ruling al-
Nahyan clan, which saw the Al-Maktoum clan and a group of merchants moving up the 
coast to Dubai, where they took control and increased wealth by encouraging commercial 
activities. It is thus seen that Dubai’s commercial establishments are not simply due to 
the convenient location of the Dubai Creek, but rather to the initiatives unleashed by the 
Al-Maktoums, who in contrast to their neighbours, largely encouraged trade and 
commerce (Ballard, 2010, 51). “Merchants from distant lands received a warm welcome 
and customs fees, port fees and vessel license fees were largely abolished” (Ballard, 
2010, 51). By the turn of the century, Dubai’s Souq had become a key hub for 
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distribution of goods throughout the entire lower Gulf, from Qatar to Muscat, and from 
Bushehr to Bandar Abbas on the Northern coast.  
 In terms of British rule, Ballard (2010) shows that British rule came in the form of 
a series of imposed ‘agreements’ on local tribes, culminating in the signing of a 
‘Perpetual maritime Truce’ in 1853 that recognized the sovereignty of five tribal sheikhs 
(Ballard, 50). This provided them with protection from each other and outside forces in 
return for allowing their administrations to be ‘guided’ by a ‘British resident’ responsible 
to the Governor of the Bombay Presidency (Ballard, 50). It is generally accepted that the 
British Resident, there primarily to ensure that the Emirs, whose authority they 
guaranteed, were strong enough to resist any piracy, used only the ‘slightest of touches’ 
in exercising their power (Ballard, 50). Similarly, Zahlan (1989) notes that the British 
officials living in the region never exceeded four or five persons in the entire Arab and 
Persian coasts (Zahlan, 22). She argues that they rarely interfered with social and cultural 
development, and most rulers of the states retained much of their own power and were 
left to organize and develop along their own lines. In this period, as Kazim argues, British 
imposed containment is said also to have led to poverty faced by the sheikhdoms of the 
Trucial Emirates, as shown in statistics whereby at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, the aggregated population of the Qasimi areas of the Trucial Emirates was 
390,000, which by the early twentieth century had fallen to 50,700 (Kazim, 2010, 75). 
The major problems arose from the containment of economy of the Emirates, and 
destruction of former long distance trade, which left Indigenous populations with fishing 
industry and agriculture, which mainly met internal demand.  Kazim argues that it was 
through the pearl industry that the British linked Trucial Emirates via Dubai to the global 
economy by generating demand in Europe for Gulf pearls (Kazim, 2010 76). In addition, 
in 1904, Dubai was a major port of call for steamers, with the Sheikh of Dubai, Maktoum 
bin Hashar (1894-1906) encouraging trade by abolishing customs duty and declaring 
Dubai a free port. Overall, Kazim examines how Dubai was constructed in the context of 
British colonialism, with the subsequent rise of the ruling class and intermediary 
merchant classes of Dubai. During this time, he highlights the role of the Trucial 
Emirates as the producer and exporter of the single commodity, pearls. The period 1820-
1945 saw the destruction of Trucial Oman’s long distance trade and the remolding of the 
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merchant classes to replace the long distance mercantile stratum that that had been so 
significant in earlier periods. Dubai is said, then, to have entered the “twentieth century 
under the security of the British imperial umbrella” (Ballard, 2010, 51), at a time when 
significant expansion in global trading networks and the shift from sail to steam were 
taking place. 
 This period of British influence, as Zahlan highlights, worked in two major ways: 
on the one hand, each state had been given sovereignty; on the other hand, they became 
isolated from the rest of the globe, which is seen as a major reason for the stunting in 
their socio-political development. During this period, “most of the Gulf states had no 
recognized legal status within the British Empire. They were not colonies, mandates or 
protectorates; they were simply described as being in “treaty relations with Britain” 
(Zahlan, 1989, 20). However, after 1947 with Indian independence, they were then 
referred to as British protected states. Until independence, the UAE states under British 
‘control’ were extremely isolated in their Arab relations, and were primarily trading with 
Indian merchants. It was not until the 1920s and 1930s that the powers of Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, and later Iraq would begin to enter the political arena. At this Britain introduced 
strong diplomatic efforts to contain their influence through the ‘Triple Containment 
Policy’. Thus, the creation of the ‘Trucial states’ had many important consequences. Each 
of the five sheikhdoms enhanced political and spatial integrity, and reinforced the 
security of their markets under the umbrella of British suzerainty (Ballard, 2010, 50).  
 In addition, scholars (Elsheshtawy 2011, Hanieh 2011, Kazim 2000, Davidson 
2008) highlight that these treaties were significant in the formation of the UAE 
eventually. One treaty of 1922 stipulated that, in the event of oil discovery, concessions 
would not be extended to any non-British entity, an agreement that Elsheshtawy argues 
had several implications. The first was the creation of Oman and Trucial Oman, which 
then divided into separate sheikhdoms leading to segmentation; and the construction of a 
social hierarchy as a result of treaty leading to signatories and their descendants as 
defacto rulers. “Through this shrewd policy, power was conferred on the mercantile/trade 
families who signed these treaties thereby establishing hierarchical relationships - thus 
giving rise to the current power base of Shuyookh (elders, rulers)” (Elsheshtawy, 2011, 
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63). Again this has worked as highlighted previously to politically separate them from the 
rest of the Arab/Muslim world.  
 Overall, as Hanieh highlights, at the cusp of the oil era that began to emerge from 
the 1920s onwards, most of the Gulf was tightly linked to British colonialism (with the 
exception of Saudi Arabia). Each future state within the Gulf was controlled by a ruling 
family that relied on a network of powerful merchant families and colonial backing. 
These early families became the proto class that came to underlie Gulf capitalism 
(Hanieh, 2011, 9). Zahlan (1989) notes that the first major shift in power would be 
initiated after World War I with the advent of oil companies and concessions in the 
region. These shifts would come to represent three important early changes: first, the 
official demarcations of geographical state boundaries and increasing separate and 
individualized identities through individual state oil concessions; second, the increasing 
foreign presence from the necessity for both skilled and ‘unskilled’ labour; and third, the 
new relationships with other Arab states as well as new forms of wealth (Zahlan, 25). 
Through these processes the position of each ruler was furthered established and 
throughout the period they continued to increase their power through their growing 
authority on economic development. It is at this time, during the 1930s, that the 
traditional economic source of pearling was shattered.  
 As others highlight with the decline of the pearl industry, Dubai’s merchants in 
import and re-export of external goods blossomed. While most of Dubai’s merchant class 
remained interconnected as importers of British goods and other goods brought by British 
India shipping lines, transformations after WWII led to the growth of Dubai’s 
government revenues, changes in Dubai’s administrative system and implementation of 
development projects in Dubai and elsewhere, and the influx of immigrant labour 
(Kazim, 2010, 79).  
 Many significant developments occurred in this period in collaboration with the 
British, the establishment in 1947 of the British Bank of the Middle East in Dubai, setting 
up Dubai as the seat of the Trucial Emirates council. Establishment of Dubai Municipal 
council, Police Force, court system, Customs services, Dubai lands department, the Water 
supply department, the postal department, Dubai state telephone company and Dubai 
petroleum, airport in 1960 (Kazim, 2010, 80). During this period of Sheikh Rashid 
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implemented important development projects, and as Dubai’s external trade was rising, 
Import trade rose from 3 million sterling in 1958 to 81 million in 1969 with the UK, 
Japan and Switzerland the leading partners. Also, after 1945 Dubai became the center for 
the re-export of Gold, which the British mined in Southern Africa, transported to Dubai 
by air, and channeled through the British Bank of the Middle East, Dubai branch (Kazim, 
2010, 82).  
 Kazim (2010) argues that these development projects reflect Dubai government’s 
role in accommodating import oriented merchant classes and diverse British colonial 
interests by borrowing money against anticipated oil revenues and using these revenues 
for implementing infrastructure development projects, with most contracts awarded to 
British firms.  
The post WWII period saw significant shifts as well when oil was discovered in 
1966. The British companies to which all these contracts were granted needed cheap 
labour, which was readily available from India and Pakistan, displaced from jobs in the 
independence/partition period. Many came from other places, such as Iran, Europe and 
the Arab countries, and by 1968, 50% of the population of Dubai was made up of 
immigrants. Thus, in the period 1945-1970, the composition of Dubai changed because of 
the need for low wage labour to implement development projects Thus, the period of 
1945-1970, composition of Dubai changed in terms of workers and merchant, foreign 
workers began to enter, partly because the largely British companies to which the 
government had awarded contracted needed low wage labour to implement these 
development projects (Kazim, 81). The impact of this influx of foreigners worked to 
strengthen the identity of locals in relation to immigrants, creating a sense of nationalism.  
In addition, as Zahlan highlights, oil concessions provided new possibilities for 
income, relief and political power for the rulers, which in turn allowed them to create the 
foundations for a welfare state. This is seen through their generosity in socio-economic 
development projects, while at the same time the traditional and informal relationships 
between rulers and their subjects was increasingly widened (Zahlan, 1989, 30). Once 
major oil revenues started to pour in, government became increasingly complex with a 
growing bureaucratic structure that distanced the ruler from citizens.   
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 Building on the political structure, many scholars (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, Fred 
Arnold & Nasra M. Shah 1984, Myron Weiner 1982) have discussed the ways in which 
older tribal structures based on differences and delineations have been adapted to the 
modern structures of contemporary Gulf States. Most of the powerful elites, who 
comprise the current monarchies, are descendants of historical tribal rulers. As Khalaf & 
Alkobasi (1999) highlighted above, these nations experienced massive wealth, 
improvements in social and economic indicators, with very few changes in basic social, 
political and cultural-organizational structures. They also argue that underneath modern 
structures, these older political orders have largely remained intact, even with 
unprecedented amounts of oil wealth. All of the states created constitutions after the end 
of their treaty agreements with Britain. The constitution of the UAE discusses the idea of 
a society built on equality, social justice, law, order and security, protection of private 
property, in which all citizens are assured health care, and personal freedom (Zahlan, 
1989, 85). Zahlan notes that similar to the history, the “states today cannot be described 
as absolute monarchies or dictatorships; nor are they constitutional monarchies”. Further, 
“they are a group of Arab states with a unique political system” (Zahlan, 1989, 89). In 
relation to this, all executive and legislative power is retained by rulers, including the 
Council of Ministers, which they appoint. However, it should be noted that they are not 
believed to retain dictatorial power, as they are bound by Islamic law (Shariah) and age-
old tribal customs and values consolidated through the process of ‘Shura’ (consultation) 
by religious advisors (Zahlan, 1989, 90).  
Overall, Zahlan explains that the more traditional balanced relationship between 
ruler and ruled had been disturbed by the growth of individual and private wealth 
accumulation from oil exploration. Although the authors do not attribute this explicitly to 
outside influence, it is clear through an evaluation of this literature that European interest, 
combined with other Western influences, drastically impacted the economic and political 
models of these states.  
Postcolonial period. Theoretically, most analysis of the region and issues of state 
and class formation in the period following colonialism are dominated by rentier-state 
theory. Mahdavy (1970) explains rentier states as those that “receive on a regular basis 
substantial amounts of external rent [which are] rentals paid by foreign individuals, 
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concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given country” 
(Hanieh, 2011, 428). Examples of this could be rent for pipelines or transportation routes. 
Originally tied to an analysis of Iran, as explained by Mahdavy, this was a turning point 
in Middle East when states were able to gain a greater share of oil revenues, which 
enabled the government to embark on large scale public expenditure programs and other 
state spending without having to resort to taxation (Hanieh, 2011, 10) and led to 
government becoming a dominant factor in the economy (Hanieh, 10). In addition, 
Mahdavy (1970) argues that this could lead to social and political stagnation as the 
revenues of the government were derived from external rents rather than from 
exploitation of the population, thus relieving governments from any pressure to 
implement political reform.  
Hanieh shows that several of the characteristics of the rentier state highlighted 
over time include: a link between Rentier states and autocratic regimes, a high degree of 
autonomy in economic decision making, and bias towards the service sector rather than 
value added production (Hanieh, 11). Additionally, decisions from the state are said to 
benefit elites through redirection of oil revenues rather than by their direct involvement in 
oil, which is controlled only by the state (ruling family). But because state is no longer 
reliant upon merchant class for financial support, the state/ruling family coalition with 
leading merchant families is reworked in the wake of large influx of oil rents (Hanieh, 
12).  
While Hanieh argues that rentier theory has helped to explain some important 
aspects of postcolonial development in Gulf States, his analysis departs from this in 
several important ways. The most fundamental difference for Hanieh is from rentier state 
theory’s reliance on a notion of ‘relative autonomy’ in which the state is seen as a distinct 
sphere of political economy, free from constraints of a capitalist class (Hanieh, 12). The 
problem for Hanieh is that the state is viewed as a separate object – severed from the 
class relations of Gulf society (Hanieh, 12). Instead, in Hanieh’s analysis, the state is not 
seen as a ‘thing’ but as particular expression of class formation, which is understood as a 
set of social relations that is continually in the process of coming-into-being (Hanieh, 12).  
In a Marxist conceptualization, he argues then that the state, as a relation, operates in a 
capitalist society to articulate and manage the interests of the capitalist class (Hanieh, 13). 
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In the GCC, Hanieh argues, the ‘internal relation’ of the state and the capitalist class is 
more pronounced. Thus the idea of relative autonomy of the state in ‘rentier theory’ is 
inaccurate.  
There are many examples in the GCC, Hanieh argues, in which high-ranking 
members of state are also a part of the ‘private’ capitalist class. In the Gulf, the state is a 
reflection of social relations but not the reason for them. Instead Hanieh argues that in 
order to explain the nature of class formation in the Gulf we must understand its 
development alongside that of a global capitalist system (Hanieh 16). Therefore, the GCC 
is not a ‘sealed bubble’ but rather is a regional space “constituted through the relations 
that exist between it and global capitalism as a whole”, and particularly after WWII 
(Hanieh, 16). In order to understand this, he insists on a rethinking of the nature of the oil 
commodity, which is a major differentiating factor in the region. Thus, for Hanieh, oil is 
not a ‘thing’ but a commodity, which is tied to sets of ‘globally determined’ social 
relations. Rather than fetishize oil as a commodity, it is necessary to understand the 
“wider motion and tendencies of the capitalist world market that confer a particular 
meaning to oil as a commodity centrally located within the reproduction of the system as 
a whole” (Hanieh, 16). 
 Additionally, we can consider two key concepts he highlights to help us 
contextualize and understand the post WWII shifts that are linked to the development of 
capitalism in the Gulf, namely, internationalization and financialization. 
Internationalization, Hanieh argues, represents a new set of social relations tied to the 
interlocking of “geographically dispersed circuits of capital” (Hanieh, 23). In addition, he 
highlights the ways that a regional circuit is elaborated through patterns of cross border 
flows, which in turn means that each member state of the GCC is more aligned “to the 
imperatives of regional accumulation” (Hanieh, 24). Therefore, regional integration has 
led to the internationalization of GCC capital through new sets of internationalized social 
relations, which embodies the process of class formation captured in Hanieh’s concept of 
Khaleeji Capital (Hanieh, 24).  
 Turning to the work of geographers Henri Lefebrve (1991), Doreen Massey 
(1988), and David Harvey (1985), Hanieh (2011) also emphasizes the importance of the 
production of space as a ‘social product that both reflects the nature of capitalism’s social 
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relations and can also be used as a means of control and hegemony (Hanieh, 24). 
Building on this work, he turns to David Harvey’s conceptualization of the ‘spatial fix’ in 
which capitalism could switch between different spatial structures to overcome crisis. 
This approach then affirms that the way “human beings conceive of, utilize, and structure 
space is a product of struggles shaped by capitalist social relations” (Hanieh, 25). From 
this, the production of space acts reflexively on “these social relations by placing 
limitations and shaping the process of capitalist accumulation itself” (Hanieh, 25). 
Hanieh argues that the process of class formation in the Gulf has been spatially 
structured, and institutionally reflected in the heavy reliance on temporary migrant labour 
and restrictive notions of citizenship. Thus, “this spatial configuration of accumulation 
has acted as an important spatial fix for Gulf capitalism, helping to maintain the enduring 
stability of the system as well as enabling a super exploitation of workers drawn from the 
peripheries surrounding the GCC” (Hanieh, 26).  
 
Post war developments. The WWII period saw some significant shifts in the 
world system, with the decline of British hegemony and rise of the US, and the anti 
colonial movements of 1945-1965. With British imperial interests exhausted, scholars 
highlight that the British withdrew ‘peacefully’, while ensuring that oil concessions 
remained and that British firms would be awarded the contracts, and that there was a 
stable political structure to ensure the power of ruling elites and prevent armed resistance 
(Elsheshtawy, 2011, 66). In 1971, the newly constituted United Arab Emirates emerged, 
coinciding with the knowledge that vast oil fields existed in the territories of the Gulf. 
Once operations had been nationalized, OPEC succeeded in doubling the price of oil in 
the late 1970s with the result that the region’s oil rich jurisdictions suddenly had access to 
untold wealth (Ballard, 2010, 52).  
Ballard (2010) highlights a few important events, which she claims have had a 
dramatic effect on the structures of these nations. These include the British withdrawal in 
1971 after one and a half centuries in the region; the oil embargo that followed the Arab-
Israeli war in1973 and subsequent rise in oil prices; the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran; the war between Iran and Iraq; and, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and 
the subsequent establishment of US military forces in the region.  
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 Zahlan (1989) offers further important considerations on the consolidation of 
regional power, as well as important historical moments that shape the course of the 
contemporary structures and attitudes of the Gulf. The Gulf Cooperation Council was 
formed in May 1981, two months into the war between Iran and Iraq. The major 
motivations at the time were to coordinate a security body, but also an economic 
integration of the six states, including the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia. It was also founded to counterbalance superpower manipulation of oil prices in 
fairly lightly populated oil states, and to serve as a council for discussing economic and 
political issues of mutual interest (Pieterse, 2010, 20). Thus, this regional bloc provided 
support for their insecurity at the time, and their initial ideas of internal security were 
challenged with the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to which no state could offer any 
serious support. The inability of any of the states to provide minimal intervention 
promoted their search for alternative protections in the form of the US led UN troops in 
their territories. Overall, the authors characterize the political and economic level of 
integration well over the strength of their defence. Thus many of their policies aimed to 
make the flow of goods easier with common markets, common regulations, a number of 
decisions to strengthen trade included the removal of custom duties, only a low tariff on 
imported foreign goods exists, and goods passing from one GCC country to the next 
being exempt from duties or taxes (Zahlan, 1989, 161). Furthermore, it is important to 
note that Saudi Arabia has strong dominance in the GCC. Last, some authors go so far as 
to argue that the “GCC provided Saudi Arabia with the institutional structure to exercise 
its influence” (Zahlan, 162).  
 In addition, although the Gulf States were providing financial aid for Iraq, as a 
fellow Arab state, they remained politically ‘neutral’. However, Iran turned towards 
retaliation against other Gulf States, with Qatar and Kuwait as its major targets, and more 
specifically, at French and US interests. During this time, Kuwait was the most 
vulnerable due to the close proximity and divisions between Shia and Sunni Muslims 
continued to create further tensions between the groups (Zahlan 1989, 176). In November 
1985 with ongoing fighting and bombings, the GCC countries had a new ideology based 
on the neutrality of Gulf States towards Iran. The contradictory US involvement on both 
sides continued to create tensions and unreliable information about the realities. Some 
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authors argue that it was an attempt to create a stalemate between the two while others 
point to the economic incentives of arms sales “no less than 27 countries had been 
supplying both Iraq and Iran with the arms and ammunition to keep the war alive” 
(Zahlan 1989, 176).  
 As Zahlan notes, throughout the war Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain remained 
on one side of the debate while the other four members of the GCC maintained good 
relationships with Iran. By 1984 the US had rebuilt its relations with Iraq, which was now 
their third largest trading partner in the Middle East, after Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
(Zahlan 1989, 179). By the summer of 1987 US military presence had grown in the Gulf 
and it was “said to be the largest assembly abroad since the Vietnam War” (Zahlan 1989, 
181). The Mecca Riots on July 31st 1987, during the holy time of Hajj when Iranian 
demonstrators protested, caused many casualties and created major disturbances and 
anger towards Iran, which ultimately shifted Saudi Arabia’s neutral policy. The Amman 
Summit in November 1987 was a significant milestone in Arab politics as 22 heads of 
state in the Arab League got together to discuses their security. The incorporation of 
Egypt back into Arab relations was key for US interests. These deliberations finally led to 
the UN resolution 598 agreement, the outcome of which left almost everything intact 
(Zahlan 1989, 183).   
 Iraqi forces, which invaded Kuwait on August 2nd 1990, focussed their anger on 
Iraqi economic decline. This occupation was seen as a major blow to the GCC countries 
and they looked for an international response, which was spearheaded by the US and the 
UK. The US refused to acknowledge the demands of Iraq to end the Palestinian 
occupation by Israel, and on January 16, 1991 Operation Desert Storm began massive 
aerial bombing in Iraq (Zahlan 1989, 185). By February 26, 1991 Iraq had no choice but 
to evacuate Kuwait unconditionally, as the US led attack had destroyed Iraq 
economically, and shattered the society. This was furthered by UN sanctions on imports 
of any kind, which were devastating to the citizens of Iraq.  
 Overall, these histories have played an important role in shaping the future of the 
Arab world more generally, and the GCC more specifically. Since the end of the war the 
GCC states have spent billions of dollars on arms purchases alone (Zahlan, 1989, 189). In 
addition, popular criticisms about the US and the Israeli occupation of Palestine have 
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grown, and are fixated on the continued punishments of the Iraqi peoples. US 
involvement grew considerably and in September 1991 it entered a 10-year-long 
agreement with Kuwait to access ports. The US then re-established its Fifth Fleet, which 
has not been in existence since the 1940s, with headquarters in Bahrain (Zahlan 1989, 
190). In more recent developments, the ‘dual containment’ of Iraq and Iran was turned 
into policy by the US Clinton Administration, and characterized both as threats to US 
interests. On the other side, the US supported UAE in peaceful efforts to resolve the 
Tunbs and Abu Musa islands problem with Iran (Zahlan, 1989, 190). These histories 
point to the ways in which the US involvement greatly differed from that of Britain, 
which has no interest in internal politics. The questions, left unanswered by these authors 
because the relatively dated nature of their histories have not touched on the ongoing 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by the US and allied forces, are based on what has occurred 
in the most recent years in the Middle East. For a further discussion it would be necessary 
to interrogate how these more recent events have impacted the GCC, if at all? And, in 
what ways does US imperialism shape the future of the GCC? As Davis highlights,  
 In many complex and surprising ways, Dubai actual earns a living from fear. 
 Its huge port complex at Jebel Ali, for example, has profited immensely from the 
 trade generated by the US invasion of Iraq, while Terminal Two at the Dubai 
 airport, always crowded with Halliburton employees, private mercenaries and 
 American soldiers en route toe Baghdad or Kabul, has been described as ‘the 
 busiest commercial terminal in the world’ for America’s Middle East wars.
 (Davis, 58) 
 
 Kazim (2010) argues that the formation of the UAE in 1971 coincides with 
particular shifts relevant to the post-WWII period of contemporary globalization. “Dubai 
adapted itself to play a new role in this postcolonial system” (Kazim, 74). While Dubai’s 
ongoing role as a major commercial center for the Gulf continued, he argues, that the 
commercial role changed during 1971-1995, and then again from 1995 -2010. These 
shifts are substantiated again by the argument made by (Hanieh, 2011) that Dubai has 
developed in relation to shifts in the broader political and economic global environment.  
Of particular interest here are the processes of decolonization, rapid developments in 
transportation and communication technologies, the growing transnational power of 
MNCs in the postindustrial service economy, the rise of China and India as powerful 
global economies, the integration of former Soviet republics into the capitalist system, 
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soaring oil prices after September 11, 2001, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, all of 
which, as Kazim argues, have served in the rise of Dubai.  
 In Hanieh’s analysis, the destruction of WWII and the subsequent decades, which 
followed, witnessed drastic shifts in the global economy. The ‘golden age’ from the 
1950s to late 1960s saw the rise of US dominance in the global economy, in part due to 
their position after the destruction of much of Europe and Asia. This can be seen in part 
through the Marshall Plan, which saw some $13 billion go towards European 
reconstruction alone, and the cementing of the US dollar as the main currency of the 
international monetary system in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference (Hanieh, 2011, 
30). Some additional shifts highlighted by Hanieh include the growing demand for 
harmonization of laws, regulations and institutions in a period of growing global 
accumulation. Thus, in this period, US dominance grew, but simultaneously, the 
conditions that enabled this growing internationalization also were strengthened. Thus, 
“the position of the hegemonic guarantor depended on the consent of the other rival 
capitalist powers, which flowed from its ability to maintain and deepen conditions of 
capital accumulation – and therefore its own strength - at the global scale” (Hanieh, 2011, 
32).  
 To understand the shift in the nature of capitalist production, Hanieh (2011) also 
explores the importance of technological and scientific innovation, related in great part to 
growing reliance on petrochemicals, and to the growth in the geographical scale of 
production. The earlier German innovation in chemicals derived from coal was replaced 
by US dominance in the industry with the use of petrochemicals and natural gas, and the 
creation of synthetic commodities (Hanieh, 33). Thus, taken together, these shifts and the 
growing reliance on oil and gas were initially met by increased American and European 
production until it was realized that more accessible and affordable oil and gas were to be 
found in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and other smaller Gulf 
states (Hanieh, 36). 
Deepening internationalization thus depended upon the integration of the Gulf 
region into global capitalism, and for this reason, the underlying basis of US 
power increasingly came to rest upon domination of the Middle East and the 
incorporation of the Gulf states into a US-led global order. (Hanieh, 36) 
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This tremendous role and power of the Gulf States in relation to US hegemony 
was economic and political, in a period in which there was also a shift away from British 
to US ownership of oil reserves (Hanieh, 36).  
 The growing anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s in Iran, Egypt and Iraq and 
elsewhere became significant in the Gulf as well and were reflected in growing assertions 
of national sovereignty through control over oil resources (Hanieh, 37). Eight 
international oil companies (IOCs), five American, one British, one Anglo-Dutch, and 
one French were owners of oil concessions in the region, for which they paid the ruler a 
royalty or tax from their production, and then refined the crude oil in North America or 
Western Europe. Hanieh highlights the history of this process, which culminated in the 
creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela). Eventually, state owned companies would replace 
ownership by IOCs (Hanieh 38).  
 The financialization of capitalism’s internationalization was in large part linked to 
the integration of the Gulf region into the broader global economy (Hanieh, 42), 
prompted by the important shift beginning in 1973 that saw the IOCs begin to give up 
control of established concessions. In 1972 eight IOCS owned 91 percent of all crude 
supplies through concession agreements with Gulf monarchies, and by 1980, this control 
was completely reversed, with IOCs owning less than a third of the crude oil location 
outside of the US (Hanieh, 43). This meant greater control and influence over the price 
and supply in the world market. With this new power, the Gulf became recipients of huge 
amounts of ‘petrodollars’, revenues from oil reserves (Hanieh, 43). Hanieh notes that this 
represented not only the Gulf’s links to the global economy through hydrocarbon exports, 
but “also linked to the ways in which its petrodollars were utilized in global financial 
circuits” (Hanieh, 43). Much of these flows from the Gulf, and particularly from Saudi 
Arabia went to North American and European banks (often those in Euromarkets) where 
they in turn were used for loans to MNCs, governments and others (Hanieh, 43). In 
another way, Hanieh highlights the role that Saudi petrodollars were invested in US bank 
accounts, equities and treasury bonds. The links between OPEC reserves, the use of US 
dollars for oil trade and the US protection to Saudi Arabia are all highlighted as important 
aspects of the US financial dominance as linked to the Gulf States.  
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 At the same time, the role of neoliberalism and its impacts in the Global South are 
significant to understanding shifts in the 1970s and 1980s, which led to growing 
privatization, cuts to social spending and worker protections, deregulation and reductions 
in taxes and tariffs (Hanieh, 46). In the South, Hanieh highlights, neoliberalism played a 
role not just to impact the domestic economic policies of these states, but also to enhance 
internationalization and financialization by ensuring conditions for capitalist reproduction 
at a global scale. The South became important for exploitation of cheap labour and other 
resources and was linked to the growth of internationalized production chains that rested 
on the implementation of neoliberal policies linked to loans and debt.  
 US political and military power in the region was strengthened through the war 
between Iran and Iraq in 1980, following the 1979 Iranian revolution that removed Iran 
from US influence. The GCC, put together in 1981, was a major ally of US power in the 
region and signaled the growing military presence of the US in the Gulf, highlighted in 
the US military role in the First Gulf War. Hanieh highlights the fact that during the Gulf 
war, around half of the entire US army was located in the region, and of the total $61 
billion that is cost to remove Iraq from Kuwait, $36 million was paid by GCC states 
(Hanieh, 53). The ‘New World Order’ ushered in by George W. Bush in 1991 highlights 
these shifts, and how control over the Gulf became a defining “element of power in the 
global economy”, as well as how the Gulf was a central element of growing US power in 
the postwar period (Hanieh, 53).  
 In specific reference to the making of a capitalist class in the Gulf, Hanieh argues 
that this has been subordinated to and integrated with the extension of US power in the 
region. The significance this formation is related not just to the accumulation process by 
owners of capital, but rather to the formation of the labouring class that produces (and 
reproduces) capital itself, hence the unique formation of the working class in the GCC by 
temporary migrant workers with no citizenship rights (Hanieh, 54). “Class formation in 
the Gulf has occurred through its spatial restructuring, and this feature is linked to the 
role the region plays in the global economy” (Hanieh, 54).  
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 Contemporary period. Pieterse (2010) argues that “Dubai’s façade is iconic, but 
iconic Dubai is not Dubai’s strength” (24). He contends that “if the GCC is an outlier in 
the Middle East, Dubai is an outlier in the GCC” (Pieterse, 24), in the sense that the GCC 
states, except Oman and Bahrain, are oil based economies. In particular, while the 1980s 
position of the Gulf with about 40 percent of worldwide oil reserves and 23 perfect of 
worldwide gas reserves was clearly built on oil exports, Dubai derives only 
approximately 6 percent of its GDP from oil. Additionally, while the role of the state in 
national development can be seen in the assertion that the “largest 10-20 companies in 
each GCC country are owned by the state, either in full or via majority stakes (all 
national oil, utilities and telecom companies, airlines, SABIC, Bourage, Dubai holding, 
Dubai aluminum, major banks like Emirates Bank, etc.” (Pieterse, 20), nonetheless it is 
argued that the private sector is growing considerably beyond rent based contracting from 
the state.  
 Dubai’s economy is based on trade and services, and its strengths emerge not only 
from its emerging global city status, but through investments in infrastructure, 
particularly in container ports, roads, and communication links and networks, in 
attracting the human capital to make its system work (Pieterse, 2010, 24). Jebel Ali port, 
the world’s largest man made port, set up by Sheikh Rashid beginning in 1972, and 
completed in 1976 with financing from newly formed UAE, and inaugurated in 1979 
(Kazim, 2010, 83), as well as business parks and free zones, such as Jebel Ali Free zone, 
inaugurated in 1985, becoming the first free zone to be built in the Gulf region, have 
established Dubai as an entrepot economy and commercial hub. “The Free Zone was 
designed to enable MNCs to take advantage of Dubai’s ports, facilities and location, 
while bypassing the 51 percent local investment allowance that was required of all 
international investors in the UAE” (Kazim, 83). It is extremely significant, as the rise of 
MNCs in this period meant that Dubai could become a distribution center for MNCs 
seeking to enter markets of the Arabian Gulf, the rest of the Middle East, and the Central 
Asian market (Kazim, 84). The building of Jebel Ali Free Zone allowed for a piece of 
land within the newly independent country of the UAE to be set aside for special trading 
purposes, thus allowing MNCs seeking proximity to sought after markets to set up 
branches there, without restrictions from the host country, or customs duties. Within the 
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free zones, other extremely significant aspects are the freedom from restrictions on 
recruitment of expatriate personnel (low wage, non unionized labour) and freedom of 
companies, for the first 50 years, and with rights to renew, to repatriate 100 percent of 
capital and profits, free from corporate taxes (Kazim, 84).  
 Thus, Dubai is understood as “the commercial and tourist hub of a region that 
encompasses [the growing] markets of South Asia, emerging Africa, oil-rich Russia and 
the Gulf states, Iran, Central Asia and [the] Caucasus, Europe and China” (Pieterse, 24). 
With this new diversified economic structure, sectors in petrochemicals, heavy industries, 
utilities, services and tourism continue to grow (Pieterse, 19). He notes that for decades 
oil revenues left the region for “Swiss banks, American arms, luxury consumptions and 
investments in the West” (Pieterse, 19), but from this earlier pattern, the Gulf has 
emerged as a major region for accumulation, breaking with earlier patterns of ‘rentier’ 
economies.  
  Ballard (2010) highlights the growth of financial services within Dubai as a result 
of the influx of migrant workers needing to remit money back home.  Dubai’s forms of 
finance, in conjunction with well established trading networks, are able to provide these 
services more reliably and cheaply than the British Bank of the Middle East, which was 
initially the only European-style bank in town (Ballard, 61). As construction projects 
grew, so migration patterns increased, and the demand for value transfer services grew as 
well. Dubai was well placed to act as settlement hub through which resultant flows of 
liquidity could be brokered and redistributed on a global scale (Ballard, 61). The 
exchange houses of Dubai emerged as a major hub in the global financial services sector, 
operating largely, but not exclusively, on behalf of an Asian clientele (Ballard, 64). It is 
estimated that migrants in the UAE transfer $15-20 billion yearly to respective countries 
as remittances (10 percent to Europe, 25 percent to Arab world, 40 percent to Asia, and 
25 percent to rest of the world) (Kazim, 87).  
 Furthermore, linkages between Dubai and the West have been apparent, but the 
growing importance of Dubai within a network of cities in Asia such as Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Mumbai as major financial centers and ports is significant. 
Linkages between the Gulf and Asia continue to increase and, while still tied to oil, they 
are becoming increasingly tied to investments in infrastructure, construction, telecoms 
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and other financial links. This ‘East’- ‘East’ cooperation has been referred to as the ‘new 
Silk Road’, where oil is the new silk and these emerging global cities have been 
described as “going global by going east, not west” (Pieterse, 27). However, the 
interdependencies of the global capitalist system may suggest a more interconnected 
system, rather than a bi-polar one. This is furthered by Hanieh’s critique of traditional 
analyses’ ‘methodological nationalism’, typified in examinations of the Middle East, that 
works under the assumption that the nation-state is a self contained unit, and thus 
neglecting the interconnected and interdependent nature of the national scale with 
regional and international scales. Shifting to a more relational understanding of these 
relationships helps provide a nuanced understanding of global capitalist development as it 
implicates the historic and contemporary role of the Gulf in the world economy.   
Dubai’s trading relationships shift after 1980 with trade during the colonial period 
based primarily on imports and exports from and to the West, and Japan; and since the 
1980s, with Europe and Asian countries, for almost equal shares of total monetary value 
of UAE imports, with by 1991 the share of Asian countries surpassing that of European 
countries (Kazim, 85). This highlights for Kazim, that the postcolonial period saw a break 
with older patterns with colonial powers in that the diversification of the UAE economy 
generated new patterns with the emerging powers. Overall then, these shifts go to show 
how the role of Dubai as commercial city changed in relation to the postcolonial global 
system, whereby Dubai sought to accommodate the new system being developed by 
MNCs (Kazim, 85).  
 Overall, then, in the twenty first century, Dubai is also seen as product of three 
major factors: firstly, that it is located in an oil-rich region, and is immediate neighbour to 
Abu Dhabi, whose ruling family share common ancestry with the al-Maktoums, hold 
close to ten percent of global oil reserves, and thus securing financial capital for the 
foreseeable future; second, its location is ideal for establishment of a global aviation hub; 
and third, Dubai’s globally networked entrepreneurs have utilized the power of 
telecommunications to engage in networks of globalization (Ballard, 60).  
 The period 1995-2010 identified by Kazim has attracted diverse multinational 
investors, and seen Dubai itself become a global investor. In 1995, Sheikh Mohamed bin 
Rashid Al Maktoum became crown prince, and this signaled changes in the building of 
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infrastructure projects in Dubai. In addition, Dubai benefited from social, economic and 
political factors such as the second Gulf War in 1990, the end of the Cold War, the 
decline of the Soviet Union, the integration of the former socialist states into a new global 
system after 1990, the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, the rise of East Asia after 
2001 when China joined the WTO, the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001, 
the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and the rise in oil prices since 
2002, all of which impacted Dubai (Kazim, 86). These shifts attracted diverse investors 
and merchants and talented entrepreneurs, enhanced by Dubai’s role as an intermediary 
in relation to Russia and the former Soviet republics in a new capitalist system, as well as 
by the rise of India and China. Additionally, Dubai saw increased diversity of merchants, 
MNC activities, and expansion of free zones such as Dubai Internet city, Dubai media 
City, Dubai Financial District, Dubai Healthcare City, and more.  The model of free 
zones was first applied in Jebel Ali Port and since then a range of Free Zones has been 
created allowing 100 percent freehold ownership of land and businesses (Kazim, 88), 
which in turn has led to a significant construction boom, met with growing numbers of 
migrant construction workers.  
 Of particular significance, the events of 9/11 have been seen as an important 
catalyst for criticisms of Dubai, and for shifts in investment outlooks. New York needed 
to solidify its position once again as an unchallengeable hub, which, although Ballard 
argues that this was not explicitly stated, became evident through the introduction of the 
US Patriot Act, which passed through Congress within six weeks of 9/11 (Ballard, 65). 
Touted as combating terrorists, drug smugglers and other criminals, the creation of a 
global regulatory regime, to which all formally constituted banks would have to comply, 
regardless of location of domestic jurisdiction, if they wished to sustain their footholds in 
NY, was significant. Ballard argues that the ultimate goal was to permanently 
institutionalize the US Treasury’s and the NY money market as central in the global 
financial order (Ballard, 65). One outcome has been that the major exchange houses in 
Dubai have strengthened their strategic alliances with major Wall Street banks and, in the 
face of a credit crunch, Euro-American financial institutions have become more 
interested in tapping into the exponentially rising volume of migrant remittances as well.  
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The resulting fear of assets being frozen because of the US Patriot Act led to Gulf 
Arabs pulling tens of billions of dollars out of their US assets and sending the money 
home (Krane, 2009, 188). The US markets were thought to be ‘tanking’, while those in 
the Gulf were on the “upswing” tied to rises in oil prices that continued over the next 
seven years (Krane, 2009, 119). Staggering figures from the World Bank showed that 
Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries invested as much as $25 billion a year into US 
investments, and that between 2001 and 2003, the figure reached only $1.2 billion 
(Krane, 2009, 199). The ‘missing’ money was largely rerouted from America to Dubai, 
where “investing at home became a matter of pride” (Krane, 2009, 199). The economic 
impacts in the Gulf were astounding as the UAE’s GDP rose by more than 60 percent 
between 2001 and 2008, in comparison to the US economy, which grew by only 18 
percent in the same period (Krane, 2009, 199). Dubai, whose growth became emblematic 
of the Gulf developmental trajectory, grew at 13 percent a year between 2000 and 2005, 
faster even than China. In the meanwhile, the population of the UAE doubled between 
2001 and 2008, reaching 2 million (Krane, 2009, 119). In addition to the large 
repatriation of Arab investments from America, since 2001 the rising price of oil to more 
than $140 a barrel in 2008 led to Gulf oil revenues of an estimated $600 billion dollars in 
2008, in contrast to a decade earlier when oil brought in just $61 billion (Krane, 2009, 
121). These developments also coincided with growing infrastructure and services in 
banking, stocks and real estate.  
 An example of ‘shifting’ allegiances can be seen through the story of Dubai 
World ports. In early 2006, the US congress erupted over Dubai Ports World’s imminent 
takeover of the London based Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, 
which operates docks from New York to Miami. Despite Bush’s support, Dubai was 
forced to withdraw from the deal after accusations of the supposed dangers of ceding 
control over American commercial ports to Middle Eastern governments, much of which 
was linked to anti Arab bigotry (Davis, 57). Eventually, DP World was sold and pulled 
out of the operation. It was clear that anti-Arab racism influenced the deal, highlighting 
the contingency of Dubai’s acceptance into the ‘global cities’ club. The DP World 
situation highlighted the ignorance of many Americans about the Gulf though, as Krane 
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argues, “some good did come of the episode. Suddenly, Americans, heretofore oblivious 
to Dubai’s emergence, knew about the place” (Krane, 2009, 145). 
 Despite these interesting political tensions, Kazim argues that Dubai, through a 
combination of old and new merchant classes, old and new MNCs and enterprises, 
creative and talented classes, and a huge influx of low wage service and other workers, 
has become one of the most globalized cities in the world because of its demographic 
diversity and global interconnections (Kazim, 87). Some of the most significant features 
of Dubai’s developmental success have been based on the development of ports, traders, 
exchange houses, and airports. The vision of Dubai’s future is based on the development 
of services such as travel, trade, transportation, logistics, and tourism. As highlighted by 
contemporary Dubai visionary Sheikh Mohamed, 
Dubai used to be a station along the East and the West trade routes, but it is now a 
gateway to the four corners of the world. The countries of the central world need 
an economic capital, and we believe we can fill this role because we have the 
necessary infrastructure, and because we are actually playing part of it already. 
We will keep developing our role in the future, until Dubai becomes the economic 
capital of this world. (Al Maktoum, 2012, 204)  
 
 The rise of commercial cities such as Dubai is significantly linked to several key 
features, including a strong merchant class, the presence of MNCs, and of course, one of 
the most significant aspects of Dubai’s development, access to a surplus labour force. 
While we have seen the highly diverse character of the region’s history, we must too 
recognize the current role that migrants play in advancing the dreams of Dubai. At all 
levels of development, migrant workers, be they professional, or labour based, supply 
vital labour for the development of the city. However, the social hierarchies of the region 
are such that the ruling elites and Emirati citizens occupy a privileged status unattainable 
by ‘Others’. While most accounts of these relationships point to simple divides between 
citizens and all others, I add complexity to these realities, in the next chapter, by exposing 
and examining the layers of power that play out in everyday experiences of residents in 
the global city, through an analysis of historical genealogies which are embedded in the 
social geographies of the city space.  
 
 
	 173	
Conclusion: Migrant Dependency  
This chapter showcased the immensely rapid economic and political development 
that the UAE has undergone, as well as its role in the global landscape over time. By 
tracing Dubai’s historical development through a few key periods, we have examined the 
city’s role as a mercantile city, facilitating important networks of trade and commerce. 
Turning to the role of colonialism and the reorientation of Dubai in the interests of the 
British, and later the US, we see how the economic and political structures have 
developed over time in relation to global trends. In the postcolonial period, we can see 
how the role of Dubai as an intermediary has intensified, and combined with oil revenues 
and diversification, building the city into the global city it is today with important 
antecedent historical webs that have shaped its global significance. Thus, the ‘global’ 
developmental trajectory of Dubai in the contemporary period has been importantly 
shaped by its historic relationships transnationally, a process that has this under the 
period of neoliberal globalization. The relationships generated by the processes of 
neoliberalism globally link the contexts of North and South in important ways, have 
generated new patterns of accumulation and wealth, and intensified disparity. Neoliberal 
processes are linked to policies of ‘development’ that have further marginalized many 
poor populations, promoting migration as a survival strategy in the contemporary period. 
At the same time, the role of neoliberal capitalist shifts in the Global North, and of global 
city centers such as Dubai, has encouraged the demand for low waged migrant workers. 
Thus, in the following chapter, we will examine the issues of   migration in more detail, 
centered on the 1970s massive development projects initiated through the huge advent of 
oil revenues that led to the recruitment of large numbers of migrant workers.  
 
 As we will see, while the state worked to protect ‘national’ interests that were 
largely about capital, issues related to labour and the protection of workers were not 
included. Thus, the historical features of the migratory regime in the Gulf which are 
essential to its development at all levels, the role of the ‘Kafala’ sponsorship system, in 
combination with the exclusive and highly restricted citizenship system, have justified the 
state’s role in protecting its own citizenry against the cultural threats of ‘Others’, and has 
worked to externalize the issues of migrant workers to sending states, and the broader 
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global political economy. Through this genealogical analysis we will see how the 
experiences within receiving countries must be coupled with an examination of the 
conditions in sending countries, as they are relationally defined. Thus, I will also explore 
a broader political economy of this period in order to understand the pressures related to 
processes of migration, shaping policy, nurturing dreams and motivating migrants. 
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Chapter Four Making the Dream II 
 
The build up to dreaming continues in this chapter, in which we continue to 
examine the conditions that make possible the Dubai dream. This section reflects stages 
three and four of NREM in which the body continues its preparation for dreaming, falling 
deeper into sleep, experiencing more dream like qualities. Specifically, this chapter, by 
examining scholarly works on the background, histories and policies that shape these 
geographies of migration, argues that migration is a central tool in the development of 
Dubai’s global city aspirations. In addition, to fully understand the impact and character 
of these geographies of migration, we ‘unmap’ a genealogical analysis of the movements 
at different levels. In keeping with the deepening of sleep in the quest for a state capable 
of experiencing dreams we contextualize the processes of globalization as they relate to 
migration in the making of ‘dreams’ that both ‘pull’ migrants to the global city in search 
of new possibilities, and of the ‘push’ factors that motivate migration in the search of new 
livelihoods or survival strategies.  
Interestingly, these last stages before one enters REM sleep occupy less time in 
subsequent cycles, and may disappear all together (Carsakadon and Dement, 2011). 
Similarly, genealogies of migration, and the broader global histories and conditions that 
give rise to global city possibilities, are erased or eclipsed in the quest for globality. 
These erasures obscure the global, historically situated forces and networks that shape 
contemporary trends of migration and globalization as they shape the making of Dubai’s 
globality, but also as they influence ideas of citizenship, nationality, race, gender and 
class. Thus, through an examination of these processes of development we also see how 
different articulations of Dubai dreams and dreams of Dubai shape migration from all 
over the globe towards the city, and how broader political and economic processes such 
as those embedded in trends of neoliberal globalization impact the making of these 
geographies over time. Thus, the mapping and simultaneous unmapping of these 
geographies and genealogies provide the analytic tools and insights necessary to 
understand the deeper, more profound and insightful explanations and motivations about 
social hierarchies that organize the resident population of the city, all of which are set 
against the backdrop of global city dreams.  
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Unmapping Geographies 
 
 Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free 
 from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting 
 because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about 
 forms, about images and imaginings. (Said, 1994, 7) 
 
 Edward Said in Culture and Imperialism (1994) discusses the role of ideology in 
legitimating imperialism. The struggle over geography, he argued, was not just about 
controlling physical land, but about the ideological apparatus that operates 
simultaneously to justify, legitimize and obscure, in order to control and influence the 
‘hearts and minds’ of people. In conceptualizing geographies more broadly, we can move 
towards an understanding of the geographies of migration, to understand the multi-
directional, complex layers of movements, both new and intensified, operating alongside 
forces and forms of geography that have become important sites of struggle for migrants 
around the world, especially those in formerly colonized regions. Thus, just as ideas form 
important components of imperial conquest, the ideologies that follow migrants on their 
journeys and intersect in new spaces highlight the significance of examining the 
genealogies of race and empire as they relate to the making of the ‘migrant-Other’, which 
can be seen as the contemporary counterpart to the older forms of colonialism.  
  I underscore the importance of migration as a central feature of the development 
of Dubai’s global city status in the contemporary period, as well as an integral feature of 
Dubai’s society and city life. The genealogies that accompany geographies of migration 
to the city importantly influence the experiences of migrants at all levels, in relation to 
national citizens. In addition, understanding the role of citizenship in subject making and 
the strategies of national identity formation by the state is significant. Adding complexity 
by examining the everyday encounters and the ideological basis of diverse subjectivities 
also helps to shed light on the social geography of the city and the role of global city 
status making. This includes considerations based on understandings of different subjects 
and their navigation of city spaces, state policies and practices related to citizenship, and 
labour and migration. It examines both the informal and formal mechanisms of these 
regimes, at the level of the everyday, examining the complexity of related ideas of 
innocence, privilege and power, relationality and relativity, and the role of race, gender, 
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class, nationality, all as they are implicated historically in structures that influence global 
labour regimes as well as their contemporary manifestations in the current neoliberal 
political and economic system. Simply put, using the everyday as a counterpoint to the 
making of the global city at the macro level, we can see how negotiations at the 
‘everyday’ level, seemingly innocent and mundane, have significant historical lineages 
that have constructed migrants through ideologies tied to race, labour/class and gender 
which intersect with both formal and informal processes of subject making through 
policies and practices of citizenship. These ideological forces shape notions of belonging, 
create and sustain hierarchies of entitlement, and help to illuminate the complex workings 
of these relationships and dependencies between different sectors. In particular, these 
complex relationships exist between not only Emirati citizens and low waged migrant 
workers, but expat professionals as well, whose privileges are generated through 
historical forces that manifest in their everyday encounters with citizens and ‘Others’ 
(low waged migrants from the Global South). Thus, importantly here, we can examine 
how subjectivities are constructed through these relationships and examine various, 
seemingly mundane rationales and justifications both by the state, and by residents at all 
levels to sustain and reinforce hierarchies of entitlement which shape who belongs and 
who does not, but also who is worthy of what and why.  
 Connecting this focus on migration explicitly to the themes of dreams, in and of 
the global city as discussed by scholars and subjects in this study, we see that the 
imagined elements of Dubai’s developments have significant impacts on how migrants 
imagine the city before they arrive and, importantly inform how migrants imagine 
themselves while in the city, all of which contribute significantly to the ways in which 
residents of the city relate to each other.  Thus, we can see how dreams of Dubai are 
shaped by historical processes that engender different motivations for migration to the 
global city. In addition, once migrants arrive, we can see how the urban form itself 
importantly shapes relationships at the level of the everyday and also informs the 
complex negotiations that residents engage in with each other. These spatial relations are 
implicated in historical genealogies that are embedded within social hierarchies based on 
nationality and labour in the city.  
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 The urban form as discussed through the explicit priorities of iconic Dubai as 
presented to the world is based on developments that “do not add up to a coherent whole” 
(Elsheshtawy, 2010, 122). Dubai’s development is “characterized by building to make 
itself a global player, using well established real estate and architectural tactics to achieve 
its global dreams” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 124). He gives the example of Burj Al Arab, seen 
as the official symbol of Dubai, despite the reality that most residents of Dubai have 
never and will never set foot in the Burj. Thus, the focus on iconic Dubai is based on 
ideas of ‘exclusivity’ and ‘luxury’, which lead to social exclusion and the creation of a 
non-egalitarian environment (Elsheshtawy, 130). The focus of iconic Dubai is found in 
luxury real estate developments, housing policies which are explicitly allocated to 
different groups, government preference to citizens for free land, and access to loans, and 
the simultaneous development of worker camps on the outskirts of the city and the 
informal and formal policies of exclusion that work at “sanitizing the city in a way by 
displacing its poor who should be kept out of sight for fear of spoiling the carefully 
crafted ultra luxurious cityscape” (Elsheshtawy, 125). The landscapes of the city 
importantly influence belonging and access, creating exclusion and reinforcing unequal 
access, but this is a manifestation of deeper rooted issues of ‘Othering’, creating distance 
between groups by simultaneously reaffirming the privileges of some through the 
exclusion of ‘Others.  
 Turning back to what made these ‘developments’ possible, we look to scholars 
who argue that migration has been a central component of Dubai’s development at all 
levels (Malecki and Ewers 2007, Zahlan 1998, Shah 2008, Khalaf 2005, Hanieh 2011). 
The significance of migration is underscored by Dubai’s unique status as a migrant 
majority city, where ‘foreigners’ outnumber citizens at a ratio of approximately 9:1, with 
no access to gaining formal citizenship. Rather than being a system of the past, the 
‘Dubai’ model is often seen as an exemplary model, based on neoliberal economic 
policy, rapid urban development and temporary migrant regimes, for future development 
in the Middle East with implications towards broader trends across the world, particularly 
in traditional immigrant receiving states such as those in Europe and North America. 
Thus, Dubai can also be seen as the dream scenario for neoliberal policy makers on 
citizenship and migration around the globe.  
	 179	
Significance of Migration in the Global 
 
 In 2007, for the first time in history, more people lived in cities than in rural areas 
(Elsheshtawy, 2010, 17), with the majority of new residents poor, living in inadequate 
housing and lacking equitable access to resources. The 2013 UN International Migration 
Report states that globally, there were 232 million international migrants. While the 
majority of these migrants still found their way to developed countries, the world’s 
developing regions hosted 41 percent of migrants, and since 2000 the South has outpaced 
the rate of growth in migrant stock globally. Generally, the report highlights that between 
1990 and 2013 the number of international migrants rose by over 77 million or by 50 per 
cent, with much of that growth between 2000 and 2010. Europe (72 million) and Asia (71 
million) hosted nearly two thirds of the world’s international migrants in 2013 (Asia 
includes here the countries of the Gulf in the UN categorizations). The report also 
highlights that the Asia-Asia corridor was the largest migration channel in the world. 
Highlighting the significance of the Gulf in Asian migration statistics, it was also found 
that in 2013, over 51 percent of all international migrants in the world lived in ten 
countries, which included Saudi Arabia (9 million) and the United Arab Emirates (8 
million). In addition, between 1990 and 2000, of the 10 largest bilateral migrant 
corridors, and the three in Asia, one included India and the UAE. In 2000-2010 bilateral 
migration corridors were split 50-50 between destinations in the South and North. Of 
these, the top ten corridors were between South Asian countries and oil producing 
Western Asia, namely Bangladesh-Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh-UAE, and India-UAE. In 
addition, from 2000-2010, the US, Spain and the UAE were the top net immigration 
countries, whereas Bangladesh, Mexico, and India were the top net emigration countries 
(UN International Migration Report, 2013). The volume of international migrants 
annually highlights the significance of South emigration, and is continuing to grow in 
significance. In addition, statistics between South Asia and Western Asia, and the Gulf in 
particular, we see a significance dependency that has been compared to the situation of 
Mexican migrants to the US in significance in terms of exchange and dependencies.  
 Globalization in the contemporary period is examined through a diverse range of 
economic, political, social, cultural and technological processes, most of which have been 
dominated by scholarly perspectives that tend to fixate their interests on the post WWII 
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period and with the consolidation of US hegemony in the postcolonial period. While this 
‘moment’ indicates significant shifts in the global order, critical scholars have highlighted 
the necessity of mapping the geographical and temporal genealogies embedded within 
these growing global networks of capital. In particular, migration has played a pivotal 
role in helping us to elucidate the pressures and shifts of the neoliberal period of global 
restructuring in both Global North and South.  
 Additionally, situating studies of the ‘global city’ amidst scholarly work on 
contemporary forms of globalization should be informed by a framework for thinking 
about processes of globalization beyond the many Eurocentric assumptions that undergird 
the conceptualization of ‘global city’ status. As part of the more specific examination of 
the role of migrant labour in the context of global city making in Dubai, it is necessary to 
examine the dialectic between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in migration studies, as well as 
historical genealogies of colonialism, imperialism and ideologies of race, class, gender, 
nationality and the impacts of migration on citizenship and nation-hood under forces of 
neoliberal globalization. Rather than isolate the 1980s as the only point of departure, I 
hope to reflect on this ever so prominent moment in many fields of study to shed light on 
the historical developments of Dubai, which happen to generally coincide with these 
shifts in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 This involves an analysis of factors that encourage migration as they relate to the 
international division of labour, colonial legacies embedded in development projects in 
the third world with particular focus on Asia and the Arab world, as well as discussion of 
globalization, migration and development strategies that lead migrants to Dubai. Thus we 
consider the role of the international division of labour, postcolonial  ‘development’ 
strategies in the Third world, the impact of SAPs and the IMF and WB, cycles of debt 
and the emergence of migration as a development strategy and the role of remittances, 
impacts of migration on sending countries, relationships between sending and receiving 
states, waves of migration and gendered labour.  
 
 While ‘globalization’ continues to be a highly debated concept, it can generally be 
understood as a process referring to the creation, interdependence, interconnectedness 
and interactions amongst global actors at various scales.  Debates continue about the 
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varied impacts and consequences of processes resulting from the differential positions of 
various nations, economies and workers in the global economy. While traditional 
divisions between the First and Third world continue to be complicated by a growing 
transnational capitalist elite, the structural features of these legacies remain central to 
many Third world economies in particular ways. Uniquely, ‘global cities’ can be seen as 
the link between First and Third world economies through unique spaces of neoliberal 
governance and dependency. Additionally, while the traditional ‘global cities’ of the 
West have dominated most studies of migration, citizenship and globalization, the 
growing acknowledgment and prominence of global cities of the Global South 
complicate these Eurocentric assumptions prevalent in many studies on the subject.  
In particular, the 1980s is seen as marking a pivotal moment for neoliberalism, 
understood generally as a market driven ideological paradigm governing economic, 
cultural, social and political policies and practices uses market rational based on 
privatization, liberalization, deregulation and flexibility. These shifts have had significant 
impacts in both the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds, with implications for the role of the state, 
restructuring of the economy, privatization of essential services, and general 
reorganization of relationships between citizens and the state in many parts of the world. 
In particular, the former colonized countries of the world face significant challenges with 
regards to the imposition of neoliberal agendas spearheaded by the Washington 
institutions that importantly shape the geographies of migration and labour. Generally, it 
can be argued that it is within this increasing neoliberal, globalized world that many 
populations in the Global South turn to migration as a survival strategy in new, renewed, 
profound, and often, gendered ways. Within the context of global cities, migrant workers 
globally face significant issues in regards to their precarious status, exploitation, 
mistreatment and abuse, and vulnerabilities with regards to their entitlements, 
protections, and status as temporary workers, and are generally regarded as flexible, 
disposable subjects at the bottom of a global hierarchy based on nationality, employment, 
race and gender.  
 It should be noted that while I am seemingly focused in this section on the historic 
relations between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world nations through forces related to the 
‘international division of labour’, I am cognizant to connect these histories to the 
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intersection of hierarchies within the unique national context of the global city of Dubai. 
Thus, the usage of terms such as ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world is done consciously in relation 
to the ‘New international division of labour’ in an attempt to highlight the continued 
dominance of structures of the international division of labour in the period of 
globalization. While concepts such as global North and South better highlight the 
growing transnational capitalist class, which challenges traditional First-Third world 
relations, the structural features of colonialism and development continue to perpetuate 
stigma and discrimination for migrants based on their country of origin, ideologically. 
Furthermore, the concept of the ‘international division of labour’, as criticized by 
globalization theorists, has challenged notions of comparative advantage in economic 
development by highlighting the hierarchies and legacies of colonialism that have 
continued to maintain divisions in the international economic system that impact the 
experiences and entitlements of the subjects of this study and in scholarly work more 
globally.  
 
The Making of and Endless Supply.  
Processes of neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s led to significant changes in 
the economies of the Global South, and significantly altered the relationships between 
state, market and citizens. As Hanieh highlights, neoliberalism impacted not just the 
domestic economic policies of these states, but also enhanced processes of 
internationalization and financialization by ensuring conditions for capitalist reproduction 
at a global scale (Hanieh, 2011). Thus, the South was linked to the growth of 
internationalized production chains that were linked to the policies of loans and debt 
(Hanieh, 2011), which also led to the creation of an abundant and cheap labour supply. 
Overall, this economic restructuring in ‘developing’ economies has played an important 
role in transforming existing livelihood strategies. From the perspective of developing 
economies, processes relating to neo-liberal globalization have dramatically reconfigured 
the issues surrounding poverty, work, and migration. The post-WWII reconfigurations of 
power through the creation of international institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) played a significant role in restructuring the newly 
independent nations. The postcolonial period was met with increasing ‘aid’ from these 
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Washington based institutions, bringing them closer under the control of the US 
dominant position in the world landscape. The debt crisis of the 1980s was met with the 
introduction of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) by the World Bank and the IMF, 
which dramatically altered the direction and possibilities of postcolonial independence 
for many developing economies. SAP conditionalities pushed desperate governments to 
adopt neo-liberal economic policies aimed at creating ‘business-friendly’ environments, 
based on privatization, de-regulation and trade liberalization in exchange for foreign 
‘aid’.  In addition, debt servicing has substantially intensified these economic collapses as 
they fail to provide any safety nets for their citizens. Saskia Sassen (2000) points out that 
the “South has paid its debt several times over, and yet its debt grew by 250 per cent” 
(Sassen, 2000, 513). The negative effects on domestic economies, rural livelihoods and 
labour participation led to the intensification of income disparities, unemployment and 
rampant, widespread poverty.  
In addition, writing about the global South, many feminist scholars 6  have 
contributed significant insights through gendered analyses of globalization. They have 
highlighted the gendered consequences of SAPs, such as the dependence on the provision 
of women’s unpaid labour to compensate for a loss in the level and quality of social 
service provisions, which significantly impact women’s abilities to provide the basic 
necessities of food, health and sustainability for millions of households. Thus, “women’s 
increased and unpaid work operates as a shock absorber to promote the apparent 
‘efficiency’ of market-oriented mechanisms” (Stasiulis and Bakan, 2005, 40). In addition, 
current trends of offshore production and factory work have pushed many women to fill 
the demand of global capitalist production in an attempt to ensure the survival of 
households. These pressures have increased the migration of women into precarious work 
such as factory work and domestic labour, as well as informal economies such as petty 
vending and sex work. In particular, the volume of ‘Third World’ migrants seeking 
domestic service jobs in the ‘developed’ world coupled with the demand from wealthy 
‘developed’ economies have created an international economy and global business, with 
many serious consequences.  
																																																								
6 Parrenas 2001, Ong 1999, Chang 2000, Stasiulis and Bakan 2005, Sassen 2000 
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The process of recruitment of migrant women workers to perform paid domestic 
labour in developed capitalist states is structurally linked to the uneven process of 
international economic development, international migration patterns and 
regulations, as well as racially and ethnically specific ideologies. Despite the end 
of formal colonial dependence, the legacy of imperialism has combined with 
modern conditions of indebtedness to generate large pools of Third World 
migrant labour. (Stasiulis and Bakan 2005, 46)  
 
  Building on these themes, Saskia Sassen (2000) highlights the ways in which 
neoliberal globalization has led to significant changes in both receiving and sending 
nations. The gendered nature of global migration is tied to both the production of global 
cities and survival circuits. Workers are needed to sustain both strategic service work and 
the lifestyles and consumption patterns in both formal and informal sectors and today we 
are witnessing the return of the “serving classes in globalized cities around the world, 
composed largely of immigrant and migrant women” (Sassen, 2000, 510). She locates the 
global supply of these low waged female workers at the feminization of survival, and 
argues that ‘cross border circuits’, which make possible the movement of these workers, 
are also used for a whole host of operations that produce revenue on the backs of the truly 
disadvantaged. For Sassen these circuits make up the ‘counter-geographies of 
globalization’ whereby the global economic system’s formal institutional support for 
cross-border markets and money flows has become the infrastructure for informal circuits 
of migration (511). The feminization of survival, which makes these movements possible, 
is again linked to the histories of development and debt servicing, through which, as she 
states, “Thirty-three of the officially namely forty-one highly indebted poor countries 
paid $3 in debt service to the North for every $1 they received in development 
assistance” (513). From this, the ‘alternative survival circuits’ that emerge through these 
processes are created by unemployment, poverty and lack of state support for social 
services. Overall Sassen argues that, “the growing immiserization of governments and 
economies in the global south is one such condition, insofar as it enables and even 
promotes the migration and trafficking of women as a strategy for survival” (Sassen, 
2002, 273). Thus, women emerge as crucial economic actors in both global cities and 
survival circuits, and evaluating these dimensions of globalization allows us to link 
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sending countries, receiving countries and different scales and processes that comprise 
globalization(s).  
Overall, it is clear that SAPs have dramatically altered the survival strategies of 
families, communities and entire nations. In these contexts, migration for labour plays an 
important role in countering high rates of unemployment and poverty, and governments 
in the global south are increasingly reliant on remittances from migrants as a source of 
foreign currency and a poverty reduction strategy. The World Bank reports that global 
remittances, as cash sent home, amounted to some 276 billion dollars in 2006 
(Elsheshtawy, 20). India’s remittances by foreign migrants are highest, taking in 32.7 
billion dollars in 2005, and estimated 26.9 billion in 2006 (Elsheshtawy, 20). Gender 
continues to be an important factor in understanding experiences of migration, 
recognizing that since the mid 1990s women have represented more than half of all 
transnational migrants in migratory flows between developing countries (Elsheshtawy, 
21).  
The difficult scenarios that promote migration from sending countries are 
intensified by conditions in receiving countries where, as Parrenas (2001) explains, the 
result is the partial citizenship of migrant Filipina domestic workers and other low wage 
migrant workers. ‘Partial citizenship’ refers to the stunted integration of migrants in 
receiving nation states, often seen, for example, through the denial of reproductive rights, 
for example (Parrenas, 2001, 1130). These workers therefore, provide care for the 
citizenry of various receiving nations at the cost of the denial of their own reproduction 
and membership in the nation state that they are helping reproduce.  
 In considering the relationships between migrant workers, working conditions and 
sending nations, we see how Halliday (1984) examines these connections to sending 
countries by exploring how traditional economic theory constructs the mutually 
beneficial relationship that may emerge between the two states, allowing for three 
possibilities open to sending nations: remittances can become a force for building in 
productive resources; migrants can acquire skills and experience therefore enriching their 
human capital; flow of labour from overpopulated and underemployed populations is rise 
a productivity (Halliday 1984, 8). However, Halliday questions whether remittances 
actually get put back into the local economies or are used for imported consumer goods. 
	 186	
Further consequences are also based on the ideologies behind capitalist modes of 
production, where there is unequal distribution of wealth, a necessity in forging 
relationships under the conditions of capitalism. The outcomes of migration to oil-
producing states seem to resemble the North–South relationships of inequality, and 
Halliday states “even where such a ‘New Economic Order’ is created, it will, under 
capitalist relations of production, reproduce exploitation and rapacity seen already in 
north-south relations” (Halliday 1984, 10).  
 Humphreys (1993) discusses the ways in which these trends of indentured labour 
serve the interests of labour receiving states where foreign workers have no rights, no 
political voice related to their employment conditions and little legal protection. He notes 
that foreign workers must rely on their sending government to ensure protection, which 
can be very difficult (Humphreys 1993, 7). These issues of responsibility are tied to the 
effects of remittances on sending countries, which include inflationary pressures induced 
by remittances, the introduction of expensive lifestyles that depend on imports, and the 
economic consequences of losing professional or skilled workers within the labour-
exporting countries (Zahlan 1984, 988).  
 Additionally, we can ask further questions such as about the long-term effects of 
dependency on labour export. What are the impacts of governments in the Global South 
depending on remittances, what vulnerabilities do state-sponsored projects of exporting 
labour produce? How do regimes of labour and migration intersect with global 
hierarchies such as those seen in networks of global cities?  Have employment 
opportunities abroad actually transformed the lifestyles of migrant workers, or have they 
deepened relationships of dependency?  
 Examining Dubai as a case study of contemporary issues related to global city 
formation, migration, labour and citizenship helps to push the boundaries of traditional 
discussions on globalization, moving beyond the polarizing debate of globalization 
through a binary framework of proponent/critic, good/bad, towards mapping a genealogy 
and geography of globalization that interrogates both its spatial and temporal dimensions, 
as well as locating emerging global cities associated with globalization as processes of 
political, economic, social and cultural shifts. In addition, we can consider interrogating 
the epistemological underpinning of mainstream political economy approaches to 
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globalization, which are almost exclusively anchored in the West. This entails examining 
globalization through various scales and through the experiences of actors who are not 
primarily seen as shaping globalization, but who are in fact actively working to subvert, 
challenge and (re) direct the outcomes and trajectory of global flows, hence affirming 
again the need to consider the workings of the everyday as a counterpoint to the top down 
approaches we see primarily. 
 Through this brief overview of what constitutes ‘globalization’ as it pertains to 
contemporary trends in migration, we can see the significance of embedded historical 
genealogies. This includes histories of colonialism and ‘development’ in the postcolonial 
period, the impacts of SAPs and neoliberal policies in both First and Third world 
contexts, and finally, the growth of migration as a development strategy by sending 
governments, as well as the dependency on remittances; all of which are related to global 
city formation. Rather than view globalization as a ‘neutral’ process, we can consider the 
role of the historical legacies of colonialism and imperialism embedded in the 
contemporary making of global relations and global cities specifically. The shifting 
realities of immigration, migration, labour and citizenship, which are impacted by global 
processes, take on localized (Sassen, 2001). This re-territorialization of processes of 
globalization is an integral aspect of the critical outlooks on globalization, which seek to 
reclaim the place-based realities of everyday experiences.  In this regard, the case study 
of the UAE is an important intervention in traditional discussions of global cities as 
located in the First world, connected to the Third world through labour migration.  
 In the detailed examination of Dubai’s development we see the importance of a 
historically grounded analysis of the UAE’s dependency on foreign labour, as well as its 
location within the global economy. In addition, locating its relationship to traditional 
centers of power in the West, the need for a more situated and concrete analysis of the 
relationships to and utilization of traditional division of labour in the global economy, as 
they intersect with local conditions, will help to explore the structural inequalities which 
shape the rights, entitlements and protections of the migrant majority workforce. This 
allows us to ask questions about the role of the state and nation building, through an 
exploration of national mythologies, political, economic, social policies and gender 
relations. Overall, Dubai’s case helps to locate how new and emerging centers of power 
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participate in and create new and intensified dynamics through the international division 
of labour.  
 The motivations highlighted by many migrants are interesting insights into why 
diverse groups of people migrate to the city, and what they believe the motivations of 
other groups to be. A major finding from these insights is that where you are from shapes 
your desires to migrate in significant ways and this impacts how you imagine yourself in 
Dubai in terms of issues such as belonging or entitlements. Much of this is tied 
particularly to what passport a person holds, and whether or not you they have a Western 
passport and the privileges associated with it. We can consider the insights of a range of 
Western passport holders, who discuss the lifestyle and motivation to migrate as about 
gaining international experience, living the life,  
 Working for an American or British company and they are provide a really good 
 salary that are tax free and maybe their accommodations are paid for, and free 
 schooling at the best schools for their kids, vacation packages. So basically, they 
 are living the life and that is why they love Dubai, because it seems all too 
 amazing to make really good money, live extravagantly. (Sara, Canadian)  
 
 Living the Dubai ‘expat’ dream, Sara explains that both families and singles find 
their desires of Dubai in different places but hold on to similar ideas. For singles, Sara 
refers to a ‘culture of indulgence’ which as she explains as “you do go kind of crazy 
because you don’t have any responsibilities and you have no purpose except for working 
and you are done by 5 or 6 and then you are going to indulge in what Dubai offers and 
basically you can get really sucked into it” (Sara, Canadian). American teacher, Katie, 
discusses her status as a new graduate and the difficulties she had starting her career,  
 Back home I was working like crazy. You get a classroom, you work with 
 teachers but you don’t get paid. You are working unpaid 40 or 50 hours a week, 
 so then what I would do, is on Friday, Saturday and Sunday I would do my work 
 as a nanny for a family. Between taking care of 4 kids and having no money, and 
 comparing to the potential. For example, I might be getting paid the same here 
 and at home, but my expenses were so much higher at home. At the time I 
 thought, the contract is two years? In your head, your like, what is two years and 
 Christmas and summer off, it’s kinda just like… I don’t know… summer camp or 
 something. (Katie, American)  
 
 Emirati, Reda discusses how she understands the motivation to migrate, through 
the following narration,  
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 … back home it was grey and cold most of the year. And yes, you have to go 
 and you know drop your kids, there is no driver, there is no maid at home,  and so 
 here that kind of lifestyle is not normal. There is no shame in saying I have 
 more than one maid, it seems very normal. It is very normal amongst Arabs and 
 now you see it more and more normal amongst expats. And you know you see 
 the wife, you have heard of the Jumeriah Janes, or the golfers. They drop off the 
 kids and then they go golf or they go to play tennis. The very leisurely 
 housewives and because the husbands are working  for a big company and the 
 house is provided and the education for the kids, and there is a lot of companies 
 that pay for that, and there is no way in hell they would have that lifestyle back 
 home. (Reda, Emirati)  
 
 Those like Jo, Egyptian expat, like many other women who follow their husbands, 
also highlighted how Dubai offered her a working lifestyle that, compared to home, 
offered much more potential for her future.    
 I just felt like in Egypt, a lot of times you are just stuck and very stagnant where 
 you are and people are in the same positions for 10 or 15 years as opposed to out 
 here in Dubai where there is potential for growth and you are being recognized on 
 a yearly basis. It is a much more structured environment, and although there are 
 rules in Cairo, they are not so much enforced. (Jo, Egyptian) 
 
  For another Egyptian expat Peter,  
 The main thing was that in Egypt we work a lot but we cannot get what we 
deserve. All the salaries and stuff are low. I cannot build my life like this. I can 
have an easy life. The salary, the average is always below the requirements of life 
but there was a lot of differences, not only money, but in the UAE I can live 
freely and I can build my life and career. But the first thing is freedom. (Peter, 
Egypt)  
 
 Interestingly, Peter expresses the discontents of Egypt’s difficult economic 
situation for middle class workers, but also discusses what he views as ‘freedom’ in 
Dubai, as different from Egypt. This is primarily tied to his background as belonging to a 
traditionally marginalized group in Egyptian society, the Copts (Orthodox Christians). 
His discussion highlighted the ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘freedoms’ he viewed in Dubai’s 
everyday life for an expat such as himself. Of course this view negates the actual legal 
and political factors of the UAE in which he lacks ‘equal’ rights to citizens, or any 
political rights to participate in decision making, but at the everyday level, many migrants 
view ‘freedom’ through a very narrow capitalist conception in which profit making and 
the accumulation of wealth is protected by the state for individuals, and the neoliberal 
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model of privatization in health and education, as well as lack of regulation and growing 
economic liberalization. This trade off between political rights and entitlements, 
economic incentive and perceptions of ‘freedom’ as tied to the accumulation of wealth 
are very significant features of the everyday negotiations that expats engage in in making 
their decisions.  
 The lifestyle, discussed by many middle class migrants is reiterated again in 
 relation to the length of stay. As discussed by many residents who have been 
 raised in the UAE for their entire lives, their parents came with the following 
 temporary mindset, I am just going to come for a couple of years, then they start 
 getting comfortable and used to it, some luxuries and privileges you have here 
 that you don’t have back home but then you go back home and you are like ‘what 
 is this?’ I miss having it easy over there (Svetlana, Egyptian).  
 
 Emirati, Natasha discusses why she thinks people keep migrating to Dubai as 
primarily financial, but also about access to different resources,  
 Money. I think it is a really great place to live in terms of safety and comfortable 
 lifestyles and people generally are happy and live life very comfortable, for the 
 majority of people its about money. And for others, a high standard of living. For 
 others, it is not just money in terms of salary but in terms of where they are living, 
 what they have access to… (Natasha, Emirati).  
 
 In considering the relationship between motivating ‘push’ factors and ‘pull’ 
factors, it is necessary to examine some of the historical forces of Dubai’s development 
to better understand its dependency on all levels of migrant labour.  
 
Development and Migration  
 It has been widely cited by scholars that the GCC states have the highest ratio of 
migrants to population in the world. Migrants make up a huge percentage of the working 
population: UAE 88 percent, Qatar 83, Kuwait 81 and Saudi Arabia 72, Bahrain 55 and 
Oman 54 percent (Khodker, 2010, 209). In considering the factors that have shaped 
migration to the GCC, and the UAE in particular in the contemporary period, oil wealth 
has been linked to the increase in standards of living and investments in infrastructure in 
these states at different times, which in turn fueled the demand for construction, domestic 
and service sector workers.  
 In regards to the UAE specifically, the UAE National Bureau of Statistics report 
of 2011, states that 7,316,073 of 8,264,070 people making up the UAE population in 
	 191	
2010 were non-nationals. This equates to some 88.5 percent of the population. 
Additionally, the private sector workforce is said to comprise 95 percent migrant workers 
(HRW, 2014, 11). While this seems to signal immense diversity, a closer look reveals 
highly unequal numbers by nationality, for example, 67% come from India and Pakistan, 
of whom 51% are from India and 16% from Pakistan, 11% are Arab, 9% Bangladeshi, 
3% Filipino (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 212). In addition, the female to male ration is highly 
unequal with the population dominated by males at 75.5 percent, and 24.5 percent female 
(Elsheshtawy, 2010, 213).   
  In terms of the breakdown of the population, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has 
reported that there are more than 5 million low paid workers employed in the UAE 
(HRW, 2015, 20). In particular, there are over 500,000 ‘bachelors’ who lived and worked 
in the city but were too poor or did not meet the basic requirements to bring their 
families. They are largely seen as a problem for the city’s image, and many formal and 
informal strategies operate to exclude them largely from Dubai’s dominant image. Of 
these construction workers, 26% of Indian workers live in apartments, another 27% in 
portions of apartments, 15% in rented rooms, and one third live in worker camps 
(Elshehtawy, 214).  
 There are an estimated 2.4 million people employed as domestic workers in the 
Gulf, predominantly women. This number has more than doubled in the last twenty years, 
largely attributed to the growing wealth and living standards associated with the oil boom 
in the region, and the growing economic base. Saudi Arabia is the largest employer with 
1.2 million domestic workers (2014), following by Kuwait with 593,272 (2011), Oman 
with 224,000, UAE with 236,545, Bahrain with 105,203, and Qatar with 84,000 (ITUC 
Report, 2014).  
 In 2013, the ILO reported from a 2008 government survey that there were 
236,500 domestic workers in the UAE, of whom 146,000 were female, though many 
reports say this number of female workers might be higher because numbers have not 
been reported accurately by the government (HRW, DW, 12). The majority of female 
migrant workers employed in domestic work come from the Philippines, Indonesia, India, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Ethiopia (HRW, DW, 2).  
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 Remittances play a huge role in understanding the impact of migration on both 
sending and receiving states, where statistics show that in 2009, for example, India for 
more than ten years continued to be the world’s top remittance earner, at US$55 billion 
per annum, followed by the Philippines US$18 billion and Bangladesh at US$9 billion 
(Khondker, 2010, 211). Whereas today, according to the WB (2016), those numbers 
continue to increase and are closer to $69 billion, $28 billion and $15 billion respectively.  
 The situation in the GCC states is unique in that formal citizenship does not apply 
to migrants, and is next to impossible to attain by foreigners. Uniquely, some scholars 
have highlighted that close to 20% of the population of ‘foreigners’ have been in Dubai 
since birth, but citizenship does not apply to any visitor, regardless of how long they stay. 
The government uses terms such as ‘non-national’ rather than ‘non-resident’ and 
‘temporary contract labour’ rather than ‘migrant worker’ to highlight the transient nature 
of their status (Khondker, 2010, 212). In addition, Emirati citizens see themselves as 
minorities, or an indigenous population outnumbered and sometimes culturally under 
‘threat’ by foreigners. The further significance of these processes will be discussed 
further in the following section when the role of citizenship in the making of social 
hierarchies is analyzed.  
Historically, migration has been seen as a central feature of the Arab world. 
“Migration is not a new feature of the Gulf economy, traditionally Arabia has been the 
location of many population movements” (Third World Quarterly (TWQ) 1982, 530). 
Different types of migration to the region are reflective of spatial, political and ‘tribal’ 
connections. Martin and Richards (1983) further this discussion by characterizing the 
Middle East as holding a history of migration and movements in traditional Arabia and 
connect these histories to Hajj or pilgrimage which they state “is almost certainly the 
largest multinational gathering on earth, with some 1.5 million pilgrims coming each 
year” (Martin & Richards, 1983, 461). However, the authors are quick to highlight that 
the majority of these movements are built not so much around religious or nationalist 
Pan-Arab ideologies, but economic pressures and contend that the oil boom of the 1970s 
and 1980s created a demand for migrant labour at all levels of development, including 
highly skilled and ‘unskilled’ workers.  
 Furthermore, Humphrey (1993) reminds us that the 19th century development of 
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the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and the emergence of indentured labour systems, all 
worked to serve as the basis for capitalist development in the world market. He explores 
how the international transfer of labour was introduced after the local Indigenous 
populations of the America’s began dying off due to disease and maltreatment, creating 
the need for ‘indentured labour’. Many Asians were used as indentured labour to other 
European colonies, and it is estimated that between 1834 and 1937, 30 million Indian 
workers found themselves dispatched on labour contracts throughout the British empire 
(Humphrey, 3). Humphrey also discusses the ways in which the industrialization of 
Europe also required unskilled workers from closer, poorer neighbouring countries.   
“Capitalist colonial expansion promoted the development of world labour and capital 
markets but at the same time increased the social and political differentiation of the world 
into national societies” (Humphrey, 4). The immigration of workers to European states 
promoted legislation that “did not reduce the number of immigrants so much as change 
their character” (Humphrey, 4). While Humphrey focuses a lot on the emigration of 
Middle Eastern peoples to Europe and North America, he also touches on the issues of 
migrant labour in the Middle East. He makes connections of older colonial forms of 
indentured labour to the new foreign recruitment of labour in the Gulf, noting “Oil wealth 
stimulated a new South-South migration organized as contract labour system which treats 
labour strictly as a commodity” (Humphrey, 5). “In this system, nationalism is the criteria 
by which foreign workers are located within national labour hierarchies” (Humphrey, 5). 
He explores the dramatic change in composition of workers and residents of the Gulf: 
first, the Asian workforce who was regarded as more politically compliant and removed 
from Arab nationalism and Islamism; second, importing states made private contractors 
responsible for recruiting workers; and, third, the presence of non-Arab workers 
“undermined class-based politics and accentuated the difference between citizen and non-
citizen along racial and cultural lines” (Humphrey, 7). He also discusses shifts in the 
1980s related to the growing feminization of labour to other regions, and highlights the 
ways in which this is contrasted to the gendered segregation in occupations in which 
women can be employed. Thus, contrary to his statement, it is not that there isn’t an 
increasing feminization of labour, but that these trends are silenced, made invisible and 
segregated. But Asian workers and non-Arabs always dominated among these women.  
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 Fred Halliday (1984) writes about the inequalities between the two sets of Arab 
nations, those with oil wealth and those without, and discusses the role of access to oil 
products, noting that “far from assisting their less fortunate fellow-states of the Third 
World to break the bonds of poverty, the oil producers have in fact imposed new relations 
of exploitation” (Halliday, 1984, 5). Although the supposed ‘naturalized affinity’ 
between ‘Third World’ countries is highly debatable, he does point to some important 
trends through which could be judged the differentiating demographic composition of the 
region. He explores four categories of Arab migration: within states to urban centers, 
Arab countries to other countries, one Arab state to another and, the last, outside of the 
Arab world to Arab states. The statistics given from 1975 by Birks and Sinclair (often 
referenced during these writings) reflect the general trends we see today in the UAE - 
continued migration of Asians, dominated by Pakistani and Indian migrants over other 
Arabs (Halliday 1984, 5).  
 Significantly the roots of capitalism can be traced back to the use of indentured 
labour, which has a long history between European colonialism and what became ‘Third 
World’ economies. These discussions have largely been based around the differences and 
inequalities between Europeans and ‘Others’. However, the case of the Gulf is unique in 
that its growth into the international capitalist economy has been characterized by unique 
histories that cannot be easily lumped into the same developments that characterize the 
West.  
 Labour migration to the Gulf is arguably one of the most significant aspects of its 
development at all levels. Expertise and experience from the Global North, and the 
seemingly ‘endless’ supply of service sector employees, labourers and domestic workers 
from the Global South, are integral components to the city’s development and 
maintenance. The Gulf states all face similar situations, but Dubai’s case provides the 
most striking example of reliance on migrant labour, in a situation where over 95% of all 
private sector employees are foreign temporary migrant workers. In a recent study, 
Malecki and Ewers (2007) argue that unlike many other contexts in which TNCs may 
play a central role in shaping global city status, in the Arab Gulf labour flows can be seen 
as an “enabling process in global city formation” and as a significant indicator of ‘world-
city-ness’ (Malecki and Ewers, 473).  
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 Importantly, Malecki and Ewers (2007) discuss the ways in which labour 
processes create demands at both the high and low skilled range for migrants, and 
analyze this in relation to the idea of social polarization with particular reference to the 
policies and processes engaged in by the state in regulating and encouraging migration. 
They argue that social polarization is both a cause and effect of global labour processes. 
In particular, in the Gulf, flows of labour are key processes in global city formation even 
though they are not included in traditional indicators of world city status. The unique 
dependency of these states on labour migration can be seen as an “embodiment of 
globalization” (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 473). In addition, recognizing the particular 
historical development trajectory based on oil development rather than diversified APS 
also impacts their growth and development (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 473), although this 
has been argued by scholars in terms of Dubai’s diversification strategies.  
 
 A review of numerous scholars (among them, A. Zahlan 1984, ‘Third World 
Quarterly (TWQ) 1982, Martin and Richards 1983) who have written about early 
migratory patterns of workers generally attributes the large influx to two major factors: 
the quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973-74 and the doubling of these prices in 1978-79. 
The paper published by TWQ (1982) explores the uses of the ideas of ‘oil rich’ or ‘oil 
poor’, as well as ‘population rich’ and ‘population poor’ to explain some of these 
population transfers. It outlines the ways in which capital rich nations such as those oil-
rich Gulf countries comprising the GCC contrast with capital poor countries such as 
Egypt, Yemen, Sudan and Jordan with large populations. Population rich countries, such 
as Egypt, are able to supply the capital rich countries with much needed labour. Sabban 
(2005) highlights four major periods that affected labour import and policies in the UAE: 
the oil embargo in the 1960’s and early 1970’s which is characterized by high Arab, 
Indian and Pakistani labour importing and low female migration and labour participation; 
after the embargo from the 1970s through the 1980s, which experienced a deluge of 
labour from Arab and Asian countries; and before the first Gulf war, and after, which 
have similarities in the Asianization of the labour force, and the ways in which after the 
Gulf war governments evicted other Arabs such as Jordanians, Palestinians, Yemenis, 
and others (Sabban, 2005, 17).  
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 Until the 1950s the number of expatriates was small, but this grew dramatically 
after the oil boom in 1973 (Zahlan, 1984, 982). This influx was furthered through the 
growth of the construction industry in the aftermath and, thus, “construction activities (in 
1984) exceeds $100 billion annually, and is the third largest market after the US and 
Japan” (Zahlan, 1984, 985). This growth also played an important role in the growing 
numbers of migrants in fields such as domestic service, child care, cooks and chauffeurs, 
which all reflect the dramatically shifting lifestyle from increased oil wealth.  
 It must be carefully noted that not all migrants can be categorized in construction 
and service sector employment. In 1975, early on in the economic boom, the 
entrepreneurial assets of migrants are also addressed. In the UAE alone, Asian expatriates 
established 8,475 businesses (Zahlan, 1984, 981). Additional considerations can be found 
in the numbers of refugees in the Middle East during these times, such that, as 
Humphreys highlights, the region’s dependence on foreign labour and its weak national 
structures lend themselves to instability. Furthermore, these issues of citizenship and 
labour migrants are complicated by the growing cultural diversity, as well as colonially 
imposed borders and elitist politics. Humphrey’s discussion leads us to investigate the 
ways in which diverse migration patterns to the region create the foundations for 
restrictive citizenship laws that restrict access even for citizens (Humphrey, 1993, 2).  
 Within the Gulf, the cities that show world or global formation are Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, Manama and Riyadh with Doha and Kuwait showing aspirations (Malecki and 
Ewers, 2007). The authors highlight that, the case of Dubai with small oil wealth set to 
run out soon stands out in two major ways: tied to spectacles and competition for super 
rich tourists, and massive investments in trappings of major nodes of knowledge. In both 
cases, both South Asian construction workers and Westerners and others with skills in IT 
are key. Dubai clearly demonstrates its aspirations to join in the global knowledge node 
through developments like ‘internet city’ and ‘media city’, with the attraction for 
footloose capital and workers linked to state of the art facilities and lifestyles. One of the 
challenges identified has been to attract all given major categories of highly skilled global 
migrations, including managers and executives, engineers and technicians, academics and 
scientists, entrepreneurs and students. This idea of ‘enticing’ professionals has been seen 
as a part of the justifications for higher wages, better living conditions, and more 
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entitlements than low waged workers, who are viewed as needing less to encourage their 
migration.  
 
Impact  
 The UAE has experienced some of the most dramatic impacts of migration, as 
well as tremendous growing wealth, which have together led to drastic changes in the 
composition of its population. In addition to the large numbers of construction workers 
and professional who migrated to the UAE, the vast wealth that was pouring in to the 
country in the 1970s, has drastically impacted the lifestyles of local Emirati’s and their 
use and dependence on migrants in the fields such as domestic service, childcare, cooks 
and chauffeurs. A reoccurring image of city life follows,  
Despite the proximity of Asian labour to all aspects of Emirati life, a 
general appeasement, a sense of normality and consent overwhelms the 
place. You drive through the streets of a city in the UAE, at any time of 
day, you observe dark skinned (mostly Indian, Pakistani, Punjabi, and 
sometimes Filipino and Indonesian) workers in their orange, blue, or 
universally coloured uniforms, planting flowers on side walks or watering 
trees, or even dusting, cleaning, or newly paving the streets. In the 
crowded fish and vegetable markets, salesmen are either longtime 
immigrants from India or Pakistan, or lower caste Yemenis. Other poor 
Indians and ‘new arrivals’ work as porters and fish-cleaners. Similarly, in 
malls and old markets, salesmen are Indians, Iranians, Filipino, Moroccan, 
and other immigrants. The image of an ethnic division of labour repeats 
itself in all aspects of life and social interaction in the UAE. Yet life 
continues very peacefully (Sabban, 2005, 18).  
  
 These observations highlight the ethnic occupational segregation and social 
hierarchies visible in the UAE. This simple description is an insight into the seeming 
‘contradictions’ of the ‘hyper’ modern ‘global city’ of Dubai, and the underclass migrant 
work force that helps sustains the economy. The sense of ‘normality’ and ‘peace’ is 
evidence of the formal strategies that have been employed by the state to control, regulate 
and maintain these divisions between ‘nationals’, ‘expat professionals’ and ‘labour 
migrants’. As such, social hierarchies control and dominate the majority of people living 
and working in the UAE, but also provide a source of national mythology to ensure that 
hierarchies of entitlement and privilege benefit ‘nationals’ and expats and exclude 
‘others’. The inequality between groups based on gender, ethnicity, citizenship and 
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occupation becomes seemingly ‘natural’ in order to provide legitimacy and ‘exception’ 
for social exclusion, and normalizes subsequent violence.  
Demarcations between legitimate and full citizenship are complicated and often 
contradictory in the Gulf. The ‘banning’ of foreign marriages, and subsequent social 
engineering projects on behalf of the government, has been based on a highly negative 
outlook on the influence of ‘foreigners’ on Emirati culture. These ideological projects are 
aimed at shifting and challenging the changing realities of demographic composition and 
have continued to form the basis or backdrop for additional discussions on the presence 
of larger numbers of foreigner workers.  In addition to the highly exclusive issues of 
family, marriage and citizenship rights and status, is the issue of the increasing minority 
status of citizens or nationals. These discussions highlight the issues of migrant workers, 
through a more internal perspective on traditional political structures. Therefore, it is 
necessary to highlight how the mass migration of workers plays into these settings.  
 
 One of the most striking and controversial programs relating to temporary migrant 
workers is the Kafala system. This is a private non-governmental sponsorship system in 
all GCC states that ties workers’ visas to particular employers or ‘sponsors’ (Khodkher, 
2010, 218) and severely restricts their right to change employers, on penalty of 
deportation (HRW, 2015, 23). In addition, it leaves workers at the will of their sponsors, 
who are entitled to revoke sponsorship at will. The system was originally created to make 
Gulf nationals responsible for the “conduct of foreign workers they employed” (HRW, 
2015, 23) and “…instead of governments simply limiting the overall number of foreign 
residents and assigning their distribution to the market or to sate control, foreign residents 
are placed directly under the control of specific individuals and local companies who act 
as the foreigner’s Kafil, or sponsor” (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, 23). The Kafala system 
has attracted the attention of scholars7 and international human rights organizations8.  
Migrant workers require a local sponsor in order to obtain a work visa and subsequently, 
sponsors have authority over legal identity cards. The sponsors also have control over the 
termination of a contract, and workers must receive formal permission to change 
																																																								
7 Ali 2010, Kanna 2011, Nagy 2006, Halliday 1984, Longva 1999, Shah 2004 
8 HRW 2004, 2006, 2012, 2015, 2014, ITUC 2014, AI 2005, ILO 2004 
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employers or renew their visas (HRW, 2015, 20). Anh Nga Longva (1999) discusses how 
this sponsorship system, in effect in most GCC countries, limits the ability of workers to 
change employers, even in the event of abuse. ‘Sponsorship Laws’ tie workers to specific 
employers highly restricting their freedom of mobility and protection. To complicate 
matters, recruitment agencies are interested in protecting the ‘purchases’ of employers 
and rarely offer any support to workers.  
 Some of the major problems identified within this sponsorship system are the 
difficulties in changing employers, inability to change employers, confiscated passports, 
and payment of fees to recruiters, which keeps people in debt, and prohibition of worker 
strikes, collective bargaining and worker associations (Ali, 2010). These factors 
contribute to a situation that has been compared to forced labour, “making it virtually 
impossible for workers to leave even abusive employers, notwithstanding the non 
payment of wages, dangerous working conditions, and sub-standard housing conditions” 
(HRW, 2015, 20). A prominent example is the long hours and extreme heat. The summer 
heat, which often rises to 50 degrees Celsius and while a 2005 government ban prohibits 
outdoor construction work during the hours from 12:00 to 2:30, the enforcement is lax 
and fines too low to keep companies compliant (Ali, 2010, 83). However, in 2009 the 
government seemed to be taking the issues more seriously and conducted nearly 2000 
inspections in the first week of July in Dubai and Abu Dhabi and found 73 firms in 
violation of the ban (Ali, 2010, 83).  
 The issue of passport confiscation, which effects the majority of low waged 
workers, is arguably an outcome of the Kafala sponsorship system holding employers 
responsible and liable for workers (Ali, 2010), in turn creating a relationship that entices 
employers to retain control over their workers by taking passports. In addition, as HRW 
reports, “when a sponsor reports that a domestic worker has ‘absconded’ they are 
required to hand in the worker’s passport to the authorities” (HRW, 2014, 39), a situation 
that encourages confiscation of passports by employers, reflecting a key element 
highlighted by the ILO as creating situations of forced labour (HRW, 2014, 40). 
Khondker (2010) highlights that these practices can ‘blur’ the boundaries between labour 
migration and human trafficking, as UAE Minister of Labour argues that “giving wages 
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below the amount promised and tricking the worker to take up work different from that 
which has been promised ought to be treated as trafficking” (Khondker, 2010, 220).  
 This system is comparable to the Canadian Live-in Caregivers Program (LCP) or 
the Temporary Workers Program9, which ties workers to individual employers through 
government programs. Thus, although the program in the GCC countries may be more 
dismal with no possibilities of citizenship or permanency, both programs work to create a 
flexible and disposable work force, which becomes internally governed and restricted to 
the control of private employers. “[I] In both cases wealth is generated by enforcing 
differential access for capital and labour; in both cases local populations may find the 
logic obscure or indeed objectionable. But the Gulf option gives citizens a seeming 
precedence at home” (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, 23).  
 
 Issues. While scholars 10  have examined complex issues related to social 
organization and urban development, international organizations such as the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), Amnesty International (AI), and Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) have published the most relevant reports documenting the exploitation and abuse 
faced by workers in low waged labour sectors in the UAE, particularly construction 
workers and domestic workers. Much of this work is focused on policy changes in hopes 
of pressuring governments to adopt internationally recognized labour standards. In 
addition, they have documented many of the government’s initiatives in amending 
existing labour laws and the Kafala system.  
 With regard to male migrants, particularly construction workers, HRW reports 
that the Gulf represents one of the largest recipients of migrant labour in the world. As a 
specific case study, the UAE is believed to have one of the largest construction booms in 
the world, employing primarily male construction workers. Hanieh (2011) notes that 
earlier flows of Arab labour were replaced by South Asian labour during the 1970s and 
1980s when many workers came to relate to the Arab and Palestinian causes. Demanding 
more permanence and benefits, many Arabs were expelled from settling or bringing 
families. By 2002 the Arab proportion of migrant workers in the GCC fell to around 25-
																																																								
9 Statiulis & Bakan 2005, Sharma 2002, Chang 2000, Arat-Koc 1989, Walia 2010 
10 Vora 2008, Mohamed and Sidaway 2012, Walsh 2010, Kanna 2008, Ali 2010, Khondker 2010 
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29 percent, down from a level of 72% in 1975 (Hanieh, 2011, 64). The shift to South 
Asian labour increased the flow of remittances to South Asian countries and their 
dependency on these relationships.  
 With regard to the law, while the federal laws provide some protections to 
workers, these remain largely unenforced. Labour laws in the UAE are supposed to apply 
to both nationals and migrant workers, but in reality, this is not the case. In the 1980s 
minimum wage requirements continued to be violated by extremely profitable 
construction companies. On average, these companies pay US $175 per month, in 
contrast to the average per capita income of $2,106 a month in the UAE (HRW 
November 2006, 7).  In Dubai, Hanieh (2011) notes that construction workers may earn 
around 50-80 cents per hour working ten-hour days, six days a week (64).  
Overall, it is clear that inequities in wealth operate at the expense of an entire 
labour force of poor, ‘disposable’ migrant workers. These non-governmental 
organizations have noted some UAE government amendments to the Kafala system in 
which workers will be legally able to change employers when the latter fail to comply 
with ‘legal and contractual obligations’. In addition, the amendment allows workers to 
exchange employers after two years. Previously, workers could only exchange employers 
at the end of contract with written permission of the previous employer in the form of a 
“No Objection Certificate” (NOC); if refused, the worker would have to leave the country 
for at least six months before being eligible again for employment in the country (HRW, 
2015, 23). This change allows workers to change employers at the end of the contract 
without permission, and also allows them to change prior to the expiry of contract 
without penalty and without employer’s permission if the employer violates his ‘legal or 
consensual’ obligations. However, as HRW documents, this ministerial decision does not 
provide a comprehensive list of the obligations that may be violated, but provides an 
example of ‘nonpayment of wages for sixty days’ (HRW, 2015, 23). The organization 
highlights mixed messages for workers, whereby a Ministry of Labour official was 
quoted saying foreign workers still need an NOC to change jobs and that they would 
impose one-year ban on those who tried to change without permission (HRW, 2015, 24). 
Thus, as we see there is a discrepancy in what the authorities have acknowledged and 
what is being practiced on the ground.  
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 In addition, recruitment fees paid by workers in home countries before migrating 
have been an ongoing and substantial feature of their exploitation. Workers often find 
themselves heavily indebted before beginning their new jobs in the UAE, and often find 
themselves in precarious situations facing delayed or non-payment of wages, or being 
paid much less than promised. This situation has been seriously condemned by scholars 
and NGOs alike who have both argued these conditions to be comparable to a situation of 
debt bondage in which workers are forced to work in order to pay back debts. In a 2012 
HRW report, ‘Saadiyat Island’, Abu Dhabi’s major new international tourist destination, 
costing between US $22 and 27 billion dollars, has been a site of immense controversy. 
This island would become home to a campus of New York University, and museums 
including branches of the Guggenheim and the Louvre. In this study (2012) almost all of 
the workers interviewed stated that they had paid fees between $2000 US (Ali, 2010, 86) 
and US$4,100, or between one and three years of their home countries’ annual GDP per 
capita, to recruiters in order to get their jobs (HRW, 2012, 13). In 2010, UAE authorities 
were able to force domestic based recruitment agencies to reimburse workers found to 
have paid recruiting fees and revoke or suspend their licenses. Although, the UAE labour 
law has prohibited employers from making workers pay recruitment fees since the 1980s, 
HRW has documented (2006, 2009, 2012) that the practice is systemic and customary 
(HRW, 2015, 25). These workers pay recruiters in their home countries, who then work 
with recruiting agencies or employers in the UAE. In response to these reports, the UAE 
government affirmed the prohibition on workers paying recruitment fees and 
strengthened domestic regulations on recruiting agents (HRW, 2015, 25). These fees are 
explicitly outlawed, and recruitment agencies may be made to refund the monies whether 
paid inside or outside the country (HRW, 2015, 25). There was no available information 
found by HRW on whether or not any recruitment agencies were found in violation, 
although the government says that they conducted 1070 visits in 2012 (HRW, 2015, 25).  
 A 2015 HRW report on updated Saadiyat Island developments highlights steps 
taken by UAE authorities, primarily through two organizations: the Abu Dhabi Executive 
Affairs Agency (EAA) and the Tourism Development & Investment Company (TDIC). 
They highlight what the EAA calls ‘The 14 points’, which requires contractors to adhere 
to more rights-protective standards on recruitment fees, passport confiscation, working 
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hours, wage payment and worker accommodation (HRW, 2015, 6). It appointed 
engineering, management and development consultant Mott McDonald to monitor 
compliance by contractors. TDIC also created its “Employment Practice Policy” (EPP) 
which applies to all projects under TDIC’s purview, and TDIC appointed 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) to monitor compliance (HRW, 2015, 6). While these 
have been important steps in rectifying some of the major issues faced by workers, HRW 
found significant difficulties in gaining access to information, and has documented on-
going abuses that violate the 14 points. The main problem they identify has been the 
inability or unwillingness to penalize contractors who violate terms of their codes of 
conduct.  
 In 2010, a resolution required firms to provide bank guarantees to cover, among 
other things, payments to workers in the event of non-payment of wages and fines for 
violating regulations on accommodations, to a maximum of $2.72 million USD, and 
corresponding to the number of workers they employ. However, the resolution states that 
companies or firms established or co-owned by the Federal Government or local 
governments are excluded from these guarantees. According to the Ministry, 3033 
disputes were settled during 2012, and $8.58 million of companies’ guarantees liquidated. 
However, as HRW highlights, there was no transparency or indication of what fines were 
paid, and by whom.  
 In terms of wages, UAE labour law provides a minimum wage (although never 
implemented for low paid sectors like construction), maximum working hours, annual 
leave and overtime pay. In an attempt to address the frequent complaint by workers of 
non-payment of wages, a 2009 Resolution requires wage protection by making 
companies transfer salaries electronically using banks in the UAE. This has been to some 
extent effective in deterring some companies from withholding worker’s wages (HRW, 
2015, 27), although the ministry data indicates that the number of complaints of unpaid 
wages continues to rise (HRW, 27).  
 With regard to passport confiscation, HRW documents that in 2001 and 2004, 
Dubai court ruled the practice of confiscating passport to be illegal, but UAE never 
passed legislations expressly prohibiting it (HRW, 2015, 22). In addition to the lack of 
effective implementation HRW documented additional issues such as the difficulties 
	 204	
faced by workers in filing complaints with the Ministry of Labour, where offices close on 
Friday, the usual day off for most migrant workers in the construction sector. In addition, 
their complaints must be filed in Arabic and on official forms. Of the 94 workers 
interviewed for this report, all said they were fearful of being fired and deported if they 
used official channels to complain about abuses (HRW, 2015, 28).  
 Construction workers regularly work six days a week of eleven hour shifts, and 
another half day on Fridays, in often very dangerous conditions with more than 700 
deaths on the job and 90 suicides per year (Ali, 2010, 83). Additionally, the ILO found 
“no documented labour inspection strategy or enforcement policy”, but the Ministry of 
Labour indicates that they have a large body of labour inspectors conducting large 
number of inspections daily. When HRW sought confirmation of the number of labour 
inspectors employed, they got no response (HRW, 2015, 21).  
 Living conditions are also a key indicator of the status of workers outside of even 
their jobs (Ali, 2010, 91). A large number of Dubai’s construction workers live in labour 
camps located on the outskirts of the city. The largest of these is sarcastically referred to 
as ‘Sonapur’ (a Hindi word meaning ‘City of Gold’), home to some 200,000 people (Ali, 
2010, 91), where 88 percent live in rooms with average occupancy between four and 
eight (Elsheshtawy, 214), although many sources report a higher number even than eight 
per room.  “As the number of Dubai’s skyscrapers and malls grows, so does Sonapur. As 
the Burj Khalifa is now the world’s tallest building, complete with luxury condominiums 
and an Armani hotel, so Sonapur mirrors it in grotesque grandiosity” (Ali, 2010, 91). The 
living conditions are said to be filthy, overcrowded, with shared toilets and kitchens with 
poor drainage, often surrounding by stagnant sewage (Ali, 2010, 92). While these 
inhumane living conditions have been criticized, as Ali highlights, these workers may be 
considered ‘lucky’ as their housing is provided by employers. Other low waged workers 
are forced to pay their own way and have been documented to be crowded with as many 
as eight or more men into a single room in a house or apartment, paying an average of 
500 AED or so for a ‘bed space’ (enough room for a single bed) (Ali, 2010, 93). When 
formal housing is not possible, as documented by Ali, creativity abounds, seen for 
example in one company who housed 2000 of its workers in cargo containers, 16 workers 
in each 300 square foot container, with a separate container for sick workers (Ali, 2010, 
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94). It has been documented that in Dubai and Sharjah some people have been renting car 
trunks for the night for 5 AED per night (Ali, 2010, 94).  
 HRW highlights that in 2015 they were prevented from conducting research 
openly and from conducting interviews at the Saadiyat Island site (HRW, 2015, 7). 
Additionally, in 2014 the UAE authorities denied a senior HRW representative 
permission to enter the country, and permanently blacklisted two other staff members as 
they were leaving the country (HRW, 12). In this ‘repressive rights climate’ they note 
that it is difficult to do research with the ongoing crackdown on freedom of expression 
for journalists to publish articles. Of course it should also be noted that strike action is 
illegal and many workers are being summarily deported for going on strike (HRW, 2015, 
22). There are numerous cases of workers going to strike to protest withheld wages, low 
wages, lack of overtime pay, inadequate housing and living conditions, poor treatment 
and abuse. However, the reason in almost all cases is to deny the claims of striking 
workers, or deport workers who do not comply. Ali (2010) notes that in 2005, Gulf News 
reported that there were 24 strikes involving more than 7,000 workers over these issues 
(89). Davis (2006) highlights several important cases of protest and social unrest in Dubai 
specifically, such as in fall 2004 when several thousand Asian workers marched down the 
eight lane Sheikh Zayed highway towards the Ministry of Labour only to be met by riot 
police and threats of deportation. In September 2005, an estimated 7000 workers 
demonstrated for three hours, the largest protest in Dubai history. In March 2006, security 
workers ignited a riot at the Burj Dubai tower site where some 2500 workers marched 
towards the construction headquarters. The following morning, workers refused to work 
until a Dubai based company raised wages and improved living conditions. At the time of 
the strike, thousands of construction workers at a new airport terminal also joined in. In 
another case in July, hundreds of labourers at the Arabian Ranches project rioted to 
protest the chronic shortage of water for cooking and bathing at their camp (Davis, 2006, 
67-68). Ali also notes a 2007 example in which 3,500 workers went on strike demanding 
pay rises. The strike was peaceful and ended by 11 am the same day and workers went 
back to work. The next day 200 workers were deported after many rioted following the 
company’s announcement of pay increases of just 2 AED per day (Ali, 2010, 89). Three 
days after the riot, 65 workers had been deported without arrest, trial, or due process of 
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any kind, and the company was given 250 additional work permits free of charge to 
replace the workers (Ali, 2010, 89). These examples all showcase the contrast between 
government action to protect Dubai’s image and construction, and the “snail’s pace at 
which the government acts to curb the exploitation of labour” (Ali, 2010, 89). It is 
important to put these strikes, essential protests for basic living conditions and wages, in 
the context of the multi-million dollar globally iconic projects for which they toil. Thus, 
what makes possible the global allure of Dubai’s development are the thousands of 
workers on whose labour these projects depend, but who are continually relegated to the 
lowest spaces in urban social hierarchies, and who are constantly dehumanized to such a 
degree that their lives and deaths are trivialized.  “[A]s human beings they are socially 
invisible, interchangeable and ultimately disposable” (Ali, 2010, 81).  
 It is within this environment that HRW has found that 9 of 11 of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) list of “11 Indications of Forced Labour” are occurring in the 
UAE, including “abuse of vulnerability, deception, restriction of movements, 
intimidation and threats, retention of identity documents, withholding of wages, debt 
bondage, abusive living and working conditions, and excessive overtime” (HRW, 2015, 
28). The consequences of these failures has been felt by workers themselves who often 
face segregation into enclaves, whether culturally or geographically in working camps or 
housing accommodations outside of key city sites. Halliday (1984) discusses how all 
migrants are restricted from political rights, but there are differentiations between what 
social entitlements various sectors of workers are given. Among the ‘unskilled’, 
“migrants have no political rights, and no rights to organize, publish or strike. Like serfs 
or slaves, they are usually tied to one particular employer” (Halliday, 6). Migrants 
themselves are generally isolated, not only from Indigenous populations, but from other 
migrants, both in location and language, which is said to effect their inability to mobilize 
a resistance (Halliday 1984, 8). Halliday also discusses the ways in which migrants 
themselves view their relationships to the state, often being more concerned with their 
home country or sending governments. Therefore, even when coming from countries 
with strong histories of political unionism or organizing, migrants are more interested in 
politics back home than where they work. “A migrant faces a choice - to organize 
politically with reference to the country of employment, or with reference to country of 
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origin” (Halliday 1984, 7). However, to add to these insights, it is important to consider 
the limitations of organizing in the context of the Gulf, the lack of political freedom and 
tremendous crack down on any form of organizing (especially unions, as they remain 
illegal), combined with the ongoing temporary and transient nature of their ‘belonging’ in 
the UAE.  
 Status of female domestic workers. The ILO reported in 2013 that there were 
236,500 domestic workers in the UAE (HRW, 2014, 12). Most workers come from the 
Philippines, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Ethiopia, although 
numbers fluctuate due to temporary bans or restrictions that sending governments impose 
in response to abuse or disagreements with UAE authorities. It has been documented in 
interviews with Emiratis and professional expats that they can afford to employ live in 
domestic workers, especially as the sector is poorly regulated, and there is no minimum 
wage or requirement to pay for overtime work. In a report (2014) entitled “I already 
bought you”, HRW documented exploitation and abuse against female migrant domestic 
workers in the UAE, implicating employers, recruiters in sending countries, agencies in 
receiving countries, sending governments and the state. Some of the major issues 
documented include physical, psychological and sexual abuse, the all too common 
practice of confinement to the home, failure to pay wages due, excessively long working 
hours without breaks or days off, denial of adequate food, poor living conditions and lack 
of adequate medical care. Countless cases of extreme violence and abuse such as torture 
and murder have been documented in local newspapers. This can also be seen in the fact 
that in 2008, the Philippines Consulate in Dubai reported that they had four runaways a 
week as a result of physical abuse, rape and non-payment of wages (Ali, 2010, 97).  
 International organizations all agree that labour laws in many Gulf States, and 
particularly in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, all ‘categorically’ exclude women 
from even basic labour law provisions. In particular,  
Women workers might suffer from a double discrimination in employment: first 
 because they are foreigners and hence subject to the same discrimination as male 
 migrant workers; and second because they are women and as such often  victims 
 of entrenched traditional attitudes in their country of origin or of employment. 
 (HRW, November 2007, 114) 
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Amnesty International (AI) reports that female migrant domestic workers living 
and working in the GCC countries face continual discrimination, and often violence. 
They are obviously denied the rights accorded to citizens but also those of other workers, 
and are said as well to face not only as workers, but also as women (AI, 2005, 47). 
Furthermore, their employment in an unprotected sector means that they work in 
unregulated and undervalued environments, a breeding ground for human rights abuses. 
These workers also suffer under the Kafala sponsorship system and the lack of 
protection by the UAE labour law. Domestic workers are explicitly excluded by UAE 
labour law and from basic protections that are afforded to most other workers, such as 
limits on working hours and provisions for overtime pay. Their work is not regulated by 
the Minster of Labour, and is therefore excluded from Ministry of Labour regulations that 
apply to other sectors, and instead falls under the Ministry of Interior’s General 
Directorate of Residency and Foreign Affairs (the immigration department) (HRW, 2014, 
27).  
With regard to wage exploitation, not only are domestic workers paid 
substantially less than their male counterparts, they also face unpaid or withheld wages, 
debt bondage incurred from travel costs and fluctuating wages. HRW reports that in the 
UAE, the official monthly salary for a domestic worker is speculated to be around 550 
dirhams (US $150), the actual monthly salary is estimated at 400- 450 dirhams (US $109-
123), which amounts to an hourly wage of US $ 0.20 for an average 16-hour day (HRW 
November 2007, 40).  
Another major issue faced by women migrants is confinement to the home, and 
confiscation of identity documents. Many international non-governmental organization’s 
(INGOs) have documented the experiences of women workers, finding that employers 
from around the globe generally make use of similar techniques to control and maintain a 
hold over their employees. These techniques include limiting their ability to speak to their 
families, friends or neighbours, forcing them to remain in the home, and confiscating 
their passports and other forms of identification. In one study by Gambard (2009), half of 
the domestic workers interviewed in the UAE have never left the house of their 
employers for the two years in which they worked in the country (Hanieh, 66). The 
confinement of women to the home and (often enforced) language barriers signify a 
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severe limitation of their freedom as they are isolated from the outside world and 
therefore unable to communicate with anyone outside of their immediate work 
environments.  
The issue of sexual abuse by employers, family members and friends is also a 
reoccurring and violent reality for female migrant domestic workers. Since many women 
are denied any privacy in their workplace, are not given adequate living space, and are 
often unable to leave the confines of the home, they are the most vulnerable to sexual and 
physical violence. In addition, reports (2006, HRW 2007, AI 2005, ILO 2004) include 
information on the ways in which ‘morality’ laws in the Gulf, function to control women 
migrants through their freedom of association, sexuality, speech and general social 
participation. In many cases, abused workers who ‘run away’ are painted as threats to 
national security and treated as criminals (Ali, 2010, 97).   
 Workers who flee abusive scenarios do not always get the help they require. This 
can be tied to formal legal structures in which domestic workers who leave employers 
without consent are seen to have ‘absconded’ and as such have committed an 
administrative offence that can result in deportation and bans on their future employment 
(HRW, 2015, 5). The UAE also criminalizes those who ‘harbour’ a migrant worker 
without a visa, including workers who have fled abusive employers, with penalties 
ranging from fines to imprisonment (HRW, 2014, 5). HRW also notes that workers who 
report abuse are frequently returned by their recruitment agencies to abusive employers 
or confined to agency offices.  
Overall, it is clear that women face specific impediments to their protection under 
the law in GCC countries, not only in their working status as ‘unskilled foreigners’ but 
also as women. It can be noted that the UAE has slowly implemented changes to legal 
labor regulations for the protection of migrant workers. In 2007 the UAE Labour 
Ministry published a draft of new laws on the Internet and invited public comments. It 
has been found that the revisions discriminate against women in substantial ways, namely 
the explicit exclusion of domestic work. In addition, the laws include limitations on 
women’s access to certain types of employment and the sanctioning of punishment for 
male ‘guardians’ who violate the law. In effect, women are treated as dependents, rather 
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than as “competent adults with full and independent legal capacities” (HRW March 2007, 
2).  
Specifically in response to domestic work, the UAE implemented a standard 
contract in April 2007 (HRW, November 2007), which is said to protect workers but does 
not include provisions on limitations to working hours, rest days, over time pay, or 
compensation, and only provides unspecified ‘adequate breaks’ and every two years, a 
one month paid vacation. This contract can be compared to the labour laws for their male 
counterparts, which include an eight hour limit on working days, and a guaranteed 
weekly rest day, a one hour daily rest period, overtime pay, a one month of annual paid 
leave, and workers’ compensation for occupational injuries (HRW, November 2007, 
133). Comparatively, the Kuwaiti government implemented a similar standardized 
contract for domestic workers, which specified a minimum wage and must be signed by 
both employer and employee. However, both contracts in the UAE fail to implement a 
regulatory mechanism to ensure compliance and solidify workers’ rights under the labour 
law.  
 The current contract for domestic work, in use since June 2014, requires 
employers to pay domestic workers in cash at the end of each month, and with seven days 
of the due date. The update in 2014 also includes a minimum eight hours rest in each day, 
one day of leave per week with compensation, and annual paid vacation. Much of the 
tension lies in the high costs employers pay to obtain workers, which pits employer and 
workers against each other, rather than promoting reform in fees by the state or legal 
agencies. In addition, HRW argues that a stronger contract is not a substitute for labour 
law protections. In the most recent discussions in November 2014, GCC representatives 
met to discuss a unified contract, which remains a mystery, as most of the draft has not 
been released. In addition, while the UAE voted in favour of the ILO convention on 
domestic workers, which came into force in 2013, they have yet to ratify it as their own 
laws and practices fall significantly short of the requirements (HRW, 2014, 6).  
 In response to many of these issues, many labour sending countries have 
implemented measures to protect their nationals. However those countries have been seen 
as largely unable to provide adequate protection from abuse and exploitation once in the 
UAE. This can be seen in the case of Pakistan, which has for years refused to allow its 
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citizens to come to Dubai as housemaids; or in countries such as Ethiopia, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia, which have, all at different times placed temporary bans on 
migration for domestic work.   
              Scholars working and living in the region (Sabban 2005, Slama and Jandaly 
2005) report that the UAE governments have publicized there direct interest in changing 
the negative experiences of domestic workers. The most recent change in 2005 was the 
official penalty of a life long ban on any employer found to have abused a domestic 
worker. Sabban also states that, “an extra overtime-payment for a day off is more 
practical to be implemented at such stage, than giving domestic workers the liberty to 
take a free day, and be free of the employer (sponsor) control” (Sabban, 2005, 28). 
However, the UAE proposal to introduce a standardized contract for domestic workers is 
not sufficient, and does not compensate for their exclusion from equal protection under 
national labour laws. So although domestic work operates in the privacy of homes, 
workers remain the most vulnerable to the aforementioned types of exploitation and 
abuse because of these exclusions, which is particularly heightened due the lack of 
adequate monitoring systems to curtail these abuses and enforce compliance with basic 
provisions and in effect thereby creating an environment of impunity for employees.  
            The popular rhetoric on the issues of domestic workers has been based on the 
perceived negative impacts of dependency on foreign maids for culture and family life. 
“No published study described them as a necessity for the area’s changing lifestyle. No 
one emphasized their integral part in development, furthermore, no one put their lives at 
the center of the study”, all the while the issue is gaining increased importance in local 
reports (Sabban, 2005, 23).  Local reports are almost entirely centered on the inabilities 
of employers as mothers to fulfill their reproductive duties because of their quest for 
consumerism and class status. Additionally, this ‘neglect’ is also linked to corrupting 
Emirati children through defective socialization and the abuse of local norms and values, 
which they are not believed to share.  
 In understanding the processes of differentiation it is important to consider 
ideologies of race, gender, class, and belonging, which intersect with policies of 
citizenship to significantly impact the migrant majority population. As formal citizenship 
only applies to a small part of the population, and migrants have no ability to apply for 
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citizenship, all categories of migrant therefore remain effectively temporary, although as 
we will see, ideas of belonging are importantly differentiated, creating important 
hierarchies, not only amongst Emirati citizens and all migrants, but between migrants at 
different levels in society.  
 
Conclusions: ‘Foreigners’ in the UAE   
 From a more focused examination of the background, policies and histories of 
migration in this chapter, we can see that in the history of the UAE migration is such a 
key component to development that it has been described as a dependency. Given the 
historical features of Dubai’s development as a global city within a broader global 
political economy, the histories of colonialism, capitalism and ‘development’ have 
created an international division of labour in which migrants from the global South have 
increasingly been on the move in search of livelihood opportunities that often push them 
towards migration. In the UAE, however, both highly skilled and low waged migrants are 
in high demand, though these workers have been incorporated, through particular 
national policies and practices, hierarchically into the social body to maintain strict social 
divisions. The working conditions, experiences, treatment, opportunities, and protections, 
both formal and informal, have importantly shaped ‘hierarchies of entitlement’ in which 
all residents of the city find themselves experiencing different worlds with different 
possibilities. Global cities in the ‘non-western’ context, such as Dubai, have been largely 
ignored by traditional scholarly inquiry, but are significant as they bring together diverse 
locales in unique ways. In addition, they are also embedded in longer historical 
trajectories that shape not only the geographical patterns of movement in migration, but 
also carry important ideological forces that follow migrants on their journey, shaping 
their lives and the possibilities that exist for them.  
 As scholars and NGOs have examined, the formal strategies related to migration 
importantly shape the entrance of workers into the UAE context. However, we see that 
existing laws and policies have failed to adequately protect workers from a range of 
exploitations and abuses, and furthermore that informal practices continue to influence 
the experiences of workers from all sectors. These workers have helped to identify the 
highly unequal status of citizens in relation to Others, despite the state’s and society’s 
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tremendous dependency on foreign workers. The insecurities that fuel tensions between 
groups can be seen in relation to the migrant majority population of the UAE, which has 
been constructed and perpetuated as a source of insecurity for the state, as well as a threat 
to the social fabric of Emirati society. Thus, as the next chapter will explore, these 
histories are important features of Dubai’s emergence as a global city that is highly 
dependent on migration. It will begin with insight into the role of citizenship in 
demarcations between legitimate and full citizens and ‘temporary workers’ from diverse 
categories of labour. We will see how formal attempts by the government to exclude and 
limit the impact of migrants are tied to xenophobic ideas of the ‘negative’ influence of 
‘foreigners’ on Emirati culture. In addition to the highly exclusive issues of family, 
marriage and citizenship rights and status, is the issue of the intensifying minority status 
of citizens.  
 Through this analysis we can see important nuances in the making of racialized 
subjectivities as they operate through the neoliberal global city. Furthermore, whereas the 
Gulf is often exceptionalized in many instances, we will see how in fact, these processes 
represent important shifts in the global division of labour and represent not so much a 
‘past’ as they do the future of migration, citizenship and labour policy and practice. We 
will also explore how it is not only the state, national and international forces that shape 
geographies of migration, but also the everyday relationships between sectors that sustain 
these inequalities, and reinforce them through the internalization of ‘temporariness’ and 
relativization. Thus, we will see how ‘dreams’ of Dubai are linked to the politics of 
‘where you are from’ overwhelming ‘where you are at’, based on genealogies of race that 
are embedded within geographies of migration that are remade into national hierarchies 
of citizenship and labour. 
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Chapter Five: Living the Dream 
 
 
If you are not careful you can drown in your Dubai dreams. I have seen it. It is 
easier than you think. (Adonis, Canadian/Jordanian)  
 
This chapter is linked to the final stage of the sleep cycle, which culminates in 
REM (the only place where vivid dreaming occurs). In this stage of sleep the brain is 
most active, but the body in many ways is more relaxed. Dreaming occurs because of 
increased brain activity, but paralysis sets in to protect the dreamer (Walcutt, n.d.). Thus, 
when we are the freest to fully experience our dreams, we may also be immobilized. This 
chapter examines the experience of ‘Living the Dream’ where one is free to finally 
experience the dreams one has been preparing for and, through the collision of various 
dreams in the making of Dubai’s dreamscapes, we will see fully the significance of 
unmapping the genealogies that accompany geographies of migration to the city as they 
impact the making of hierarchies and everyday relationships.  
We explore the dreams of residents as they are linked to social geographies, lived 
experiences, and everyday logics that create, maintain and legitimize hierarchies of 
entitlement within the urban landscapes of Dubai’s globality. Furthermore, we see how 
dreams are best mapped through a genealogical analysis that exposes the forms of power 
that shape and make possible both migrant dreams and the dominant Dream of Dubai’s 
globality. To do this, we consider insights from groups of residents on their motivations 
for migration, descriptions of their lifestyles, reflections on their relationships to other 
sectors, and the experiences and impacts of citizenship and nationality on their everyday 
lives. Thus, different perspectives – at the macro and micro levels, as well as levels of 
analysis such as the global, national and local, and temporal realms, past, present and 
future - are linked through the ‘everyday’, which is a counterpoint to the spectacle of 
globality in which hierarchies are made, reproduced and maintained. Overall, what we 
find upon closer examination of the power and impact of dreams is that when people are 
in a position to live their Dubai dream, they falsely believe themselves to be free, when in 
actuality they are immobilized and unable act, think or challenge the limits set forth for 
them. Thus, whether dreaming is experienced as restorative or as disrupted, there are 
consequences both real and imagined.   
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 While much of the contemporary data on the plight of low waged migrant 
workers has been importantly documented by international organizations such as those 
discussed in the previous chapter, there remain significant gaps in these analyses. Much 
of these gaps are related to the broader ‘human rights’ discourse in which these reports 
are situated, which often lacks a nuanced historical contextualization of the issues being 
documented. Thus, in order to avoid ahistorical, essentializing views that erase the 
significant historical and ideological complexities that shape lived experiences, we need 
to explore how the specific structures of the Gulf, in combination with neoliberal trends 
in the global political economy and the broader historical context, work together to create 
structural and systemic forms of urban social inequalities.  
 Additionally, the insights found in the interviews emphasized the need to link 
the ideological basis that fuels xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners to a broader 
historical dependency. This chapter explores how categories of workers are complicated 
not only in relation to nationals but to ‘other’ expats, such as those working in 
professional jobs. Also, exploring how transnational communities are created and 
accommodated by the state and civil society exposes the participation of non-nationals 
through newspaper and media in the making of urban cultures. Taken together, these 
analyses work towards theorizing practical yet radical policy and political changes that 
work beyond merely holding the state and wealthy Emirati’s accountable by implicating 
the role of history in making possible these networks and the subsequent policies, as well 
as the complicity of foreign interests, sending governments, and individuals caught in a 
matrix of globalized inequalities and the everyday negotiations that form the hierarchies 
embedded in the urban spatiality of Dubai’s global city aspirations. 
 In the last chapter we saw how histories and processes of migration are 
integral to the development of the city’s physical infrastructure, daily operations and 
maintenance, and in creating its global allure for migrants of all socio-economic statuses, 
as well as building its industry and expertise. Thus, Dubai was examined in more material 
dimensions, through examinations of the international division of labour, histories of 
demand for labour, and development.  Building here, this chapter explores state policies 
tied to citizenship, migration, and labour, which are set against the backdrop of the 
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experiences of migrants themselves as they articulate why and how they migrated, and 
how they relate to Emirati citizens. Thus, we see the lived realities and spatial logics of 
migration and labour in Dubai as they manifest into rigid social hierarchies. These 
arguments about contemporary citizenship regimes are theorized as the metropolitan 
counter part of imperialism. Exploring these imperialist geographies and their 
manifestations into neoliberal spaces of ‘globality’ in the making of Global Cities such as 
Dubai exposes the creation of modern subjectivities/ontologies based on the exploitation 
of racialized, gendered labour and the supremacy of whiteness, capitalism and subsequent 
ideas of innocence. Working together these processes produce the exaltation of particular 
subjectivities, creating preference, exaltation and humanity for some through the 
abjection of ‘Others’. Interestingly, all subjects interviewed in this study were able to 
articulate a pervasive hierarchical categorization of labourers, primarily based on the 
mechanisms of citizenship, status and labour. This was generally presented as dominated 
by the few, but powerful, subject of the Emirati national, followed by Western expats, 
primarily white professionals, followed by elites from the Third world, then by other 
Arabs, followed by Africans, Asians, and South Asians, the majority of whom work in 
construction or service sectors, and are considered Dubai’s underclass. It is too simple to 
reduce these hierarchies to a simple analysis of class relations, and instead it is necessary 
to examine how genealogies of race and gendered notions of work operate in the making 
of preferred citizens/subjects in a context of majority migrants living in their relative 
levels of ‘temporariness’. Why some migrants are preferred is not only a matter of class, 
but an important matter of race and gender, and the historical making of categories of 
humanity and privilege, which bring with them ideas about race and belonging, most 
clearly seen through understandings of nationality in the making of urban hierarchies.  
 
The Power of the Seemingly Mundane in the Everyday 
 
 As was shown, the major scholarly works on globalization and the global city 
have largely reproduced the dominant Eurocentric framework for evaluating ‘globality’ 
as an economic and political force with social consequences. Thus, the top down, macro, 
econo-centric formulation through which many scholars operate tends to reinforce 
notions of the hegemonic, seemingly inevitable power of capital to dictate the function 
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and forces of cities, and all relations therein. On the other hand, the everyday is 
understood as an important “counterpoint to global city literature on emphasis of space of 
flows” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 177). Thus, we can consider two key concepts here that help 
us to explore these ideas: the ‘everyday’ and ‘space’.  
 The power of ‘everyday’ negotiations and relationships is found in the reflections 
of subjects, as well as in insights into the social organization of places in the city, 
embodied in the conceptualization of ‘space’. The everyday both conceals and reveals 
important insights into the hierarchies of entitlement that shape the experiences of 
residents in Dubai. These insights lend themselves to the broader conceptualization of 
genealogies of migration that work to expose the temporal and spatial features and 
realities of various subjectivities and the ontological (im)possibilities, which are realized 
through epistemologies grounded in racial formations in contemporary processes of 
neoliberal globalization.  
 The popular ‘façade of glittering high rises and luxurious shopping malls’ lends 
itself to an ahistorical and decontextualized representation of Dubai as being ‘fake’. As 
Elsheshtawy argues, “…its everyday life shows a place full of aspirations, struggles, 
encounters taking place in all sorts of settings” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 1). Thus the 
everyday is seen as a site of possibility through negotiations, resistances and alterative 
worldviews. People are not simply being ‘duped’, they engage in complex practices that, 
 … Circumvent these spectacular developments seeking instead an experience that 
 is not tied to imagery or appeal of spectacle, they are not passive, nor does the 
 proliferation of the spectacular cause them to be unwitting participants in 
 capitalist exploitation. (Elsheshtawy, 187) 
 
  In the making of ‘everyday urbanisms’ we see that through the seemingly 
mundane and banal operations of daily life, complex relationships and ideological 
negotiations are taking place in which subjects engage in making ‘sense’ of their lives. 
While the potential that is explored here is linked importantly to issues of empowerment 
and agency, we can also, as I argue, see it as tied to the normalization and 
legitimatization of particular practices that contribute to the creation of 
hegemonic/commonsensical ideologies.  
 From these considerations and the focus of the everyday as a scale of analysis, we 
can also map the social geography of the city, in which, as Elsheshtawy highlights, we 
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can see the differences in the constitution of daily experiences of residents. However, as I 
argue, the mapping of social geographies, and migrant geographies for that matter, 
necessitates that we simultaneously ‘unmap’ these geographies beyond both material 
places and ideologies to uncover the historic underpinnings and workings of racial 
ideologies and structures that imbue the everyday with its most salient, insidious feature, 
the creation of different ontologies, subject positions and relations through practices of 
‘Othering’. 
  For Henry Lefebrve (1991) the schema related to the ‘Production of Space’ 
encompasses both production of space through professions and planning, and its 
everyday life. For Chase et al, (1999), the everyday highlights a range of possibilities, 
which should be mapped through the social geography of the city based on differences in 
experiences of the space. Traditionally, place has been very simply understood in its 
physicality, in the infrastructure and its geographical development. Of course the 
construction and physical aspects of the city are extremely important in shaping social 
relations, but for this analysis, the idea of space is significant in understanding the social 
relations that give meaning to place. In particular, this means thinking more explicitly 
about denaturalizing spaces by asking how race, for example, constitutes space. Through 
the work of notable scholars on critical race and spatial theorists11 we see that this 
framework allows for the examination of multiple systems of oppression. First, as 
Sherene Razack (2002) argues, spaces are organized to sustain unequal social relations, 
and these relations in turn also shape spaces. Furthermore, building on Ong’s critique of 
the ‘spaces of flows’ argument in globalization theory, the inability of traditional 
frameworks to deal with the simultaneity of multiple systems of oppression is supported 
by critical spatial methodology. If we follow that racial hierarchies are produced through 
spatial relations, then we see how “place becomes race” through various practices 
(Razack, 2002, 1).  
 Second, Henri Lefebrve’s concept of ‘social space’ highlights the dialectical 
relationship between spaces and bodies, in which both the material and symbolic work 
together to create and constitute space. Thus, this discussion explores the relationality of 
identity, whereby positions are secured in relation to others. In this sense, spaces and the 
																																																								
11 Razack 2002, Goldberg 1993, Mbembe 2001, Thobani 2007 
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relations embedded within them only exist in so far as they are understood in relation to 
another, or in this case, as citizens are understood in relation to ‘Others’. Expanding this 
further through the work of Razack and Thobani (2007), we need to explore the creation 
of subjects in relation to the constitution of national space, which is explored in more 
detail in the upcoming sections of this chapter.  
 Overall the major issues raised through this discussion involve several threads, all 
of which are based on how to (un)map and denaturalize the spaces of Dubai. In this 
framework, (un)mapping requires thinking about the spaces as tied to social relations that 
are organized hierarchically based on colonialism and the racial logics embedded in these 
histories. In the case of Dubai, a spatial methodology comes into significance not only in 
theorizing subject positions that are produced in and through space, but also to 
understand how the nation is conceptualized in the global capitalist economy.  
 In a more practical way we see that ‘periphractic space’ is relational,  
 … it does not require absolute displacement of persons to or outside city limits, to 
 the literal margins of urban space. It merely entails their circumscription in terms 
 of location and their limitation in terms of access - to power - to (the realization 
 of) rights, and to goods and services. (Goldberg, 1993, 188)  
 
 Therefore, the geographical and social organization of spaces whereby certain 
bodies are considered illegitimate and denied access or have their mobility controlled is 
one way of limiting the impact these bodies can have. The segregation of ‘labour’ 
workers into worker camps, or apartments on the outskirts of town or in neighbouring 
Emirates, in accommodations provided by their employers means that the people who 
sustain the economy are being kept away from the ‘image of Dubai’. This segregation 
need not always be explicitly enforced through fences, because it can also be imagined.  
 When formally sanctioned exclusions are no longer politically possible, private 
 preferences to exclude may be sustained under more generally acceptable 
 principles like freedom of expression, or association, or un-coerced property 
 contracts dictated by free market forces. (Goldberg, 1993, 195)  
 
 This can be seen in examples of policy that govern and enforce these inequalities 
through less explicit means, such as government controls on entrepreneurial ownership, 
property ownership and public strategies to promote the shift from public to private 
participation of nationals. Another major example can be seen in the idea of contractual, 
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temporary employment and limited visas, whereby workers are kept ‘in line’ by being 
continually reminded of their inability to settle, bring their families or gain permanent 
residence in Dubai.  Migrants are thus disciplined through their temporality, non-
belonging and the precariousness of their status and visas, all of which combined, 
although differentiated by gender, produce insecurities amongst migrants that limit their 
ability to produce organized resistance.  
  The necessity of a spatial analysis is shown by asking how the creation of 
subjectivities in this space is linked to the suppression and exploitation of racialized 
labour and the supremacy of global capitalist values, which work together to produce 
privileged citizens and expats/tourists in relation to ‘migrant-Others’. To explore these 
ideas, I examine both the materiality of places and landscapes, but also the imaginative 
spatialities, which work together to constitute subjects through hierarchies of citizenship 
in Dubai. In this sense, citizens, expats and tourists all need the bodies of ‘migrant-
Others’ to reaffirm their position and superiority.  A spatial analysis in this way then, 
explores multiple scales of analysis in relation to multiple systems of oppression over 
time. It considers how these relations both collide and collude together to form structural 
and systemic relations that are both upheld and challenged in our traditional assumptions 
through the voices of diverse informants.  
 To consider a few examples, in the case of the global we can see how critical 
scholars have identified the dialectic relationship between neoliberal restructuring, in the 
global North and South under globalization. Examining the ways in which neoliberal 
logics connect the consequences of development and free trade, embodied in SAPs, to the 
disproportionate burden on Third World peoples, and particularly to women – through 
the processes of domestic welfare reform in the “First World” – who are then tied to the 
restrictive immigration and welfare policies in receiving countries, through which 
migrants are filtered. While many have focused on ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world relations, we 
can see how these structural features shape Dubai in significant ways whereby the city 
participates in upholding these structural features of the international division of labour, 
while simultaneously enforcing extremely exclusionary models of citizenship, which 
together can be seen as constituting the neoliberal dream. This new model of urbanity 
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highlights Dubai’s unique adaptation of neoliberal economic policies and geographic 
position within the division of labour internationally.  
In considering the space through more nationally based examples, Elsheshtawy 
highlights some important relationships at the everyday level in Dubai. The idea of 
‘transience’ is a dominant theme in many subjects’ descriptions of life in Dubai. Scholars 
have tied these insights to physical spaces, which, in the case of Dubai’s globality, are 
created to deter or inhibit attachment. “[t]hey do not seem lived in” (Elsheshtawy, 2011, 
13). This is further supported by many of my interviewees who also articulated how their 
belonging was made precarious through their status as temporary migrants without 
formal citizenship or any basis on which to make claims on the state, but also by the 
places themselves. In an interesting vein, Elsheshtawy like many subjects in my study 
argues that ‘lived’ spaces are found in older, less gentrified spaces such as ‘Satwa’, and 
parts of Deira and Bur Dubai, made up of a mix of inhabitants. In this sense, “The 
superficial, homogenous urbanity of the Jumeriah walk or Bastakiya Souq is no substitute 
for the real life mix of people in Meena Bazaar. Or along shores of the creek…” 
(Elsheshtawy, 2011, 14). These aspects of the more informal Dubai are parts of the city 
that most tourists need not see on their trip, as they are primarily made up of South 
Asians.  
In addition, the consideration of uneven geographies in which exclusion takes 
place is highlighted in the context of ‘spectacular Dubai’, a model being exported 
elsewhere. Elsheshtawy argues that Dubai based developers have built new developments 
in places such as Cairo, which, unlike Dubai that has no contextual constraints, has large 
pockets of poor people who seem to create an unstable juxtaposition of extreme wealth 
and abject poverty, that he argues will inevitably result in “social problems and unrest” 
(Elsheshtawy, 2011, 201). However, when we consider the theoretical underpinnings of 
this analysis we see that despite the ‘differences’ in the contexts, there are significant 
commonalities that make Dubai as problematic as Cairo in terms of exclusion and 
poverty. In fact, much of the problem with Dubai for Westerners and other elites is that it 
makes many people feel ‘uncomfortable’ as it brings the Third World into too close 
contact with the First World.  
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The spectacle of Dubai not only segregates and separates people, it also generates 
and sustains social hierarchies tied to notions of race and histories of unequal global 
development, which are also important sources of nation building and help to shape 
public perception on acceptability, inevitability, and often, necessity. As scholars such as 
David Harvey (2006) have shown, social organization is further impacted by the forces of 
neoliberalism, which creates uneven geographies in urban development by building 
‘exclusivity’ and catering for the wealthy.   
 
Diversity in Migrant Experiences  
 Here we explore how the dominant images of Dubai’s globality compare with the 
lived realities articulated by subjects. Subjects were asked to discuss issues such as 
multiculturalism, the Dubai dream, lifestyles of different groups, the role of citizenship 
and nationality in determining what they were entitled to in their jobs, housing, benefits, 
as well as the experience itself and different considerations for different groups, the 
experiences of nationals in relation to migrants, the role of racism and gender stereotypes 
in determining the treatment and experiences of groups, the impact of where they  came 
from in shaping their understanding of the Dubai dream and their experience within the 
city, lifestyles and personality of the city and who the city is built for. These insights are 
organized into three subsections, beginning with insights into the ‘personality’ of the city, 
the dominant characteristics and aspects of city life as they experience it. Subjects 
reflected on the different lifestyles and experiences they had, and I compare and contrast 
these with reference to scholarly works and insights and analysis on the social 
geographies of the city. In addition, this section turns to examine the major features of 
social organization in the city and how subjects reflect on these hierarchies. This section 
works to reiterate the significance of ‘unmapping’ as a methodological tool in uncovering 
the genealogies embedded within geographies of migration to the data to elucidate factors 
and forces that impact and shape notions of belonging and identity, before we turn to the 
impacts of citizenship on the making of the ‘nation’.  
 
 Dubai is a huge contradiction. It’s difficult to describe Dubai in one word…in 
 some ways you want to say inclusive, because it is a place where people live with 
 so many different cultures and religions, yet its this superficial side of Dubai that 
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 stops it from fully integrating and becoming one word that  makes  sense for the 
 entire place. (Lo, British) 
 
 Amidst tremendous diversity, subjects reflected on the reality that while Dubai is 
a multicultural city, there are still forces at play that encourage divisions between places 
and people. Many provided insights into these exclusionary trends, which primarily 
highlighted the extreme inequities between low waged labour migrants and Emirati 
citizens, as well as the movement and segregation between the ‘global city’ spaces of 
Dubai, and the ‘Other’ places such as Satwa and Bur Dubai for example, as inherently 
violent. These spaces are older, more diverse and accessible, and most importantly, they 
are dominated by labourers and other racialized workers, and stand in contrast to the 
spectacular developments such as the Dubai Mall, Palm Jumeirah, Burj al Arab, or Burj 
Khalifa. In addition, these places are often described through biased depictions such as 
being the ‘ghetto’ of Dubai, often represented as crime ridden, dangerous and fringe. 
While Dubai attempts to distance labourers from the dominant image of Dubai, all 
residents, visitors and citizens can articulate similar descriptions into the social 
hierarchies that organize the city. In fact, the significance of these hierarchies is found not 
in ‘hidden’ places, but through the spaces that showcase the relationships between 
different sectors in any one place, where the contrast between relative levels of power 
and privilege are most obvious. “Exclusion, poverty and violence are on the rise as the 
sense of belonging, social cohesion and the very notion of citizenship are threatened” 
(Elsheshtawy 2011, 21). These divides are characteristics of Dubai’s development as a 
global city, and highlight the priorities which shape Dubai’s rapid development trajectory 
into the global sphere, giving rise to iconic buildings and infrastructure that work towards 
establishing its place in the global city network. Thus, focusing on “well established real 
estate and architectural tactics to achieve its global dreams” has been a key priority of the 
city (124). The focus on development therefore has been to attract wealthy GCC 
nationals, Western tourists and professionals, as well as wealthy elites from India, Iran, 
Russia and other non-Western countries.  
 Many critiques of the real estate sector center on the priorities of luxury that tend 
to ignore or disregard the needs of its migrant majority population, many of whom live in 
dismal conditions in labour camps, shared apartments, rooms and bed spaces. In effect, 
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there are processes through which the city works in “sanitizing the city in a way by 
displacing its poor who should be kept out of sight for fear of spoiling the carefully 
crafted ultra luxurious cityscape” (Elsheshtawy, 2011, 125). The focus on luxury has 
been built on the idea of exclusivity and this has led to extreme social exclusion, which 
has arguably lead to an environment that is non-egalitarian in nature, with the 
international and national systems operating to uphold existing global inequalities and 
reinforce these structures through the formal policies and procedures by which migrants 
enter the city. In further considering how subjects discuss and explain the lifestyles and 
experiences of different sectors we can turn to some major themes and insights, which are 
organized through broad categorizations of ‘low waged migrant workers’, expat 
professionals and Emirati citizens.  
 
 Low waged Migrant Workers. “Life is there. Money is here” (Waseem, 
Pakistan). On a taxi ride took one afternoon, I meet a driver, Waseem, who has been 
working in Dubai for over 18 years. He has two children back home, and his wife and 
parents to support. His experiences of Dubai are based on the reality that “people just 
come to grab money here, but mostly its not there”. He shows me his bank slip 
highlighting his paycheck for the month of 1000.60 AED (275.42 USD), of which 25 
AED must go to pay for his uniform, 500 for fees, and 400, which he sends home. 
Waseem explains that over the years he has been employed in numerous sectors such as 
construction, but that the current job is much easier although it still does not pay him well 
enough to live comfortably and grow.  
Most of Waseem’s insights are tied to his dreams. He talks profoundly about the 
dreams he has to buy a car of his own to drive. He explains that he would invest in a bus, 
and drive people to work, back and forth, but the cost is too high, 50,000AED and a 
down payment of 2,500AED, which he doesn’t have, and cannot likely foresee based on 
his current situation. He quickly turns to another dream, “But the best jobs you could 
have is it your own a cafeteria, making small 5, 10, 15 AED foods, best business where 
you are happy, serving hamburger, sandwiches, drinks. This is the dream job”. For 
Waseem, having dreams beyond the reality of his work experience, affording him the 
freedom to start his own business is the real dream. With almost two decades of work 
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experience in Dubai, he knows too well that the cycle of poverty he faces cannot be 
resolved in his current job, though his dependency on the meager salary he receives, 
combined with his family’s insecurity back home, furthers his necessity to maintain any 
income, no matter how little or exploitative. His continued struggle and hustle are tied to 
his endless dreams.  
 “They offer you green fields, but when you get here all you get is desert” (Adeel, 
Pakistan). Informal discussions with ‘Adeel’, a taxi driver, highlight the false and failed 
promises of Dubai’s dreams for workers such as himself. Lamenting the promises sold to 
him and many of his coworkers back home by recruiters, Adeel says, “How can I save? 
Nothing is as it was promised”. He explains that wages are not as promised, living 
conditions are harsh, and freedoms are severely constrained. In Adeel’s five years 
working in Dubai, he discusses a difficult life, working 12 hours a day, living in an 
accommodation block housing 3000 workers, living six men to a room. “What many 
people don’t understand is that we must pay for everything, all expenses out of our small 
salaries” (Adeel). He explains that he must pay 400 AED a month for his bed, even on his 
vacation months and sends almost 2,500 of his 3,000 AED monthly salary home. He 
highlights the limited health insurance, which he argues would make you pay if you were 
actually ill in any way. He also paid a recruitment fee of 9,500 AED (2,586.75 USD) 
before coming to Dubai. He explains that he has no base fee for this work, but rather is 
paid a percentage of the monies he earns. Overall he articulates that it is unfair to require 
him to pay for basic requirements for his work, such as a uniform and housing fees for a 
bed.  
In the quote above, Adeel talks of the Dubai that is represented as a lush and 
bountiful place of abundant wealth and unlimited potential, only to be awakened by the 
reality of its desert landscape, seemingly uninhabitable, harsh and scarce. “Work is very 
hard here. There is no social life, no family, no friends… but some people have worse 
situations than me…” (Adeel). He tells the story of his close friend, a construction worker 
who died a week before our meeting. “He woke for work at 5 am and had a heart attack 
when he arrived to work. Do you know that it took five days to give his body to his 
family, who must also pay the fee to send his body back home! Meanwhile they are 
crying” (Adeel, Pakistan). Adeel fixated on the five-day return of his body, which he 
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understood as outrageous for Muslims who must bury the body of the deceased as 
quickly as possible. He explains that the company did not pay anything for his family, so 
he and a few workers had made a box to collect donations until a manager said to them 
“throw this away, forget this, you will not send this to them, or you will leave”. He 
explains that organizing amongst workers is tightly regulated, and that even charity is 
looked upon with suspicion when it comes from workers. Another practice amongst taxi 
drivers in Dubai was, if someone died while on the job, each worker would put 100 AED 
of their salary toward a large sum like 60,000 AED to send to his family. However, with 
many attempts being undermined by employers, they were forced to abandon the practice 
for threats of being fined, fired or deported.   
 Overall, Adeel explains a similar, well documented narrative of the struggles of 
labourers,  
 They can’t leave, they have to pay debts. They take their passports and if they  
 want to leave, they have to pay. The places they live are very bad, with sickness, 
 dirty and overcrowded. They work very long hours. They have no health care. If 
 company has financial problems, they will not pay workers. They are promised 
 ten times more money and then they come and they are lied to… Dubai’s dream is 
 a trick. Their dreams are ruined. Their dreams are not real. They come because 
 there are shortages for jobs back home. If you try to go out one day, you will        
 spend something, and he already has nothing…so. (Adeel, Pakistan) 
 
 From this topic, Adeel turns to his own story, explaining that he has four children 
back home in Pakistan that he must support. In reflecting on his family, Adeel shares this 
story,  
 My eldest daughter is twelve, and then I have another daughter that is ten years 
 old, I have one son who is eight years old, and one little baby of two years old. 
 The other day I called home, and my eldest daughter said, ‘Papa I am fasting’.
 Even my other daughter, who is ten, is also fasting. She asked me if she could 
 drink even though she fasted for most of the day. I told her there is only half a day 
 left, so I told her to be patient and wait. And she did.  
 
 Adeel couldn’t contain his happiness as he retold the story. His smile didn’t leave 
his face. His eyes stared far into the distance and the contentment and satisfaction of 
having helped his daughter to persevere through her first day of fasting during Ramadan 
was clear. This story is evidence of the complexities in how people articulate their lives, 
considering those things that give them meaning, those that make the difficulties of their 
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everyday struggles slightly more bearable and which subjects choose to share on their 
own to describe their lives.    
 In this sense, the understandings that different workers have of their own 
situations are often tied to stories of exploitation and struggles or hardship, but are also 
often iterated with ideas of what gives their lives value or meaning. In many cases, these 
are linked to alternative worldviews that are often in tension with the dominant, 
hegemonic logic of capital that inflects many analyses of Dubai’s social geography. This 
is not to diminish the importance of a class based analysis of labour, but it is necessary to 
highlight a significant example of how life/meaning/value is challenged by alternative 
understandings. My own experience as a researcher, and my academic background, has 
focused on examining inequality and exploitation as the dominant theme of migrant 
workers lives, while potentially neglecting other elements. Throughout the experience of 
fieldwork and upon reflection, it was clear that many of my questions centered largely 
around exploitation, labour, working conditions and policy, which were often challenged 
by the subject’s own stories that were not explicitly based on this conceptualization of 
their life’s most important feature and instead reoriented their experiences through 
alternative criteria.  The following reflection attempts to unpack these epistemological 
differences through the experience of fieldwork,  
Sometimes you have to trust your heart, because sometimes your mind limits 
what you know you feel but can’t explain. (YYZ to DXB Diary)  
 
 So they are here now. They are getting ready to ‘work’. They are taking their 
 positions on the base of this building. They are wearing blue coloured uniforms, 
 and hard hats. It is hot, but it is not impossible heat. The sun is going down on this 
 side of the building now. And they will begin working soon. And I am sitting here 
 looking down on them. From the last building they built. (YYZ to DXB Diary) 
 
 In reflections on the fieldwork experience I often found myself caught between 
what I felt compelled to ask workers about their experience in Dubai, primarily those 
things linked to their working conditions and stories of exploitation and abuse, and what 
they chose to share themselves. In addition, what my interactions with many workers 
highlighted was that many of these people, despite their struggles and unfair working and 
living conditions, wanted to share parts of their lives that extended beyond these 
concerns. Thus, as captured in the following entry, Yassin, a Bangladeshi boat driver on 
	 228	
the Dubai creek, challenges my insistence on ‘work’ by shifting the focus onto what 
mattered to him in his experiences.  
  
 You are a boat driver, Yassin, from Bangladesh who has been working on and off 
 in the UAE for 13 years of his life. Since he was 20 years old, to his 33 years        
 today. You are the one with a wife and a six year old son who rely on your work 
 here. You smile so much, maybe more than anyone I have met in Dubai yet. You 
 speak of your life here as difficult but worthwhile. You are specialized in your 
 work. Working 16 hour days, beginning at 4 am everyday, making an average of 
 1,200 AED a day. But you explain, it is summer now and in this impossible heat 
 things are slow. Everyday you have to pay 300 AED to the owner of the boat, 
 who provides your accommodation, and takes you from home to work. But it is 
 hard you explain, living in one room with twelve other men. It is not clean you 
 said. You also said what bothers you most is that the government problems in 
 how they get rich and make you pay for your visa to come work here. The best 
 part of Dubai you said is the amount of work and trade between people, the 
 mosques, the quality of food and the clean streets. Then you very quickly 
 switched topics and told me that your mother died recently. It seemed that all of 
 our talk about your working conditions and your experiences in Dubai were 
 eclipsed by the reality of your mother’s passing, which you chose to share. This is 
 what is so interesting, is that even though I didn’t ask, what you choose to share 
 with me was this. This boat ride was so beautiful and the views were 
 extraordinary. It was so peaceful, all I could hear was the sound of the engine 
 pushing the boat, smelling some gasoline and seeing your smile. You forced me 
 to see the beauty in the least expected places, and inspired the thought in this city, 
 sometimes the  people with the least, smile the most. You make what is dreamt, 
 possible. Are you a hero, or a victim of an evil exploitative process? It seems 
 you are both. Forget Marx. Yeah… yeah… and you will say now, “but who 
 will you use in your theoretical framework?” and I will say, “I don’t know… 
 maybe Yassin, from Bangladesh. (YYZ to DXB Diary)  
 
 What the encounter with Yassin highlights is the ways in which people negotiate 
their lives based on criteria that often extend beyond the materiality of their existence. 
Thus, the issues of importance as identified in my questions seemed to create a schema of 
what must matter most to working class migrants and, while these issues do shape their 
lives, people also have complex and diverse realities that help them to make sense of their 
everyday experiences. Many of these ideas shape the various iterations of Dubai Dreams 
for low waged migrant workers in industries such as construction, domestic work, service 
and retail related sectors. The diversity in lived experiences is highlighted through the 
complex set of negotiated realities that impact how individuals understand their situation 
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in Dubai based on considerations such as where they are from, their working conditions, 
their support networks, and their motivations for leaving ‘home’.  
 These ideas helped me to reflect on the experiences of fieldwork and to consider 
in more detail how epistemologies help to shape ‘knowledge’ about the place and people 
within it in amidst their immense diversity and complexity. Thus while I am telling 
particular stories in this dissertation, I am very cognizant of how these encounters were 
shaped by particular epistemologies and the need to try and unpack the many 
assumptions which are embedded in any and all encounters. It should be noted that many 
of the insights I garnered from low waged workers during my fieldwork were conducted 
in informal settings, largely due to the precarious status that impacts the ways many 
workers work and live. Generally speaking, many people were hesitant to participate in 
formal interviews because of the general aura of suspicion that marks their lives in Dubai. 
Furthermore, their temporary status is such that any behaviours that are seen as a 
disruption may end up costing them their livelihoods. Additionally, because of the tight 
regulations many of them face in their working life, which simultaneously structure their 
life outside of work, it is often difficult or not encouraged for them to meet in their 
limited time ‘off’. In many instances, it was not permissible for me to visit them at their 
residence, which was provided by their employers, and in other cases they lived 
extremely far away, such as the case of ‘Shahina’ who was bused into Dubai daily from a 
neighbouring Emirate. Other times, they were extremely difficult to reach, and their 
schedules were extremely rigid and consuming, leaving them with little time to do 
laundry, cook food, or sleep, let alone meet for an interview.  
Generally speaking, the majority of low waged workers I spoke with articulated a 
similar reality, which was based on promises of prosperity that were met with realities of 
exclusion. Ideas of high wages, savings and economic incentives were the main allure to 
the city; the realities of social exclusion, unfair or unequal treatment and tight regulations 
created general feelings of uneasiness and disappointment. These experiences were in 
turn impacted by additional considerations such as the community or company in which 
one worked. For those who were working with similar ethnicities and genders, they were 
afforded a level of comfort in a shared language and culture, while those who did not 
have these networks were further marginalized and excluded from any informal social 
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supports. This can be seen in the stories of two different women workers; Shahina, a 
bathroom attendant employed by the Dubai Municipality, and Louisa, who worked in a 
nail salon inside of one of Dubai’s many malls.  
 The gendered aspects of global migration cannot be understated, and as scholars 
argue, ‘gendering migration’ as an analytic strategy exposes the increased precariousness 
through which women make decisions to migrate, often leaving behind children and 
family, in order to provide for that very family. In addition, issues related to gender 
inequality often shape the decision making process to migrate for labour. Through a focus 
on two key subjects in my fieldwork we will see the complexity in understanding the 
experiences of low waged migrant women workers.  
 
 But I am working here because I want to give my children more than my husband. 
 I want my kids to know that their mother gave them all of these things. So no 
 matter what, I will do anything, so that they will know that I gave them more than 
 him. They must know that. (Louisa, Filipina) 
 
 Louisa is a Filipino woman in her thirties who works in a nail salon in an older 
mall in Dubai where the local Emirati presence is much more felt. Her story begins and 
ends with her failed marriage, which began at 15 years of age and is one of many that 
highlight the gendered nature of migration and women’s work in the global city, tied to 
issues of patriarchy, religion, economic necessity, addiction and survival. Louisa begins 
by telling her current situation in Dubai for the last four years, where she works six days 
a week, from 9 to 6 pm, and is then bused back to her accommodation, an apartment that 
she shares with four other women who work in the salon. The ladies rotate days off, 
which means they don’t get to share days off. The average salary she explains is between 
1500 and 1700 AED per month, more than she would be making at home in the 
Philippines. She pauses her story, and interjects saying,  
You know, I never had a Toblerone before I came to Dubai. I could never afford 
this in the Philippines because I have to choose between this chocolate and two 
pounds of rice, so when you are trying to survive you cannot have money for 
luxuries. Here I can have good food. I can have fruits… You know back home I 
never had fruits, only on Christmas we had some grapes or an orange. But we 
cannot afford to have these fruits. That is one reason why Dubai is good. (Louisa, 
Filipina)  
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Louisa, like many other workers understands her situation beyond only the 
economic, which like for almost all workers is better than back home, however 
minimally. Most are just trying to make ends meet, to survive.  
 When asked if she was married, she smiled and said, “I am separated now, and 
that’s why I wanted to leave, to get away from my husband”. She explains that many of 
the women working in the salon also have similar stories where they needed to leave their 
husbands. She explains that there is no divorce in the Philippines, which means she is 
stuck now. She will never marry someone else in her life and she is trapped by the fact 
that she must carry his name. This is something she repeats several times in the course of 
the two-hour interview.  “I have to carry his name”, “I wish I could get rid of his name”, 
“I just wanted to be free of his name but it follows me”. But she assures me that she is 
over him. She realized she doesn’t love him anymore, and she explains the circumstance 
of her separation by saying that “he just drank. He would spend all our money on alcohol 
and my children would cry”. He didn’t have a job and wouldn’t look for one, and instead 
would drink away the little money they did have. She then begins a discussion about the 
lax state of laws back home. She explains, “I wish we had some rules. They sell alcohol 
to 15 year olds, to 11 year olds. You see 11 year olds doing drugs and smoking on the 
street. No one tells them no. I can’t have this happen to my oldest son, and I am fearful 
that he will start drinking, like his father”. Louisa explains that she will bring her eldest 
son next year to Dubai for a visit. She is saving as much as she can so that her son can see 
what is possible, where he can work. She wants him to come so that “he can dream of 
things”, these dreams she explains are ones that he can’t have back home. Thus, for 
Louisa, bringing her son is a way for him to see the city and dream, so as to motivate 
him. “He wanted to be dentist, but now I don’t know. He is changing now. He is in the 
last year of high school and is quiet now and distant”. She fears that his unstable family 
life has impacted his personality. “When you are young, you don’t understand these 
things that are happening to you, so you don’t know what to do.”  
 “You know many Indian girls I know have the same story”, Louisa continues, 
and tells the story of an Indian woman working in the salon who came to Dubai to escape 
her abusive husband. “She cannot leave him back home because of her family obligations 
and her child. How will she live?” Louisa then shakes her head. “It’s too hard, this life”. 
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After turning back to telling more of the details about her husband’s downward spiral into 
addiction, and her family situation back home, she changes the subject, and again begins 
discussing her fears for her son, “My mother is getting old, she can’t keep chasing my 
son. The same for my daughter in third grade who is a troublemaker”. On the subject of 
her husband she explains,  
My husband is a good man until he drinks… but sometimes the pressures to 
provide for the family are too much. My husband was always saying ‘look at all 
of my friends from college, they have jobs, businesses, and I have nothing’. I used 
to say, ‘Just go look for a job… but he did nothing’. (Louisa, Filipina).  
  
Her insight into laws in the Philippines that do not allow for divorce was that 
many young women choose to be single mothers, not getting married to avoid the issues 
of divorce. “There are so many women here leaving their husbands because we cannot 
get a divorce, so what will we do? We are stuck. The only way we can leave is for work”. 
She discuses the difficulties in finding work in the Philippines where jobs are precarious, 
and even with a job, poverty is a chronic feature of daily life. She continues,  
If I had a choice I would go to Canada or United States, but it is too difficult for 
us. Then I would get a citizenship and bring my kids with me. Here everything is 
temporary, you cannot stay here, and you cannot get citizenship here. That is one 
bad thing about here. I could work for 12 years and still I would not get anything, 
no citizenship. I will always have to go back… and I don’t want to live there but 
we must go back. (Louisa, Filipina)  
 
Louisa’s main motivation in coming to Dubai is to provide for her children. “I 
miss so many things about them.  My daughter was five when I left for three years, and 
when I finally went back home to visit she was eight. That is so hard. You are always 
worried about back home, and you know you cannot go easily”. The difficulties of being 
a mother away from her children continue to dominate much of her discussion. But 
similarly, her husband seems to motivate her equally,  
But I am working here because I want to give my children more than my husband. 
I want my kids to know that their mother gave them all of these things. So no 
matter what, I will do anything, so that they will know that I gave them more than 
him. They must know that. (Louisa, Filipina)  
 
 “There is no happiness for me in this life… life is too hard. Husband is no good”.  
(Shahina, Bangladesh). On another evening, sitting on Jumeirah Beach, often referred to 
as ‘Kite Flying Beach’, created as an open waterfront space, busy on weekends, filled 
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with a mix of residents and visitors to the city. The sight on this afternoon is a mix 
between a few young Emirati men, several white European sunbathers in bikinis, a few 
Muslim families, other Western expat women, and a few South Asian men. I had sat 
down on a towel I had brought to the beach and was enjoying the sounds of the waves 
crashing onto the shore, reflecting on some of my most recent encounters when I get a 
call to meet a friend nearby. I pack up my bag and begin to walk towards an outhouse 
facility. I notice a South Asian women sitting on a plastic chair in front of the washroom 
entrance. She catches my eye and gestures with her hand for me to come to her. I 
approached her and she said, “Alone you are?”, “Yes. I am just sitting here alone. It was 
so beautiful. How are you?” I said. “Okay, Alhamdulillah (Thank God)”, she says.  
Somehow I found myself sitting on the floor, while she sat on the chair next to me and 
we chatted. She gestured for me to sit on the chair, and I refused, at which point she 
joined me on the floor. I asked her to remain seated on her chair but she refused. The 
common courtesy of respect for elders was replaced with the racial/class dictates. She 
tries to speak to me in Arabic but I explain that English is fine. We manage to piece 
together a conversation, but truthfully, much of our encounter defies spoken word, 
feelings need not be expressed in words to become real. I asked her many questions, like 
“how long have you been in Dubai?”, “Do you like this job?”, “Are you married?”, “Do 
you have a family”? From our conversation I gathered that she was been here for 1 year 
and 3 months so far, out of her two-year contract. She makes approximately 700 
AED/month, and works 10am to 10pm where she is picked up to go to Ajman, a 
neighbouring emirate that takes approximately two hours to get to everyday. There she 
lives with 16 other women in a single room provided by her employer. She works for the 
city municipality but through a private contractor who brought her from Bangladesh. She 
wakes up everyday to cook for herself at 6 am and gets one day off every one month. She 
also tells me about her two daughters, one who is 14 years old and the other is 10. I said, 
“But you look so young” and she laughs, before bursting into tears, lamenting, “Husband 
is no good”. She explains that he drinks alcohol and has treated her poorly. As she wipes 
her tears with her black abaya, an Arab expat walks out of the washroom, passes her a 
bill, and makes a hand gesture for her to get up, pointing inside the washroom. Her 
gesture makes the impression that the washroom needs attending, and the money is a 
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confirmation of this request. “What’s your name?’ I ask, “Shahina” she says while 
showing me her work badge. She has worked in Dubai before, as a domestic worker, but 
most recently got this job. She turns her sights towards a couple holding hands walking 
along the beach, and says, “There is no happiness for me in this life.” She says that 
everyone is in love, but for her there is no love. “My life is to be alone.”  She points to a 
hole in her nose, where a ring used to be, and tugs at her ears, to show that all of her 
jewelry is missing. Her husband requested all of her valuables to buy alcohol, as he did 
not have a job. She begins to cry again. Every mention of her husband seems to bring her 
to tears. She came to Dubai because all of the children in her village were going to school 
except her daughters. “They cry everyday because they want to go.” She made the 
decision to find work abroad in order to support her two daughters back home. She knew 
of Dubai from her sister and one brother who have been working in Dubai for a combined 
eleven years. She began her employment in Dubai as a housemaid in an Arab house but 
the work was too hard. “No sleep. When I go to rest, every minute they would call me to 
do work.” She says this job is better but she lives far, has no time for herself, money is 
“too little”, and again, “Husband is no good”.  
Shahina’s insights highlight the motivating force for her migration as a survival 
strategy to support her children back home. Facing difficulty in her marriage, impacted 
by employment, alcoholism, and abuse, she continuously links her husband to her lack of 
happiness and love. She describes her life as “suffering” where there is no ‘love’ for her.  
 It is interesting again to note what migrants, such as Louisa and Shahina choose to 
discuss versus what questions I imagine would be most important to their lives. In fact, 
while most low waged workers I met easily narrated their working conditions as little 
more than factual information, what was interesting on reflection on these encounters was 
the information they shared on their own, and what they narrated as important to shaping 
their lives. Much of this was linked to gendered inequalities that shape their livelihood 
strategies in migrating to support children and families back home, and to escape 
patriarchy in the home and systemically. What migrants articulated as important to their 
experiences of migration did not always fit into the narrow confines of a simple analysis 
in which labour dominates and shapes all of one’s life. Instead people negotiated their 
experiences in complex ways that did not always fit neatly into the limits of an 
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‘academic’ analysis. Thus, the emotional and spiritual components to one’s worldview 
often help us to see the complexities in understanding the experiences of migrants from 
different sectors. Shahina is certainly an exploited worker, but she also migrated as a 
strategy for survival, and to escape domestic violence. Louisa used migration as a 
strategy to gain independence, and to find alternatives to patriarchal state and cultural 
practices that make divorce impossible, and to be an agent for change for her children. 
Shahina is emotionally distraught over her loneliness and the partner and love she lacks, 
and Louisa highlights the benefits of her migrant journey through the access she has to 
food and goods she could not access back home. These different motivations, experiences 
and focuses are all a part of their Dubai Dreams, as are the structural conditions that push 
people to migrate for labour, and the policies that shape their experiences, and the 
working conditions that dominate their every day lives.  
 
  Expat professionals. “It is easy to say a lot of crap about Dubai, but it is… kind 
of amazing and everyone needs to remember that it is amazing, even if it is not right in 
some ways” (Sean, Canadian). The broad category of ‘expat professionals’ refers to those 
working in relatively privileged professional sectors, comprising diverse sets of migrants, 
including those from the West, as well as professional migrants from the ‘Third world’. 
This category is easily identified in the context of Dubai, but of course has its own 
important diversity and complexity, particularly related to degrees of privilege, related 
heavily to nationality. For the purposes of understanding the relationships between 
sectors, workers in this category self-identify as expat professionals, which creates 
important insights into their roles and relationships vis-à-vis local Emirati citizens, and 
the majority of low waged migrant workers from the Global South. The interviewees 
include expats from the West (including Canada, USA, and the UK) and from the global 
South (including many from the MENA region, particularly Egypt, Palestine via Jordan 
or Lebanon, or South Asia).  
 “It’s shopping, it’s luxuries, and I think it is very different on who you are 
marketing to” (Lo, British). The theme dominating many representations of expat life is a 
luxurious dominates, to which they have access as a result of their rank in the social 
hierarchy as a group of relatively privileged migrants. This privilege of course can only 
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be understood relationally in comparison to local Emirati citizens, and in relation to the 
majority of less privileged low waged Third world workers who dominate the industries 
that provide the luxurious life of Dubai for many expat professionals. In relation to 
Emirati citizens, their status is contextualized as privileged but with important 
limitations, specifically in terms of political and state based entitlements such as 
citizenship to which they do not have access and that in turn impacts ideas of belonging. 
Their relative privilege can be seen in many of their insights on what brought them to 
Dubai, as well as how they relate to other sectors of the population.  
 Beginning with the typical expat lifestyle, subjects described a luxurious life, 
living in the nicest villas, condos, with high tax free salaries, free accommodations, free 
education for their children at the best schools, and extravagant vacation packages. Many 
expats live a lifestyle that far exceeds that back home. Canadian expat Sara, working as a 
teacher in an American school in Dubai, gave some very interesting insights into the 
transitory nature of Dubai’s life for single, young, expats. She describes Dubai as based 
on a ‘culture of indulgence’, in which her fear of “not getting sucked in” seems harder 
than she thought to maintain. “Sometimes I think what happened to my life? It is not 
stable. And it is very easy to become extremely materialistic, very easy…” (Sara, 
Canadian).  
Sara discusses the ways that she transitioned into Dubai life with ease, with 
English spoken almost everywhere, and life that seemed very “westernized”, except the 
cultural shock of communicating with taxi drivers. She discusses the lifestyle she had 
access to in Dubai as including,  
 … the fanciest, nicest hotels, huge buffets, access to beautiful pools… everything 
 is really, really just too extravagant…You get a very luxurious life…Life is too 
 easy here because of that. Because of the fact that, I hope that I don’t become like 
 that, this is why I am worried for myself, because I just feel like I was more 
 disciplined when I was home. At home you were forced to be harder working and 
 I kind of like that because you kind of feel like you earned certain things. We 
 enjoyed going on vacations we saved for all year, now I bet you if I went I’d be 
 like, this is what I do everyday. I don’t think I would enjoy it anymore. So if life 
 is too easy, it is like nothing seems good anymore. (Sara, Canadian).  
 
 For another Canadian expat named Sean the typical expat life was similar, simply 
put, “you’re probably just going to go to brunches a lot” (Sean, Canadian). The ease with 
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which expats articulate the inequalities in social status are a frightening reality in which 
their privilege is found and maintained. However, the interesting complexity here is the 
ways they are disciplined as a result of their relative ‘lack of entitlement’ in comparison 
to Emirati citizens, which seems to create a sense of insecurity and is an important factor 
in shaping their feelings of belonging and their sense of precariousness, albeit a 
privileged version. Thus, what was found in many articulations of the expat lifestyle was 
a sense of entitlement dotted with insecurity in their temporary status and lack of political 
entitlements or permanent citizenship status. This force of ‘temporariness’ creates a 
bargain whereby expats trade in formal citizenship for the privileges of expat lifestyles in 
status and treatment. Another important outcome of these insights is the ways in which 
nationality impacts one’s feelings of insecurity. As we will explore further on here, those 
holding passports and citizenship from more privileged places in the West were better 
able to accept the trade offs than those from Third world countries whose lack of formal 
citizenship created more insecurity and was a more dominant feature of their criticisms of 
Dubai. Thus, the idea of ‘where you are from overwhelming where you are at’ continued 
to shape all expat and migrant experiences, but the degrees and impacts were felt 
differently based on ‘where one is from’, thus reinforcing broader global hierarchies of 
nationality and ideas of race, class and gender which significantly impact individual and 
collective understandings of belonging in Dubai.  
 In another way, where you were from impacted how you understood Dubai’s 
lifestyle for expats. For many British expats the ‘culture’ of Dubai was too heavily 
dominated by corporate, consumer culture rather than by what they identified as the ‘real’ 
culture found in Britain’s well-established arts and culture scene. Hattie, a British expat 
who accompanied her journalist husband to Dubai, expressed her ‘culture shock’ in terms 
of the consumer lifestyle she believed dominated cultural life.  
It’s like everybody is living this kind of… wait, not everybody, I should say a lot 
of people here are living the kind of rich life, they want to hang out, they  want 
go to really expensive restaurants, they want to go to expensive bars… I am a 
great consumer like anyone, but its not real life for me. (Hattie, British)  
 
 She lamented the difficulties she found in navigating Dubai’s corporate culture, 
and critiques the lack of ‘real’ culture that she finds in Dubai’s expat scene. “Your 
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currency is based on consumerism in a way, because that’s a shared thing and it’s a bit of 
a dull and dangerous thing to, you know. You can’t go plop in front of a Matisse at the 
Tate Modern…” (Hattie, British). Similar sentiments about the lack of history and culture 
in the cityscape and lifestyles of Dubai featured prominently in other understandings of 
culture in the city, but were always referenced back to the allegedly ‘real’ cultures of 
Europe.  
 For others, who face insecurities related to their home countries, such as Copt 
Egyptian expat Svetlana, the comforts of Dubai, and the ‘multicultural’ atmosphere 
creates an important factor in shaping her family’s experience in the UAE. She describes 
a comfortable life, which she bases on her experiences of Egypt. On the expat lifestyle, 
she states,  
 We enjoy it. It is a very, lets just put it this way, a comfortable life. And that is the 
 main difference between Egypt, is that it is so comfortable, the school is 10 
 minutes away, you have your office, everything is just near and people treat you 
 nicely, having this multicultural thing, you have respect for other cultures and 
 religions. So it is comfortable but then you need a Plan B. It gets to a point where 
 you realize ‘what am I going to do next? (Svetlana, Egyptian) 
 
 Thus, the benefits of Dubai’s multicultural life are again limited by her 
insecurities in planning ahead for what comes after Dubai based on where she is from and 
the nationality/passport she holds. 
 God no! The first time I went to a spa was here and I was like ‘Oh. What do I 
 wear? Am I going for a massage, do I have to wear nice underwear, what are they 
 going to think?’ And you go  in and it is actually so easy. And now I go to the spa 
 like all the time. It’s disgusting. We first come here and we are not sure and 
 we are feeling it out, now we get our hair blown out and get manicures and 
 pedicures all the time…but sometimes, I don’t know…  I am 23 years old and I 
 have a cleaning lady… like  ‘awesome?’ An apartment that I don’t pay for…it is 
 cool but its just not… One thing that is hard is that it doesn’t feel like real life. 
 And I think that a lot of people have accepted that this is their home, but I  never 
 could… (Katie, American) 
 
 Canadian expat Sara also discussed the benefits of a cleaning lady, explaining that 
it is way more expensive back home. For example, as she states,  
 I pay 90 dirhams for my maid to come clean for two hours and she like cleans 
 everything and you can pay her to cook for you too. People do that at my 
 work… you can just call someone and they will come at all hours of 
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 nights… Once, I forgot milk and you just call them and they will deliver milk to 
 you in 2 minutes. (Sara, Canadian)  
 
 Continuing the discussion of expat luxury, Lo, a British expat working in the arts 
and culture scene of Dubai, discusses what changes have shaped her lifestyle,  
 There is the thing about what kind of person I have turned into. Like I have a 
 cleaner, I have family come and visit me, I have a cleaner who cleans my house 
 and does my ironing, and my  family are like… you have changed… (laughing)… 
 When I first started working in the place where I work, the company was set 
 up and run by an Indian lady and we had support staff, and we had a driver.  
 When I first started here, I found it incredibly strange and unusual to ask 
 somebody to make me a cup of tea,  when I could get it myself, whereas it is 
 completely commonplace for an Indian family to have a member of staff that 
 will make tea, and bring them a cup of tea. Atrociously I have done things like… I 
 have been busy at work and I haven’t been able to take a dress to the dry 
 cleaners that I need to wear it on New Years Eve, and I have sent the driver, you 
 know? (laughing)… something I would never do. So yes, it could be… it could 
 be…  kind of… say egotistical, superficial, whereas you could say yes to
 describe the place, you could describe sometimes how people act, which I  think is 
 the impact of living here and being used to  certain lifestyles and certain  ways 
 of being, but then there are other things. There is so much more to this place. (Lo, 
 British) 
  
 Explaining the easy access to these services, most Western expats also discussed 
the ways in which low waged workers were treated in Dubai’s social hierarchy and found 
this to be a hugely shocking at first. However, as most subjects discussed, the hierarchy 
that was at first ‘foreign’ to them, became an integral part of their experience of Dubai. 
Most subjects never questioned the social organization as something that they also 
participated in upholding, benefited from or, in fact, perpetuated. Instead of focusing on 
how they too were complicit in these gross social inequalities, and how low waged 
workers were essential in providing them with access to the luxurious life they found in 
Dubai, they generally embraced it as a ‘natural’ social phenomenon. A significant point 
raised by numerous interviewees related to the social acceptance and subsequent 
normalization of these inequalities found in the constant, daily bombardment of cheap 
labour for any and all services, which became more and more natural. As Sara describes, 
  You know what’s funny. You don’t even notice the workers anymore after a 
 while…you have opened my eyes to them again, because I was like you when I 
 first arrived but then once you live here for a while you become blinded to them 
 by accident. I don’t know why. It’s because the culture establishes that way that 
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 people act towards them.  They are very much like lower classes. It’s just funny 
 how I have changed and just because you just adapt to the way people act around. 
 By accident. You just get sucked into it. (Sara, Canadian) 
 
 In addition to its pervasiveness in all aspects of social life, hierarchies are also 
rationalized in important ways, as ‘helping’ provide jobs, or in comparing their low 
wages in Dubai to their worse off situation ‘back home’ as justification for their low pay 
compared to others. Thus, much of the justification of the lesser treatment of migrant 
labourers is tied to comparisons of ‘back home’, again linked to notions of where you are 
at, versus where you are from.  
 Interestingly, in some cases expats discussed the ways that their own temporary 
status in Dubai without formal avenues to political rights, no matter the length of their 
stay, left them feeling like perpetual visitors who had no right or ability to shape the 
model of migrations or impact policies or laws. This was then seen as making many feel 
outside of the structural features of the systems and as a reason for their silence or 
inability to speak out or work towards any kind of social change.  
 In reflecting on whom the city was built for, Mohamed, Canadian expat states, 
“No one. They did not consider human beings, but purely profit” (Mohamed, Canadian). 
In another way, Egyptian expats Laura and Zain highlight the same structural tendencies. 
“They need rich people to make this country go on…” (Zain, Egyptian), and , “They need 
poor people to make this country go on…” (Laura, Egyptian). Mohamed, Zain and Laura 
highlight that while Dubai’s image and development has been shaped by promoting 
tourism, high end luxury and spectacular developments, the necessary component for this 
vision has been the low waged workers who build, maintain and service the city. Thus, 
what we find is not that these realities are hidden or unknown, but rather it is the very 
obviousness of their existence that helps to solidify the status of expats and Emirati’s, and 
the rationalization of these inequalities that creates the normalization of the everyday 
social hierarchies that dominate city life.  
In relation to inflexible divides, Lo explains the social structure as based on,  
 Constant contradictions the whole time. I think that is Dubai’s biggest challenge 
 now, and it is what will make it a place where people actually stay and not see it 
 as a place of transition, where people will stay and invest more of their time. I 
 think is because you need all of those sides, that’s what makes a city so rich, is its 
 diversity and I think at the moment, they are too much of a contradiction, there 
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 needs to be that middle ground where you blend the two together. At the moment, 
 it is not a blend, everything is segregated, and it started to mix but its not fully 
 blended. (Lo, British) 
 
 In considering these issues in more detail, we find that the culture catering to the 
rich is of course but one part, but a significant force in shaping many Emirati, and expat 
lifestyles, and it simultaneously shapes, and is built on the less then desirable lifestyles 
and status of the city’s majority poor, migrant labourers. This relationality however is not 
always an obvious fact as most subject positions have been normalized in such a way to 
create a sense of normalcy and peace in everyday interactions. Additionally, 
contradictions of space and social/spatial segregation make it difficult for expats to 
interact both with Emiratis and the city’s underclass of workers.    
It is very difficult city to be natural in because you have roles to play and if you 
don’t fit into it, it’s quite difficult to navigate. But also those roles are quite all 
encompassing, they kind of define your life here pretty much and it’s quite 
difficult to exist outside of those. So I think it’s very, in a way, it’s a very 
inflexible divide… (Hattie, British)  
 
 Emiratis. Emirati citizens comprise an extremely small numerical minority in the 
broader population of the UAE, but represent extreme privilege in their status and 
entitlements, primarily based on their highly exclusive citizenship status; which is denied 
to foreigners, no matter the length of their stay, and affords immense privileges and 
benefits from the state. With regard to the relationships between Emiratis and the migrant 
majority population, the narrative of Emirati culture ‘under threat’ has utilized their 
minority status to generate social anxiety and panic over the alleged erosion of ‘Emirati’ 
culture in the face of a growing foreign population who are represented as a threat to the 
identity and social cohesion of Emirati culture and society. The rapid neoliberal, capitalist 
growth and development of Dubai as a global city, combined with the majority of poor 
labourers from South Asia, is represented in popular culture as a threat to the social body, 
which in turn lends itself to measures of social control and regulation to control the 
impact of the migrant majority population, as well as attempts to protect and preserve 
Emirati culture. The pressures on cultural identity manifest through the enactment of 
distancing measures between citizens and ‘Others’ through employment equity 
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provisions, state subsidies and grants for example, and are represented as initiatives to 
‘protect and preserve’ what many refer to as ‘indigenous culture’.  
Interestingly, while both Western culture and influences are sometimes the target 
of concern for the majority Muslim population of Emiratis, who often lament the lack of 
respect for cultural practices in terms of appropriate dress, mannerisms and consumption 
of alcohol, the majority of measures aimed at protecting ‘indigenous’ culture do not in 
fact target the dominance of Euro-American cultural influence, but rather the majority 
low income South Asian migrants who are seen as a danger and threat to both the nation 
and national identity. How this occurs is a significant and important occurrence within 
the broader social landscape that reaffirms racialized hierarchies based on nationality and 
class, and justifies and legitimizes differential treatment of various categories of workers.  
 Another major area of insight found through interviews is tied to the highly 
orientalized and racist representations of Emiratis, Arabs and Muslims in Western media 
coverage of expat related issues. These ideas are found in many popular news outlets, as 
well as tourist materials, and even ‘fictional’ novels - Diamond in the Desert by Jo 
Tatchell, Hello Dubai by Joe Bennett - often taken as historical texts rather than fiction. 
 Beginning with the idea of a cultural threat, Emirati national Reda confirms that 
these ideas exist in relation to the idea of being a ‘minority’ that needs to be protected, 
raising the commonly held belief that expats “come and go, and exploit the country, 
taking our jobs” (Reda, Emirati). But Reda is quick to point out that much of Dubai’s 
history has been linked to living with “hundreds of different nationalities” and, compared 
to the other Gulf states, the UAE has always been one of the most multicultural because 
of the role of trade and commerce in its history.  
 Another Emirati national, Natasha, takes this up.  
 There is this very strong discussion… I mean, you see it in the way that most 
 Emirati’s dress. They still wear the kandora, Abaya. It is seen as pride, to dress 
 a part of your country, which people forget but not every culture in the world does 
 that anymore. Generally, the world is very globalized, people don’t dress the 
 same. There are a few cultures or nationalities or ethnic groups who dress in a 
 certain way to differentiate from the rest of the population. (Natasha, Emirati) 
 
 Clothing and the preservation of these traditions have been seen as both a tool in 
the preservation of culture, and an issue of pride.  
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She discusses issues related to language, a major source of concern and debate. 
As an Emirati she is expected to speak Arabic in public, which she does not often do,  
 If I am in a government office or some place where for example, I am passing on 
 my ID or at the airport customs where they see I am Emirati and if my first words 
 are not in Arabic, they are always like why don’t you speak Arabic? They openly 
 say it. (Natasha, Emirati)  
 
 In her view, the culture is not disappearing, but there is a sensitivity about it, a 
kind of “paranoia” that is seen as needing to be protected. The government works 
actively to “promote the culture, and keep it alive, investing in old sports and traditions” 
(Natasha, Emirati).  
 In Reda’s interview she explores the dramatic shifts Dubai has experienced in her 
lifetime, and the search for an ‘authentic’ Emirati culture that attempts to fix culture in a 
particular historical moment in the past, away from the current shifting reality. There 
have always been many different people who make up Dubai, but concern is growing 
concern over Emirati culture being destroyed by diversity,   
At the time the country was setting up, they obviously imported lots of teachers 
and doctors from the Arab region, and Indians… I have always  been them 
around. And again, maybe once in a while there is questioning ‘oh  they are taking 
over’ just like the red Indians. And its like ‘No, we invited  them  all of these 
people, please’. This comparison is just the most nonsense ever. And they are 
here. I never hear enough gratefulness, like you know, a lot has been built thanks 
to hard effort. It’s never hats off, lets respect the labourers. Instead  there is this 
attitude, if you don’t like it, then go back. And if someone critiques anything here, 
they are like, well why do you want to come here? Like you are here you must 
follow our rules… I don’t have any specific examples, but you know, like when 
you are in the West and you still kind of, you don’t  necessarily adapt, it’s a two-
way thing. We have invited them and there should be a right to respect. Fine, 
sometimes you hear, oh in the malls, the women, she swore at me and   used foul 
language, or walking in a mall and you are not dressed well and that is offensive 
and that is not following the rules and respecting our culture, so it becomes this 
big incident… but I am just as offended by other Emiratis and the way they 
behave towards other people. Or who drive  badly, or who have a maid carrying 
their bags walking behind them. You know  what I mean? Why is what you are 
offended by rightful, and if someone has a problem with you, it isn’t good 
enough? (Reda, Emirati) 
 
 Further lamenting her frustrations over the making of an ‘authentic’ Emirati 
culture, Reda uses the example of “Ask Ali” a column written by an Emirati national for 
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a newspaper called The National. Describing the column as ‘condescending’ and ‘awful’, 
she states, “Sometimes I read it and think that these can not be real questions. I feel like 
they make them up, and the answers are so unsophisticated”. She believes Emiratis often 
become utilized instrumentally in the attempt to be ‘represented’.   
 
When they don’t have an Emirati, and they want one to fill a page in a paper or 
want one to be involved in any kind of thing… so we can’t talk about… Because 
we can’t address anything serious. Or if there was a writer writing about a 
political issue, even then, we really don’t want you to write, and so it’s like… 
then can you just not. Just don’t write. (Reda, Emirati)  
  
 She explains that this lack of “intelligent representations” from Emiratis in 
English papers contrasts with sophisticated articles in Arabic papers that take up social 
problems. She argues that none of these issues are addressed properly in English papers, 
“It’s almost like it doesn’t matter because this is for the expats, as if Emiratis don’t read 
English” (Reda, Emirati). She describes the ways that knowledge about the emirates is 
differentially offered to Arabic and English readers. This in turn is tied to the audiences 
who are invited to engage in conversations over cultural and social issues and those who 
are marginalized in these debates, but also filled with ‘misrepresentations’ of Emiratis 
and Emirati cultures that fit the parameters of what is seen as expat participation. Reda 
explained that thirty or forty years ago when the expat communities were being 
established it might have been more understandable that dialogue was not established, but 
now that people had been living there for decades, dialogue was necessary to deepen 
understandings, rather than publish “where an expat can go for brunch” as the only 
important issue that expats should care about (Reda, Emirati). There were several 
significant threads in her analysis, such as the ways that the idea of ‘cultural threats’ is 
seen as an Emirati-only issue that need not involve the insight of or dialogue between 
groups. Thus, culture is seen as a self-contained Emirati issue to be taken up by the state 
through projects based on ‘cultural preservation’ rather than dialogue and exchange 
between residents. These divisions lend themselves to social divisions that many find 
difficult to transgress. In particular, many expats highlight that they have never spoken 
directly to an Emirati national, and many never feel that they ‘can’ engage them at any 
level, for any reason, because of their relatively ‘untouchable status’. Similarly, many 
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Emirati’s feel that expats do not respect the social and cultural mores of their society 
enough to be engaged respectfully. Migrant majority low waged workers are not at all 
included in these dialogues but face the brunt of the restrictions and regulations aimed at 
protecting ‘indigenous’ culture against the intrusions of ‘Others’.  Reda comments on 
these divisions between expats and Emirati’s highlights,  
I feel like it is on both ends. On the one end, some people came here just to live a 
certain kind of lifestyle and make their money and leave, that was always there 
intent, they really don’t care if they don’t go past the Marina, but then there are 
those people who have stayed longer and who want to explore but I think it just 
takes a bit of effort to find it. And it is hard, because, like, okay, for example, a 
man just can’t suddenly approach and start talking to an Emirati woman. And then 
the Emirati men always hang out in packs, and interests are the same, like sports 
or that kind of thing. I do understand that it is a challenge and that it is not easy. 
And I do find Westerners who are really chummy… sometimes I feel like it is 
brown nosing, horrible from my side. And its like that’s all they are trying to do. 
Brown nosing from the Westerner to the Emirati. (Reda, Emirati) 
  
 Reda also discussed the ways in which, as an Emirati, she is often tokenized to 
represent the ‘Emirati’ perspective and often finds relationships of this kind to be 
inauthentic.  
 Importantly, she discusses also the hopes she believes many Emiratis share in 
terms of Dubai’s development and the ways that this has been carried out.  
 In the spirit of the ‘Can Do’ city and the city with a big dreams and ambitions 
 and hopes. And it is all well intentioned I don’t doubt that, or it’s how things 
 are done, and how fast. And  sometimes it is better to do things like in phases 
 versus trying to do everything. So I mean, there is nothing wrong with trying to 
 be a top city but we want to be respected. So then do it well. Can we not do it 
 where, just because we have the money we do it, but because we have the brains 
 and the intelligence and we know what to do with it. And not always relying on 
 hiring  someone else to do it. And this is what like I want Dubai to move away 
 from. You know, for the longest time, we have got  the money, we have got the 
 money, but what about us and how we feel.  Are we always going to rely on 
 someone else to do our dirty work? Or be there to consult us to do what is right? 
 This is  sometimes where it just worries me, on where or how Dubai is 
 growing. But like I said, at the end of the day, it works. I like that I can work, and 
 there is the South Indian shops and you can  have a shawarma here, and yes the 
 ridiculously named places in  Satwa.  As much as we are trying to,  we are still not 
 there, then fine, that is where the true colours show. I feel like there is a lot that 
 can be done by the Emirati’s instead of just  moaning, and  wallowing about 
 the culture… (Reda, Emirati) 
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 Reda expresses the frustrations of many Emirati’s who feel that the 
developmental trajectory of Dubai has been carried out without the consultation of 
Emirati’s themselves who feel that their voices are lost in the rush towards development, 
as well as being built at the expense of the many, who are integral to building the city, but 
are treated as though they are disposable.   
 In considering popular representations of Dubai, several Emiratis discussed 
variations of their frustrations in the highly orientalized descriptions and assumptions 
about Dubai, and Emiratis. For example, Natasha, discussed what she views as a 
dominant theme of Dubai, spearheaded by the West, as either only about excessive 
money and wealth, or repressive, Muslim cultures and traditions.  
 So whenever I go anywhere, everyone is like, ‘Oh my God, Dubai! You  must 
 be so rich! And you have money money! Dirhams Dirhams! Gold! Gold!”  So 
 there is that perception of luxury and glamour, which definitely there is some 
 of that, but it is not the whole experience for everybody who lives here. So when 
 you come and live here you totally see that immediately. But at the same time, it 
 is an idea that is completely perpetuated by Dubai itself. This is what they put out 
 there. They put out this, scenes of Burj Al Arab, Burj Khalifa and the beach, 
 hotels and Rolls Royce and things made of gold and that is the only thing some 
 people have taken away from it. That is one  impression. And then, the other 
 impression is like this whole middle  eastern… you know, I don’t know how to 
 explain it… like… really strict kind  of repressed society, there is a lot of  that 
 especially in the British tabloids. (Natasha, Emirati) 
 
 Frustrated by the ways in which Dubai is dichotomized by two extreme views, 
Natasha discusses the one view of money, gold and glamour, and the other of a highly 
orientalized notion of Arab/Muslim ‘Otherness’ propagated by Euro-American tabloids. 
Natasha gives another important example of the ways in which European orientalism 
towards Arabs and the Emirates in particular operates to create ideas of ‘Eastern’, 
‘backwards’, ‘irrational’, ‘repressive’, ‘Arab-Muslim’ culture through the example of a 
British expat couple who were arrested on a beach in Dubai for having sex. In the 
European media the story was presented as ‘the crazy backward Arab country’ who jailed 
a women and tried to control her sexuality, thus in effect, curtailing her ‘freedom’. The 
story was told in many versions but Natasha’s understanding was that a couple was seen 
having sex on a public beach in bright daylight told them to stop immediately. He went 
away but the couple continued, and when he returned he again told them to stop and 
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again left. When he came back and the couple had still not stopped, the woman began 
shouting and attempted to assault the officer. She was arrested for insulting a police 
officer and taken to jail. In her telling of the story, Natasha asks, “If you were on a beach 
somewhere in New York or LA, would you be allowed to have sex in broad daylight? I 
think not. But of course, those ‘crazy Arabs and their third world laws trying to control 
women is the story we are told” (Natasha, Emirati). As many explained, the British 
tabloids often represent Dubai as repressive at times, and simultaneously a dream world. 
Reda also is concerned over what she calls the idea of “the evil Arabs” who are 
represented as greedy and guilty, but as Reda states, “a lot of the same people are guilty 
of buying or investing here, so everyone is guilty” (Reda, Emirati).  
 
Real Culture?  
 In another way, many expats highlighted that their view of locals was based on 
limited interactions with Emiratis, and was based on their social status, rumors and 
relationships and ideas of their power and privilege. These views, built mainly on 
speculation, are encapsulated in the following exoticized representation of Emirati 
women.  
 Their lives are so fascinating… they wear fancy abayas, expensive abayas, and 
 they are like 3000 dirhams or more, and you can’t see what they are wearing 
 underneath, so the way they dress up is with their really high heels, their purses 
 and their abayas open up so they wear the tights and clothes underneath. The only 
 time I see Emirati’s or their culture is possibly when they enforce certain dress 
 codes or have areas of how they frown down on public displays of affection… 
 (Lo, British) 
 
 On differences in cultural interests, Sean argues that most foreigners are not that 
receptive to Emirati culture. For example, he argues that expats, “don’t want to get up at 
6 am and watch camel racing. Maybe you go to falconry once and then you cannot drink 
and sit separately from your spouse. I don’t know it is just so culturally different” (Sean, 
Canadian).  
 Expats had different ideas about the ‘threats’ faced by Emiratis in the wake of a 
majority migrant population. Karen, a Canadian expat, comments on viewing citizens as 
an ‘indigenous group’ that is often seen as part of a spectacle.  
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Sometimes I try to look at it from their point of view and it is their country and 
okay… Not about the unequal part, but there are certain things they have to do 
because they are the minority and sometimes I feel like they have the right to 
be… Sometimes I feel like they are angry. Sometimes I walk in the mall and I can 
not see one Emirati instead and I just feel like… One time I went to the salon and 
it was filled with Brits and other nationalities and this one national walked in and 
she was like an alien, like ‘what are you doing here?’ Everybody was just staring 
at her and I feel bad for them. If you are living in your own country and it is 
invaded by other people, then you are going to put rules to like… protect it. 
(Karen, Canadian) 
 
 However, in contrast, another Canadian expat, Svetlana explains,  
    
I’m sorry but it is not invaded. These people and these expats are the ones  who 
helped build the country. It has been 37 years, I am sorry but the Emiratis would 
not have been the Emirates without the expats. Basically then expats came and 
built the country and then right now they are treating them like, oh okay, now we 
are becoming more and now we are trying to encourage whatever, localization. 
(Svetlana, Canadian) 
 
 Many long time expats such as these subjects articulated similar feelings of 
isolation and frustration with what they viewed as unequal treatment, “We respect their 
culture, we respect their lifestyle, we respect everything and everything related to their 
traditions and their culture and then they just… we are just not treated equally. Not like 
normal citizens” (Rebecca, Egyptian).  
 In addition, many discussed the ways in which culture was being represented in a 
time capsule. “I feel like it is an invented heritage. It is complicated between what is real 
and what wasn’t and trying to shoehorn Emirati’s into the world histories” (Hattie, 
British). In considering how these themes are taken up by expats we find a range of 
perspectives on culture and identity. Some highlight the ‘newness’ of the city, as Mario 
explains in his experience.  
You don’t come here expecting to walk and find Cathedrals and Mosques. It is a 
2000 year old city. No one is going to say that. It’s a 40-year-old city. It is a 
choice you make. Most people, wherever you are, if you move to Canada, and live 
there and criticize everything, then why are you there? You were in a different 
place, then why did you come? You come here willingly and then you criticize 
everything, then just leave, no one is forcing you to stay here. (Mario, Canadian)   
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 The ‘real’ Dubai many informants argue is in-between these two extremes. Thus, 
Dubai is based on a “unique urban condition, which can not be explored by looking only 
at its spectacular projects” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 1).  
These diverse insights into some of the major lifestyles and relationships between 
groups help to provide insight into the many complex issues and negotiations that 
subjects are engaged in. In terms of the relationships between sectors, as subjects have 
articulated in various ways, whether explicitly or implicitly, all residents of Dubai are 
situated within a complex social hierarchy that is both formally and informally 
maintained. In addition, as highlighted previously, the historic development of the area 
that would become modern day Dubai has been shaped by significant international forces 
that, taken together, have manifested themselves into the global city trajectory that 
importantly shapes the city’s priorities and forms. At the same time, the UAE represents 
an important contemporary example of global city-making with unique contextual forms 
such as the majority migrant population, exclusive citizenship policies and a global 
location, both in imagined terms and in geographical and migratory pathways between 
‘East’ and ‘West’. As home to over 200 different nationalities, each group brings with it 
unique histories and conditions that interact with local conditions to shape everyday lives 
in diverse ways.  
 
Multiculturalism?  
 For some expats, from the Global North and South, the multicultural aspects of 
Dubai’s globality are a significant change from back home. Lo, a British expat describes 
the area she comes from in the UK as very ‘white’, and therefore, for her, “Cultural 
integration isn’t something that I have always felt done very well in the UK, or there are 
many obstacles for people. And I think one of the things that I found here, is the cultural 
acceptance” (Lo, British). She explores different symbols of this diversity in her 
discussions of Diwali in Bur Dubai or the spirit of Ramadan, and her exposure to the 
religions and cultures that make up Dubai’s residents and believes many migrants who 
come to Dubai may be open to learning about other cultures since they are willing to 
leave home for the experience of living abroad. Furthering these ideas, Jo, an American 
expat, discusses the daily interactions with diversity.  
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 Here there are people here from all sorts of backgrounds so you are not dealing 
 with one sort of mentality or one culture, you are dealing with … your grocer is 
 different from the people you are working with. You are dealing with all sorts of 
 cultures. In a day, I have an Indian, Pakistani and Kenyan security guards. The 
 grocer is Filipino. My Pilates instructor is Tunisian, and there is another girl that 
 is Chinese. And then there is you, but everyday you are going to at least bump 
 into at least 10 cultures… there are British people and South American, there are 
 just so many cultures. There is everything. It’s because it’s so naturally seen on a
 daily basis that you never think about it… when someone asks you to think about, 
 you have to put in effort because when you see something so frequently you just 
 sort of block it out. (Jo, American)  
 
 For others, such as Egyptians Svetlana and Anna, living in Dubai taught them 
“respect for other cultures and religions” (Svetlana, Egyptian), “Here I feel that everyone 
are equals. Muslims and Christians. I don’t feel that they are unequal” (Anna, Egyptian). 
For Zain, another Egyptian expat, university life showcased this diversity tremendously 
with, in his university, 10% locals, around thirty percent Arabs including from Lebanon, 
Syria, Jordan and Egypt, around twenty percent Americans and Canadians, a little bit of 
British, and then Iranians as the biggest majority in the university.  
 The way that I see it is that you get to see people from all over the world in one 
 little, very tiny location. So I mentioned this before, you get to know a lot about 
 different backgrounds, different religions. You get to learn how to communicate 
 with someone who doesn’t understand where you are coming from. I don’t know, 
 it is very comfortable in such an environment. (Zain, Egyptian)   
 
 Another Egyptian expat discusses how respect for other cultures is a major part of 
his appreciation of the UAE. He compares the UAE to Egypt, and then argues that 
Dubai’s peaceful coexistence of diverse groups is based on the fact that the strict ‘rules’ 
of the UAE foster respect amongst diverse populations. For Emirati Natasha, the 
multicultural aspect of Dubai is reflected in people who grew up in Dubai, who are 
generally open to a vast variety of cultures, speak different languages, and have 
experience dealing with different cultures. And although interact with each other, for the 
most part people tend to retain their culture no matter how long they have lived in Dubai.  
Maybe that is because they don’t get naturalized. But if you have been here for 20 
or 30 years and you are from China, let’s say, you still think of yourself as 
Chinese and that kind of applies to all the nationalities. There are people from 
100s of different countries here, and they all behave that way. (Natasha, Emirati) 
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 While many discuss the ‘multicultural’ makeup of the population, all subjects 
interviewed for the study, as well numerous scholars on the region, have documented 
strict social hierarchies that significantly impact the everyday lives of different groups. 
As discussed, these divisions are heavily based on highly racialized ideas of class and 
nationality, and are supported by state based ideologies and commonsensical 
knowledge(s) created about different groups. Therefore, realities of privilege and 
complicity are masked by ideas of cultural ‘threats’ and survival that work to create 
distance between groups through ideas of ‘us’ and ‘them’, or the racialized construction 
of the category of the ‘Other’. The social organization of Dubai is heavily based on 
hierarchies of entitlement that shape access to resources, standards and conditions of 
work and life, and the possibilities of belonging. As Elsheshtawy points out in his study 
of the social geographies of Dubai,  
 While a city such as Dubai defines itself for the most part as a multicultural 
 melting pot of sorts, it is more of a polyglot, a confused mix of ethnic groups, 
 where, in spite of the existence of numerous nationalities, each has its own 
 dedicated space and encounters take place only in controlled settings such as 
 shopping malls. (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 27)  
 
 Similarly, subjects articulate a range of important considerations in how these 
social hierarchies are experienced and lived, as well as how they are shaped and 
understood. For American expat Jo society is divided into ‘local’ citizens and everyone 
else, and “everyone else is where you find all of the different cultures clustered together. 
I see all these clusters together and they create their own, they recreate their own culture 
and their mini culture here” (Jo, American). Further, “there is no one culture here and 
when they do end up mixing like the different cultures together, it is a very superficial 
mixing” (Jo, American). In supporting this idea of cultural organization, Lo notes the 
clubs that cater to different nationalities at specific places and events. “For instance, the 
400 Club, it will be a Lebanese club. If you go to Nassimi it’s a very Arab crowd, 
sometimes it would be Arab on one side and expat on the other. Chi, which would be 
very English, and then on another night, depending on the music, Indian” (Lo, British).  
American expat Carlos notes that while you may learn communication and tolerance, in 
the end “every community sticks together” (Carlos, American).  For Emirati, Reda, 
diversity has always been a part of her life in Dubai. She explains that the British 
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dominated the expats when she was young, but over time more nationalities migrated to 
Dubai, each congregating in its own space. 
 There is definitely a split and depending on which part of town you go to, you 
 know what you are going to find and see, and that is fine and good having a 
 multicultural society. Yes we are not all integrated and I think it’s… again, it’s 
 different backgrounds, and lifestyles, and you know the money makers versus the 
 non-money makers. So I can understand, socially we don’t all mix but there is still 
 once in a while we might… (Reda, Emirati) 
 
 For others, the openness of the UAE has its limits, as Rebecca asks in an 
exchange,  
 How many people have ever met someone Jewish here? You can’t say I am 
 atheist. You have to put a religion. A lot of my French friends would be so mad 
 because their parents would be atheist, and they would have to put Catholic if 
 they wanted to come to the country. I think it is open-minded but not as open 
 minded as people think. (Rebecca, Egyptian)  
 
 These insights all beg the question of what best describes Dubai’s diversity. 
Melting pot? Mosaic? Meeting place? What is clear is that the façade of multiculturalism 
is superficially understood by most as merely acknowledging the existence of different 
communities, but the spatial geography of the city clearly highlights the immense social 
hierarchies, which dominate relations between groups.  
 Considering how Dubai’s ‘multiculturalism’ is put into practice, while many low 
waged labourers may be forced out of malls and face explicit discrimination in many 
spaces, at other times their exclusion is more intangible and thus difficult to pinpoint for 
many. The simple feelings of ‘not being welcome’ are in fact tied to larger social 
understandings of who belongs and where and thus operate as mechanisms of discipline 
and social control. Elsheshtawy (2010) highlights several other mechanisms at play in 
creating these seemingly informal types of segregation. The Mall of Emirates or Madinat 
Jumeirah are both located far from the traditional city core, designed to be accessed by 
car, and next to impossible to access without. This is seen as geographical distancing and 
biased infrastructural development that implicitly leaves certain people out (Elsheshtawy, 
2010, 215). In addition, geographical distancing can be seen through the accommodations 
provided to many low waged labourers who often explained that they lived on the 
outskirts of town or even in neighbouring emirates, making it immensely difficult to 
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reach these major centers and forcing them into a form of social isolation. The reality of 
long hours, inadequate rest days, and illness, combined with poverty and the exclusionary 
forces of ‘luxury’, all work together to exclude many people from accessing many 
popular spaces, but also in feeling a sense of belonging or entitlement.  
However, as Elsheshtawy (2010) also highlights, alternative spaces do exist in 
Dubai, which cater to different needs and where ‘Other’ communities gather beyond the 
spectacular spaces of Dubai. But, while many romanticize these places as ‘real’ or 
‘authentic’ spaces, with their ‘decay’, ‘disorder’ and less sanitized areas (Elsheshtawy, 
2010), they have in fact been created as a response to the needs of low income and 
marginalized communities, which gives insight into the extreme social inequalities that 
dominate much of the city’s development and social life. Formal policies also work to 
shape access to certain spaces, explicitly outlining areas for expatriates and locals, as well 
as giving tremendous benefits to citizens, including land grants, housing allowances and 
loans. “Taking care of your own would be fine, if it wasn’t at the expense of everyone 
else who did all the work” (Adonis, Jordanian).   
 In the ‘Other’ Dubai, one finds the disenfranchised majority who generally live in 
substandard living situations, facing eviction, arrest and detention, or confinement to 
camps. The ‘plight of bachelors’ (Khalaf and Alkobaisi, 1999), is a reality faced by 
married or single men unable to bring their families because of minimum income 
requirements that they do not meet. Scholars highlight the ways that ‘bachelor’ life is 
highly racialized, and not equally applicable to all residents but rather works to regulate 
the lives of low income populations. Two important spaces are the largest labour camps 
of Al Quoz and Sonapur, military style camps that encourage segregation by nationality, 
and are located on the outskirts of the city to keep workers away from the dominant 
image of Dubai. The ‘Othered’ spaces are often not extremely isolated from the city and 
may often be visible and accessible but socially distanced through negative, racialized 
representations as spaces of danger and crime because of their inhabitants.  
 
 The importance of this study is connected to the fact that while many important 
scholarly works on Dubai have been published in the last ten years, there are also large 
numbers of works that are riddled with grand generalizations, that while sometimes 
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thoughtfully considered, lack the necessary historical analysis that situates particular 
forms of power and subjectivity in relation to states practices or the lack there of. Overall, 
there is very limited analysis that attempts to deconstruct or map historical trajectories 
which consider how race, nationality, push factors, and other social considerations may 
have both created and perpetuated the ‘general’ lifestyles. Here however, I will highlight 
a few significant works that connect to the broad themes of the socio-spatial hierarchies 
operating in Dubai.  
 The extreme differences in lived experience between expats, Emiratis and low 
waged workers highlight the highly unequal status and entitlements faced by different 
groups.  The insights examined by different groups highlight the ways in which social life 
in the city is organized and maintained both in material and ideological terms. In 
particular, the everyday experiences, as a scale of social analysis, illuminate the ways that 
seemingly invisible, yet formal and historical mechanisms, create and maintain 
hierarchies based heavily on citizenship and nationality. The existing scholarly research 
available on these issues makes clear that any adequate analysis on the contemporary 
experiences of migrants to this region must be rooted and explained through a historical 
understanding of the processes that have worked to create highly racialized and 
exclusionary structures of social and political rights and entitlements. The hierarchies of 
entitlement between nationals and foreigners cannot be understood without revealing the 
complicated relationships between citizens themselves, as well as the historical legacies 
of European and American interests and what shaped the modern Gulf state as we know 
it today. In addition, the significance of gender in differentiating the experiences of 
workers is significant, as numbers of female migrant workers continue to grow, while 
many of their vulnerabilities continue to be ignored as issues taking place in the private 
sphere with little or no regulation. A range of scholars support these ideas, and add 
different elements for further consideration in the subsequent chapter, as we turn to 
examine the formative features of citizenship that shape national mythology and the 
creation of exalted and preferred subjects. 
  
 To begin, Malecki and Ewers (2007) explore the labour networks that link labour 
demand in booming Gulf cities to sources of supply in poor, yet labour rich countries. 
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This relationship, which is embedded in the conceptualization of ‘unmapping’, 
acknowledges the need for a relational analysis in explicating social relations. Malecki 
and Ewers acknowledge the existence of discriminatory hiring practices tied to 
nationality. They point to the example of hospitals where nurses are primarily Filipino 
and Egyptian, unskilled janitorial positions are taken up by Sri Lankan and Bangladeshi 
workers, while Americans and Europeans fill senior hospital administration, medical and 
head nurse positions (Malecki and Ewers, 2007, 475). Many interviewees referred to the 
explicit preferences in hiring for certain nationalities in certain jobs, as well as the 
practice of paying different nationalities different salaries for the same job, based on 
where they are from.  The authors note the unique contextual features of the UAE having 
no avenue for formal citizenship for migrants, and highlight the differential treatment of 
workers, many of whom cannot bring their families because their incomes do not meet 
the basic requirements.  
The authors point to unique and complex variations of social polarization in the 
Gulf. They highlight the widening inequalities in many cities, and the marked ethnic and 
social exclusion found in many multi ethnic cities. In the case of the Gulf, they argue that 
polarization of the labour force has sharper divisions from elsewhere in the world as a 
result of the strong need to import labour. Because each group has a function, they argue 
that instead of binaries between skilled and unskilled, or areas with social and economic 
power and those without, “there are multiple layers of distinct divisions between public 
and private sector, between national and expatriate and between male and female 
(Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 477). This is seen in the discussion of diverse lived experiences 
in the city where expat professionals and low waged workers are differentiated based on 
their employment sector and nationality, thus reinforcing the multiple layers of 
differentiation that work to organize social life. The authors point to a trichotemous social 
division between local Arabs, skilled Western expats and low skilled mainly South Asian 
workers. Although it is necessary to acknowledge the diversity that exists within these 
sectors, as gender and nationality for example dictate differential status and treatment, the 
authors still support the popular understandings of social hierarchies with indigenous 
Arabs at the top with posh government jobs and unparalleled social contracts from the 
government. This, in their view, leads to unsustainable practices in the entire private 
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where almost all employed are expatriates. Age demographics add pressure to these 
divisions with over half of the GCC population under the age of 25, and almost half of 
that under 15 (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 477). In the case of the second division, skilled 
workers are recruited, because capital accumulation in the Gulf can pay foreign firms and 
foreign workers unparalleled wages and fees to build highly specialized physical and 
service infrastructure. Finally, in the third division, are low skilled, low waged migrant 
workers, the highest numbers of whom are construction workers and domestic workers. 
They also argue that different groups live in distinct housing areas, which is an important 
feature of the urban social geography and is one of the key physical embodiments of 
polarization. In general it is important to highlight that these divisions are more varied 
and complex than dichotomies, thus, “The social status of individuals in this 
kaleidoscopic mélange is a fundamental representation of social polarization in the 
region” (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 478).  
This can be seen in the ways in which Westerners occupy the highest social strata 
after local Arabs - even other Arabs, depending on their levels of education and economic 
status, can be second to westerners - and then Asians who are described as “outcasts in a 
society that depends on them for its basic functioning and whose infrastructure their 
efforts build” (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 479). In addition to these divisions, further 
inequalities exist in wage differentials where Indians are paid more than Bangladeshis 
and Sri Lankans.  
 With the female labour force there are even more divisions and issues faced by 
women from Asia and Africa who occupy the lowest levels of the social hierarchy, which 
in turn shapes the type of work they are given within the home. Domestic workers in 
general are treated as extremely disposable although integral to everyday living. 
“Housemaids in the Middle East are like luxury goods regarded as indispensable for 
maintenance and upkeep of the large homes and comfortable lifestyle which the 
population is used to now” (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 479).  
 Several important scholarly works on expat communities build on the 
complexities between sectors, and the role of ethnic, racial and gendered criteria in 
organizing labour by examining important forces such as the layers of differentiation tied 
to ethnic, racial, and gendered criteria, in relation to methods of recruitment and the low 
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wage flexible and disposable workforce, in contrast to high skilled, high wage global 
cosmopolitan lifestyles.  
 The recent work of two notable scholars on Dubai specifically shows how these 
issues operate through important historical conditions. First, the work of Walsh (2010) on 
British expat communities in Dubai importantly highlights the ways that analysis of 
Dubai’s rise as a model for global city development is often devoid of any adequate 
examination of the role of race, class and migrant status. Walsh discusses the impacts on 
Dubai in its post-Federation economic diversification strategies, which are heavily tied to 
a migration regime that has been called an “immigrant gateway” by scholars. In her 
examination of urban spaces in this emerging global city, she discusses the ways in which 
migrants negotiate spatial relations. It has been widely documented that a strong 
racialized and classed social hierarchy exists between nationals and migrants, and even 
among migrants, depending on their place of origin. Her focus is on the interactions 
between high skilled British migrants and low skilled migrants from Asia and the Middle 
East, exploring the role of postcolonial notions of race, class and nationality, as they 
relate to the imperial histories of Britain and discussing these racialized encounters in 
relation to political economy and imperialist legacies. Her work strongly supports the 
theoretical analysis being presented here around the ways that power works through 
racial histories to create informal processes through which power is “asserted, accepted, 
contested or subverted” (Walsh, 2010, 237).  
 She presents important insights about the ways that the racialization of urban 
space represents localized power relations, resulting from global and transnational 
interconnections, past and present (Walsh, 2010, 237), thus acknowledging not only the 
broader global political economy in which Dubai is situated, but the significance of the 
temporal and genealogical histories that influence the racialization of everyday life and 
urban space, discussed here through a spatial analysis.  
 She importantly highlights the ways in which white British migrants utilize race 
for privilege and simultaneously deny its existence, and thus displacing whiteness in a 
processes of racialization. She invokes the work of numerous postcolonial scholars who 
focus on ‘colonial continuities’ between nationals and expats. Importantly, however, 
other scholars give importance to the relations between a diverse range of groups to 
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highlight how ‘displaced’ postcolonial encounters work to transfer colonial continuities 
into contemporary processes, relationships that are informed but not limited to historic 
relations. Thus, spatialized processes of racialization contribute to the formation of 
migrant identities. As Dubai has the highest percentage of foreign born residents in the 
world, the issue of segmented labour markets is marked by gendered and racialized 
processes through which employers, as discussed by subjects in my study, make known 
explicit preferences for specific nationalities, and it is openly acknowledged that different 
nationalities will be paid according to their citizenship based status, even in cases of the 
same labour.  
 Not all British migrants, as those discussed here have highlighted, would be 
considered ‘highly skilled’ or ‘transnational business class’, but as a group, primarily 
based on their nationality, itself highly racialized, they become privileged in the social 
hierarchy. She unmaps these geographies of migration to expose the historic links 
between Britain and the protectorate relations it held with the UAE from 1892, until the 
federation of the UAE in 1971. She highlights the ways in which imperial relations 
remain visible through the Visa system, where British migrants move with relative ease 
and freedom to the Emirates. Most significantly here, as I have argued previously, the 
links between historic forces of race and class, as they intersect with local inequalities, 
shape their privilege (Walsh, 2010, 239). Of course in her analysis, Walsh is focused on 
British migrants who experience whiteness in obvious physical ways. However, as we 
will see in further analysis of the role of race, nationality and citizenship in shaping 
privilege, power and disposition work to create social hierarchies with significant 
consequences in the everyday lives of all residents of the city.  
 Walsh highlights the work of Mike Davis, analyzing British complicity and 
contributions to the exploitation of low paid Asian migrants. Thus, both contribute to 
analyses that push beyond simple dichotomies of migrants and nationals, and interrogate 
the levels of relationships which afford privilege to many migrants, such as Third world 
elites and Western expats, as seen in the lifestyles discussed by subjects above. Overall, 
their whiteness and imperial legacies, which shape their nationality, afford them privilege 
vis-à-vis the disempowerment of Others. Thus, we see through her analysis the 
postcolonial space of encounter - postcolonial not with regard to ongoing imperial 
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relations between British and Emirati nationals, but postcolonial in relations between 
highly skilled European migrants and low skilled migrants from Asia and the Middle 
East. “In encounters between these groups, there is a sense of historical relations from 
elsewhere being reproduced in the urban spaces of this emerging global city, a kind of 
displaced postcolonial encounter” (Walsh, 2010, 251).  
 
 The second work, by Neha Vora (2008), explores the experiences of middle class 
Indians in Dubai through two modes of diasporic subjectivity, racial consciousness and 
consumer citizenship. Vora works to challenge the underlying assumptions in many 
Indian diasporic literatures that prioritize the economic domain as the foundation for 
diasporic formation and culture (Vora, 2008, 378). Instead she explores a range of 
diasporic subjectivities and practices constituted through migration to Dubai and the 
experiences of living there (Vora, 2008, 403). In terms of racial consciousness, Vora’s 
examples highlight through the insights of informants high levels of systemic 
discrimination and racial hierarchies in Dubai. However, while most informants 
experienced discrimination based on race and nationality, they still maintained a 
particular middle class subjectivity, tied to their belief in the globalized free market, 
which was ‘supposed to offer opportunities for everyone” (Vora, 2008, 388). Importantly, 
Vora notes that middle class status, a status that is constructed in relation to other 
categories and groups of migrants, was a significant status that middle class Indians used 
to differentiate themselves from labourers, and to argue that they deserved “less racism”, 
thus making them feel superior (Vora, 2008, 390). Vora’s informants focused many of 
their experiences of racism on Goras (Hindi word for fair skinned or white) (Vora, 2008, 
385). Their negative experiences were seen as failures of Dubai’s free market, which 
were being threatened by whites and locals. However, while they connected their 
struggles to other classes of South Asians, they still promoted neoliberal discourses of 
self management and attributed failures to individual inefficiencies, as in the case of 
lower paid workers who should practice more self-management and greater self respect to 
create a less discriminatory system (Vora, 2008, 391). Overall then, racial consciousness 
emerged out of experiences of discrimination but was influenced by their middle class 
status and belief in the free market economy (Vora, 2008, 395).  
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 With regard to consumer citizenship, Vora argues that despite a lack of formal 
access to citizenship and segregation from Emiratis and other expatriate groups, Indians 
in Dubai displayed forms of belonging through their consumption practices. Neoliberal 
technologies of belonging and subjectivity were understood by middle class Indians in 
Dubai through the idea of the ideal citizen as an entrepreneur of himself. This was 
understood in relation to Indian elites who were conceptualized similarly to Emiratis, as 
“excessive consumers, lazy, did not want to work hard and unfairly got wealth off of the 
labour of others” (Vora, 2008, 394). Interestingly, then, racial consciousness which arose 
from experiences of discrimination was a part of a new subjectivity for these migrants, 
but this oppression was not a challenge to their middle class status or their belief in the 
free market (Vora, 2008, 395). Thus, issues such as racism were considered to be failures 
of globalization in Dubai, which should be outside and separate from issues of identity 
and social relations.  
 
 From these analyses of the understandings of different groups of residents in 
Dubai of their social status and lifestyle relative to others in the city, we find that there 
are important factors, both structural and ideological, that impact the creation of social 
hierarchies. The relations embedded in the space both shape and are shaped by forces 
such as the broader political economy, national discourses, policies and practices, while, 
historical genealogies that undergird the geographies of migration implicate broader 
histories of the colonialism and international division of labour in the making of various 
subjectivities.   
 Although the concept of the ‘the international division of labour’ may be 
considered an outdated conceptualization of international labour migration, with scholars 
of development, for example, pushing more contemporary concepts of Global North and 
South to illuminate the shifting global terrain, the historical conceptualizations of ‘First’ 
and ‘Third’ worlds have important historical continuities of ideas of race, class and 
gender in the contemporary period. Despite important shifts in the global political 
economy, these divisions exist in so far that they help to create and maintain national 
hierarchies that privilege the ‘West’ over the ‘East’, and reinscribe Orientalizing notions 
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of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, which help to explain popular conceptualizations of Dubai 
as a nation ‘in between’ two worlds.  
 The endless engagements of diverse groups with each other and the city space 
generate important modes of being. We can see, for example, that when low waged 
workers articulate their difficult struggles and experiences in the city relative to the 
promises of Dubai dreams, the articulation is linked to the lifestyle of the professional 
expat communities of the city. Similarly, when expat professionals from the Global North 
discuss their lifestyles in Dubai, then is shown the making of their ‘relative’ privilege vis-
à-vis this majority of poor workers from the Global South, and their relationships to 
Emiratis. Furthermore, the experiences of Emirati citizens as they are engaged in social 
contestation over issues of culture, identity and ‘indigeneity’ shape their relationships to 
other sectors, and create a sense of normalization of social inequalities based on 
‘hierarchies of entitlement’ that shape who is deserving of what with interesting, albeit 
problematic, rationales.  
 
Conclusion 
 In exploring the hierarchical social relations of space that together constitute the 
identity of the city and its subjects, the many overlapping, intersecting and conflicting 
geographies must be examined through a genealogical analysis that allows us to make 
sense of the simultaneity of social processes constructed around migration, labour, and 
citizenship in various spatial arrangements, at various levels, that allow for the 
reproduction of racial, gendered and class based hierarchical configurations. Together, 
they produce a broad based social consensus about the roles and rights of Others, through 
the everyday interactions that provide the manifestations of various global regimes of 
power relations into the socio-cultural landscapes, both physical and symbolic.  
 The impact of understanding what is behind the hegemonic ‘Dubai Dream’ means 
exposing the ideologies of ordering in which the seemingly informal social hierarchies 
that dominate everyday interactions in Dubai become normalized. This means exposing 
the ways in which these inequalities are often formally regulated, but become common 
sense and perpetuated by the ‘everyday’. Examples include the naturalization of 
hegemonic ideologies of ‘us’ and ‘them’, which shape relationships that are not limited to 
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Emirati-Migrant relations. These ideologies work to create dehumanized categories of 
people that reinforce hierarchies, which in turn impact the entitlements of various 
subjects. The basis of much of these entitlements has been linked to ideas and histories 
embedded within the broader historical context of migration for labour, and the making 
of Dubai’s global city dreams.  
 Within this matrix, migrants from all over the world, and Emiratis themselves, are 
made as subjects within the global city space constituted both through formal and 
informal processes.  
The following chapter explores in more detail the role of citizenship in 
influencing these hierarchies and the overall social organization. In particular, it 
examines how the absence of citizenship for the majority of migrants impacts their 
experiences of Dubai Dreams. It also examines the role of citizenship, both Emirati and 
‘foreign’, as it reinforces the national identity and privilege of certain categories. In 
addition, as we will see that, when national identity is seen as under threat, and national 
insecurity becomes a dominant socio-political concern, the social consequences are felt 
differentially based on one’s social locations within the urban hierarchy. Thus, we will 
explore the roles of exaltation, and Othering as they impact subject making.  
We continue to deepen our understanding of the histories that accompany 
migrants on journeys of migration, as well as how these forces have shaped Dubai’s 
global city based developmental trajectory, through notions of belonging, entitlement and 
citizenship. These processes in turn are accompanied by policies and projects at the state 
level to control and regulate social relations, which are implicated in broader narratives 
and experiences of belonging. As will see, these processes are linked to the ideological 
forces that justify, excuse, rationalize, and even legitimatize the exclusion and 
exploitation of the majority of poor, low waged workers from entitlements, thus 
enhancing the role of dehumanization in creating disposability and normalizing violence.  
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Chapter Six: Awakening, Citizenship and the Making of the ‘Other’ 
 
Dubai is place where it looks like a dream. On the outside it looks beautiful and 
then on inside you realize it is no good, it is selfish and mean, it is a nightmare. 
(Alice, Filipino)  
 
 ‘Your vision will become clear only when you look into your heart. Who looks 
outside, dreams. Who looks inside, awakens.’ Famously attributed to Carl Jung, the 
statement connects well to the themes of awakening examined in this chapter. From the 
outside, the dream of Dubai, as explained by low waged Filipino migrant worker Alice, is 
a beautiful façade, enticing and inviting, only to be met with the nightmarish awakening 
to the conditions that many low waged workers face. Significant here is that the core, the 
heart of the body, project, or dream, is a central tool of understanding the realities and 
conditions influencing its functioning, abilities and possibilities.  
Cesaire (1972) proclaimed in his examination of colonial rule, “A significant 
thing: it is not the head of a civilization that begins to rot first. It is the heart” (Cesaire, 
1972, 28) and argued that the heart of European civilization, in its greedy, quest for 
colonial domination, with all the violence and destruction wrought on colonized peoples 
leading to the rotting of its ‘heart’, could not be separated from its body. He described the 
historical legacies that live on in Western cultures as the ‘heart’ of its civilization, 
representing the ‘core’, and speaks of the diseased and rotten nature of its operations. In 
an important example, Cesaire discusses the origins of fascism within colonialism, a 
supreme barbarism that manifested in Nazism. Thus, Europe is responsible for the 
emergence of Nazism, and importantly, that what is unforgivable about Hitler is not the 
particular Nazi crimes themselves, but “the crime against the white man, the humiliation 
of the white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures, which 
until then, has been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India, 
and the blacks of Africa” (Cesaire, 1972, 14). In this example he highlights that the 
violence of colonialism does not incite public outcry and contestation by the general 
population because the ‘thingification’ of the colonized is so pervasive that there is no 
recognition of its inhumanity, let alone the fact that it destroys the colonizer in the 
process. “That a nation which colonizes, that a civilization which justifies colonization - 
and therefore force – is already a sick civilization, a civilization that is morally 
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diseased…” (Cesaire, 1972, 18). Cesaire uses this example to highlight that no matter 
how ‘civilized’ a man, the activity, enterprise, and conquest of colonialism will 
dehumanize and destroy anyone, that through these processes “a poison has been instilled 
in the veins of Europe and, slowly but surely, the continent proceeds towards savagery” 
(13). The functions of both the heart and the brain can face deterioration when sickened 
or facing moral constraint.  
In the case of sleep, we see that awakening, an unavoidable aspect of sleep, may 
also be experienced as a nightmare. A disruption stemming from our waking life (Neilson 
and Lara-Carrasco, 2007), our actions and histories, which awaken us with a frightening 
set of realizations of our inward character, center, our heart if you may. Thus in this 
chapter, the Dubai dream is reconceptualized as a nightmare through which the dream is 
made and lived by some, and not by ‘Others. We examine here how histories of race, 
nationality, gender and class influence ideologies of ordering that manifest into 
hierarchies of entitlement, as they operate to rationalize, normalize, and even, legitimize 
violent ‘dreamscapes’.  
 
 As the analysis of social hierarchies that structure relationships between residents 
of Dubai deepens, we find that the issues are in part related to the construction of 
migrants as ‘Others’. In particular, we see how the making of the ‘Other’, as a threat, 
serves important purposes in the making of nationhood. As Castles (1999) has 
highlighted, “the migrant has always been the ‘other’ of the nation-state, who could 
undermine the myths of cultural homogeneity and national identity. In the era of 
globalization, states welcome flows of capital, trade and know-how, yet frequently reject 
flows of people” (Castles, 7). In the case of the Gulf more specifically, given its 
demographic reality, as Khodkher (2010) highlights, the Gulf has little choice in its 
dependency on migrants. Rather than rejecting flows, what we find in many contexts, 
including Dubai, are modes of differential incorporation, which play an important role in 
the creation and affirmation of national mythology and identity. Therefore, the creation 
and maintenance of the category of the ‘Other’ is the necessary counterpart of the 
national citizen, and the hierarchical levels of entitlement which privilege citizens over 
‘Others’ are reinforced to reaffirm the status and power of the citizen. Furthermore, it is 
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necessary to consider how the case of global city making in Dubai complicates simple 
dichotomies between ‘us’ and ‘them’ through the dreams of diverse migrant subjects. 
Within the different layers of migration that form the majority of the population, we find 
that different forms of power operate through markers such as nationality and 
employment. In turn these are raced, classed and gendered, and implicate all residents, 
albeit in different ways. As has been highlighted through the insights from different 
subjects in the city, the ideological apparatus that accompanies the formal and structural 
conditions of sending countries, and the national policies and practices that incorporate 
different groups into a hierarchy are just as significant in maintaining the everyday 
normalization of ‘exaltation’ and ‘privilege’ of some, and disposability of ‘Others’.  
 In particular, it can be seen through an examination of how race operates, not only 
through physical markings on the epidermis, although this is a significant form, but rather 
through the ideological representations and meanings given through processes of 
racialization that are tied to nationality. Processes of racialization are explained as,  
  Those instances where social relations between people have been structured by 
 the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define 
 and construct differentiated social collectivities…. The concept therefore refers to 
 a process of categorization, a representational process of defining an Other 
 (usually, but not exclusively) somatically. (Torres et al., 1999, 7)  
 
 A simple example found in many interviews is tied to the open and commonly 
accepted practice of differential salaries given on the basis of nationality. Many have 
argued that this is largely a function of the economy in which competitiveness amongst 
firms dictates that attracting talent from the ‘First’ world requires more incentives to 
come to work in Dubai. Although these seemingly ‘neutral’ economic processes are often 
more difficult to unpack, the flip side of this clearly shows the highly discriminatory and 
racialized process through which different subjects, based on their nationality, are 
organized hierarchically to create a system of valuation in which certain subjects are 
more highly sought for reasons of prestige, status and more valued ‘experience’. This is 
based on sets of ideas in which people of colour, dominated by those from the ‘Third’ 
world, are painted as desperate, less experienced, less valuable, less desirable and thus, 
more easily disposable or replaced.  The image of the ‘desperate’ starved ‘Third world’ 
masses plays prominently into the process of racialization in which skill and value are 
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determined through sets of ideologies that create seemingly neutral structures of 
differentiation that actually have much larger historical and colonial legacies. The 
genealogies that accompany different migrants on their journeys can clearly be seen in 
the case of domestic workers, for example, who are commonly assigned tasks in the 
home depending on social perceptions of the worker and their value, based on their race 
and nationality (Khodhker, 2010, 222), or higher salaries and better benefits for Western 
passport holders for the same job. In addition, we find that the role of nationality in 
creating differential status and treatment/entitlement is based on ideas of what is seen as 
acceptable for certain people, who are then expected to work under conditions that no 
other worker would be asked to work under, especially not an expat from the West, and 
absolutely never an Emirati citizen.  
 Understanding how race operates through space, as well as how national subjects 
are constituted vis-à-vis Others, especially within complex social spaces such as the 
global city of Dubai, provides important insight into how race shapes ideas of 
‘humanness’, endowing particular nationalities with racial characteristics and qualities 
that allow some more privilege and entitlements than Others. As Torres et al. (1999) 
explain, the power of ‘race’ is not related to its having any biological basis for dividing 
the human species into groups based on physical traits, but it does exist as part of “a 
classificatory system through which a racialized social order is reproduced and 
maintained” (Torres et al., 1999, 5). As scholars note, this often takes the form of 
us/them, self/other, and white/black. The power of race is then tied to its,  
 Adaptive capacity to define population groups, and by extension social agents, 
 as self and other at various historical moments. It has thus facilitated the fixing of 
 characteristics of inclusion and exclusion, giving an apparent specificity otherwise 
 lacking to social relations… [it is] able to signify not so much in itself as by 
 adopting and giving naturalized forms of prevailing  conceptions of social group 
 formation at different times. (Goldberg, 1992, 558) 
 
 Therefore, although race is not natural it becomes as such through the social 
“construction and rationalization of orders of difference, making group relations appear 
as if they were natural and unchangeable” (Torres et al., 1999, 5).  This also explains how 
certain groups are seen as an existential threat to national security and identity at different 
times, and currently, in the face of growing migration, globalization and the growth and 
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dominance of capitalist consumer culture. Interestingly, earlier discussions of the role of 
Dubai’s global position between orientalized and racist notions of ‘East’ and ‘West’ also 
significantly impact policies, practices and ideologies of the global location of Dubai as 
to what is permissible and ‘natural’ in the ‘non-western’, ‘non-democratic’, Islamic, Arab 
cultures of the ‘East’. These racial logics also show why and how the ‘Third world’ is 
represented in ways that normalize exploitation as part of their ‘nature’, devoid of 
historical context, which simultaneously promotes ideas of innocence and benevolence 
on behalf of Western expat professionals and Emirati nationals who actually all benefit 
and uphold these hierarchies of power and privilege for their own benefit. Of course these 
issues are complicated by citizenship regimes that create a temporary population with no 
political or civic voice.  
  Overall, we see here how race and citizenship operate to create the ideological 
tools necessary in upholding hierarchies of entitlement, which shape the experiences of 
diverse groups of residents in the city. This chapter begins with an analysis of the broader 
context of citizenship in relation to neoliberal globalization and then turns to connect this 
specifically to processes of racialization. In turn we will examine in more detail the 
making of the ‘nation’ in the UAE in relation to issues of migration and citizenship. In 
particular, histories of citizenship in the UAE will be examined to support the analysis of 
relational identity formation, and conceptualizations of the ‘nation under threat’, thereby 
legitimizing processes of exclusionary citizenship and the regulation of particular migrant 
identities. In particular, we will see how in the context of Dubai, specifically, processes 
of ‘exaltation’ and Othering operate in relation to genealogies of racial categorizations of 
geographies and migrants.  From here two major methods through which these processes 
operate are examined: first, as ‘where you are from’ overwhelms ‘where you are at’; and 
second, how relativity operates as a mode of rationality and justification. To begin, we 
can examine the shifting terrain and processes through which regimes of citizenship 
operate as important markers of subject making and tools for nation building.  
 
Globalization, Neoliberalism and Citizenship   
 In considering the broader political and economic context, scholars note the 
growing global anxiety of nation-states in relation to migration. With regard to 
	 268	
globalization, Torres, Miron and Inda (1999) argue that the current situation is one in 
which globalization’s labour practices and the working conditions for low income people, 
for example, depict systematic enforcements and exploitation of gender, racial, ethnic, 
and national hierarchies. The ideology of poverty ‘over there’ is tied to the repression of 
circumstances experienced by low-income people of colour ‘here’. While they are 
discussing the case of the US, we can see how the logics remain similar in the global city 
context as local policies are often influenced by global hierarchies (10). In addition, 
shifting conceptualizations of contemporary racism(s) in the context of demographic 
shifts, changing class formations, and new forms of global dislocations play a significant 
role in the construction of the nation and the citizen versus the alien, the foreigner, the 
stranger, the immigrant - the ‘threat’ to the nation.  
 
 Scholars have long challenged the universalistic claims of ‘democratic’ 
citizenship by arguing that there have always been inequalities within nation states 
between those who are not capable of fully belonging.  Castles and Davidson (2000) 
argue that globalization is creating new challenges for citizenship whereby the growing 
international mobility of people questions the basis for belonging within the boundaries 
of the nation-state. They argue further that the boundaries of the nation state are being 
eroded when millions of people have multiple citizenships or live in more than one 
country during their lifetimes. They begin then by exploring European notions of 
modernity, in which the essence of nation-states is tied to the institution of citizenship 
(Castles and Davidson, 2000, 3) arguing that globalization affects citizenship in three 
major ways: questioning the notion of the relative autonomy of the nation state; 
undermining the ideology of distinct and relatively autonomous national cultures since 
homogenization is at the core of nationalist projects; and embodying the rapidly 
increasing mobility of people across national borders (Castles and Davidson, 2000, 8).  
 
The authors advocate for a theory of citizenship for a global society, tied to a 
separation of nation from state, in which the state is based on a shared political 
community and not cultural identity (Castles and Davidson, 2000, 24). If we consider the 
pressures of globalization on the state, we can see how the threats to national identity 
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may have more to do with neoliberal shifts and the interconnections of the economy than 
with the influx and influence of ‘foreigners’. For example, increasing cuts to social 
spending and privatization under neoliberalism impact the economy and social services in 
ways that squeeze people’s access to resources, which are then often represented as 
pressures due to an influx of foreign migrants. Thus, migrants often become important 
scapegoats when citizenship is linked explicitly to notions of ‘cultural homogeneity’, and 
consequently in the processes of national building at different times. Overall then, the 
nation state has a tendency to create difference and to create racialized minorities, not 
only through discourses but through various forms of political and social action that 
separate and differentiate members of minorities from mainstream population (Castles 
and Davidson, 2000, 69).  
 Seyla Behabib and Judith Resnik (2009) argue that migrations related to 
globalization involve the increased movement around the world of goods, services, 
information and capital of all kinds, as well as of legal, political and moral norms. They 
highlight the complexity of the current nation-state system and the commitments of the 
international order to the human rights regimes, of which citizenship rights are central. 
While some argue that we are witnessing the end of the nation state, they note that though 
the meaning of state sovereignty may be under revision, nation states remain a critical 
form of organization. “Porous borders continue to define networks of obligation and 
constitute real barriers, rendering some persons alien” (4). Analysis of gender are often 
missing from reforms aimed at addressing the meanings of citizenship and sovereignty, 
and understanding gendered impacts changes the picture and adds complexity. They 
argue, for example, that women’s migration is rarely a simple matter of the movement 
across state boundaries of a single, isolated individual as their mobility is a nodal point in 
a network of relationships. Overall, they emphasize the need to examine globalization, 
borders, migration and citizenship through an interdisciplinary analysis that brings 
together law, politics and theories that highlight the way gender categories illuminate and 
enriched the analysis of ‘the right to have rights’ (31).   
 Linda Bozniak (2009) examines how citizenship is often considered the most 
desirable condition, and the highest fulfillment of democratic and egalitarian aspiration. 
However, “while the concept is commonly invoked to convey a state of democratic 
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belonging or inclusion, this inclusion is usually premised upon a conception of a 
community that is bounded and exclusive” (Bozniak, 2009, 127). Bosniak argues that 
citizenship itself represents an axis of subordination, and that if the problems are seen 
only in all or nothing citizenship-terms then practical protections, such as work hours and 
wages, are forestalled because of the complexity of the large political and legal 
challenges presented when various migrant groups seek protection. Thus, in discussions 
of transnational migrant labour, gendered notions of work and citizenship mean not only 
thinking about equal citizenship but also about citizenship as an exclusionary national 
status. Tracing genealogies of nationality and the underlying factors that influence the 
differential status of diverse migrant categories helps trace the deeper and broader 
historical forces that shape the citizen subject and Others, generating hierarchies that are 
influenced by regimes of citizenship.   She asks, “What does it mean that, whatever equal 
citizenship some women in wealthy countries may achieve through market sphere work, 
it is often facilitated by the employment of people from poorer countries who themselves 
lack status citizenship in the country in which they labour?” (128). Here we can extend 
these questions to include how entitlements and privileges are built not only on exclusion 
of migrants from formal citizenship, and how notions of ‘nationality’, race, gender and 
labour all impact migrant subjectivities and national identity.  
 In speaking about national borders, Bosniak argues that despite increasing 
economic globalization, national borders remain rigid when it comes to movements of 
persons including workers. Highlighting the inclusion and exclusion inherent in the 
concept of citizenship, she highlights both the inward looking and boundary conscious 
approaches arguing that the citizenship of the border follows into the interior, and thus 
citizenship is not always a prerequisite for enjoyment of many important rights. In the 
US, aliens formally enjoy expressive and associational rights, procedural rights in 
criminal and civil contexts, contract and property rights, and the right to attend public 
schools with other children (Bosniak, 2009, 143). Thus, she argues that it is analytically 
possible to enjoy aspects of equal or democratic citizenship without being a formal 
citizen (Bosniak, 2009, 144). It is therefore not “incoherent to speak of the citizenship 
enjoyed by aliens” (Bosniak, 2009, 144). Overall then, citizenship rights and citizenship 
status are not always coextensive or mutually entailed, which further supports the need to 
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understand citizenship and the practices that flow from its conceptualization beyond 
formal policy.  
 The important issues that emerge through these texts include: the tensions 
between the universalistic claims of citizenship and states, and the particularistic 
constructions of nations; the increased mobility of capital and people and the effects on 
national sovereignty; the importance of gender and race in citizenship-based struggles; 
and the contradictions between expanding citizenship at the expense, or in the face of, the 
citizenship-less-ness of the nation’s ‘Others’.  
  In considering the role of neoliberalism in the making of a seemingly endless 
supply of workers, we can also consider the role of neoliberalism is attracting workers.  
Considering how forms of power impact ideas related to work, and impact and are 
impacted by policies such as labour and citizenship that relegate migrant workers to the 
periphery is significant. Rhacel Salazar Parrenas (2001) discusses Evelyn Nakano 
Glenn’s (1992) concept of the ‘racial division of reproductive labour’, highlighting the 
context of the US to explore how domestic labour is tied to racial, gender, and class 
privilege based on an interdependency connecting women (61). Glenn’s analysis heavily 
focuses on the relationship between white women and women of colour and the ways in 
which privileged women are shifting reproductive responsibilities without challenging 
them. Parrenas’ analysis extends this to the international terrain to consider issues of 
globalization and the feminization of wage labour (62). Through this, the ‘international 
transfer of caretaking’ emerges out of a three-tier transfer of reproductive labour among 
women in sending and receiving countries of migration, where class privileged women 
purchase the low wage services of migrant Filipina domestic workers, who in turn 
purchase the even lower wage services of poorer women in the Philippines (62). 
 To understand the impacts of neoliberalism as a technology of governance, Aihwa 
Ong (2000, 2006, 2009) explores how neoliberal logics impact sovereignty and regimes 
of citizenship in non-western contexts, through the management of migrant populations 
based on market driven calculations and neo-conservatism, leading to the elimination of 
social programs and promoting big capital business. She argues that a new mode of 
political organizing is emerging, that is reconfiguring relationships between governing 
and the governed, power and knowledge and sovereignty and territoriality (Ong, 2006).  
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 Ong (2006) identifies many implications for new ways of thinking about 
neoliberal citizenship and sovereignty. First, she explores why neoliberalism as 
technology of governing is an important concept for inquiry into mutations in citizenship 
and sovereignty. Here she highlights that we must explore neoliberalism not as culture 
but as a “calculative technique of governing that can be decontextualized from their 
original sources and recontexualized in constellations of mutually constitutive and 
contingent relationships” (Ong, 2006, 13). Second, Ong explores the concept of 
citizenship as an ensemble of elements that can be delinked and relinked to market based 
rationalities, exploring how contemporary flows of capital and of migrant labour have 
interacted with sovereignty and rights discourses in complex ways to disentangle 
citizenship claims once knotted together in a single territorialized mass. Third, Ong 
explores how neoliberal exception is an important analytic tool for rethinking sovereign 
power as a shifting and flexible ensemble of heterogeneous calculations, choices, and 
exceptions that constitute security, life and ethics (Ong, 2006, 15). Special Economic 
Zones and Special Administrative Regions in China have created new spaces through 
techniques of calculative choice, institutionalized in mechanisms and procedures that 
mark out special spaces of labour markets and investment opportunities, spaces in which 
there exists an option of exception that has led to the carving out of different territory for 
‘better’ economic engagement. Finally, she highlights articulations of the neoliberal 
project and moral economies, which can both strip human beings of citizenship and 
become realigned in the interests of protecting bare life. 
 In highlighting the difference between ‘neoliberalism as exception’ and 
‘exceptions to neoliberalism’, she notes the former is tied to sites of transformation where 
market driven calculations are being introduced in the management of populations and 
administration of special spaces. At same time, exceptions to neoliberalism can be found 
in political decisions to exclude populations, such as through protecting social safety nets 
or by stripping away all forms of political protections (Ong, 2006, 3-4). Overall then, 
exceptions to neoliberalism can both preserve welfare for citizens and exclude non-
citizens from benefits of capitalist development. Through these shifts, new forms of 
governing, of being governed and what it means to be human are emerging (Ong, 2006, 
6). 
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 To develop these ideas further, Ong (2006) brings together several key concepts. 
First, Foucault’s insights on ‘governmentality’, which are explained as an array of 
knowledge and techniques concerned with the “systemic and pragmatic guidance and 
regulation of everyday conduct” (4). Here neoliberal governmentality results from an 
infiltration of market driven truths and calculations into the domain of politics. The 
second concept is ‘exception’ and here Ong uses Agamben’s notion of exception as a 
fundamental principle of sovereign rule predicated on division between citizens in 
juridical order and outsiders stripped of juridical-political protections (5). She pushes this 
further by viewing exception as deployed to include and exclude certain bodies and 
argues that we need to explore the hinge between neoliberalism as exception and 
exception to neoliberalism, the interplay among technologies of governing, disciplining, 
inclusion and exclusion, and giving value or denying value to human conduct (5). Overall 
Ong argues that ‘bare life’ does not dwell in zones of ‘indistinction’ (Agamben), but 
‘becomes’ through interventions of local communities, NGOs and even corporations, 
which shift and recognize various categories of morally deserving humanity (24). In the 
end, there are a myriad of disarticulations and rearticulations made possible through the 
logic of exception with which we “transform the elements we used to associate with a 
unified concept of citizenship into values placed on humanity that are increasingly varied, 
fragmented, contingent, and ambiguous, but permanently subject to ethicopolitical 
critique” (27).   
 Further, Ong (2006) introduces her concept of ‘graduated sovereignty’ to explain 
the relationship between global forces and the actions of emerging Asian states to show 
how neoliberal logic reconfigures the territory of citizenship. Here she argues that 
emerging countries are compelled to be ‘flexible’ in their conceptions of ‘sovereignty and 
citizenship if they are to be relevant to global markets” (76). The implementation of 
graduated sovereignty means that market driven logic creates political policies in relation 
to corporate interests, so that development decisions favour the fragmentation of the 
national space into various zones and “promote the differential regulation of populations 
who can be connected to or disconnected from global circuits of capital” (77). Thus, 
Asian ‘postdevelopmentalism’ is a geography of governing resulting not from an anemic 
state apparatus, but from deliberate neoliberal calculations as to which areas and which 
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populations are advantageous or not advantageous in appealing to global markets. 
Overall, graduated sovereignty refers,  
 … to effects of a flexible management of sovereignty, as governments adjust 
 political space to the dictates of global capital, giving corporations an indirect 
 power over the political conditions of citizens in zones that are differently 
 articulated to global production and financial circuits. (Ong, 2006, 78)  
 
 In relation to graduated citizenship, Ong (2006) highlights how in post-
developmental governments there is a mix of disciplinary, regulatory, and pastoral 
technologies aimed at instilled self-discipline, productivity, and capacity to work with 
global firms (79). A mix of market calculations is undertaken subjecting different 
populations to different technologies (79). She explores two major case studies, Malaysia 
and Indonesia, to show “how graduated sovereignty is the effect of market driven 
strategies that are not congruent with the national space itself but that are biopolitically 
and spatially attuned to the workings of global markets” (96).  
 Ong asks how people make themselves stable in an unstable world. These are the 
processes and genealogies that when uncovered help us to map the forces which shape 
the ideological and structural processes that lend themselves to national projects aimed at 
‘protecting’ citizens and nation-states from the polluting power of the poor, racialized, 
migrant majority. It is the added postcolonial complexities of being situated between 
worlds that also lend themselves to the neoliberal rationality in policy and practices 
related to citizenship and sovereignty that highlight the significance of global city 
aspirations in the contemporary period for non-western cities and spaces.  
 In considering Dubai more specifically, Kanna (2010) relates her discussions of 
neoliberal subject making to young professional citizens in Dubai. The aspects of 
neoliberalism as described by Kanna include,  
 The emancipation of capital from the oversight of the state, the 
 commodification or marketization of realms of life that were previously the 
 prerogative of the state, the apotheosis of the entrepreneur as a creative genius, 
 the analogization of society as a corporation - are translated in the  ideologies of 
 powerful local institutions such as corporations and privileged sectors of the state. 
 (Kanna, 2010, 101)  
 
 Kanna (2010) highlights the unique ways in which Dubai’s flexible citizens 
appropriate neoliberal discourses, arguing that this shows how neoliberalism is not 
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monolithic but rather is inflected with local meanings, discourses and histories (102). 
Following Ong, Kanna explores neoliberal governance as a sophisticated, population 
focused, and responsive instrument of state adaption to market pressures (102). Thus, 
“the ways neoliberal ideologies resonate with and are made persuasive within local 
formations of identity, conceptions of self-hood, and idioms of citizenship are essential to 
their appropriation by the subjects targeted by neoliberal modes of governance” (102).  
For Ong, Singapore exemplifies the ways the state mobilizes its populations to adapt to 
increasing global market pressures. Repositioning the city globally also means a 
reformulation of state sovereignty into zones of governance. Ong is also interested in 
cultural processes by which the state aimed to create ‘valuable citizens’ in line with 
neoliberal tenants, and also reflect a reorganization of ethnical norms. Kanna argues that 
in the case of Dubai, and the vast outnumbering of citizens by low waged migrant 
workers, the issues of citizenship are not framed in terms of economically valuable 
citizenship, but in terms of national ethics and modes of proper and authentic citizenship 
(Kanna, 2010, 104). 
 As we can see from these insights, citizenship in the context of neoliberalism and 
postcolonial urbanity in the context of globalization is influenced by nationality, race and 
gender which impact experiences of migration and labour in integral ways, both at the 
structural level and the ideological. Here we can consider in more detail how processes of 
racialization operate in the making of citizens and ‘Others’.  
 
Race in the making of Citizens and ‘Others’ 
 … Analytically, these issues are the contemporary metropolitan counterpart 
 of women’s struggles against colonial occupation in the geographical third 
 world. In effect, the construction of immigration and nationality laws, and  thus 
 appropriate racialized, gendered citizenship, illustrates the continuity between 
 relationships of colonization and white, masculinist, capitalist state rule. 
 (Mohanty, 1991, 23)  
  
 Struggles related to ‘citizenship’ can be seen as the contemporary manifestation 
of earlier struggles against colonial occupation, particularly in the ways in which race, 
gender and class are embedded within constructions of ideal citizens and of ‘Others’, and 
the way in which these ideas work to maintain rule for an elite, capitalist class, itself 
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highly gendered and racialized (Mohanty, 1991, 23).  In particular, Mohanty explains 
how race operates as an ideology that “legitimates the exclusion of nonwhite people from 
particular areas of social and economic life, simultaneously promoting a tolerance of 
these inequities on the part of the ruling class” (23). What we see on the economic level 
is the ways in which “the differential allocation of workers, the composition of the 
‘underclass’ and ‘welfare recipients’ are all constitutively dependent on race as an 
organizing principle” (23). Thus, the construction of different ‘migrants’ entitled to 
differential treatment on the basis of their nationality also uses race as a central 
organizing principle and, as she argues, “race is a primary consideration in the definition 
of ideas of citizenship” (23), not limited to the context of most scholarly studies in the US 
and UK. In both historical and geographical contexts, race has always been tied to a 
longer colonial legacy and ideas of modernity, which have operated, and continue to 
operate, transnationally through regimes of citizenship and migration. Thus, colonial 
legacies shape racism through continuities that are not limited to formal colonial 
occupation or imperialism. These genealogies are thus embedded in the making of 
contemporary geographies of the migration, and the forces of nationality embedded in 
regimes of citizenship that accompany and await them.  
 Several scholars have explored the ways in which race shifts its referent through 
time and context. Torres, Miron and Inda (1999), highlight the work of Stuart Hall on 
discourses justifying slavery in the US, highlighting the role of binary oppositions in 
which symbolic boundaries between ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ were constructed, and linked 
to physical features that worked to create the difference between black and white (8). 
While Torres et al (1999) argue these crude biologisms still exists, they also highlight 
‘cultural racism’ (Gilroy 1990, Giroux 1993) neo-racism (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991), 
and cultural fundamentalism (Stolcke 1995). In the case of ‘cultural difference’ (Stolcke, 
1995) we can see how ideas of ‘insurmountability’ are used to justify racism in 
multicultural settings. Here cultural racism assumes a set of symmetrically opposed 
counter concepts, such as ‘national’ citizen versus the alien, the foreigner, the stranger or 
the immigrant. In the latter grouping, the ‘Other’ of the nation is most often construed as 
a political threat to national identity, which is linked to immigrants’ ‘cultural diversity’, 
which challenges the nation-state’s ‘bounded and distinct’ community, set on a shared 
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sense of belonging and loyalty often based on a common language, cultural traditions, 
and beliefs (Stolcke, 1995). Furthermore, “this ‘other’ then, since ‘it’ poses a threat to the 
nation, is relegated to the margins of society, often blamed for all the social and 
economic ills that befall the nation” (Torres et al., 1999, 9).  
 Building on the ideologies of the state, Goldberg’s (2002) discussion highlights 
not only how the state is implicated in reproducing the local conditions of racist exclusion 
but “how the modern state always conceived of itself as racially configured” (Goldberg, 
2002, 2). Goldberg argues that the modern state is “nothing less than a racial state” (2), 
whereby race is integral to the emergence, development, ordering and transformation of 
the modern nation state. Tied to earlier projects of colonial ‘discovery’ and ‘voyages’, 
racial configurations are necessary to the discursive production and ideological 
rationalization of modern state power (4). Arguing that in a moment of unprecedented 
heterogeneity, the modern nation-state must promote racially conceived and configured 
homogeneity through sets of institutions and ideologies. Furthermore, if as Goldberg 
argues,  
The modern state founds itself not just on exclusions, those absences that render 
invisible, but on the internalization of exclusions…[then] inclusions, those 
privileged by and in the modern state, assume their privileges in virtue of the  
exclusions the state at once renders possible conceptually and technologically.  
(Goldberg, 2002, 9)   
 
 From these insights we can see how the modern nation-state is conceived in 
relation to racialized, social (in)/exclusion in the form of formal regimes of citizenship, 
and informal social hierarchies. Further, in the contemporary period of neoliberal 
globalization, Goldberg (2002) argues that a central component is the growing idea of 
‘racelessness’, which serves to “extend the routinization of racial states of being as a sort 
of civic religion behind the façade of privatized preferences” (12). This insight has 
implications for the ways in which the nation under globalization is conceptualized 
through (neo)liberal notions of capitalist accumulation, constructing it as allegedly 
devoid of any ideological tools or racial underpinnings. Focusing on the national scale 
lends itself to important questions about the role of the state and the construction of 
national identity under the unique conditions of the migrant majority population of the 
UAE. The national scale allows us to examine the hierarchies of entitlement that 
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accompany the geographies of migration implicated in a colonial genealogy. These 
ideologies of ordering, tied but not limited to the colonial context, in turn shape the 
national identity of Emirati citizens in relation to ‘Others’ through the construction of 
‘threats’ to the nation. Thus, how nationhood is constructed is also implicated in this 
genealogy, as well as in the constructions of global city status, and the positioning of 
Dubai between conceptualization of ‘first’ and ‘third’, ‘west’ and ‘east’.   
 In the case of Dubai, racialized conceptualizations of citizenship statuses create 
the hierarchies of entitlement that shape subjectivities and spatial relations in the city, and 
which are best understood through the lived realities of different groups at the everyday 
level, maintained and negotiated relationally. The exaltation of Emirati citizens, and the 
preference for Western (white) expat professionals and, to a lesser extent, Third world 
elites, are made in relation to low waged migrant workers from the ‘Third’ world and 
non-western context. Also, as the data highlights, important invisible, yet formal and 
historical, forces are at play in the making of these hierarchies, at the crux of which are 
racialized conceptualizations of citizenship as an ontological marker. The exclusionary 
practices and structures of social and political rights and entitlements cannot be 
understood without reference to these three broad categories, as well as to the historical 
legacies of colonial and imperial conquest that have shaped the development of modern 
Gulf states as we know them today. The recent developments in the UAE for example, 
are complicated, dynamic and diverse, and thus need to be understood within a larger 
discussion to bring to light the situation of foreigner workers and expose the exclusionary 
histories on which they were based and currently operate through.  
 Here histories of citizenship in the region and in UAE history in particular, and a 
focus on the implications of such practices and discourses for the making of different 
subjectivities of migrants and national citizens, are all related to processes of 
racialization. Khodhker (2010), in his analysis of citizenship and state belonging, 
highlights how the discussion of citizenship, labour rights and democracy typically 
associated with talk of citizenship regimes takes on different meanings in the context of 
the Gulf with its highly exclusionary citizenship policies and residency requirements. At 
the same time, we can contextualize citizenship regimes globally, highlighting the ways 
in which different permanent residence programs are being remade and growing numbers 
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of states, from North America and Europe, to the UAE or Singapore, are funneling 
migrants through temporary guest worker programs.  
The erosion and shifts in formal avenues for citizenship must be contextualized in 
relation to contemporary neoliberal regimes of labour migration operating under the 
current globalized world order.  In the Gulf, citizenship is not an option for foreigners, 
while countries like Singapore have selective citizenship policies, where professionals are 
given PR status on a short-term basis, but foreign labourers are rarely granted citizenship. 
In addition, workers in lower income bracket are restricted from bringing their families.  
Khodhker gives an example of Singaporean policy in its highly racialized thinking, 
whereby “policy is based on implicitly meritocratic ideology, which welcomes ‘talent’ 
but believes that such talent is only concentrated among people in certain age groups and 
racial communities” (Khodhker, 2010, 224).  
These explicitly racialized programs and policies of citizenship and migration 
around the world highlight the pressures and forces that poor low waged migrants must 
contend with in the contemporary period. Whereas citizenship has traditionally implied 
access to rights and entitlements vis-à-vis the state, we see how discourses around 
cosmopolitanism and forces of neoliberalism are reshaping notions of belonging and of 
‘ideal’ subjects. Citizenship in this sense becomes a currency through which 
entrepreneurial subjects are made, and schemes of valuation are made through colonial 
continuities and contemporary regimes of empire building. What is unique in the case of 
Dubai is how difference and entitlements are shaped in a context with a majority 
population of temporary residents.  Thus, the shared temporariness of Gulf migrants 
pushes us to consider more deeply how ‘temporary’ status is differently lived by 
examining how notions of ‘belonging’ and degrees of entitlement are generated. To 
understand these functions, it is necessary to explore, both in material and ideological 
terms, the relationships between the state and citizens, as well as how processes of 
racialization operate differently based on nationality to generate more complex, 
differential scales of belonging and subsequent ‘hierarchies of entitlement’, which work 
to create and justify difference through the dehumanizing processes of othering discussed 
here.  
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 In particular, the implications of the UAE’s citizenship regimes and its 
relationship to broader historical genealogies of race, for example, help to examine the 
reasons why the experiences of expat professionals is so different from those of the low 
waged labouring class, although both face the reality of ‘temporality’.  Additionally, we 
can see the ways in which most low waged workers may not be qualified to bring their 
families based on insufficient income, which is turn pushes, and is based on, the limiting 
of ties of this particular category of workers to the UAE. Overall, while all migrants face 
the idea of ‘temporariness’, it is this majority of low waged workers who face the most 
significant impacts as they are continually reminded of their non-belonging through 
formal and informal, material and ideological mechanisms of ‘distancing’ and ‘Othering’.  
Realties of ‘temporariness’ are mitigated and shaped by one’s nationality and 
class such that privileged Western expats for example do not necessarily face or live the 
same pressures of non-belonging as Others. What we find on closer examination is that 
‘where you are from’ continues to overwhelm ‘where you are at’ in many different ways. 
Through the interviews and review of scholarly research conducted here, it is found that 
one of the major forces in these differences is tied to how citizenship is constructed in a 
global hierarchy, and the subsequent interaction of these valuations in the local context. 
Many subjects who held citizenship from the Global South were more vocal at and 
frustrated by not being able to gain citizenship in the UAE, whereas others, primarily 
citizens of Canada, the US, or the UK, were less invested in gaining citizenship. 
Canadian expat Sara explains that “subconsciously, when you know you are a Canadian 
citizen, you feel more secure” (Sara, Canadian), and British expat Jo reflected on being 
‘temporary’ by saying that, “It doesn’t really bother me. You have to accept it in some 
ways because it’s not your home” (Jo, British). Another Canadian, Mohamed, says that 
this temporary stint in Dubai is not something he would ever want to be permanent. “I 
view it as a good place to make money, not paying any sort of taxes or anything like that, 
and then hopefully just go home.” For American expat Carlos, originally Egyptian and 
has lived his entire life in the UAE, “I am here to make money and soon as that is 
accomplished, I am gone and I will probably never come back here again, ever”. In 
contrast, Peter, an Egyptian starting his career in the UAE explains, “I feel that I would 
like to live here as long as I can, but at the end… I am not an immigrant, I am a worker” 
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(Peter, Egyptian). Svetlana who recently acquired Canadian citizenship, but previously 
held Egyptian citizenship,  
The problem is that you will be living here for 25 years, as in my dad’s case, and 
helping to build the country but when he retires, they are not going to renew his 
residency visa… he has to get out of the country. So basically, you work your butt 
off here for 20 years or 30 or 40 or 50 years but then when you retire… you are 
out of the country. So this is why, no matter what, you are living here but you still 
feel like this is not stable. You still feel like you need a plan B. My dad decided to 
get us Canadian citizenship because he had to have a back up plan because he 
doesn’t want to go back to Egypt and be treated like crap or be discriminated 
against. (Svetlana, Canadian)  
 
Many holding citizenship from the Global South explained their hesitation, 
anxiety or need to have a back up plan. As Anna (Egyptian) explains,  
I have been dreaming for a long time to get the citizenship here, but it is so hard. 
There is no reward when you work all your life here and you at any point you can 
be send back to your country…you just have to enjoy it right now and if you have 
to go back then you should have a Plan B. (Anna, Egyptian) 
 
Furthermore, as Karen explains, where you are from definitely impacts how you 
understand your status in the UAE.  
You find a lot of people who stay here a long time, mostly Arabs with 
unstable countries. You’ll find some Brits and Americans and things, but they 
come, they make money, and they leave…you get comfortable and you don’t 
want to leave but then you retire and it’s a big question mark? (Karen, 
Egyptian) 
  
For Zain, another Egyptian expat, the lack of options motivated his desire to 
belong more securely in the UAE, “I have no where to go except here or Egypt…Egypt 
can not offer me anything right now. As an Egyptian in Egypt and as an engineer in 
Egypt, it is worthless” (Zain, Egyptian).  Thus, much of this is based on where one is 
from, what citizenship is held and the prospects of home, and the privileges given and 
experienced in the UAE relative to each group. In addition, many rationales are given for 
why Western expats are treated differentially, such as situating the global political 
economy as part of the rationale for the lesser treatment of low waged workers in 
particular.  
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This often works through discourses that argue that highly skilled global 
professionals must be enticed with more than their ‘Third world’ counterparts. To begin, 
low waged workers are often thought to be making considerably more than ‘back home’. 
Karen thinks that many low waged workers are exploited and that they are not aware of 
the conditions before they come, “But why do they stay if they can leave? Because even 
though they are getting exploited, they are getting paid, and maybe to us it is nothing, but 
for them, it might be a fortune” (Karen, Egyptian). Reda explains that while everyone is 
being exploited here,  
If you are blonde and blue eyed then things change, but if you are Arab then you 
do know that you are going to come here and you are not going to have the same 
rights and you still accept it because you know that if you go back to your country 
it is going to be ten times worse. (Reda, Emirati) 
 
Egyptian expat Laura explains that “back home a good salary is like half of what 
they are paying. So they know they are giving you really bad compared to the rest… but 
the idea is that you have to be thankful because they offering you something you can’t get 
back home” (Laura, Egyptian). Karen further explains the mentality,  
For an Indian to come you don’t have to convince them by much. But to bring 
someone from South Africa (White) with a better education, then you have to 
convince them to leave their homes and come and live in the UAE where they 
know no one, differences in culture…so you have to pay them more to convince 
them to come. They need more professionals, so to convince someone from 
England, they have to convince him to come here and live in the desert. Whereas 
someone from Indian who could barely feed their families, would rather come 
here and they would come and work for less. (Karen, Egyptian) 
 
In Karen’s explanation, regardless of occupation or class, workers from the 
Global South are continually considered more desperate than their Western, or white 
counterparts. Furthermore, ‘professionals’ from the West are seen as more valuable 
regardless of experience or skill, as their education and passport are believed to represent 
their higher worth. This is arguably related to Brand Dubai as they attempt to sell their 
worth by showcasing whiteness as an entry into ‘modern’ and global living. Emirati 
Natasha explains the conditions as highly problematic, going so far as to say that 
conditions in labour camps represent a lifestyle that “might as well not be in Dubai” for 
its starkness to the rest of the city.   
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I see the conditions as problematic. I see the lack of minimum wage as 
problematic, and a lot of people argue that well they are coming here for the work 
and you know, it is their choice to come here, but I find that it is a very weak 
argument to say that, it’s kind of exploiting the desperate. So I find it very weak 
to say that well if you want the job, but the kind of environment, the work 
environment which is created by them is being done in the UAE, and whether 
they come from X country or Y country or not, is kind of irrelevant to me. I do 
find it problematic and yeah the conditions are really bad and worse than anything 
is that they don’t really have a voice. (Natasha, Emirati) 
 
The idea of disposability also factors in highly, with expats from the Global South 
also feeling that they are highly replaceable, “There are a lot of us. So, if you don’t like it, 
we can find someone else…” (Zain, Egyptian). Building on this, Mohamed (Canadian) 
sees the reasons behind these distinctions being linked to needing ‘experts’.  
When this place first kicked off, they had nothing. And they needed experts to get 
it going. And the reason that all this starts is basically that you have to bring in 
Americans, British, because they were at the forefront of every industry basically, 
and you know, that was seen as valuable talent that you were bringing in. Those 
biases seem to have stuck, even though in my opinion, the level of 
professionalism that expats from Europe and the States are bringing to the table 
has gone down big time. So it just seems that you know, just a little bit old 
fashioned at this point. (Mohamed, Canadian) 
 
Laura explains that comparisons are made with where you are from, despite the 
fact that you live in Dubai. Through these logics, she contends that you are continually 
seen as privileged,  
Indians or Filipinos would get paid less, because they know that they would be 
earning nothing back home, and they think of it as this salary will buy him a home 
in India, but what if he never wants to go back, it wont buy him a home here, but 
it will buy him one there. (Laura, Egyptian) 
 
Overall, through the considerations of ‘where you are from’ we find in the making 
of the citizen-subject, ideal migrant ‘subject’, and the ‘Other’ of the city a highly 
racialized, relationally defined set of processes which are embedded in colonial histories, 
implicated in broader structures of inequalities through the new international division of 
labour, forces of neoliberal globalization and deeply intertwined in the developmental 
agenda of emerging global cities.  
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Insecure nationhood/ Nation under threat  
 
 In the Gulf, and the UAE more specifically, since formal citizenship applies to a 
small minority of the population, different labour sectors are endowed with ‘privatized’ 
notions of entitlement. Citizenship status thus represents intense benefits and legal status 
incomparable to those of foreigners, while the benefits and entitlements of non-citizens 
are based on their nationality, race, class and gender.  
 In considering the tremendously different context in which Gulf citizenship 
operates, we see that the GCC population was 37 million in 2006, about 12 percent of the 
total Arab population of the MENA region, but its economy accounted for more than 55 
percent of the Arab world’s 1.25 trillion economy. In the case of per capita income, the 
averages for Qatar are $63,000, and the UAE $38,000, higher than many advanced 
industrialized nations. Much of this difference is tied to oil wealth and the ability of the 
state with its enormous levels of sovereign wealth to provide immense benefits to its 
relatively small population of citizens, which in turn furthers divides between non-
citizens and citizens.  
 Paul Dresch (2005), discussing marriage and nationality in UAE, outlines the 
patrilineal relations of lineage and the ways in which all governments in the Gulf have 
some definition of kinship and its subsequent relationship to citizenship. Some Gulf 
states have strict bans on the marriage to foreigners including those from Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar and Oman; while the UAE does not do so explicitly it has begun to undertake some 
drastic reconfigurations of ‘private’ life (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, 136). Within mixed 
marriages there are obvious class based hierarchies.  
One of the major motivations for increased government control in marriage is based on 
the continued fears of minority status and the dependency on foreign labour. These 
problems have been represented as a historical feature of the smaller Gulf States, which 
are characterized as always struggling with intense pressures of self-identification (137). 
As a result, marriage does not only represent a personal and family symbol, it becomes a 
marker of the nation. According to Dresch, the UAE’s capital, Abu Dhabi, has 
undertaken, and other emirates have followed, many initiatives for its citizens, including 
material incentives such as residential land, commercial property, and grants at marriage 
of DH 900,000 towards a house. Dubai’s aid to citizens recently has been Dh500, 000 in 
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the form of a free loan, with Sharjah’s offering Dh 200,000 (139).  
 The major provisions for defining citizenship status are based on the ‘Nationality 
and Passports Law’ of 1972 12  where nationality may be acknowledged by law, 
dependence, or be granted (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, 139). Even without the official 
citizenship categories, there are great complexities in older tribal relations, mixed 
families and lineage on both sides, thus it is thought that in many ways there are also 
different strata of citizens within the UAE. Furthermore, nationality is almost always 
passed through males, and women nationals who marry foreigners cannot confer their 
nationality to their husbands or their children (143). The Federal Law of 1975 amended 
the provisions and entitled citizenship to those, who by law were defined as ‘Arabs’ or 
who were residents at the critical date. Another interesting point is the numbers of 
foreign, such as Indian or Egyptian, wives taken by Emirati men, who would need a 
sponsor if they were divorced or widowed (145). In 1986 the UAE began discussions 
around changing these laws and by 1992 there was a full state sponsored project entitled 
the “Marriage Fund”, which worked to encourage marriage amongst Emiratis, by 
providing financial help, curbing marriage by Emirati men to foreign women and 
promoting the alleged stability of family life (147). Throughout the project, the 
government consistently referred to the ideals of Emirati Society, such as campaigns 
targeting women not to become over reliant on foreign maids, and promoting the idea 
that men should not seek foreign women. This marked a massive attempt at social 
engineering that included mass weddings, were all undertaken under the general rhetoric 
of the stability and security of national families. In particular, as Dresch and Piscatori 
(2005) note, Emirati families were seen as being tainted by foreigners, Muslim or non-
Muslim, and thus “the private concerns of family life were made the subject of appeals to 
generalized morality and public order” (154). The discourse used in 1999 to discuss the 
issues faced by Emiratis was rooted in a language of those who needed to ‘protect’ their 
society through demographic control, and was furthered through the ideologies of Emirati 
																																																								
12
 This law is based on the Kuwaiti model of patriarchal lineage, which ensures that anyone resident in the country before 1925 can 
be named an Emirati citizen, as well as anyone born to an Emirati father. Another process of naturalization is that Qataris, Bahrainis 
and Omanis who have been a resident for three years can have nationality, other Arabs must show ten years residence, at least five of 
which must fall after the date when the law was issued. Others may be eligible if they have been a continuous resident in one of the 
emirates since 1940, with a proper means of livelihood and good Arabic, or for 30 years, of which 20 years must fall after the law 
came into force. Lastly, nationality may be granted to persons giving noteworthy service to the state at their discretion (Dresch & 
Piscatori 2005, 140). 
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culture in its Arab-Islamic roots.  
 Suad Joseph (1996) introduces a gendered reading of these policies and the larger 
role of the state in Middle Eastern familial and political identity. She argues that marriage 
regulations are used as boundaries of the nation state. Joseph’s discussion relates to 
earlier insights into the ways in women are tied to ideologies of the state, and how “at 
time, preservation of the nation results in moves to assume greater control over women 
than had existed in some imagined past” (Joseph 1993, 6). Furthermore, this analysis can 
be tied to the fear of overpopulation and the subsequent xenophobia that has become a 
dominant concern in Emirati social life.  
 Joseph (1996) argues that as scholars that we need to continue to locate the 
continuities and discontinuities through a framework that is based on de-essentializing 
stereotypes of the Middle East. In popular feminist discourse, gender is seen as the sole 
source of identity through which oppression functions. In contrast, Joseph’s discussion 
promotes recognition of a multiplicity in forms of social identification, which intersect in 
women’s lives. She highlights issues of class, race, ethnicity, religion, kin or other issues 
like age or marriage that influence women’s political status. In addition, we can consider 
how levels of citizenship in turn impact the gendered nature of women’s oppression. Her 
discussion is based on the experiences of ‘citizen’ women but is additionally useful when 
contrasted with the experiences of migrant women, and specifically domestic workers, 
who are located at the bottom of social and political hierarchies.  
 Overall, citizenship policies and the ideologies that foreground their appeal are 
largely constructed through the idea of the citizen population as a family, with the ruler 
retaining the responsibility of governing their functioning. Thus women become 
important sources of experience and knowledge, both as nationals and non-nationals, and 
as tools for understanding the boundaries of the state. These ideologies, however, have 
serious implications for the majority-migrant work force, and have led to the creation and 
perpetuation of ideas of migrants as a threat to national security, stability and the national 
‘family’. Rachel Silvey, a feminist scholar on Indonesian migrant workers to Saudi 
Arabia, suggests, “The lack of state capacity to protect these women is not a coincidence. 
Rather it is reflective of class-, nationalist-, and gender-specific norms about tolerable 
crimes and acceptable victims” (Silvey, 2004, 249). Thus the major question to consider 
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here is how particular migrants are regulated to create distance and to limit social, 
cultural, and political impacts while maximizing their economic contributions.  
 
 The influx of foreigners, including exorbitant numbers of Indian, Pakistani and 
 Bangladeshi labourers brought in to build this city, has marginalized 
 Emirati’s and their way of life. (Time Out, 35) 
 
 …now that Emirati people are much wealthier than the more numerous 
 migrant workers in their country, they have become accustomed to  consider 
 foreigners to be, at least to some extent, employees who might represent a  threat 
 of some sort. (Walsh, 45) 
 
  These statements reflect popular ideas of how migrant workers are seen to be 
impacting Emirati culture and the nation more generally. The idea of ‘insecure’ 
nationhood is tied to the construction of a threat posed by migrant-Others and is targeted 
through policy and everyday practices, including both formal and informal mechanisms. 
To begin, it is important to highlight the process through which the national-citizen 
subject is constituted. This relational and dialectic process is such that the identity of 
‘Emirati’ citizens can only be understood in so far as it is explored in relation to the status 
and positioning of various ‘migrant’ categories within the social stratification of 
hierarchical entitlements. In addition, the colonial legacies of this system of valuation are 
based on racist ideologies that tie particular bodies to the global economic order 
embedded within the international division of labour. These institutionalized preferences 
and privileges for citizens through their differentiation from other groups, organized on 
the basis of racialized understandings of citizenship and nationality, work to spatially 
segregate and socially distance ‘Others’ from citizens.  
 In part much of the rationale for restrictive citizenship rights is linked to 
xenophobia, which is linked to national insecurities. Thus, as scholars highlight, “Behind 
the huge stress on citizens’ rights and identity in the Gulf case, lie specific conceptions of 
society encouraged by current circumstances” (Dresch and Piscatori 2005, 24). Much of 
the basis for these policies on marriage, as well as the highly restrictive citizenship 
regime, is rationalized through ‘fear’ related to the idea that culture and the nation are 
under threat from a migrant majority population, and insecurity tied to the dependency on 
foreign labour for all levels of development. A key site on which these fears and 
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insecurity are enacted is control and regulation between sexes, and in particular, on 
women who are seen as ‘mothers of the nation’. Furthermore, growing fears are 
attributed to local concern about the effects of materialism and consumerism on their 
culture though, as Dresch highlights, the idea that these changes reflect Western and not 
Gulf culture is often a myth. He further states, “consumption and commoditization 
govern young people’s lives in Saudi shopping malls just as in Californian malls” 
(Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, 27). The major question left to discern is through what 
processes, and from where, do these fears of the ‘Other’ originate? How do xenophobia 
and racialization work to construct the figure of the ‘Other’? And furthermore, how are 
these ‘issues’ constructed through discourses that are maintained through a hierarchical 
structure and filtered through a top-down approach to governance?  
 In considering Thobani’s (2007) insights on processes of exaltation, we see the 
ways in which mechanisms of differentiation are inscribed into state practices that 
institutionalize the differential rights of nationals in relation to their Others, thereby 
realizing very tangible and material consequences in the social order (10). The category 
of the Other, or migrant, is thus differentiated from citizen-subjects by markers such as 
gender or class, but operates through structures carrying within them colonial genealogies 
and imperialistic violence(s) that mark particular bodies as ‘outside’ the realm of 
citizenry, and therefore not needing or deserving protection from the state. This generates 
populations of ‘Others’ who are seen as inherently exploitable and disposable. As 
Thobani highlights, 
Relations between citizens and their Others – which were forged in the labyrinth 
of the global market economy, binding slave and master, colonizer and colonized, 
developed and underdeveloped, North and South together in a vice that has not 
loosened much in the current phases of globalization. (Thobani, 71) 
 Thus, from Thobani’s insights we see: first the ways in which the national 
identity of citizens is relationally constituted; second, how racialization is implicated 
through ontological considerations related to the making of migrant subjectivity; and 
third, the historical genealogies of colonialism, and their manifestations in the 
contemporary period of neoliberal globalization. 
 In specific reference to the Gulf region, Ang Nga Longva (1997), who has written 
extensively on migration and Kuwaiti society, reaffirms that the status of Kuwaiti women 
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is understood within the ‘ethnic composition’ of the population as well as through the 
relationships between nationals and expats. Though Longva does not articulate their 
socio-economic position in particular, but she seems to be assuming that the majority of 
these migrants are those who form the basis of lower economic and class positions that 
are racialized in relation to the privileged ethnic minority of Kuwaiti citizens. Feelings of 
superiority and the inequalities in status and treatment between nationals and expats 
extend into almost all realms of social life, where, for example, citizens will seldom be 
expected to stand in line behind an expat. These ideas are further reinforced by the dress 
code of ‘dishdasha’ for men and ‘abaya’ for women, national costumes that are an 
immediate “symbol of social power and privilege” (Longva, 1997, 448). While there are 
differences in the ideas attached to men and women’s clothing, Longva confirms that the 
general understanding is rooted in the ‘politics of ethnic stratification’ (Longva, 1997, 
448). Connecting to Thobani’s discussion, she states, “…exaltation has been key to the 
constitution of the national subject as a particular kind of human being, a member of a 
particular kind of community, and hence, ontologically and existentially distinct from the 
strangers to this community” (Thobani, 2007, 5).  
 These ideas of relational identity formation are supported by the fact that the Gulf 
represents one of the largest recipients of migrant labour. Emirati identity therefore is 
inextricably linked to the relationships between nationals and various categories of 
‘migrant workers’ including privileged ‘expats/tourists’ and ‘migrant-Others’. In 
addition, shifting lifestyles play a role in the ways that citizen identities are constructed, 
with ‘culture’ considered a huge issue that is undergoing change. As explained by 
interviewees, these ‘cultural’ changes can be largely attributed to two major forces: the 
influx of and dependency on migrant workers who are not believed to share the same 
moral and cultural values that citizens embody, and the constant mention and negotiation 
between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ as a feature of daily life. As a result of these 
insecurities, huge development projects are implemented to protect indigenous heritage, 
culture, sense of national identity, language, national dress, integrity of family life, the 
orientation of youth, and the education system. However, we can see that many of these 
‘static’ conceptions of culture and identity have been actively invented and promoted as 
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Emirati ‘tradition’, seen as part of a past that exists outside of the contemporary, modern 
developmental trajectory of Dubai.  
 Dresch and Picatori (2005) highlight what they call a “Globalising monarchy” in 
which economic and political insecurity is linked to the perceived “assault on culture” 
(27). The major threats are conceptualized not only around the influence of globalization 
on goods and images but also in the numbers of foreigners who inhabit the region. The 
outcomes are growing social isolation and division, in which “The rich and the poor have 
everywhere in the Gulf become more widely separated; distinctions among families have 
become more pronounced; and within broader family groupings age makes a great 
difference” (16).  
 Generally, the ‘threat’ of the overpopulation by foreigners is largely brought 
about through the 1971 official independence, and subsequent oil boom. It is in that 
moment that large numbers of workers at all skill levels came into high demand and, as 
the economy began to develop, the smaller Gulf States, such as the UAE, became 
increasingly dependent on foreign workers. As Khodhker (2010) discusses in his work on 
migration, the nation and morality, popular discourse in the UAE and amongst policy 
makers works to ensure that the national identity of Emiratis is not threatened by the 
influx of migrant workers, “who outnumber them four to one and in Dubai, for example, 
9 to 1” (227). The idea is that foreigners bring their own culture and tradition, which, 
because of the sizeable majority they form, threaten to undermine UAE culture. 
However, as he argues, “migrant workers actually pose little threat to nation building in 
the UAE, as they remain socially and even physically excluded” (Khodkher, 2010, 228). 
The life of a low waged migrant worker is shaped by the global economy, national 
politics, and their social networks and connections play a prominent role in their lives 
(Khodhker, 2010, 228). Thus, the ‘threat’ to the nation is socially constructed to ensure 
political and economic dominance of preferred subjects, through the exclusionary 
practices of differentiation and distancing.  
 In exploring how the nation is conceptualized as particularly vulnerable it is 
necessary to explore how it is considered under ‘threat’. The examples above based on 
population constitute one of the major ways that national identity is constructed, through 
the threat posed by migrants because of the minority position of nationals. This fear of 
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being outnumbered is regulated by increased restrictions on the social and economic 
impact that migrants might have on the culture of Emirati nationals. In addition, the 
exclusivity of formal citizenship, which applies to the minority of national citizens, 
means that different sectors of the economy are entitled to ‘privatized’ notions of 
entitlement. These entitlements are of course based on the genealogies of migration, 
which impact the valuations of different citizenship statuses. It is important to note that 
this xenophobic threat is not only related to the culture of hyper-capitalist consumerism 
that controls many aspects of social life, but rather is fixated on the impact of ‘lower’ 
class, largely South Asian migrants who are seen as the largest numerical force in the 
region. These insecurities are then embodied in the category of ‘migrant-Other’ and 
filtered through various forms of structural racial, class, and gender based violence. 
Following this, the influx of professional migrants from more developed nations or the 
elites from Third world nations are not considered threatening in the same regard. There 
is no question that this differentiation is based on racist, colonial legacies that have 
affected the class position of these various groups, and have been institutionalized 
through formal policies that give preferences and privileges to citizens and, to a lesser 
extent, to elite migrant groups.  
 Various scholars (Silvey 2004, McMurray 1999) have highlighted the ways in 
which the ideas of ‘society’ have changed over time, and some even compare the ways in 
which kinship is comparable to Western histories and associations of race, which are now 
expressed in terms of ‘culture’. In furthering these ideas, Kuwaiti sociologist Muhammad 
Rumaihi discusses the ways in which the modern systems of government are imbedded 
with socio-political contradictions. He points out that the modern infrastructure of the 
state has dramatically expanded and changed since the advent of oil revenues, while the 
power of the ruling families remains largely intact. “… the motive force of the society is 
not production but the distribution of revenue by the state; actual production of oil is 
carried out entirely by foreigners, the local populations playing a virtually insignificant 
role in the productive process” (Dresch 2005, 86).  Ramaihi analyzes these trends by 
concluding that the oil industry has not been integrated into the political fabric of the 
Gulf, which means that there is no middle class of nationals who work in the production 
of oil. Thus the role of the state is the allocation of funds, rather than the generation of 
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revenue.  
 Alan Richards and Philip L. Martin (1983) point to an interesting difference 
between the Gulf states and Western nations, highlighting the ways in which the West 
has moved into a highly complex hierarchy of desire among workers for upward 
mobility, while disdain for manual labour derives from, “pre-industrial social norms and 
from the role of a paternalistic state” (463). They continue: 
   
The age-old symbolic tension between agriculturalists and pastoralists in the 
region  underlies the latter’s rejection of manual labour. Former Bedouins 
typically became soldiers or drivers, shunning manual labour as a task for fellahin 
(peasants) and thus beneath their dignity. Consequently, a principal potential 
source of manual labour has bypassed any industrial work rather than having 
‘moved through’ it. Direct government payments and subsidies for housing, 
medical care, education, and other services further reduce the incentives for the 
local population to assume jobs in the construction or service sectors. (Richards & 
Philips, 1983, 463) 
 
 The authors summarize their discussion by highlighting some major 
characteristics of migration to the Gulf: occurs in basically laissez faire environments; 
comprised of highly skilled and unskilled labour; contains relatively high proportion of 
workers producing investment goods (like construction); fill jobs which locals are either 
untrained for or have a disdain for, based on pre-industrial tradition and state policy; and, 
most importantly, and unique to this region, “move from poor to rich countries but not 
structurally less developed to more industrialized nations” (Richards & Philips 1983, 
463). They also highlight the ways in which the state’s welfare policies, and material 
benefits to citizens helped to shape the disdain towards foreign-born workers by further 
socially distancing them. Dresch (2005) furthers these ideas by highlighting how citizens 
are given direct material benefits in the forms of state sponsored education, medical 
treatment, home ownership and utilities at a fraction of the cost. In addition, Fred 
Halliday (1984) introduces the ways in which the indigenous population’s outlook on 
migrants is extremely hostile, and the ways in which the government works to restrict the 
employment of migrants in certain sectors, as well as working to protect their industries, 
their political voices and, most importantly, to ensure their compliance with the status 
quo.  
 Through these politics, Gulf governments maintain strict controls on industries, 
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and “foreigners can only do business by having a partner who is a national; and no 
foreigner can own more than 49 percent of any company” (Dresch and Piscatori 2005, 
87). Arguably the outcome is that all nationals are given the priority over private 
ownership in industry; and, in contrast to the supposed neo-liberal globalization 
advocated by the West, the government in effect controls and regulates business. Citizens 
constitute a majority in public sector jobs and government administration, both of which 
are largely reserved for citizens, and particularly, in the case of the latter, members of the 
royal family. However, in contrast, access to land is undergoing serious transformations 
in the Gulf, with Dubai giving leaseholds, even freeholds, to foreigners, who can now 
sponsor their own employees, though foreign investment remains prohibited in key areas. 
Dubai also now allows foreign ownership of property, and Abu Dhabi grants 99-year 
leases. These regulations though are often arbitrarily drawn up as some scholars 
highlight, so that “In one sense these countries are extremely open. In another they are 
among the least open societies on earth” (Dresch & Piscatori 2005, 27). Overall, the 
shifting policies towards foreign ownership highlight dramatic shifts in the privatization 
of industry and increasingly global networks.  
 Hanieh (2011) argues that the significance of understanding class formation in the 
region is related not just to the accumulation process by owners of capital, but rather to 
the formation of the labouring class that produces (and reproduces) capital itself. Thus, 
Hanieh highlights the unique formation of the working class in the GCC by temporary 
migrant workers with no citizenship rights. He argues that “class formation in the Gulf 
has occurred through its spatial restructuring, and this feature is linked to the role the 
region plays in the global economy” (Hanieh, 2011, 54). Since citizenship is restricted to 
a small minority who benefit from cheap housing, education, economic grants, contracts, 
and a range of other state sponsored material benefits (Hanieh,2011), Hanieh argues that 
the working class was transformed through its spatialization, which means that workers 
brought from outside who lacked all citizenship rights existed alongside citizens who 
moved up the ladder, in terms of positions, and wealth. For Hanieh, it is these two 
features of class formation; the spatial fix of systemic reliance of migrant workers, and 
the development of a capitalist class through redirection of oil revenues to merchant 
families and elites that led to a powerful system of control over the resident population 
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and the allegiance of the citizenry (Hanieh, 2011). Additionally, Hanieh challenges the 
popular arguments related to population pressures or the lack of adequate workforce in 
the explanation of migrant labour dependency. He discusses the spatial structuring of 
class that links the dependency on migrant labour to the highly exclusionary citizenship 
rights, and repressive policies, that control and curtail the rights of migrants. The 
situation is such that “class is congealed spatially around temporary migrant labour flows 
and was demarcated through the institution of citizenship” (Hanieh, 2011, 63). Highly 
restrictive citizenship policies were in fact embedded in processes of state formation 
itself, which was deliberate, with the spatial configuration of space having two major 
outcomes. First, the structural reliance on temporary migrant labour worked to increase 
the amount of surplus value extracted, based on the value of migrant labour as 
commodity being measured relative to social conditions ‘back home’ rather than in the 
country in which they perform their labour. Second, the spatialization of class acts as a 
powerful mechanism of social control in which social relations are constituted through 
the reproduction of capital and not through birth or citizenship rights, with workers 
becoming illegals when employment contracts are severed and forced to return home.  
  
 Building on this, we can consider in more detail the ideological apparatus of the 
nation. Sara Ahmed (2000) explores the idea of ‘strange encounters’ beginning with the 
idea of aliens and humans and arguing that aliens are not those who we fail to identify, 
but the ones we already know as alien. “The alien is hence only a category within a given 
community of citizens or subjects: as the outsider inside, the alien takes on a spatial 
function, establishing relations of proximity and distance within the home(land)” (3). 
Ahmed argues for an analytic intervention where through these encounters we understand 
how the stranger and the self are produced relationally. Using postcolonial theory, she 
pushes us to rethink how,   
… colonialism operated in different times in ways that permeate all aspects of 
social life, in the colonized and colonizing nations. It is hence about the 
complexity of relationships between past and present, between histories of 
European colonization and contemporary forms of globalization. (Ahmed, 2000, 
11) 
 
	 295	
 Thus, we can see how colonialism as an encounter involves territorial domination 
in shaping contemporary manifestations of ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds, or Global North and 
South, but can also be found in discourses and the subsequent ontologies related to its 
populations.  Thus, the histories which affect the ways in which various groups of bodies 
enter the space are important in understanding how these hierarchies are maintained by 
all levels of participants. “The production of people in the international division of labour 
also involves the production of spaces: spaces, as well as people, are utilized for 
differential production and capital accumulation” (Ahmed, 2000, 168). These insights 
lend themselves to thinking about how diverse nationalities are imbued with particular 
notions of work, entitlements and protection. However, the formation of these ideas is 
informed heavily through processes of racialization, which attach particular bodies with 
sets of ideas of their humanity, and set standards for acceptable ‘treatment’ and living 
conditions. What is interesting in this case study is the ways both in which individual 
bodies are coded through these racial logics, and spaces, such as entire communities, 
nations and regions of the world are racialized to create knowledges that seem to justify 
and legitimize the exploitation and disposability of workers in a global landscape. Thus, 
one may often hear the remarks, “At least they have jobs here”, “They get paid more than 
they would at home”, or “They don’t know any better, so they don’t mind”. The 
interesting point here is that these everyday normalizations and knowledge about Others 
allow distance to be constructed between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which in turn works to 
rationalize the plight of low waged migrants based on certain racialized knowledges that 
construct Others as less capable, less knowledgeable and, ultimately, less human.   
 The racialized ontologies of persons and places also lend themselves to another 
unique manifestation of Dubai’s identity: its unstable and precarious status in 
‘modernity’. The processes of racialization which distance Emirati citizens from low 
waged migrant Others do not fully erase its non-white, non-western character. Thus we 
find that if the nation is considered under threat by overpopulation of non-nationals, 
specifically Third World labourers, then the global city status of Dubai between ‘East’ 
and ‘West’ is also threatened. As I have highlighted earlier, Dubai is often positioned 
between worlds, ‘first’ and ‘third’, ‘east’ and ‘west’, tied to orientalized notions of 
‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, in which Dubai’s status as a global city is contingent on its 
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ability to cater to Western capitalist values and lifestyles. Additionally, as scholars have 
noted, under globalization the growing interconnectedness of processes of economic, 
political, social, cultural, and environmental forces, both from above and below, has been 
tied to growing national insecurities related to sovereignty, which increasingly views 
(im)/migrants as threats to national security. This often operates in seemingly 
‘multicultural’ spaces to justify the intensified regulation of borders and the public order. 
In the case of Dubai’s global city status, we can argue that the unique space between 
‘east’ and ‘west’ creates anxieties based on its contingent status. This is often discussed 
following logic whereby “people hate Dubai because it brings the third world into view 
of the first world” (Bennett, 2010, 256). Bennett continues that it is easier to ignore 
poverty when it stays over there, “than if it comes to live in an ostensibly first-world city 
alongside western businesses and western tourists” (Bennett, 2010, 256).  
 Interestingly, in these representations, all aspects of labour exploitation or human 
rights violations are tied to the ‘third world’ character of Dubai’s in-between status. Thus, 
one often hears arguments related to the juvenile, inexperienced or growing character of 
Dubai, which excuses its shortcomings, and also simultaneously infantilizes the city 
through an orientalist reading of the ‘native’ as not quite ‘caught up’ or capable of 
reaching Western standards of modernity. As commonly portrayed in tourist materials we 
find the following, “with its gleaming skyscrapers, love of modernity and apparent lack 
of anything over ten years old, you’d be forgiven for thinking that Dubai is a mere child 
of a city, albeit one undergoing an incredible growth spurt” (Time Out, 2007, 12). What 
we see here is Dubai as conceptualized from a Western epistemology that imagines 
Dubai as a growing child, experiencing an intense growth spurt but only beginning to 
learn the ropes of Western capitalism¸ and must be excused for inadvertent mistakes like 
the exploitation of labour under what have been referred to as “slave-like” conditions. 
Various interviewed expats likened the situation of low waged workers to slavery. 
American teacher Katie recalled being warned that there are both amazing things in 
Dubai as well as the “awful things [they do] to slaves…”. Anna compares nannies to back 
home (Egypt), “I think here it is more of a slavery thing. They see these people as slaves 
and they (Emiratis) think they are very superior to them” (Anna, Egyptian). Similarly, 
Reda, “I have only seen Emirati’s and gulf nationalities who have nannies and drivers 
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and all that stuff. And when you see them treating them, it is like, “He is not a slave”. I 
have seen the way they treat the office boy… he is treating him more like a slave and not 
a human being” (Reda, Emirati). Overall, in many ways these conditions are linked to a 
logic that tends to relegate ‘backward’ practices such as ‘slavery-like’ conditions of 
workers, a lack of democratic political systems, or universal citizenship rights to its 
‘third-worldliness’, thus reducing exploitation to inherent deficiencies in Emiratis 
(Muslim, Arab, Other).   
 In this sense, as Goldberg explains, the idea of degeneration must be avoided and 
thus the impetus to segregate and limit the impact which ‘Others’ have on the body 
politic is increased and “the paranoia about losing power assumes the image of becoming 
‘Other’ to be avoided like the plague” (Goldberg, 1993, 200). This is a very important 
point, as much of the intensified regulation of these ‘Othered’ subjects is tied to the 
contingent status that Dubai holds in relation to modernity. This contingency is tied to the 
ability of citizens and the nation to suppress the Other within since the modernity of 
Dubai is constituted by those citizens and expat subjects who can attain subjectivity, 
whereas, migrant workers remain outside and connote difference, strangeness, and 
otherness. In the case of conceptualizing Dubai as inside and outside simultaneously, 
these relations become intertwined through the racist legacy of orientalist fantasies 
propagated by Western tourists and entrepreneurs and those utilized by citizen subjects to 
exalt their statuses. Citizens, Western expats and tourists all see themselves then in 
relation to the Migrant-Other. But the Western subject also views him/herself in relation 
to ‘the orient’ where their whiteness is a marker of civility, able to assist the ‘East’ into 
modernity through a contingent belonging conditioned upon the production of a capitalist 
structure and exploitation of the ‘Other’ within.  
 In considering in more detail how Western expats or elites from the Global South 
view themselves in relation to both the oriental space of Dubai as located in the ‘Middle 
East’, and as privileged and innocent, we can consider the insightful work of Katie Walsh 
(2010) on British expat subjects in Dubai. She highlights many of the important ways that 
privilege is enacted in unconscious ways, and explores how racialized encounters are 
negotiated and made sense of by British expats. An analysis of the interviews conducted 
here more generally shows that while individuals may have been able to locate their 
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relative privilege in social hierarchies in terms of their lifestyles, they rarely were able to 
implicate themselves as complicit in upholding these inequalities. In many ways, this was 
informed by their ‘shared’ sense of ‘temporariness’ in a place where they did not belong, 
and in which they felt they had no power, responsibility or right to voice their criticism of 
the politics of the city. They have been disciplined by state surveillance and the constant 
looming threat of deportation. In addition to their own inability to ‘change’ the system, 
many expats, as highlighted by Walsh, actually justify their status and role in Dubai 
through popular narratives regarding ‘desperate workers’ who can be paid low wages 
because of where they are from and, in many instances, expats come to believe in their 
benevolence towards these ‘poor’ workers by providing them jobs, allowing them in 
effect to help with their children’s education back home (Walsh, 2010, 245).  
 Furthermore, as Walsh highlights, many expats also negate their responsibility in 
upholding or making possible these global hierarchies by pointing to local hierarchies, 
which means that although some recognize practices as negatively contributing to 
inequality, they are justified through claims that they are spatially specific and therefore 
temporary (Walsh, 2010). Thus, since Brits do not constitute the highest tier, which is 
reserved for Emirati nationals, in the social hierarchy they then work to distance 
themselves as merely workers in a larger national and global economy. Following this 
logic, Walsh highlights that Brits claim that “everyday life in Dubai itself generates 
racism with no consideration of the wider patterns of the negotiation of race in 
postcolonial spaces” (Walsh, 2010, 246). In considering whiteness, and race in more 
detail, Walsh argues that we need to consider the instability of whiteness where there are 
multiplicities of white identities that need to be understood. For example, British subjects 
are often seen as more foreign than other groups because of their whiteness, as they are 
viewed as not sharing the culture, religion or language of Arabs, but at the same time, 
they are also privileged in most urban encounters in Dubai as they hold a higher status 
than other migrant groups. For much of these privileged groups, whiteness appears as 
neutral and invisible, where white Britons feel unmarked by race in their everyday 
encounters. Furthermore, as Walsh highlights, gendered, sexualized, classed and 
racialized bodies are perceived differently, and thus British status is a particularly 
privileged category, compared for example to the whiteness of Eastern European sex 
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workers. Overall what we find for privileged expats in general is that the globality of the 
city of Dubai emerges, not in isolation, but through lived and negotiated relations of 
postcoloniality in which race, class, and gender create different experiences of belonging, 
identity and status. British expat identities then, as Walsh argues, are produced, in part, 
through their everyday interactions with other categories of migrants, and are tied to 
cultures of imperialism elsewhere.  
 Among Emirati nationals, we find, of course, gendered differences between 
citizen subjects and strategies through which, as Razack highlights through the work of 
Foucault, the early bourgeois citizen of the state knew himself through his “distance 
between lower orders and aristocracy” (Razack, 2002, 10). The tourist, expat or elite 
subject must self-regulate himself from those degenerates, who threaten his status. Thus 
the Emirati citizen is at once inside and out, through logics of contingent belonging 
predicated upon his ability to expunge the ‘Other’ from within his socio-cultural 
worldview and his body. In the colonial project, the bodies of racialized Others need to 
be “killed or colonized, slaughtered or saved, expunged or exploited” in order to protect 
the body politic (Goldberg, 1993, 187). “Threatening to transgress or pollute established 
social orders necessitates their reinvention, first by conceptualizing order anew and then 
by reproducing spatial confinement and separation in the renewed terms” (Goldberg, 
1993, 187). Thus, modes of social exclusion and segregation are tied to maturing 
capitalism and modernity in general and have been effected in terms of “racialized 
discourse, with its classificatory systems, its orders and values, and its ways of seeing 
particular bodies in their natural and social relations” (Goldberg, 1993 187).  
The discussion comes full circle in exploring how genealogies of migration tied to 
colonial relations structure and constitute spaces embedded with racialized-hierachical 
social relations, which in turn produce various subject positions and the subsequent 
hierarchies of entitlement, and uneven urban geography within the city. In the case of 
Dubai many of the major examples, which explicitly highlight these processes, are based 
on the segregation of spaces and the social hierarchies that are constituted both formally 
and informally, and are rationalized and justified to legitimize the structural and everyday 
forms of violence and exclusion towards Others that create privileged statuses.  
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 To enact and support many of these processes, the state develops projects to 
reaffirm the privileged status of Emirati citizens, Western and elite expat professionals 
and tourists through the creation of spaces that are organized to sustain unequal relations, 
through, as Razack (2002) highlights, racial hierarchies. As she argues, we must examine 
the spatial and legal practices that maintain, in her example, a white-settler society, and in 
our case, a globalized, neoliberal city.  Razack highlights the need to challenge the idea 
that spaces exist prior to or separate from the subjects who image and use them (Razack, 
2002) and introduces the work of Henri Lefebvre to discuss the dialectic relationship 
between spaces and bodies, and the material and symbolic processes of spatial relations. 
Lefebvre’s concept of ‘social space’ highlights: perceived social space; conceived space; 
and, lived space (Razack, 2002, 9). In all of these aspects, space is a social product by 
which both respectable and abject bodies are produced. From Razack’s work we see that 
to interrogate bodies traveling in spaces is to engage in complex histories of (un)mapping 
spaces and bodies in relation to multiple systems of domination. Here we can highlight 
two important aspects of an interlocking analytic approach: first, how the systems are 
mutually constitutive of each other; and, second, how all the systems of domination 
operate at the local level, a task facilitated by attending to material and symbolic 
constitution of specific spaces. Significantly here we can consider the making of spaces 
through the ways that different bodies engage, thus, the inclusion of some, exclusion of 
Others are all part of the processes of making subjects who are constructed differentially 
through hierarchies of race, class, gender and nationality. A clear theme found throughout 
the interviews is the extreme differences in experience and diverse notions of Dubai 
dreams, all based on where one stands in the nation, and a reflection of one’s place in the 
broader global, capitalist landscape. The range in background, motivations and 
experiences can include Dubai as “all inclusive vacation” or as a survival strategy. Dubai 
is,  
A great place to live in terms of safety, comfortable lifestyles and the people are 
generally happy here and live life very comfortably, and I think the vast majority 
of people come here for money because it is a tax free society. So financial is the 
main thing, and plus there is a high standard of living. (Natasha, Emriati) 
 
Fresh graduates such as Canadian expat Mohamed and American expat Katie both 
came to Dubai for better job opportunities. For Karen, Dubai meant that she could 
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exchange unpaid teaching placements backhome that forced her to ‘nanny’ on weekends 
for the possibilities of Dubai and living what she describes as an “all inclusive vacation”. 
Expats from the Global South, Jo and Peter both described limited opportunities in Egypt, 
which pushed them to look abroad. “In Egypt we work a lot but we cannot get what we 
deserve”, (Peter, Egyptian) and thus, Dubai became a place of possibility to move away 
from their “stagnant” careers. Other expats from the Global South highlight that the 
luxuries and benefits of living in Dubai make going ‘home’ difficult, and thus while they 
do not have permanent residence in Dubai, “they go back home for summer and think ‘I 
just wanna go back to the UAE’. They get comfortable and never want to go back there, 
but when they retire it’s a big question mark” (Karen, Canadian/Egyptian).  
For many of the female migrant workers I spoke to from the Global South, the 
themes of gendered migration, patriarchy, religious sanctions, economic necessity, 
addiction and alcohol linked their stories together and Dubai was directly linked to their 
survival strategies. For Louisa, Dubai opened up opportunities and experiences that she 
may never have had back home, such as increased access to food, and ‘luxury’. Louisa 
also describes how Dubai induces dreams, representing a place of possibility. For 
Bangladeshi Shahina escaping an abusive husband and providing money to support her 
children’s education back home motivated her but as she cried, “I will never be happy”. 
For Mohamed, a Pakistani taxi driver, Dubai’s dreams were broken promises that never 
lived up to the expectation. “They promise you green fields, but when you come here all 
you get is desert” (Mohamed, Pakistan). The range and diversity in experiences is vast 
and as Bannerji (2000) states, “If one stands on the dark side of the nation…everything 
looks different” (104).  Thus, the idea that where one stands can shape one’s entire 
experience is significant in the case of Dubai, as the claims of a neutral, open, 
welcoming, multicultural global city become questionable when considering the majority 
of its temporary, foreigner workers/residents who live in extremely unequal conditions 
that are used to sustain the privileges of the few.  
 As a result of these struggles to claim its location as a nodal point in the network 
of global cities in a global landscape, intense social regulation serves to also reclaim 
footing through processes and policies of localization and nationalization in various 
aspects of social and cultural life. While much of the dialogue surrounding the loss of 
	 302	
Emirati culture is discussed in relation to the need to preserve ‘tradition’, tied to religious 
and cultural practices, what we find is that the practices which ensue to protect 
‘indigenous’ culture target low waged migrant workers instead of shifting patterns of 
consumption and consumerism linked to a growing capitalist culture. 
 Aihwa Ong (2009) shows how ‘moral economies’ affect the treatment and 
experiences of migrant workers, and more specifically female migrant workers, 
beginning with the “underpaid, starved, and battered foreign maid, which has become the 
image of the new inhumanity in the Asian metropolis” (157). “Low-skilled foreign 
women circulate in zones of exception that support the citadels of Asia’s new rich” (158). 
She argues that the ‘neoslavery’ of migrant women emerges out of a “postcolonial 
intersection of racialized nationalities, neoliberal strategies, and disjunctive moral 
economies based on kinship and ethnicity” (160), with postcolonial nations built on 
questions of who is considered human or subhuman.   
 Ong (2009) discusses the idea of ‘transient aliens’ or foreign domestic workers 
who are subjected to “household-based disciplinary regimes and to techniques of 
securitization at the national level” (161).  Because of their mobility, they are not 
considered attachable to moral economies despite their reproductive labour and as a result 
are considered both undesirable aliens and threats to the security of the nation’s society. 
Moral economies are understood as a “web of unequal relationships of exchange based 
on morality of reciprocity, mutual obligation and protection” (161). The moral 
obligations of the family and kin have created opportunities for the state agencies and 
labour syndicates who seek to channel migrant women to overseas markets, as in the 
neoliberal strategy of the Philippines of employing programs that create contractual 
agreements with foreign countries to hire Filipino workers (162). The government works 
to promote the image of the docile and flexible Filipino female worker, while at the same 
time creating the patriotic duty of modern day heroes to earn needed money overseas, 
which Ong describes as the feminization of migrant labour and the masculinzation of 
their national roles (162). Here she highlights how NGOs play an important role in 
reinforcing the moral economic justifications of overseas employment as well as 
sustaining the moral economy of the family, through the moral connection between free-
choice in seeking employment overseas as well as the moral indebtedness to their 
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families. Ong contrasts this strategy to the case of the Indonesian government, which 
does not play a direct role in organizing the trade, but instead relies on moral economy 
systems to mobilize young women who are then trained by NGOs (163). Overall, Ong is 
interested in the interplay between moral economies, state policy and NGOs, which she 
argues, creates conditions under which many women sent across these boundaries 
experience two major technologies of control: the housebound form of labour 
incarceration, and a technology of securitization that treats them as potential political 
threats (164). Interestingly, she notes that in both Singapore and Hong Kong, these 
workers are seen as remainders of a not too recent past from which they emerged, and 
thus represent threats to the ethnoracial distinctions that characterize postcolonial Asia 
(165-166).  
 Overall, Ong highlights the ways in which neoliberal restructuring, combined in 
the Third world with a dependency on women’s paid and unpaid labour to absorb losses 
in government administered social services and supports, are linked to the hierarchies of 
citizenship amongst women in the home/workplace, as well as in an international system 
of hierarchically organized nation-states. She also highlights the non-economic factors 
that motivate migration; the ‘emotional’ or ‘affective’ aspects of gendered labour; the 
importance of sending states in constructing nationalist identities through remittances, as 
well as through transnational linkages amongst workers around the globe which allow 
them to situate their belonging within a global economy; and, the role of colonialism, 
racialization and dehumanization in the construction of migrants as a threat to the nation 
thereby justifying the need for subsequent moral regulation.  
 In considering how processes of racialization operate, we can turn to the everyday 
negotiations, which are often more difficult to break apart as they become hegemonic and 
seemingly natural in order to legitimize the story or myths they wish to protect. In this 
sense, the following two examples highlight some of the methods through which 
strategies of control operate and the subsequent justifications of social hierarchies in the 
context of neoliberal global city making in Dubai. These insights, which resonate with 
many subjects, residents and visitors to the city, help to add complexity and nuance to the 
lived experiences of different groups, pushing us to ask questions and denaturalize 
violence and the dehumanization of Others, implicating ‘silence’ as complicity rather 
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than as neutrality and innocence. 
 
Where you are from vs. where you are at.  
In Dubai, everything that is good is beyond our reach so it’s best to be content 
with nothing. We get bored here because we can’t afford anything - this place is 
built to cater to the rich. (Time Out, 23) from Diyal Chand, 24-year-old 
electrician.  
 
 One of the most salient themes in considering influences on the experiences of 
diverse groups of migrants stems from a line of thinking we can refer to as “where you 
are from”. This force becomes the most significant determining factor in one’s 
experience and place in the hierarchy of entitlement. Not only does it shape the privileges 
of some, through the exclusion of others, it also works to influence how different groups 
of migrants think of themselves and their experiences in the city, their ideas of belonging 
and, often, their levels of criticism or frustration. In other ways, ideas about the ‘Third 
world’ and common myths circulating in the city are often used to legitimize, justify and 
sanction or encourage particular policies and practices towards low waged migrant 
workers, both service sector and construction workers, and domestic workers. Thus, the 
idea of ‘where you are from’ is constructed through gendered, racialized and class based 
ideologies that position people from different places into hierarchies that are seen as 
natural, inevitable or necessary. Before we explore the many different examples of how 
this idea operates, and the strategies and outcomes it encourages, we can consider some 
scholarly background and insights into its conceptualization.  
  Ien Ang (1994) explores the role of diasporic identity formation through 
hybridity, often based on the mythic notions of the homeland, the politics of minority 
status and the experiences of non-belonging. Ang draws on her family history and her 
inability to speak Chinese as issues that complicate her own identity. Furthermore, “not 
speaking Chinese” is seen as an example of her non-authentic status, as it relates to the 
issues of “Where you’re from vs. Where you’re at” (10-11). Further, she discusses the 
political pressures that influence people to come to identify themselves in racial or ethnic 
terms. These pressures relate to the colonial politics of divide and rule and are implicated 
in modern ideologies of nation state, and raise confusion in the conditions of existence 
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for those who are never really going to belong to a specific place (11). Further, Ang 
discusses the processes of self-ethnicization as a confirmation of status in western white 
culture, as a sign of non-belonging, based on the credentials of ‘authentic’ essentialist 
notions of ethnicity, as well as the social policies that imposed the acknowledgement of 
these differences from the majority (11). This constitutes the politics of diaspora as it 
relates to both the desire to keep ‘western cultures white’ and the imagined idea of where 
you are from as a form of marginalization in the place you are at (15). 
 Borrowing the idea of the ‘third space of hybridity’ from Homi Bhabha, Ang 
(1994) highlights how the diasporic subject can “never return home” (15). This liminal 
space of hybridity is inextricably linked to these experiences and is based on the reality 
that the ethnicized diasporic subject is never fully able to become a part of the dominant 
culture.  Ethnicization of the diasporic subject means that they are unable to fully become 
part of dominant culture, “governed by the unerased traces of ‘where you’re from’, no 
matter how mediated, but ultimately framed by the possibilities and limits offered by 
‘where you’re at’ (17). 
 Overall the use of ethnicity as an identity is political in the sense that we hope to 
find roots and to belong to experiences. However, in this process we often justify colonial 
politics of modernity to categorize ethnic identities. This is where Ang (1994) highlights 
Spivak’s idea of ‘strategic essentialism’ to challenge hegemonic definitions of where 
you’re at and to insist on being heard from the particularities of history and experience as 
they are based in ‘global distributions of power’. Ang ends her article, “In short, if I am 
inescapably Chinese by descent, I am only sometimes Chinese by consent. When and 
how is a matter of politics” (18).  
 Although much of Ang’s discussion is tied to her example of being a part of an 
Asian ethnic minority in a ‘white’ Western country, the insights on the processes of 
identity formation, and the role of lived experiences of subjects in and through national 
boundaries and borders provide insight into the ways in which people are produced by, 
and resist dominant constructions of subjectivity and belonging. From here, we can also 
link these insights to the role of identity formation in relation to state sovereignty and 
citizenship in the production of these subjectivities and strategies of governance. Not 
only does the function of ‘where you are from’ continually work to maintain distance 
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between Emirati citizens, professional expats and tourists, it also functions to marginalize 
people in the place they are at, based on an imagined idea of where they are from.  
Once they retire, they are going to go back there and live as kings compared to 
how they used to live, so they have come a long way and they have achieved a lot 
in their life, and they do acknowledge that they probably would not have reached 
that if  they had stayed there. (Mario, Canadian) 
 
            This idea is tied to questions of why low waged workers continue to migrate to 
Dubai, and to popular arguments that promote the idea that these workers should be 
‘grateful’ for the opportunities afforded them by the state. When questions of 
exploitation, mistreatment, abuses, deplorable living conditions, and general inequalities 
in experiences in Dubai are raised, many subjects create responses that are based not on 
the city and spaces in which they currently reside, but on imagined ideas of ‘where they 
are from’. Thus, where they are from is tied to an imagined idea of the ‘Third world’, full 
of desperate, impoverished, brown and black bodies, waiting for the opportunity to be 
saved from their misery, who come to Dubai, work on short contracts, remitting large 
sums of money (by their standards), and who will return home to live lavishly, as ‘kings’ 
compared to the slum-life from which they came. Thus, Dubai becomes a place of 
opportunity, to fill the needs of the desperate millions, a benevolent role to play, rather 
than a culpable one.  
 Scholarly opinions on the subject of labour range in the extremes from the 
Marxist view in which workers are victims of a larger economic system, without any 
consideration of the social and cultural factors of migration, to another economic view in 
which migration is seen as economic freedom driven by the market, allowing workers to 
send remittances as a development strategy. If we consider what migrants themselves say 
about whether or not they are better off, many in my study, highlight the difficulties they 
have in maintaining a significant remittance flow, because of debts, the cost of living, and 
significantly lower wages than promised. According to the International Organization of 
Migration (IOM) (2013), many rate their lives as similar to or worse than those of 
‘matched stayers’ in the home country, i.e. (persons of a similar profile who did not 
migrate). The IOM states that, 
Consequently, South–South long-timers consider themselves to be worse off than 
if they stayed in their home country – reporting, for example, difficulties in 
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obtaining adequate housing. Migrants from the South generally report that they 
have more difficulty in achieving a satisfactory standard of living and do not 
consider themselves to be better off than if they had stayed at home. (IOM, 2013 
report) 
 
                  This strongly contrasts with the view commonly held by residents of the city 
and challenges the idea of pure economic mobility and, with it, freedom. One may argue 
that in the contemporary period, ‘chains’ have been replaced with economic coercion, 
which, in conjunction with the growth of migration for labour, acts as a powerful tool in 
binding workers to employers. In another line of argument, expats claimed that these 
workers know what they are getting into as “no one forces them to come”. However, as 
we know, survival strategies in the Global South in which migration has been used as a 
strategy of ‘development’ are increasingly under pressure. Thus, as the global economic 
system continues to intensify inequalities between and within nations, growing numbers 
of impoverished citizens must find alternative survival strategies.  
 So we come. You say we know the rules before we come. But does that 
 necessarily mean the rules are fair? Oh, but you never said the rules were fair, you 
 just said those were the rules. So why do I play this game you ask? Well, it’s 
 because before I was born, there was a bet made on my behalf, and my debt grew 
 and grew, even before there was the slightest caress. This is the burden of my 
 existence. That if I will survive, I will play the game by your rules. This is my 
 colonial inheritance. The burden of my breaths. Will we change the rules? Change 
 the game? Can we change this inheritance? (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2012)  
 
 Some scholars highlight these justifications of ill or unfair treatment, and related 
cases of abuse as resulting from ‘individuals’ acting poorly, rather than as part of 
structural and systemic forces that allow for these abuses to exist and to be rationalized. 
Thus, the international division of labour in combination with contemporary forces of 
migration for labour is seen as a rational consequence of inequalities of wealth between 
nations. In this sense, as Walsh highlights, “Asian labour diasporas are represented as 
poor, needy and unskilled, which serves to legitimize the inequalities of the labour 
relationship including the neglect of human rights” (Walsh, 2010, 245).  
 Additionally, as Walsh (2010) highlights in her case study of British expats, 
domestic workers are often conceptualized through racist logics that seek to justify their 
lesser status and treatment in ways that relate explicitly to where they are from. Thus, as 
	 308	
she highlights in the racialization of domestic workers and the domestic work itself, 
Asian workers are seen as ‘unskilled, immature, inexperienced’, which, as she points out, 
is not as explicitly racist as the Emirati conceptualization of ‘tea boy’ or ‘house girl’, but 
nonetheless works to justify the low wages and long hours. What Walsh finds in her 
study resonates with what is being discussed here, in that these imagined ideas of ‘back 
home’ are used as part of strategies that justify and often encourage the need for training, 
surveillance, and discipline of low waged workers. In addition, if we consider the policies 
and practices of hiring foreign workers, and the visa/sponsorship system, we find that in 
fact the racialization of places from which they originate, in conjunction with programs 
that tie workers to employers, create highly precarious situations for domestic workers in 
particular, in which employers routinely confiscate passports to protect themselves from 
the flight of workers for whom they will still be responsible, or to lock up workers within 
the house, or to deny them freedom of mobility outside the home on days/time off, in an 
effort to ‘protect them’. In the case of British expats Walsh argues that the management 
of domestic workers within the home helps to reaffirm their ‘postcolonial Britishness’ in 
which the ‘everyday encounters’ of many Britons “with those positioned beneath them in 
Dubai’s social hierarchy, structured by migrant status, are informed by the sense of 
imperial capital that they carry with them” (Walsh, 2010, 243). In similar forms, I would 
argue that these justifications based on ‘where you are from’ work to reaffirm the 
identities of all residents in the city. For Emiratis, the foreign, temporary status of all 
workers, and the clear privileges and preferences they receive from the state confer them 
with a status incomparable to any other group. In addition, all expat professionals find 
their privilege based on notions of where Others are from by distancing themselves from 
these low waged workers. In the case of white subjects, it is often easier than for non-
white professional expats in which issues of race and nationality must be more clearly 
explicated through encounters and enacted through other means such as class privilege. 
For example, many subjects discuss practices at work that clearly ask for nationality as a 
determinant in allocating salaries,  
Its very obvious here. I was volunteering in a hospital and even if people are 
working the same job, they get paid differently based on where they are from. So 
the South African nurse gets paid more than the Indian and both are getting paid 
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less than an Australian nurse. This isn’t something you have to hide because 
everyone knows how much they are getting paid. (Anna, Canadian/Egyptian)  
 
A similarly idea is highlighted by Carlos who says that once his sister had 
received her American citizenship, “…she refilled her paperwork as an American, from 
her previous status as an Egyptian and her salary doubled” (Carlos, American). He very 
adamantly and clearly states that, “You get treated differently based on your salary.” This 
statement is neither a secret nor something taboo, is highly problematic, yet widely 
known and ‘accepted’. Overall then, Third world migrants can be paid and treated 
relative to ‘back home’, while expat professionals are also treated based on ‘back home’ 
but hierarchies and higher values are given to Western passports and persons, particularly 
whites. Thus, Third world migrants are relegated to Otherness and continually treated as 
outsiders, while residents and citizens are paid and live in the ‘global city’.  
 The question of where you are from overdetermines where you are at in many 
significant ways that often take explicit forms such as passports and paychecks. As I have 
highlighted previously, this idea impacts and shapes not only one’s experience, access 
and lifestyle, but also one’s entitlements. This can be seen most blatantly in discussions 
of wages and working conditions, in the case, for example, as one interviewee discussed, 
of two expats working professional jobs, holding Western passports, who each make well 
over 20,000 AED (approx. $5,400 USD) a month (Dee, Canadian). They work in 
international firms and have a full time live in nanny/domestic worker. She works 
everyday with unregulated/unfixed hours and receives a half day off once a week. Her 
monthly salary is around 1,500 AED (approx. $400 USD). This is understood as a higher 
salary than many would receive. However, when we consider the cost of living, $1500 
AED is not enough for anyone in the city to live off. This can be compared to the salaries 
of construction workers who earn around 50-80 cents per hour working ten hour days, six 
days a week, living in squalor (Hanieh, 2010, 64). As interviewees and scholars both 
highlight, the lack of minimum wage in the private sector and the differences in wage 
levels are tied to ‘where you are from’ (the home country of workers), rather than the 
country in which they work (Hanieh, 2010). This spatialization of class, according to 
Hanieh, acts as “powerful mechanism of social control”, a result of the lack of 
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permanence, repressive laws and existing barriers of race, religion, language, etc. that 
make class consciousness difficult to build (Hanieh, 2010, 65).  
 This idea of creating differential standards based on where one is coming from 
dominates the rationalization. When asked about this, many expats and Emiratis pointed 
out that the salaries of domestic workers did not calculate benefits such as the costs to 
employers if the work not always the same and fluctuate tremendously in practice (as 
some employers illegally make workers pay these costs by taking it out of their salaries). 
Regardless, through discussions with various individuals, it became clear that if Dubai is 
understood as a meeting place, the space allows you access to two worlds, ‘first’ and 
‘third’, or ‘East’ and ‘West’. Although we need to challenge the idea of a bi-polar world 
order, the international division of labour still characterizes the majority of migrants, and 
is connected to Dubai as a global city, where those professional making ‘first world’ 
salaries can have access to labour from the ‘third world’ at relative cost. Professionals are 
arguably paid based on living in Dubai and their privileged status as Westerners, while 
low waged workers get paid based on back home.  
They compare you to where you come from, and to them, it is a privilege. Your 
living here is a privilege, and they let you know that it is a privilege. Or you just 
feel it… Like the salaries. Yeah, you know that’s why he said that, you know. 
Indians or Filipinos would get paid less, because they know that they would be 
earning nothing back home, and they think of it as this salary will buy him a home 
in India. But what if he never wants to go back, it wont buy him a home here, but 
it will buy him one there. (Laura, Egyptian)  
 
 This is however highly contested, as while ‘success’ stories of building a life back 
home are touted as the opportunity afforded to poor migrants by the global city of Dubai. 
In almost all of my encounters, low waged workers did not see their salaries as affording 
them a huge economic leap, but rather as part of their survival, to pay school fees for 
their children or to provide basic living expenses back home. Another major explanation 
is tied to the cost of living which employers believe is a burden they bear that is not 
included in the wage itself. In addition, many employers pay for a return ticket for their 
workers to visit home, and although it is widely believed that this is a yearly trip, it is 
rarely enforced. In addition, expats highlighted the popular notions of “they need jobs”, 
“at least it is better than back home”, or that “Dubai gives them an opportunity”. There 
are many considerations that challenge these myths, such as whether or not this 
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‘luxurious life’ they are allegedly building back home is actual ‘real’ or just a popular 
myth? To what extent and for how many? In reality, for most low waged migrants, the 
debts incurred, the physical and mental abuse, the insecurity and the exploitation are 
never compensated because of their largely unregulated work environments. Nor are 
issues such as the disposability of workers in these sectors, the living conditions, the 
double standards, why some jobs and wages are legitimized for certain workers based on 
where they are from, versus the living standards assumed by others, are not considered. 
In addition, non-economic criteria also influence decisions to migrate, and the difficulties 
of leaving families and young children ‘back home’ also impacts the experiences of 
migration for many. This can be seen in the insights of Shahana (Bangladesh) or Louise 
(Phillipines) who both discussed their children, abusive spouses and difficult familiar 
situations as reasons for migrating.  
 In one example, an interviewee expressed her shock that her friend from the West, 
living in a luxurious villa, could could legitimize having a ‘bedroom’ that consisted of a 
mattress on the floor and an old dresser for their nanny who was the primary caretaker for 
their children, something incomprehensible for some, and completely ‘normal’ for others, 
And why? The logic again was tied to it being ‘better’ than an imagined ‘back home’. 
Back home is based on a racist, colonial based set of ideologies, which dehumanizes 
‘Third world’ migrants and legitimizes their abuse and exploitation as naturally suited to 
them. Why some are paid ‘Third world’ salaries, while others are paid ‘First world’ 
salaries is a continual feature of everyday dynamics. The precariousness faced by low 
waged workers is impacted by many other factors as well, including differential laws, 
expectations and visas, health requirements and other limitations. Additional factors also 
impact common practices in the Gulf such as the confiscation of passports, not allowing 
workers to leave the house in their time off, or even locking the doors to force workers 
inside. These are also impacted by racist ideologies, but also are influenced by state 
policies, such as the ‘Kafala’ sponsorship system in which workers are tied to employers, 
and employers are told that if anything happens to their employees, or if they commit any 
crimes, they, the employers, will be held accountable, which empowers and encourages 
them to carry out these measures to protect themselves, even if it is justified under the 
logic of benevolence in an effort to protect them. In the end, ideas of race, gender and 
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class work to create beliefs that infantilize and dehumanize workers to normalize and 
legitimize these actions, from their meager salaries to physical confinement.   
 Additionally, these logics also impact other, more privileged workers, who often 
note the common practice of discrimination in the workplace on the basis of their race or 
passport they hold. Schools are one major example of contracts and salaries for teachers 
created based on origin. The same school can have two teachers doing the same job being 
paid drastically different salaries, one that affords a life in the city, the other that affords a 
life ‘back home’ (or so it is claimed). Why two workers in the same job are treated so 
differently is again legitimized through this logic, and is an example that many find 
highly problematic. Why are expats from the West paid to maintain a luxurious lifestyle 
in Dubai, and others, for the same work, are paid relative to ‘back home’. While many 
argue that this is a way to entice workers from the West, who require more incentive than 
those from the Global South, a broader global hierarchy of states, nationalities that place 
higher values on Western education, experience and passports legitimizes these practices 
as tied to neutral economic determinism. As Jo remarked on whether her American 
passports benefits her,  
Yes. Always. There are two reasons. There are different classes - an American 
passport and bearing a pure American name, and then there is having an 
American passport and having some other nationality (shown through your race 
or name) and then there is just having another nationality all together. The best 
out of the three is being an American with a white name. The difference between 
the two is that a lot of times, some employers will be like, ‘Okay well you’re 
American but you are actually Arab in origin’, so they might not be as keen on 
giving your benefits as they would if someone would have an American passport 
from American descent. (Jo, American)  
 
 Benefits and pay are allocated based on these differences, thus for Jo, many 
employers will ask, because of her name, if she speaks Arabic, where she feels compelled 
to deny that she is Arab, to be entitled to the same benefits as others in the company. 
Further, 
I think because they are a minority here and the fact that I am Arabic and  we are 
in an Arabic country, I feel like… I don’t know how to say it… but I just feel 
like… its funny because my dad said the same thing because we used to live in 
Saudi Arabia and my dad worked in an American company there…That it was 
almost like a disadvantage to be Arabic, even though you are living in an Arabic 
country when you work for an American company… they have preferences for 
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expats who are British, American or Canadian. They almost have this hierarchy 
feeling as if Arabic people are like lower. It is just weird…they think they are 
better. They actually do. (Sara, Egyptian)  
  
 However, Jo and Sara agreed that while racist ideas and practices position them 
lower than white Westerners, these same logics also work to place non-Arabs, such as 
Africans and South Asians below them.  
 The preferences for Western professionals can be seen clearly in the case of 
teachers.  
There are these request forms for teachers for the next year. I would say that there 
are at least 50-60 requests for next year, which say that I would like my son or 
daughter with someone that has a strong American accent. Or they say certain 
nationalities that they do not want their son or daughter to be with. (Katie, 
American) 
 
 The racism is both explicit and neutralized at the same time, where wanting 
‘white’ educators is neutralized and hidden in the desire for ‘American accents’, while 
racism is implicitly involved in excluded non-white teachers. Another way that ‘where 
you are from’ operates is in the ways that different subjects understand their experiences 
in the city, and the city in general. Depending on your nationality, and as possibilities 
diminish ‘back home’ for many ‘Third world’ professional migrants, the desire to stay or 
appreciate Dubai’s stability increases.    
 In 2000 even it was just sand and water, but then 15 years later it is full of towers 
 and it is like a different country. I didn’t find this in Egypt, but I found this in 
 Dubai or the UAE. The traffic is great. In Egypt it is a disaster and everyday it is a 
 disaster. It was like Egypt was a disaster and everyday it comes more of a 
 disaster. This is why I love Dubai. (Peter, Egyptian)  
 
 This view could be challenged if the relationships between the UAE and Egypt 
were better understood, thus exposing the ways in which the global capitalist system has 
shaped and led to increasing impoverishment and instability in the global South, to the 
benefit of global cities in the non-western context, and to the Gulf states in particular.  
 To understand the implications of these logics on the everyday experiences of 
different residents, we must see how ideas of ‘belonging’ are shaped through these 
pressures of where you are from. The insights provided by different subjects show how 
genealogies related to power relations embedded in various nationalities impact how 
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groups and individuals understand their relationships to Dubai. Very broadly, for 
example, in my interviews I observed that in many instances informants who held 
‘Western’ or ‘First world’ passports and nationalities were often much more critical of 
Dubai than were those who held passports with ‘lesser’ status. Interestingly here, we can 
consider the question of where you are from overwhelming where you are at, and how the 
idea of where you can or will be in turn impacts the feelings and desires of various 
migrants, especially expat professionals, to stay, invest or desire more from Dubai.  
 Similarly, and interrelated with this logic, is the idea that this is a temporary 
home. For some, based on their level of privilege, Dubai offers a less temporary life in 
terms of building or affording a life while working, and for others the temporary life, 
which may last decades, is based on their lack of entitlements and their inability to build 
a stable life. Important to consider is whether or not this is an intended goal, which in 
turn will impact the understandings different subjects have in their experience. So then 
we can see how some workers, based on race, class and, often, gender, are seen as more 
‘welcome’, belonging or deserving than others. This regulation extends to many other 
entitlements and governs access to many aspects of life, such as where one can live, 
whether based on affordability or ability to gain residence in certain areas. Worker camps 
and accommodations provided by employers push many to the outskirts of the city, in 
neighbouring emirates or generally out of view, away, as one informant described, “from 
the dominant image of Dubai”. This reality is popularly referred to as the ‘dark side’ of 
Dubai.  
 
Relativity as a mode of justification  
 Another significant theme to consider is how different residents come to 
understand the city and to make sense of or normalize certain practices or realities 
through the idea of relativity. ‘Relativity’ works through different practices as a rationale 
to create exceptions for certain everyday realities that work in turn to create normal, 
acceptable, inevitable and, often, necessary practices.  
 You will find exploitation in any city in the world, and you will find greater 
 exploitation, and greater poverty and greater injustice in hundreds of third world 
 cities, the cities that many of Dubai’s workers come from. Which is why many of 
 them choose to stay. (Bennett, 2010, 255) 
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 Not only does this sentiment relate to the overwhelming power of where you are 
from, but it also works to relativize the exploitation of low waged workers in Dubai as 
somehow better than ‘back home’, which is itself a highly contested idea. The existence 
of exploitation in other cities is obvious, as exploitation is not exclusive to any one place 
but is clearly integral to the capitalist mode of production. The exploitation existent in 
Dubai is not negated by the existence of exploitation elsewhere and, particularly, not 
based on the racist logics that confine ‘Third world’ people and places as naturally suited 
or bred with inequality in their blood. In a related manner, this logic operates to relativize 
Dubai’s issues as like ‘any other city’ with a history of exploitation. Some interviewees 
explained that most Western countries were built on colonialism, slavery and exploitation 
and thus Dubai is no different. This logic in fact seemed to create an idea of relativity as 
exception - most nations in the world have been built on the exploitation and 
dehumanization of Others so Dubai should not be seen as exceptional. Indeed, for some 
the exploitation taking place in the city is seen as excusable on the basis of relativity. In 
other ways, it is seen as a necessary or inevitable element to the building of a new city. 
Again this links back to the temporal element of ‘developmental’ lineage in which Dubai 
has not yet ‘caught up’. This misses the important analysis or connection to the reality 
that many other nations are creating more and more temporary programs, that many of 
these nations have been built on notions of insider and outsider from their inception, and 
most importantly, that the Gulf and the UAE in particular play a significant role in the 
development of contemporary capitalism.  In a similar vain, justifications of the city are 
also interestingly tied to the right of Emiratis, as ‘Indigenous’ to the country, to create 
exclusionary policies of citizenship and settlement to protect their culture and identity.  
 Additionally, while Dubai’s social hierarchies are not nationally bound or limited, 
as has been argued through this analysis, it is significant to contrast the labour and other 
policies in Dubai, as an emerging global city, with those programs and policies that are 
shifting around the world. Neoliberalism as a ‘technology of government’ and mode of 
rationality operates to distance citizens from governments in terms of their entitlements, 
and the contemporary period of neoliberalism has eroded existing notions of entitlement 
and protection from the state, alongside ideas of universality and equality through 
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citizenship programs in liberal democratic regimes.  Many subjects made reference to, 
and numerous scholars have articulated, how North America and Europe are seeing 
growing numbers of temporary foreign work programs, and an intensification of 
hierarchical visa systems, where naturalization and citizenship, though always regulated 
through particular political criteria, are increasingly difficult to attain and were much 
more common in the past. This reality lends itself to another important point of 
consideration, which is the ways in which some Western analyses and representations of 
the ‘East’, the ‘Oriental’, the ‘Middle Eastern’ as ‘backwards’, a place and people of the 
past, seem to relativize the problems of Dubai’s migrant majority workforce as somehow 
natural and exclusive to its context, rather than a globally interconnected and historically 
embedded system of labour, solidified through European colonial expansion, and US 
capitalist hegemony, further solidified and supported through its proxies around the 
world, generating and intensifying patterns of wealth and impoverishment throughout the 
Global North and Global South.  
 Another example of how this relativity operates is to create cultures of 
normalization surrounding these social hierarchies. Thus, as noted in my research journal 
and in my encounters, privilege is such that, “Day by day you learn to swallow it (Dubai), 
and it seems to get easier and easier… you forget how to live without it. It’s scary the 
power it wields” (YYZ to DXB Diary). It is this everyday acceptability and normalization 
of social hierarchies of inequality and violence that pushes individual thresholds for what 
is acceptable or normal further and further. Many interviewees confessed that they began 
to accept certain realities over time because they were so widely occurring and accepted 
in society at large. This operated in relation to domestic workers, the living and working 
conditions of construction workers, inequalities in status and wealth, and of course all of 
these justifications were linked to the above noted mythologies of labour and migration. 
In many different ways the logic of relativity operates to depoliticize and pacify outrage 
towards inequalities and injustice, and the logics of temporariness and threats of non-
belonging and eviction work to discipline subjects. Many interviewees remarked on the 
differences in a society in which only a few held exclusive access to state benefits, 
entitlements and protection, while the majority were temporary, ‘disposable’ workers. 
This lack of citizenship based rights also created difficulties for some subjects in how to 
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understand themselves and to articulate the problems in a system where ‘equality’ was 
not a recognized right of all individuals, but that treatment and entitlements were largely 
privatized and based on where one is from, which is turn is constructed in relation to 
colonial and capitalist histories of race, gender and class, working to uphold an 
international system of inequality, and masking it through complex webs of national 
articulation by both national citizens and privileged expat professionals.  
 Turning back to Filipina migrant worker Alice then, the Dubai dream when 
interrogated critically is much more dark and nightmarish. As Alice articulated, Dubai’s 
global dreamscapes are in fact much more haunting than the ‘global’ city façade allows 
us to see. The genealogies embedded in these myriad of processes, ideologically and 
material, all highlight the ways in which race and citizenship have always been intimately 
connected to the Dubai dream. Thus overall, the dream of Dubai was awakened to the 
frightening, nightmarish realities of social exclusion, violence, Othering, and 
dehumanization. Together these processes work to legitimize the social hierarchies and 
subsequent entitlements, both in formal and informal processes, and implicated in 
processes at multiple scales, bringing together different temporal realms embedded in the 
geographies and genealogies of diverse migrant journeys and developmental trajectories.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has examined the role of Dubai’s aspirations/development 
trajectory towards attaining global city status, its impacts on the migrant majority 
population, and how citizenship regimes and everyday experiences and ideologies are 
shaped by, and shape, notions of the Dubai dream. In considering further the impacts of 
the dream, scholars have begun to ask important new questions about how dreaming may 
influence our waking lives, and how and in what ways dreams may in fact help us live 
better in our waking lives. Breus (2015) highlights new research suggesting that dreams 
may “assist in daytime function and performance, especially as they relate to creativity 
and problem solving”. Thus, we can ask what productive power do dreams hold for 
imagining different possibilities.  
The uniqueness of Dubai lies in there being “no other region on the planet that has 
seen such a remarkable transformation in such a short period of time” (Hanieh, 2011, 1). 
Repeatedly lauded for its developmental achievements, its monumental and spectacular 
spaces, its luxury and all things unbelievable, Dubai is surely a place of dreams and a 
space for dreamers, a space not only shaped by dreams, but whose representations also 
induce dreams. Dubai is a place to dream from and for. And so people do. But amidst the 
glittering facades of its towers nestled deeply into the skies, dreams are built and broken. 
Despite the spectacular levels of violence necessary in the making of Dubai’s hegemonic 
global dream, both exclaimed and whispered, Dubai dreams both conceal and reveal 
insights for the future of citizenship, migration and the developmental desires for 
‘globality’. It is within this context of both the spectacle and mundane that a sense of 
normalcy and consent overwhelms the space, albeit with extremely diverse lived 
experiences. These ‘peaceful’, safe, and ‘normal’ everyday dreamscapes are based on the 
generation of relationships of privilege and exclusion, consent and coercion. All of these 
insights together, beg the question, as Jasbir Puar (2007) asks, “If we feel that things are 
calm, what must we forget in order to inhabit such a restful feeling?" (xviii).  
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 This place is a place of dreams.  
 They meet each other here. Colliding. Colluding.  
 They have found a rhythm that seems to effortlessly bring them together.  
 But can the dreams of some negate those of Others? 
 Some are locked into our dreams, while some decide which dreams are fulfilled.  
 But this can only be the case if you allow them to dictate the material of our 
 dreams. If we dream beyond their means, in other worlds, we will surely fly free, 
 above their towers and lights.  
 (YYZ-DXB Diary, 2010).  
 
 What must we forget when we applaud Dubai for achieving the dream? What can 
we awaken to find when we examine Dubai dream(s) in their multiplicity? We implicate 
the role of dreams as abstractions, as temporary releases from reality, but we also actively 
cultivate desire through dreams that have implications in the conscious state. When we 
consider the hegemonic Dubai dream we see that it is both real and a dream 
simultaneously, but faces the problem that all dreamers and dreams face, which is the 
“failure to recognize its own true condition, its incoherence (or bizarreness), its severe 
limitation of thought” (Hobson, 2010, 803). The dreams of Dubai conceal and potentially 
‘hide’ aspects of its reality. When we awaken, what we often find is that the promises of 
Dubai’s dreams are not as they seem for many. They are not reflected, for example, in 
Sheikh Mohamed’s statement that, “…Dubai is a city where you do not feel estranged or 
marginalized and where nobody lives on the fringes feeling dismal, because this is a 
feeling alien to Dubai” (Al Maktoum, 2012, 151). They are in fact much more violent and 
nightmarish than the vision of this Dubai dream implies. The fringes are in fact outside 
but within at once, embedded into the cityscape and expressed through spatial relations 
that can only be understood by tracing Dubai’s geographies and the genealogies that 
make possible its ‘globality’.  
 This research has explored the multiplicity of dreams, colliding and colluding, 
through geographies of migration and neoliberal globalization, as they connect to 
historical genealogies and temporalities in the making of a contemporary global city, 
Dubai. The dominant promises of Dubai’s Dream, embedded in the aspirational, 
developmental trajectory of global city making is explored in its manifestations in the 
geographical landscapes of the city and in shaping the rigid social hierarchies that 
organize and govern Dubai’s resident population. In addition, how these social 
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hierarchies are constructed and maintained to create a seemingly ‘normal’ and ‘peaceful’ 
set of everyday relationships between diverse groups of residents has been explored 
through a genealogical analysis.   
 The dissertation began with an exploration of the idea of (the) Dubai Dream(s) as 
a way to examine the allure of global city-induced notions of possibility and ‘progress’, 
and as part of shaping desires for migration. It examined the dominant notions of the 
Dubai dream as embedded within the making of the city’s global city status and the 
subsequent development trajectory of the city, as well as how dreams shape 
understandings and motivations for migration. Through an examination of scholarly 
insights on the making and qualifying of global cities generally, we were able to see how 
Dubai is situated within these discussions and also how this case study challenges 
traditional assumptions and adds complexity to these debates.  
To situate these discussions, the historical development of the city was examined 
within the broader national, regional, and international political economy, as well as 
through examinations of how temporal and ideological forces impact the 
conceptualization of Dubai’s dreams. Examining the ways in which migration has been 
central to Dubai’s foundational dreams highlighted how migration is key in shaping the 
city in many ways. Insights from interviewees highlighted the impacts of migration as a 
strategy for development in Dubai’s dream, and the rigid social hierarchies that exist to 
shape the different levels of access to entitlements (protection, rights, benefits, privileges) 
of different groups in the space. Importantly here, the role of subject making in relation to 
issues of race, class, gender, and nationality are argued as significant markers in the 
generation of different categories of persons. We ‘unmapped’ geographies of migration 
by exploring and historicizing the conditions that give rise to migration in sending states 
through a genealogical analysis of the legacies of colonialism, development and the 
impact of neoliberal globalization on the international division of labour, as well as the 
ideologies that accompany migrants on these journeys. Also examined here are histories 
and contemporary processes of subject making, citizen-subject identity construction and 
how citizenship policies and practices shape issues of belonging and entitlements. In 
particular, we examined the spatiality of the city, through the scale of the ‘everyday’ to 
examine how outlooks, practices and lived experiences and ideas on the ground are 
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impacted by the ‘global’ that shapes and is shaped by Dubai as a city in a global 
landscape. Also mapped here are the geographies of migration that are embedded in 
Dubai’s developmental trajectory as a global city and through a simultaneous unmapping 
we examined the genealogies (colonial continuities and historically implicated 
relationships of globalization) that accompany migrants on their journeys and within their 
Dubai dreams. In a practical way this helps to illuminate the historical forces and factors 
that have created and maintained the international division of labour that shapes 
migratory patterns and experience linking the Global North and South in the unique 
context of Dubai.  
 The last chapter more specifically examined the role of citizenship in the making 
of subjects, and the implications of these regimes for the lives and experiences of groups, 
and their relationships to each other. For many, it is the absence of citizenship that creates 
situations of precariousness but, as this research has shown, it is not only the absence but 
the differential conceptualization of various citizenship statuses and nationalities that 
shape the urban landscape in the neoliberal model of global city development that Dubai 
exemplifies. Thus, the ideological apparatus that leads to distancing between Us and 
Them and the creation of Others as threats shapes hierarchies of entitlement and socio-
spatial landscapes. It is within these processes of naming and knowing, ignoring and 
rationalizing that notions of deserving and not are constructed. These explicitly racialized 
processes are historically implicated, which means thinking beyond the narrow 
conceptions of national citizenship and towards a broader global genealogy of migration 
and its contemporary manifestations.  
 When we consider the significance of Dubai as a case study, we can see that,  
 Dubai, then, is a unique kind of social space, a social experiment in the 
 construction of a new kind of global city and postmodern reality. It is in Dubai 
 where the dreams of laissez faire economists are finding their ultimate 
 realization. The state rarely interferes with and indeed goes to great lengths 
 to support business interests, and the bulk of the population are treated merely 
 as ‘factor of production’; from maids and construction workers to architects and 
 business executives, expatriate guest workers are there simply to do a job. Dubai 
 is the ‘market society’, George Soros worried about, where  civil society is 
 squeezed out. While on the surface this relation seems highly exploitative of 
 expatriates, the reality is more complex. (Ali, 2010, 13) 
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 Several significant contextual considerations about Dubai and the Gulf in general 
make it an important and unique case study. These include its status as a migrant majority 
city, with a higher percentage of foreign born residents than any other city in the world; 
its dependency on foreign labour at all levels of development, and in particular, the 
necessity of a majority workforce of low waged, temporary workers; its highly exclusive 
citizenship policies; and its unique location and role in the broader political economy. 
While these considerations highlight the uniqueness of Dubai as a case study, it does not 
mean that the situation of migrants in Dubai is exclusive to only this context, but rather 
we must see it as part of a continuation and remaking of older forms of the international 
division of labour. Furthermore, its uniqueness as a non-Western city, neither First nor 
Third world, ruled by a monarchy, and branded as a global city, are all significant for 
understanding the role of neoliberal citizenship regimes in the making of contemporary 
globality and the important continuities embedded in these geographies of labour that 
reproduce and remake genealogies of race, class and gender through constructions of 
nationality and citizenship across the globe. Thus, whereas the major metropolitan cities 
of the West that largely dominate global city thinking are more clearly tied to legacies of 
colonialism, global cities in the non-Western context also participate in and benefit from 
ongoing hierarchies through the international division of labour and their role in the 
global political economy. Thus, if we understand neoliberal globalization as leading to 
the creation and maintenance of global cities such as those in the UAE, it is necessary to 
explore the historical legacies (genealogies) that accompany geographies of migration for 
labour. By exploring the historical lineages that accompany migrants on their journeys 
we see how ideologies of race, class, gender, nationality and labour intersect in the local 
(global) context of the city to create and sustain inequalities. This is significant as the 
underlying racial logics embedded within many of the policies and practices that both 
target labour migrants and privilege expat professionals are connected to broader colonial 
legacies and histories.  
 
 In particular, this study reveals several key contributions to various fields of 
research. First, global city status and the ranking and criterion through which cities aspire 
to be recognized are implicated profoundly in the historical legacies and colonial 
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continuities that are necessary in the making of contemporary capitalism. Amidst this 
context, we have been how the aspirational claims of global city status as part of a 
developmental schema shape national priorities and in turn shape labour regimes. In 
addition, the genealogies embedded in the developmental aspirations expose and 
implicate conceptualizations of ‘East’ and West’, ‘First’ and ‘Third’, ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’ with important consequences for formal and informal practices that impact 
social hierarchies in the making of the global city. Overall, this research builds on critical 
scholarship in global city and urban studies to highlight the biases that are generated in 
the understanding and making of global cities, as well as the desires that are induced from 
rankings and statuses based on this designation. Thus, globality operates as a dreamscape, 
lucidly implicated in the making of (im)mobilities. In the case of Dubai, whether or not it 
is accepted in mainstream scholarly criterion as having achieved this designation, the fact 
remains that notions of what the ‘global city’ represents in the global imaginary have 
shaped, and continue to shape, the developmental trajectories of spaces such as Dubai in 
ways that have profound impacts and implication for the processes of urbanization and 
the experiences of a diverse range of actors. These ideological impacts are significant not 
only for how we evaluate and think of the city, but for the racial logics that code the city 
in the global landscape, and which are very much invested in the maintenance of a 
particular global, capitalist class.  
 Second, in the analyses of migration and labour, many conceptualizations of 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ have not considered the role of temporality and genealogy in the making 
of contemporary processes. The genealogies that accompany people through their 
migrant geographies implicate not only a historical lineage as practices of the past that 
shape the current, but as a continuity into the present made possible through this past, 
generating and generated through new forms and spaces, shifting and evolving but also 
incorporating. Thus, geographies of migration are an integral part of the processes of 
making the global in and through the city. So, if we want to understand social relations, 
we must begin by ‘un-mapping’ through a genealogical analysis that allows us a nuanced 
examination of the ‘present’ to challenge the temporal and linear historical configurations 
of now, by understanding the past, present and future possibilities of the city, as 
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constituted by the historical developments that operate simultaneously in contemporary 
patterns of global city formation.  
 This takes us to the third area in which these processes are understood by 
recognizing the operation of simultaneity in scales and levels in analyzing different levels 
and temporalities as co-constitutive and relational, rather than prioritizing material over 
ideological or global over local. This is partly accomplished by foregrounding the 
importance of lived experiences of three general categories of subjects living in the UAE 
- Emirati nationals, expat professionals, and low waged labourers. These experiences are 
mapped through the notion of the ‘everyday’, a social scale that examines how outlooks, 
practices and ideas on the ground impact, and are impacted by, the ‘global’ that shapes 
and is shaped by Dubai as a city. This methodological consideration helps to illuminate 
the historical forces and factors that have created and maintained the international 
division of labour that shapes migratory patterns and experience linking the Global North 
and South.  
            Fourth, in understanding the significance of the ‘everyday’ we consider how 
violence operates through social hierarchies. This was in part made clear through an 
understanding of racialized nationalities that are used to generate a social structure that 
governs how different groups of people are entitled to various rights and possibilities. 
These hierarchies of entitlement were analyzed in relation to the racialization of 
citizenship and nationality, which not only creates schemas of value but also, 
importantly, generates ideologies to support and rationalize these inequalities in status. 
Thus, racialization in relation to nationality operates not only to exclude, devalue and 
dehumanize low waged workers, but also to confer significance, value and privilege on 
expat professional workers, particularly those from the Global North, and simultaneously 
to use local conditions to generate forms and scales of belonging and entitlement for 
privileged groups, including Emirati citizens. These contributions were linked to the 
fields of migration and citizenship studies as they examine labour and development, and 
are significant in the linkages between postcolonial conceptions of racialized nationality, 
the influence and impacts of neoliberalism in the making of development trajectories and 
the subsequent conceptualization of nation and citizenship, as well as the ideological 
apparatuses that generate knowledge(s) and rationalities about social stratification. Taken 
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together, these considerations help us understand the complex negotiations that residents 
are engaged in on a daily basis to contest, affirm or rationalize in order to promote the 
‘innocence’ of a few, culpability of some, and the legitimacy necessary in ‘othering’ 
Others. Thus, the ultimate considerations which emerged through these analyses, are 
linked to questions of who belongs and who does not, and ultimately lead us to 
ontological questions about who is considered fully human in 21st century global 
cityscapes.  
                From here we might ask ourselves how citizenship, migration and labour 
studies understand the example of Dubai as a global city. “We spent so much time 
dreaming of the future, when it was here being built all the time” (YYZ to DXB Diary, 
2011). Is Dubai a city of the future or a city of the past? How this question is answered is 
contingent upon several theoretical and conceptual considerations, including the role of 
race in coding the idea of ‘modernity’ that is linked to understandings of globality and the 
future trajectory of capitalism by means of neoliberal globalization. These shifts are 
reshaping relationships between states and citizens, as well as migrants and (im) 
mobilities. In the consideration of Dubai, many readings of the city have attributed its 
‘human rights’ failures and abuses to aspects of its ‘traditional’ policies and structures, 
often described by such as, “There is luxury and squalor, a mobile elite served and 
enriched by an army of transient workers, an architectural hotchpotch of pristine newness 
and ancient disorder which is ‘the kind of thing you see everywhere’” (Elsheshtawy, 
2010, 15). ‘Ancient disorder’ is the type of evidence that is cited as part of the ‘pre-
modern’ (non-liberal or democratic) character of the city, as in the many practices that 
have resulted in a situation of exploitation is considered ‘unique’ to the non-western 
world. These ideas are then cited as evidence of either the failures of ‘development’ in 
political and social terms such as those documented by international organizations and 
agencies, or through an orientalist reading as evidence of its ‘barbaric’, ‘traditional’ (i.e. 
Muslim, Arab), ‘Third worldness’. However, closer considerations in globalization 
studies suggest that neoliberalism is reshaping notions of citizenship around the globe, in 
which many emerging global cities are becoming seen as models of the ‘future’, found in 
the “spaces outside of the spectacle, in the shadows of skyscrapers” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 
15). Thus, the majority of low waged, racialized workers can be seen as the ‘real’ face, 
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cost or reality of contemporary processes of labour and migration, in which a 
permanently, temporary workforce is generated.  
 
 Although Dubai and the Gulf more generally are often seen as exceptional cases, 
this model of development and the policies that accompany it are increasingly being 
replicated around the globe, with Western countries increasingly adopting policies similar 
to those found in the Gulf, such as the US H1B visa program that limits the ability of 
professionals from overseas to stay, and ties them directly to their employers (Ali, 2010); 
or the Canadian seasonal agricultural workers program that bring workers on a temporary 
basis and places heavy restrictions on what they can do and where they can go; or in the 
UK (Miroff, 2013) where more than half of skilled workers from non-European union 
countries arrive on ‘intra-company’ transfers (Ali, 2010). These moves create a situation 
similar to that of Dubai with expats being legal, yet impermanent residents. 
 This social and spatial isolation is a key component of the neoliberal citizenship 
regimes that govern temporary or guest workers, whose lives are shaped by 
categorizations that create differential regimes of belonging in which their entitlements 
are shaped based on notions of ‘where they are from’, and not ‘where they are at’. 
 Currently, Dubai’s system of sponsorship controls the ability of migrants to stay 
in the country and links their residency to explicit conditions and specific entitlements 
that are tied to their class and nationality. While formal policies such as those embodied 
in the ‘Kafala’ system encourage unequal and exploitative power relations between 
groups, the ideological force of Dubai’s global location, in conjunction with the 
seemingly ‘informal’ everyday knowledge(s) that attempt to rationalize and justify social 
hierarchies, are equally significant in shaping the everyday lives of different groups. With 
these considerations in mind, further research can relate these insights to a larger analysis 
of the trends in global migration regimes, including a focus on growing restrictions on 
citizenship, the expansion of guest worker programs in the West, and the seeming 
contradiction of free economic flows and restrictive immigration policies. These 
questions can build on the common connections between forces of neoliberalism and 
citizenship policies, as well as on the ongoing processes of racialization of non-citizens or 
‘Others’ through which both privilege and exclusion are generated as mutually 
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constitutive. Ali asks, can we consider what impacts these policies have on the “non-
assimilation” situation amongst expats in Dubai, communities of adults who are 
“essentially in the country, but not of it” (Ali, 2010). What impacts does this ‘temporary 
status’ have on feelings of belonging? How does it impact feelings of helplessness or 
innocence on behalf of privileged workers? Taken together, these insights from the case 
of Dubai, with its ‘permanently impermanent’ population, would look less unique and 
more like a “prescient harbinger of the future experience of incorporation - or lack 
thereof” (Ali, 2010).  
 Elsheshtawy argues that the juxtaposition of slums with luxury developments is 
not yet as characteristic of Dubai as it is of Amman or Cairo, for example, and when the 
Dubai model is replicated through megaprojects and enclaves of the ‘new Dubai’-type 
areas, it is “inherently rife with explosive socio-political issues” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 
275). In this view then, explosive potential for social unrest only exists in the extreme 
discrepancies of wealth in contexts where existing histories of social inequality exist. 
However, when we consider the historical genealogies accompanying geographies of 
migration and development in Dubai we are able to ask, what processes and practices are 
at work to uphold and perpetuate these systems? Further, how are cultures of ‘innocence’ 
sustained in the ideas of the status quo? Through these considerations we see issues such 
as ‘slum-like’ labour camps or rigid, social hierarchies become increasingly normalized, 
and often sanctioned as necessary to protect the social, economic and political interests of 
the neoliberal state and its benefactors. Perhaps, as Pramoedya Ananta Toer highlights, 
  Just as politics cannot be separated from life, life cannot be separated from 
 politics. People who consider themselves to be non-political are no different; 
 they’ve already been assimilated by the dominant political culture – they just 
 don’t feel it anymore. (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 262) 
 
 Thus, one of the most frightening aspects of the Dubai dream is the insidious 
ways in which various groups are inculcated through cultures of neoliberalism that 
rationalize, excuse and often legitimize the violent nightmarish realities necessary in 
building the global city dream. “We will keep chasing that high until we can not fall any 
lower” (Adonis, Jordanian/Canadian).  
 Everyday outlooks, practices and ideas impact, and are impacted by, the ‘global’ 
that shapes and is shaped by Dubai as a city. This is significant as it challenges the idea 
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of ‘exception’ in that instead, for example, of viewing an instance of violence in a suicide 
or murder as something individual, shocking or irregular, we would instead start to see a 
much more complex view of these situations that extends violence not only as physical, 
but as a structural, systemic form of institutionalized behaviour and action that shapes 
and curtails possibilities for groups of people. This is difficult primarily because we often 
view these situations through legal frameworks that individualize and target particular 
actions, incapable of redressing collective or social forms of violence and exclusion, 
which themselves are forms of ‘everyday violence’. The fact that much of this daily 
violence is sanctioned, first by the state, and then by the larger social body and 
normalized into commonsensical everyday practice is important. The power of ideology 
is found in its abilities to be reproduced in everyday practices and actions without notice, 
and this is part of the significance of this fieldwork in Dubai, and the attention it brings to 
local, everyday narrations of larger processes and the ability of individuals to locate 
themselves in a larger matrix of social, economic, political, cultural and environmental 
relationships. Franz Fanon (1994) reminds us,  
 Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they are 
 presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new evidence cannot 
 be accepted. It would create a feeling that is extremely uncomfortable, called 
 cognitive dissonance.  And because it is so important to protect the core belief, 
 they will rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that doesn't fit… 
 (Fanon, 1994) 
 
 So, turning back to Puar’s (2007) question, “If we feel that things are calm, what 
must we forget in order to inhabit such a restful feeling?" (xviii). Let us all ache for an 
anxiousness that is restless, moving beyond dreams towards nightmares that keep us 
awake and haunted.  
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Appendix A: Simple Participant Email  
 
Hello,  
 I hope that this email finds you well. My name is Alisha Ticku and I am currently 
a third year PhD student at York University in Toronto, Canada. I am working on a 
research study that looks at the experiences of different groups of people working and 
living in global cities. It explores issues of migration, citizenship and labour. In specific, 
my project explores Dubai, UAE as a case study of a contemporary global city. I am 
looking for people to participate in this study through a variety of different ways: (1) 
Interviews; (2) Identifying a site; (3) Meeting informally or connecting me to other 
friends or people you know who may be interested or able to support this work.  
 
The tentative title of this study is “Dubai Dreams: Exploring Globalization in the Gulf”. 
Here are some of Major Research Questions:  
• What this case study (Dubai) allows us to understand about citizenship and 
immigration/migration experiences and policy within global cities?  
• What is unique about the context of the UAE, and how does this effect people’s 
experiences of migration?  
• How do different people in the UAE relate to each other, and how do they 
understand each other?   
• What are the motivations that different groups have for migrating to the UAE?  
• How do different groups of workers relate to each other? 
• How, if at all, does nationality or citizenship affect different groups? 
• Is Dubai a global city? If so, what aspects of it give it this status?  
 
 Thank you for your interest in this research study. I really appreciate you taking 
the time to read a little bit more about the project and how you, or people you know, may 
be able to participate. Please consider letting me know if there are other people you know 
who would be beneficial to this study. I am open to contacting others and am interested in 
making new contacts in the UAE regardless of whether they participate formally in the 
study or not.  
 Also I have attached and pasted below, additional information here in the form of 
a letter that provides more details on the major themes that you could help support. If you 
feel that you or other people you know would be interested please contact me with any 
questions.  
 
 Thanks in advance for you help and consideration. Looking forward to hearing 
back from you and learning from your experiences.  
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Appendix B: Professor Contact Email  
 
Hi Professor,  
 I hope that this email finds you well. My name is Alisha Ticku and I am currently 
a third year PhD student at York University in Toronto, Canada. My major areas of study 
are in Women and Politics, Globalization Studies and International Development Studies. 
Currently, I am working on a research study that looks at the experiences of different 
groups of people working and living in global cities. In particular my research explores 
issues of migration, citizenship and labour using Dubai as a case study of a contemporary 
‘global city’. The project that I want to introduce to you is tied to my interests in political 
economy as well as the ways in which individuals make sense and narrate their own 
journeys of migration to global cities.  
 I am writing this email in regards to your research interests and areas of teaching. 
I believe that your work in the areas of …. will provide valuable insights into my 
research.  
 It might be useful to provide some introductory information about my research 
study to see whether you feel your work might provide some insights into these topics:  
 My fieldwork in the UAE provides one piece of my larger dissertation project 
which focuses on the historic relations between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world nations through 
the ‘international division of labour’, and the intersection of these hierarchies within the 
unique ‘national’ context of the global city of Dubai. The major research questions for 
my dissertation are inextricable interrelated in an attempt to account for the simultaneity 
of social processes. I ask, how can we account for contemporary forms and experiences 
of labour migration to the UAE by simultaneously mapping geographies of migration, 
and unmapping historical genealogies, such as the international division of labour, under 
contemporary forces of globalization? Furthermore, how and in what ways does the 
position of Dubai, UAE as a ‘global city’, between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds under 
contemporary forms of neoliberal globalization, impact migrant workers?  The goals for 
my fieldwork include conducting interviews with different sectors of the population, 
locating four major sites for observational data, collecting data and meeting with people 
working and teaching on related issues.  
 I will be traveling to the UAE at the beginning of June 2011 and staying for the 
duration of the summer to conduct some interviews and collect ethnographic data. If you 
are available over the summer from June – August to meet informally to discuss your 
research interests and current or previous work that could help provide insight into any of 
these issues I would really appreciate the opportunity to meet. Overall, I would really like 
to get a sense of the academic community in the UAE and see what kinds of important 
and critical work you are engaged in and learn more from your experiences. In addition, 
if possible, you may also be able to provide some important direction in terms of locating 
resources, additional contacts or your own experiences that will prove invaluable to my 
overall research project.  
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Appendix C: Guiding Questions for Emirati Interview 
 
Personal Experiences 
1. Can you describe your family history/origins in terms of becoming or being born 
a citizen of the UAE? 
2. Can you explain how citizenship and nationality operates in the UAE? And how 
does your citizenship status affect your life living and working in the UAE? 
3. Can you describe growing up in Dubai for a local citizen? 
4. How you describe the society or culture of the UAE? And more specifically, the 
society or culture of Dubai? 
5. Can you describe how you relate to other groups of people living and working in 
the UAE? Consider both expat professionals and less skilled labourers? 
6. Can you describe the relationships between the major groups of people in Dubai? 
From local Emirati citizens, to expats employed in professional sectors, to those 
migrants working in low-skilled jobs? What are some of the issues currently 
facing each of these groups? 
7. Can you tell me what factors you think impact life and experiences different 
people have in the UAE?  
8. Can you describe how local citizens relate to the migrant-majority population? 
And how, if at all, the demographic composition of the UAE affects Emiratis? 
Focused Analysis  
9. Can you narrate the story of Dubai and its growth and how it has changed over 
time?  
10. Can you describe the dominant international ideas about Dubai? How would you 
challenge or confirm these ideas? 
11. Is Dubai a global city? If so, what factors have contributed to and impact this 
status? 
12. Can you describe what you believe the major factors are that bring people to 
Dubai? 
13. Can you describe some of the major issues you think face Dubai currently? 
14. How would you compare Dubai and Abu Dhabi? Also, can you describe what is 
unique about Dubai to any other cities, whether in the Gulf or internationally? 
15.  Can you evaluate the idea of ‘belonging’ in Dubai? Who belongs here and why? 
16. Can you describe how, if at all, citizenship statuses or nationality affect people 
coming to, and while in, Dubai? 
General Perspectives 
17. How would describe the personality of Dubai? 
18. We have heard the idea of an ‘American dream’, can you describe a Dubai 
Dream, or Dubai Dreams? Is there a dominant dream or scattered dreams?  
19. What do you think the major differences are between an Emirati’s dream of Dubai 
and other groups of migrants?  
20. Who is this city built for? 
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Appendix D: Guiding Questions for Expat Interview  
 
Personal experiences: 
1. Can you describe how you first found out about Dubai? Describe how you 
imagined Dubai would be before you come? 
2. Can you describe the major factors, which pushed you to leave your home country 
and those factors that pulled you to Dubai? 
3. How would describe the differences or similarities from Dubai to the country or 
city you came from? (Infrastructure, culture, society, work environment) 
4. Can you describe the major different in your life in Dubai form your country of 
origin or countries where you have lived and worked before? 
Focused Analysis: 
5. Can you describe dominant international ideas about Dubai? How would you 
challenge or confirm these ideas?  
6. Is Dubai a global city? If so, what factors have contributed to and impact this 
status? 
7. Can you describe the major reasons/push factors that bring people to want to work 
in the UAE? 
8. Can you describe the major pull factors that bring people to want to work in the 
UAE? 
9. Can you describe the major changes Dubai has experienced overtime? 
10. Can you describe the major issues that currently face Dubai? 
11. How would you describe UAE society and culture? 
12. How could you compare Abu Dhabi and Dubai? Also can you describe what is 
unique about Dubai compared to other global cities (name city of comparison). 
13. Can you describe the relationships between the major groups of people in Dubai? 
From local Emirati citizens, to expats employed in the professional sector, to 
those migrants working in low skilled jobs. What are the major issues currently 
faced by each group? 
14. Can you evaluate the idea of ‘belonging’ in Dubai? Who belongs and why? 
15. Can you describe how, if at all, citizenship statuses or nationality affect people on 
coming to, and while in, Dubai? 
General perspectives:  
16. How would describe the personality of Dubai  
17. We have heard the idea of the ‘American dream’, can you describe a Dubai 
dream? Is there one dominant dream or scattered dreams? Dream dream or Dubai 
dreams?  
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Appendix E: Guiding Questions for Expat Interview  
 
1. Can you describe how you first found out about Dubai? Describe how you 
imagined Dubai would be before you come? 
2. Can you describe the major factors, which pushed you to leave your home country 
and those factors that pulled you to Dubai? 
3. Can you describe the story of your journey to Dubai? (Include as many details as 
possible, visa, work arrangements, living arrangements, saying goodbye) 
4. How would you describe the differences or similarities from Dubai to the country 
or city you came from? (Infrastructure, culture, society, work environment)? 
5. Can you tell me what factors your think impact life and experiences different 
people have in the UAE? Start firstly with yourself, what factors do you think 
impact your life and experiences in the UAE? And then highlight what factors 
impact the experiences of other groups in society? 
6. Can you describe how you believe an outsider might think of Dubai? How would 
you describe Dubai as a global city for an outsider with your insight? 
7. How would you compare Dubai and Abu Dhabi? Also, can you describe what is 
unique about Dubai compared to other global cities (name city of comparison). 
8. How would you describe the society or culture in Dubai? 
9. Can you describe your relationships to other groups of workers and people in the 
population here (locals, expats, labourers)? 
10. Do you see yourself as belonging in Dubai? 
11. Can you describe the major differences in your life in Dubai from your country of 
origin or countries where you have lived and worked before? 
12. We have heard the idea of the American dream, can you describe a Dubai dream? 
13. How would you describe the personality of Dubai? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
